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ABSTRACT 
The United States (US) Constitution’s Eighth Amendment includes a restriction on cruel and 
unusual punishments. Over the past fifty years the punishments clause has been developed by 
the US Supreme Court through its ‘evolving standards of decency’ (ESD) jurisprudence, 
restricting the range and application of lawful capital and non-capital penalties. Although the 
punishments clause has been evolved in the capital sphere such that the American death 
penalty is reaching a vanishing point, the Court has neglected to apply similar scrutiny in the 
non-capital setting, especially with respect to conditions of imprisonment. By undertaking an 
examination of the Eighth Amendment, a theoretical framework is developed in order to 
understand how the ESD principle has been applied, and to examine how a future 
constitutional challenge to disproportionate confinement conditions might materialise. 
This thesis contends that modern solitary confinement represents a recession of constitutional 
protection. It is argued that principles of morality underlying the Eighth Amendment create a 
bar to this severely disproportionate, under-reviewed, and often under-reported punishment. 
In reaching such a conclusion, Dworkin’s theory of interpretivism is applied to solitary 
confinement in a novel way. An interpretivist understands morality to have been an 
undercurrent in the drafting, adoption, application and, therefore, future interpretation of the 
Constitution. Moral principles trump majoritarian policies, and such an approach compels a 
curtailment of extreme solitary confinement under the Eighth Amendment’s ESD principle. 
Sources of morality relied on to reach such a conclusion are derived from the community and 
include traditional consensus, which is state counting, in addition to other elements selected 
for analysis due to their regular citation in Eighth Amendment decisions: public opinion, 
penological principles, transnational perspectives, and professional consensus. As a result, an 
original contribution is also made to the medico-legal literature, which has traditionally 
fixated on the psychiatric implications of confinement. Wider implications will extend to 
other areas of academic commentary, including professional consensus literature, and 
transnational law. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, roughly 81,000 prisoners are held in some form of solitary confinement in 
the United States (US).
1
 While there is no universal definition of such confinement, 
Riveland’s is the most widely-accepted, defining it as: ‘a highly restrictive, high-custody 
housing unit…that isolates inmates from the general prison population and from each other’.2 
Riveland’s definition also requires a period of at least 22 hours per day in which prisoners are 
not allowed to leave their cells, a process known as ‘lockdown’.3 It will be demonstrated that, 
while every single US jurisdiction permits some form of solitary confinement, transparent 
reporting on its use - including population, conditions, duration of stays, and review 
processes - is information yet to be forthcoming. That lack of transparency will be addressed 
to demonstrate the pervasiveness of solitary confinement, and to understand an otherwise 
fractured picture of the country’s use of this extreme form of punishment. 
President Obama’s comments in July 2015 that solitary confinement was ‘not smart’, 
and ‘an environment…that is often more likely to make inmates more alienated, more hostile, 
potentially more violent’4 followed recent high-profile exposés of solitary confinement 
published by the New Yorker
5
 and New York Times.
6
 In addition, 2014 saw the most 
legislative reforms to this form of punishment in recent decades. In spite of this 
unprecedented focus on solitary confinement, US Board of Prisons director Charles Samuels 
                                                          
1
 John Gibbons and Nicholas Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement (Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons 2006) 52-53, 56. Figures vary since classification of “solitary” is not uniformly accepted 
across the fifty-two jurisdictions. 
2
 Chase Riveland, Supermax Prisons (US Department of Justice 1999) 6, emphasis removed. 
3
 ibid. 
4
 ‘What’s more, I’ve asked my Attorney General to start a review of the overuse of solitary confinement across 
American prisons.’ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, (14 July 2015) ‘Remarks by the President at 
the NAACP Conference’ <http://1.usa.gov/1KvzI20> accessed 28th July 2015. 
5
 Atul Gawande, (New Yorker, 30 March 2009) <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole> 
accessed 28th July 2015. 
6
 Richard Perry, (New York Times, 14 July 2014) ‘Rikers: Where Mental Illness Meets Brutality in Jail’ 
<http://nyti.ms/1tHTE9J> accessed 28th July 2015. 
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stated before a Senate Committee in August 2015 that the federal system ‘do[es] not practice 
solitary confinement’.7 Whether this statement was an oversight by the director, or a real 
attempt to deny the full extent of punishment in both the federal and state prison systems, is a 
question that has yet to be answered. The opportunity will be taken to demonstrate that 
solitary confinement is a reality, and it will be argued that the chance is ripe for a 
constitutional review of this often hidden corner of punishment. 
Additionally, despite significant reforms to capital sentencing by the executive and 
legislature, the American criminal justice system as a whole has been described as having 
‘gone astray, lost in a dark wood of its own making,’8 evidenced by Samuels and Obama’s 
locking horns in 2015. Redress will be demonstrated by constitutional interpretation of a 
corner of the prison hidden from scrutiny: solitary confinement. This will enrich the 
discussion surrounding improvement of the criminal justice system, a debate more commonly 
fixated on capital punishment and mass incarceration. It will be argued that principles of 
morality underlying the Eighth Amendment compel a bar to this severely disproportionate, 
under-reviewed, and often under-reported punishment. The contribution provided by such an 
argument will contain a theoretically-justified blueprint for the constitutional curtailment of 
solitary confinement, something lacking in the Court’s precedents. 
In the final week of the Supreme Court (SCOTUS) 2014-15 term, the Justices handed 
down a decision where solitary confinement was denounced, albeit in a sole concurrence, for 
the first time since 1890.
9
 In Davis v Alaya,
10
 the Court held that a judge’s decision to 
exclude the defendant from a meeting about juror-exclusion was harmless error, an issue 
unrelated to the punishments clause. Concurring in the Court’s opinion but writing alone on 
the topic of solitary confinement – not pertinent to the challenge – Justice Kennedy noted that 
the defendant had been held in solitary for 25 years, and that ‘the condition in which 
                                                          
7
 Oversight of the Bureau of Prisons, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 
US Senate, 4 August 2015 <https://tinyurl.com/HSGACsenate> accessed 10th August 2015. 
8
 Robert Ferguson, Inferno (HUP 2014) 249. 
9
 In Re Medley 134 US 160 (1890). 
10
 576 US ___ (2015). 
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prisoners are kept simply has not been a matter of sufficient public inquiry or interest.’11 The 
gap identified in Kennedy’s concurrence, confinement conditions, will be examined to 
develop the argument that such conditions are not only a matter of public interest, but require 
constitutional scrutiny. Kennedy might have opened the door to a challenge to solitary in the 
nation’s highest tribunal for the first time in recent memory,12 and it can be expected that at 
least two others Justices might follow him through that door,
13
 but a central question was left 
open, namely “is solitary confinement, as practiced in the US today, constitutionally 
offensive under the Eighth Amendment?”  
In The Federalist 48,
14
 James Madison warned that clauses of the Constitution could 
become mere ‘parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power’.15 The Eighth 
Amendment, ratified in 1791, purports to protect citizens from ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’16 but until the mid-20th Century that clause could be described more accurately 
in Madison’s cautionary terms. For the first 170 years of the Union federal prisoners were 
treated as ‘the functional equivalent of non-citizens’,17 without access to the constitutional 
rights of those at liberty. The picture was no better at state-level, where local courts left 
matters of sentencing to the legislature, and the imposition of punishment to the executive.
18
 
For the federal punishments clause to have purpose, its incorporation and a more active 
approach by the courts was required. Throughout it will be argued that, although the 
punishments clause has been evolved in the capital sphere, since that provision’s 
                                                          
11
 ibid 2-3 Kennedy, J (concurring). 
12
 See Andrew Novak, (Casetext 19 June 2015) ‘Davis v. Ayala and the Coming Challenge to Solitary 
Confinement’ <http://bit.ly/1Iryfrd> accessed 29th July 2015, noting that Prieto v Clarke citation pending (13-
8021) (4
th
 Cir 2015) might reach the Supreme Court. Prieto concerns a due process challenge to SHU, rather 
than an Eighth Amendment claim. This thesis focuses on the latter. 
13
 It is widely understood that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer favour individual rights in criminal justice cases, 
exemplified by Glossip v Gross 576 US ___ (2015) 41 Kennedy, J (dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J): ‘it [is] 
highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.’ 
14
 The partisan tract published in favour of the US Constitution. 
15
 James Madison, The Federalist (Terence Ball ed, CUP 2003) No 48, 241. 
16
 US Const, Amendment VIII. ‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.’ 
17
 Michael Goldman, ‘Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison Confinement’ (2004) 45 Boston College LR 423, 427. 
18
 John Fliter, Prisoners' Rights (Greenwood 2000) 45. 
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incorporation to the states,
19
 and after a renewed approach to prison issues,
20
 SCOTUS has 
neglected to apply similar scrutiny in the non-capital setting, especially to solitary 
confinement. The claim will be developed that modern solitary confinement, ‘a species of 
meta-prison’,21 represents a recession of constitutional protection where inmates are punished 
in a way which contravenes the Eighth Amendment. 
By undertaking an examination of the Eighth, a theoretical framework will be 
developed to understand how the punishments clause has been interpreted since its 
incorporation, and to analyse how it should apply to solitary confinement. Dworkin’s theory 
of ‘interpretivism’22 encourages a review of history and precedent, with the added filter of a 
moral lens. An interpretivist understands morality to have been an undercurrent in the 
drafting, adoption, application, and therefore the future interpretation of the Constitution. 
Fidelity to the Constitution is thereby upheld in addition to principles of morality, which are 
not fixed in time. It will be shown that such an approach provides the momentum for future 
adjudication under the Eighth Amendment. It will be argued that the Eighth Amendment’s 
decency principle compels a curtailment of extreme solitary confinement. Sources of morality 
relied on to reach this conclusion are derived from the community and include traditional 
consensus, which is state counting, in addition to other elements of political morality selected 
for analysis due to their regular citation in the Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions: public 
opinion, penological principles, transnational perspectives, and professional consensus. To 
reach the conclusion that solitary confinement, as practiced, is abhorrent under the 
punishments clause, a roadmap for the progression of this thesis is provided below. 
Chapter II will provide an historical and contextual background to the evolution of the 
punishments clause, including an analysis of the various factors which led to its revival from 
                                                          
19
 Robinson v California 370 US 660 (1962). 
20
 Cruz v Beto 405 US 319 (1972) 321: ‘Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons, but to enforce the 
constitutional rights of all “persons,” including prisoners.’ 
21
 Loïc Waquant, ‘Foreword: Probing the Meta-Prison’ in Jeffrey Ross (ed) The Globalization of Supermax 
Prisons (Rutgers UP 2013) xiii (original emphasis). 
22
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (LE) (Hart 1986) 45-47. 
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something of a ‘parchment barrier’23 to a fundamental guarantee. The impact of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which sought to afford the ‘inalienable rights’24 spoken of in the 
Declaration of Independence to all citizens,
25
 will also be examined in Chapter II. It will be 
shown that Congress’s creation of a ‘new liberty’26 paved the way for a departure from 
traditional federalism, eventually leading to incorporation of the various clauses of the Bill of 
Rights. That line of incorporation cases in the 1960s will be examined,
27
 as will Weems v 
US,
28
 where SCOTUS acknowledged that it was ‘a precept of justice that punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense’,29 and Trop v Dulles,30 which 
contains the first acknowledgment of ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society’31 underlying the Eighth Amendment. Chapter II will also 
examine the impact of the Court’s attacks on capital punishment, where it will be argued that 
it has narrowed capital punishment to a near vanishing point. Such an argument is important 
to understanding the judiciary’s treatment of punishment, where the death penalty is regarded 
as creating a ‘different’32 level of suffering, yet civic and social death, followed by slow, 
isolating, painful, biological death, is not regarded at all. It is of fundamental importance that 
this thesis sheds light on solitary confinement, in which thousands of prisoners are being left 
to die in a manner arguably far worse than execution. 
Chapter III will develop the theoretical framework for the analysis of a constitutional 
challenge to solitary confinement and for the purposes of mounting a challenge, 
demonstrating that the most coherent and consistent explanation of the Court’s attitude 
towards the Eighth Amendment is one of interpretivism, as laid out by Dworkin. Under this 
                                                          
23
 Madison, in Ball (ed) (n 15) 241. 
24
 Merrill Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (OUP 1970) 124. 
25
 US Const, Amend XIV (‘No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws’). 
26
 Charles Warren, ‘The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1926) 39 HLR 431. 
27
 William Brennan, ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights’ (1977) 90 HLR 489, 493-495. 
28
 217 US 349 (1910). 
29
 ibid 367. 
30
 356 US 86 (1958). 
31
 ibid 100-101. 
32
 Gregg v Georgia 428 US 153 (1976) 188: ‘death is different in kind from any other punishment’. 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 
6 
 
tenet of interpretation morality is relevant to the background and the framework of law, not 
distinct from it, as argued in traditional legal positivism.
33
 Chapter III will argue that the 
Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is best explained by Dworkin’s opposition to 
traditional post-Enlightenment conceptions of law such as those endorsed by positivism, 
instead focusing on the interpreter’s recourse to moral principles. This chapter addresses the 
contention that the Eighth’s constraint on governmental power to punish has been understood 
to be defined by a set of developing collective values,
34
 and that consequently the 
punishments clause has been expanded by SCOTUS in an ‘activist’35 manner. 
By contrast, the case will be made for a different understanding of the Court’s 
approach, explaining that a theory of law informed by morality need not ask whether judges 
should read the Constitution as ‘living’36 or ‘dead’,37 but asks only how they interpret its 
existing provisions in light of underlying principles.
38
 With respect to legal interpretation, 
judges draw on a form of morality known as ‘political morality’,39 providing them with the 
tools to dig ‘deeper into the law to find the strongest moral and political principles that could 
justify an authoritative decision’,40 without engaging in majoritarianism, which Chapter III 
will reject as undercutting the moral element of the Constitution. The principal criticisms of 
Dworkin’s jurisprudence will then be discussed, before the interpretivist approach is outlined 
in the context of the Eighth Amendment. It will be explained that the interpretivist aspires to 
‘purify and perfect’41 rights, and it will be acknowledged that such aspiration brings 
                                                          
33
 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 203 (discussing how law derives only from rules of 
social convention: the Conventionality Thesis). 
34
 William Heffernan, ‘Constitutional Historicism’ (2005) 54 American ULR 1355, 1441. 
35
 Strauss notes that these criticisms typically take ‘the form of condemning “judicial activism of the left or the 
right,” with the Warren Court (or “Warrenism”) seen as an example of the former’. David Strauss, ‘The 
Common Law Genius of the Warren Court’ (2007) 49 W&Mary LR 845, 846.  
36
 David Strauss, The Living Constitution (OUP 2010) 1. The phrase ‘living Constitution’ was itself coined by 
Howard McBain, The Living Constitution (Workers Education Bureau Press 1927). 
37
 One author has identified 72 types of originalism: Mitchell Berman, ‘Originalism is Bunk’ (2009) 84 NYU 
LR 1, 14-15. 
38
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Moral Reading of the Constitution’ (New York Review of Books, 21 March 1996). 
39
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘“Natural” Law Revisited’ (1982) 34 University of Florida LR 163, 165 & 171. 
40
 Thomas Simon, Law and Philosophy (McGraw-Hill 2001) 139-140. 
41
 Gregory Keating, ‘Justifying Hercules’ (1987) 3 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 525, 528. 
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challenges due to the abstract and indefinite status of perfection. Like the ‘Rule of Law’,42 
which gathers virtually unanimous support but brings with it conflicting definitions and 
components,
43
 Dworkin’s tenet of legal rights and obligations is aspirational. It will be argued 
that such an aspiration is worth pursuing in the context of protection from ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’.44 
To develop the morality argument proposed by Chapter III, and to explain how 
political morality manifests in a real-world setting, such a theoretical framework will be 
developed in Chapter IV where  the principal source of political morality relied on by the 
Court will be investigated using the tool developed in Chapter III. That source, majoritarian 
state counting, comprises a nose-count of the fifty state jurisdictions, plus the federal 
government and the military. It will be shown that the Court has traditionally deferred to state 
legislatures in matters of evolving standards adjudication, seemingly exercising a form of 
majoritarian judicial restraint when counting states as the principal indicator of societal 
decency. Chapter IV will argue that this is far too simplistic a method, however, and that state 
counting is better explained by Dworkin’s interpretivism than a strictly majoritarian premise. 
The chapter will then expose the Court’s use of state counting for the restriction of: the pool 
of capital crimes; the execution of juveniles; and the execution of intellectually disabled 
offenders. 
The principal purpose of Chapter IV is to build on Dworkin’s ‘soaring, 
confrontational celebrations of individual rights as broad antimajoritarian immunities’,45 by 
demonstrating that data provided by state counting, without the assistance of a rational 
‘sieve’,46 provides mere statistics of collectivity rather than a rational form of communal 
                                                          
42
 Paul Craig, ‘Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law’ (1997) 21 Public Law 467. 
43
 Brian Tamanaha, ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ [2012] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
232: ‘the notion of the rule of law is perhaps the most powerful and often repeated political ideal in 
contemporary global discourse.’ 
44
 US Const, Amend VIII. 
45
 Richard Pildes, ‘Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 309, 313. 
46
 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (TRS) (Gerald Duckworth 1977) 252. 
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will.
47
 The argument will be made that, for the moral background of the Constitution to be 
respected, the principle of rights overriding utilitarian policy goals or majority preferences 
must be adopted. Such an approach adheres to a counter-majoritarian basis for interpretation, 
where judicial review upholds the rights of individuals on a moral rather than a popular basis. 
To that end, an argument will be made that interpreters must refer to community standards 
and principles to show the law in its best moral light. It will be noted that majoritarian 
statistics are not without merit, but that care must be taken if they are to provide a moral basis 
for Eighth Amendment adjudication. A framework for the use of state counting will be 
developed in the conclusion to Chapter IV. 
The origin of the constitutional principle of evolutive decency, Weems,
48
 contains 
direct reference to public opinion: Justice McKenna talked of the Eighth Amendment 
‘acquir[ing] meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’49 This 
notion of collective consciousness can be treated as a straightforward, almost whimsical 
concept, but is far from uncontroversial when resorted to for constitutional interpretation. 
Chapter V will draw on earlier rejections of raw majoritarianism, by analysing the remaining 
sources of political morality underlying the Eighth Amendment. This chapter will provide a 
way forward for moral constitutional adjudication, treating the remaining sources by the same 
Dworkinian rational sieving process which Chapter IV applied to majoritarian state counting. 
Applied in the context of punishments clause adjudication and the Court’s precedents, 
further sources of political morality manifest as public opinion polls; penological principles; 
transnational legal comparisons; and professional consensus. Chapter V will discuss the 
shortcomings of deriving moral principles from sources which are selected by fallible 
interpreters. Far from the ‘myth’50 of Supreme Court Justices’ fidelity to the Constitution 
                                                          
47
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Thirty Years On’ (TYO) (2002) 115 HLR 1655, 1677; Dworkin, LE (n 22) 189. 
48
 Weems (n 28). 
49
 ‘The [punishments] clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore 
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened 
by a humane justice.’ ibid 378. 
50
 Rorie Solberg and Eric Waltenburg, The Media, the Court, and the Misrepresentation (Routledge 2015) 
Chapter 1 (discussing the objective criteria upon which the Justices rely to bolster their apolitical legitimacy). 
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above all else, it is accepted that judges operate with an underlying positioning on an 
ideological spectrum.
51
 It will be shown, however, that ideologies can shift over a judge’s 
tenure,
52
 and that in any case the impact of an interpreter’s position on any sort of scale is 
often overstated.
53
 Nonetheless, caution will be urged when striving for the moral reading of 
the Eighth Amendment. What will result is a refined approach to punishments clause 
analysis, laying foundations for scrutiny of modern solitary confinement. 
For discussion-framing Chapter VI will introduce contextual issues such as the history 
of solitary confinement, the last Century’s boom in civil rights suits by prisoners, and the 
onset of mass incarceration. The chapter will pay close attention to the individualised impacts 
of solitary confinement, and the breadth and depth of its imposition in contemporary US 
prisons. This will provide the basis for an analysis of solitary confinement’s constitutionality 
under the Eighth Amendment, which will follow in Chapter VII. 
In 2011 Justice Kennedy delivered the Court’s opinion in Brown v Plata,54 providing 
the clearest assurance of the relevance of dignity to the Eighth Amendment in decades. The 
Court acknowledged that ‘[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all 
persons’,55 and held the entire state prison system in violation of the Eighth Amendment for 
lacking adequate safeguards for physical and mental safety.
56
 Plata followed a series of leaps 
and bounds in federal policy and jurisprudence regarding sentencing proportionality, 
including most recently the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
57
 the Second Chance Act of 2007,
58
 
and US v Booker,
59
 handed down in 2005. Despite these leaps, which will be discussed in 
Chapter VII, it has been noted that, ‘[i]n comparison to the immense scope of the public 
                                                          
51
 Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn and Jeffrey Segal, ‘Ideological Drift among Supreme Court 
Justices?’ (2007) 101(4) Northwestern ULR 1. 
52
 ibid. 
53
 Ryan Black, Ryan Owens, Daniel Walters and Jennifer Brookhart, ‘Upending a Global Decline’ (2014) 
103(1) Georgetown LJ 1, 7, 26. 
54
 131 S Ct 1910 (2011). 
55
 ibid 1928. 
56
 ibid 1947. 
57
 Pub L No 111-220 §2, 124 Stat 2372 (2010). 
58
 Pub L No 110-199 §3, 122 Stat 657, 658 (2008). 
59
 543 US 220 (2005). 
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policy disasters that gave us mass incarceration, the positive changes of the last decade are 
small beer’.60 Furthermore, those reforms dealt only with one issue: proportionality on paper.  
They did not deal with the lived-experiences of prisoners, suffering in worsening conditions 
of imprisonment, most acutely in conditions of solitary confinement. Simon’s hypothesis that 
Plata is a mechanism for constitutional revolution, with decency as the driving force,
61
 will 
be examined in Chapter VII and expanded to solitary confinement. 
To provide the substance of an Eighth Amendment claim, Chapter VII considers the 
constitutionality of solitary confinement in light of the moral assessment refined in previous 
chapters. Through a series of theoretical and practical bases of analysis, including the sources 
of political morality introduced in earlier chapters, it will be argued that the use of solitary 
confinement in the US may be deemed impermissible on the following two constitutional 
grounds. First, the ‘ever-increasing fear and distress’62 condemned in Trop is perpetuated, to 
an even greater extent, by contemporary solitary confinement. Second, the warning from 
Robinson v California that society ‘would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if 
we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be punished for being 
sick’63 is applicable to solitary, due to its flagrant disregard for the psychiatric welfare of the 
inmates on whom it is imposed. 
First, pre-interpretive data is investigated by this thesis. Research was carried out into 
local, national, and international government databases, non-governmental bodies (including 
human rights charities or other lobbyists), and most prominently media outlets. As a result, an 
original contribution is made to the literature, which, in the solitary confinement field, has 
traditionally fixated on the psychiatric implications of confinement. This element, 
“professional consensus”, is relevant to the legal assessment, but greater scrutiny into other 
areas of political morality will be encouraged. As a result of Chapter VII’s analysis, 
                                                          
60
 Lynn Adelman, ‘Criminal Justice Reform’ (2015) Wisconsin LR (in press) 101, 115. 
61
 Jonathan Simon, Mass Incarceration on Trial (The New Press 2014) 134-135, 145. 
62
 Trop (n 30) 101. 
63
 370 US 660 (1962) 678. 
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judgements of political morality (the “rational sieve”, as guided by moral responsibility and 
political integrity, which is consistency in decision-making) will be applied to the otherwise 
“pre-interpretive data” first unearthed by the positivistic counting of consensus. Justice 
Kennedy’s ‘privilege of unknowing’,64 the blissful ignorance enjoyed by the bulk of society 
about the rights of prisoners once they are condemned, will be undone by this examination. 
Ultimately, the claim will be made in Chapter VIII that solitary confinement, as practiced, is 
unconstitutional under the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.’65 
                                                          
64
 Anthony Kennedy, ‘Speech Delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy at the American Bar Association 
Annual Meeting’ (2003) 16 Federal Sentencing Reporter 126. 
65
 Trop (n 30) 100-101. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States (US) Constitution prohibits inter alia 
‘cruel and unusual punishments’.1 The text of the punishments clause, ratified in 1791, was 
adopted from the earlier Virginia State Constitution,
2
 which borrowed from the English Bill 
of Rights a century earlier.
3
 Interpreting the punishments clause of this provision has proven, 
for reasons to be discussed, less straightforward than taking the text at face value. In Trop v 
Dulles
4
 Chief Justice Warren held that the punishments clause ‘must draw its meaning from 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’.5 This 
application of evolutive interpretation has formed the basis for significant judicial 
enhancements of Eighth Amendment protection. From the mid-20
th
 Century to today, 
punishments clause jurisprudence has undergone something of an evolution. This thesis will 
return to the theoretical underpinnings of constitutional interpretation and assessments of 
evolving standards of decency (ESD) in Chapter III, where a theoretical framework for the 
analysis intended by this thesis will be built. The ensuing chapters will assess the objective 
indicia of these evolving standards available to interpreters. First, in this chapter, a contextual 
socio-political overview of the Eighth Amendment’s progress over the past half a century 
will be provided.  
                                                          
1
 US Const, Amendment VIII. 
2
 The Constitution of Virginia (29 June, 1776) <www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-1776.htm>  accessed 26
th
 May 
2015. 
3
 ‘[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.’ Bill of Rights (1689) 1 Will & Mary Sess 2 c 2. 
4
 356 US 86 (1958). 
5
 ibid 101. 
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2.2 WEEMS V US: BENEVOLENT IMPERIALISM? 
Before introducing the Eighth Amendment precedent relevant to this chapter, it is 
vital to have an understanding of another important Amendment to the Constitution. 
Following the Civil War, Congress sought to afford the ‘inalienable rights’6 spoken of in the 
Declaration of Independence to all citizens, regardless of race.
7
 By enacting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress created a ‘new liberty’,8 marking the beginning of a departure from 
traditional federalism. In 1833 Chief Justice Marshall had concluded with force that the Bill 
of Rights ‘contain[s] no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State 
governments.’9 In that case, Barron v Baltimore, the Court made clear that the Constitution 
created only the federal government, so its limitations on state power were not intended to 
apply to local governments like Baltimore, upholding the primacy of states’ rights. It was not 
for another six decades that SCOTUS would depart from its continuous refusal to apply the 
Bill of Rights to the states, a process known as incorporation.
10
 In the earliest case to depart 
from the Barron doctrine, Chicago Railroad Co v Chicago,
11
 the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth was held to apply an element of the Fifth Amendment to the states:
12
 the first 
demonstration of incorporation. Chicago Railroad Co was handed down in 1897, the year 
following Plessy v Ferguson,
13
 a case now widely considered ‘anticanon’14 for its judicial 
sanction of racial segregation. In Plessy, the Supreme Court deferred to local lawmakers in 
upholding the racist regimes of Jim Crow, another showing of deference to the states from 
which it would soon depart. 
                                                          
6
 Merrill Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (OUP 1970) 124. 
7
 US Const, Amend XIV. 
8
 Charles Warren, ‘The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1926) 39 HLR 431. 
9
 Barron v Baltimore 7 Pet US 243 (1833), following Marshall’s declaration that ‘[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’. Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803) 177. 
10
 William Brennan, ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights’ (1977) 90 HLR 489, 493. 
11
 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v Chicago 166 US 226 (1897). 
12
 The takings clause: US Const, Amendment V: ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.’ 
13
 163 US 537 (1896). 
14
 Balkin and Levinson define Plessy as anticanon due to common acceptance that it was wrongly decided. Jack 
Balkin and Sanford Levinson, ‘Commentary: The Canons of Constitutional Law’ (1998) 111 HLR 963, 1018. 
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In The Strange Career of Jim Crow,
15
 Vann Woodward developed a theory that would 
upend conventional wisdom surrounding racial segregation. The segregation of post-Civil 
War slaves and their free descendants did not develop in the US with Reconstruction, 
Woodward’s thesis claimed, but at the end of the 19th Century and later.16 Despite correcting 
various errors in later revisions,
17
 Strange Career attracted wide-ranging reproaches from 
critics.
18
 Woodward later admitted that he should have emphasised the location of the 
developments, not the time-scales.
19
 Jim Crow was born in the early years of Reconstruction, 
but foremost a ‘city slicker’20 he would not venture to the rural South until some years later. 
Only when segregation had been enacted in the more distinctively class-divided urban cities 
would it reach the more rural, underdeveloped areas, accounting for the time-lag Woodward 
originally described. 
At the same time that SCOTUS upheld Jim Crow regimes, McKinley’s government 
was engaged in war with the Spanish, a conflict that endured throughout 1898. The Philippine 
Islands, formerly a colony of Spain, were consequentially governed by the US as an ‘insular 
area’.21 An account of a prominent Filipino writer in 1899 remarked the hypocrisy of 
America’s grip on the Philippines, noting that just over a century prior the US had broken 
free from a similar reign. ‘Give us a chance’, he wrote, ‘treat us exactly as you demanded to 
be treated at the hands of England’.22 It would be against this backdrop that the case of 
Weems v US would arrive at the Supreme Court in 1910.
23
 
                                                          
15
 C Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (1st edn, OUP 1955) (Strange Career 1955). 
16
 C Vann Woodward, Thinking Back (Louisiana State UP 1986) 82. 
17
 See Vann Woodward, Strange Career 1955 (n 15) 124 (noting that African Americans stopped voting at the 
turn of the century, which was widely corrected). See Howard Rabinowitz, ‘More Than the Woodward Thesis: 
Assessing the Strange Career of Jim Crow’ (1988) 75 The Journal of American History 842, 849. 
18
 Rabinowitz (ibid) 845 fnn 9-10. 
19
 C Vann Woodward, ‘Strange Career Critics: Long May they Persevere’ (1988) 75 The Journal of American 
History 857, 859-861. 
20
 ibid 859, quoting John Cell, Highest of White Supremacy (CUP 1982) 134. 
21
 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image (Ballantine Books, 1990) 196. 
22
 A Filipino, ‘Aguinaldo’s Case against the United States’ [1899] (September) North American Review 1, 2. 
23
 217 US 349 (1910). 
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Substantively, the case concerned a sentence of cadena temporal, hard and painful 
labour whilst shackled in chains for a period of at least 12 years.
24
 The punishment was 
applied in the Filipino colony but, given America’s control over the territory, SCOTUS was 
able to provide review. Writing for the majority, Justice McKenna explained that it was ‘a 
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
offense’,25 deeming cadena temporal in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. While 
McKenna clarified that proportionality was fundamental to the Eighth, he fell short of 
providing the ‘exhaustive definition’26 of the punishments clause, absence of which he 
lamented. Much more significant than the merits questions in Weems was the willingness of 
the Court to engage in such paternalism over foreign territory, and the invocation of evolutive 
decency, a principle which would one day revolutionise the Eighth Amendment on domestic 
soil. 
Raymond has noted that the Court’s cultural and geographic distance from the 
Philippine Islands enabled it to view them as part of as ‘a disrespected, foreign system’.27 
Unprepared to answer questions surrounding such an intrusion on sovereignty, the Court was 
nonetheless willing to condemn the shortcomings of the Filipino system. In effect, American 
Imperialism was legitimised. The prevalent view in the early-20
th
 Century that native 
Filipinos were ‘uneducated, unsophisticated, unambitious, and incapable of 
selfgovernment’28 aided such imperialist activism by SCOTUS. Some contemporaneous 
commentary was even more extreme, with one example from 1901 describing the ‘little 
brown man’ from the Philippines as ignorant of the ‘great world, a complex sphere of 
action’.29 Such views bolstered the Court’s call to ‘remember that [the punishment] has come 
                                                          
24
 As well as hard labour, certain ‘accessory penalties’ were imposed: ‘(1) civil interdiction; (2) perpetual 
absolute disqualification; (3) and sub- jection to surveillance during life’. Frederick Fisher, ‘Some Peculiarities 
of Philippine Criminal Law and Procedure’ (1932) 19 Virginia LR 33, 42-43. 
25
 Weems (n 23) 367. 
26
 ibid 369. 
27
 Margaret Raymond, ‘“No Fellow in American Legislation”: Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of 
Proportionality’ (2006) 30 Vermont LR 251, 254. 
28
 ibid 284. 
29
 Anna Benjamin, ‘Some Filipino Characteristics’ (1901) 68 Outlook 1003. 
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to us from a government of a different form and genius from ours.’30 In addition, the US 
government’s imperial policy of control over the islands was sustained.31 
Given its proximity to Lochner v New York,
32
 the Court was wise in Weems to take 
the opportunity to display deference to local state jurisdictions. Lochner concerned a dispute 
surrounding New York’s regulation of the free market. SCOTUS took a laissez-faire 
approach and struck down the state limitation on maximum working hours for bakers,
33
 
handing down a decision ‘infused with reactionary hatred of emerging social movements that 
sought to aid workers and the poor’.34 Lochner is reviled for encroaching on state rights,35 
and for perpetuating class-bias and disregard for individual citizens.
36
 Weems gave the Court 
an early opportunity to react to these criticisms, whereby the Justices affirmed their 
conviction that states were to be considered sovereign,
37
 renewing the Barron assumption 
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.
38
 The Court in Weems set no limits on 
existing American punishments. Despite the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
Lochner’s encroachment, the Eighth Amendment was still reserved for scrutiny of federal 
government activity and, by extension, American colonies. Incorporation of the punishments 
clause was not a consideration the Justices even vocalised during oral argument or in dicta. 
The Weems majority’s willingness to listen to the will of the People, as displayed by 
state legislatures and by recourse to social and economic statistics, was something expressly 
                                                          
30
 Weems (n 23) 377. 
31
 See Peter Stanley, A Nation in the Making (HUP 1974) 64-65: ‘Taft, president of the Philippine Commission, 
wrote in 1900: “The great mass of them are superstitious and ignorant...The idea that these people can govern 
themselves is...illfounded”’. 
32
 198 US 45 (1905). Striking down a state regulation of working hours, SCOTUS regarded it as having no valid 
purpose. Balkin and Levinson (n 14) 1017 also describe Lochner as anticanon. 
33
 David Bernstein, ‘Lochner v. New York’ (2005) 83 Washington University Law Quarterly 1469, 1525. 
34
 ibid 1470. 
35
 Shaman references numerous authors for the claim that handing down a “Lochner-like decision” is the highest 
judicial insult. Jeffrey Shaman, ‘On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York’ (2005) 72 Tennessee LR 
455, 456 fn2. 
36
 James Ely, ‘Economic Due Process Revisited’ (1991) 44 Vanderbilt LR 213: ‘[Lochnerism] resembles a 
Victorian melodrama. A dastardly Supreme Court is pictured as frustrating noble reformers who sought to 
impose beneficent regulations on giant business enterprises.’ 
37
 Christine Hightower, ‘Recidivist Offenses - Can the Whole Be Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?’ (1980) 26 
Loyola LR 698, 700 (noting the Court’s subordination to state legislatures). 
38
 Barron (n 9). 
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ignored in Lochner and called for by Holmes’s dissent in that case.39 The Lochner Court was 
‘[u]nder the sway of categorical thinking [and] dismissed empirical evidence that belied the 
Court’s precious preconceived notions.’40 Where Weems differed was by the Court’s 
deference to public opinion, at least in dicta. Noting that ‘time works changes’41 within the 
Eighth, Justice McKenna emphasised the importance that ‘a principle, to be vital, must be 
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of 
constitutions’.42 As this section has shown, the foundations for Eighth Amendment evolution 
had been prepared with Weems, though the decision was well before its time. Much further 
incorporation was required before real activism in the Court’s punishments clause 
jurisprudence would begin. 
2.3 THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, INCORPORATED 
Between 1911 and 1917, seven states abolished capital punishment for all crimes, and 
Tennessee for all but rape. Capital abolition seemed to be accelerating, but in the wake of the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, progress slowed. The US entered World War I and, following its 
end, the Red Scare persisted,
43
 leading to ‘national hysteria’.44 In this era sociologists would 
describe the death penalty as a ‘preventative and necessary social measure’,45 and the utility 
model of punishment prevailed.
46
 Mounting tension in the 1930s,
47
 combined with the Great 
Depression, culminated in that decade providing the most lethal statistics of any decade in the 
history of the US: 1,667 legal executions were carried out.
48
 At the same time, the end of the 
Lochner era was signalled in 1938,
49
 when a newly composed Court decided in Carolene 
Products that legislation such as that at issue in Lochner was to be subjected only to very 
                                                          
39
 Lochner (n 32) 75 (Holmes, J, dissenting). 
40
 Shaman (n 35) 488. 
41
 Weems (n 23) 373. 
42
 ibid 
43
 Robert Murray, Red Scare (Reissue edn, Minnesota UP 1955). 
44
 ibid. 
45
 Jacqueline Herrmann, The History of the Death Penalty in the United States (GRIN Verlag 2008). 
46
 Punishment philosophy is examined in Chapter V. 
47
 Murray Levin, Political Hysteria in America (Basic Books 1971) 29. 
48
 William Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (2nd edn, CUP 1997). 
49
 Bernstein (n 33) 1510-1511. 
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minor judicial scrutiny.
50
 The post-Lochner Court, under Chief Justices Hughes (1930-1941) 
and Stone (1941-1946) took a much more active role during World War II, emerging as a 
‘progressive agent’51 in the protection of citizens against state control. Later, the Court began 
to incorporate many guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. It was from 1962 that 
constitutional law would begin to change in the US, starting in earnest with the incorporation 
of the Eighth Amendment.
52
 
The 1950s had seen extensive civic reprisals surrounding social inequality and a lack 
of civil rights for black Americans. Finally, overdue judicial condemnation of racial 
segregation arrived in 1954; in the form of the Court’s unanimous pronouncement in Brown v 
Board of Education that the ‘separate but equal’53 doctrine upheld in Plessy half a century 
prior was unlawful under the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown, which will be revisited in the 
next chapter when sources for constitutional interpretation are discussed, is noteworthy not 
just for its social context, but its role in the enhancement of progressive moral values such as 
ESD, the principle of interpretation central to this thesis. Loveland has noted that Brown was 
an example of SCOTUS leading the way, in the face of popular consensus.
54
 A similar issue 
might face the Court regarding the death penalty, namely: ‘is it for the Court to lead or to 
follow the views of America’s citizens?’55 This question is vital to the Eighth Amendment’s 
ESD, a principle honed shortly after Brown, in 1958, and one to which this thesis will 
eventually return when focus is placed on solitary confinement in Chapters VI and VII. 
In the case which woke the Weems principle of ESD from its half-century slumber, 
Trop v Dulles,
56
 the Court concluded that the military had infringed the Eighth Amendment’s 
                                                          
50
 US v Carolene Products Company 304 US 144 (1938). 
51
 Evan Mandery, A Wild Justice (WW Norton 2014) 12. 
52
 William Brennan, ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights’ (1977) 90 HLR 489, 493-495 
(reviewing the 1962-1969 incorporation cases, starting with Robinson v California 370 US 660 (1962)). 
53
 347 US 483 (1954) 495: ‘in the field of public education the doctrine...has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal’. 
54
 Ian Loveland, ‘“How do I Kill Thee? Let Me Count the Ways”: Lethal Injection as a Means of Execution in 
the United States’ (2009) 3 Public Law 453, 465. 
55
 ibid. 
56
 Trop (n 4). 
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cruel and unusual punishments proscription by stripping a deserter of his citizenship.
57
 In a 
‘bizarre[ly]’58 grounded judgment, the Court condemned the treatment as worse than death, 
the majority concluded: 
‘[t]he provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow 
shibboleths. They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit 
governmental powers in our Nation...The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.’59 
While the ESD principle had been pronounced in earnest, it would take Eighth 
Amendment incorporation before real progress could be made. Following the Warren 
Court’s60 departure from Lochner and in the wake of numerous civil rights advancements at 
the congressional level,
61
 the Eighth was finally applied to the states.
62
 Chief Justice Warren, 
known for his progressive civil liberties jurisprudence and opposition to the death penalty as 
governor of California,
63
 noted at the outset of his judgment in Trop: ‘let us put to one side 
the death penalty’.64 This dictum, deposited as a tactic to bring on board death penalty 
retentionist Justice Black,
65
 which was successful, indicated that the extension of Trop to the 
death penalty was likely to require a new bench-composition, with at least five Justices 
willing to challenge the historic penalty. 
Incorporating the punishments clause in 1962 and thereby applying it to state 
sentencers, Justice Stewart’s majority relied on ‘contemporary human knowledge’66 to 
condemn the Californian criminalisation of narcotics addiction. By referring to modern 
                                                          
57
 ibid 103. 
58
 Loveland (2009) (n 54) 454 fn9 (explaining that the ground – worse than death – was bizarre). 
59
 Trop (n 4) 100-101. 
60
 As is convention, the “Warren Court” denotes the era when SCOTUS was led by Chief Justice Warren. 
Similarly, the “Roberts Court” is the present compositon. 
61
 See the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (74 Stat 89, Pub L 86–449); the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat 241e); the 
Voting Rights Act of 1964 (79 Stat 437, Pub L 89-110). 
62
 Throughout this thesis, mention of the Eighth Amendment is in reference to the punishments clause only. 
63
 Mandery (n 51) 12. 
64
 Trop (n 4) 99. 
65
 Mandery (n 51) 12 (who derived this data from interviews with law clerks sitting at the time). 
66
 Robinson (n 117) 666. 
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knowledge, Stewart invoked the Weems-Trop principle of interpretation without verbatim 
reference to ESD, demonstrating the providence of this tenet of interpretation from the outset 
of the Eighth’s incorporation. While Robinson was confined to non-capital punishment, it is 
that area of law, governing the boundaries of the death penalty, which has provided the 
richest example of Eighth Amendment evolution over the past fifty years. As such, it is the 
treatment by the Court of capital punishment to which this chapter will now turn. 
2.4 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Whilst the vast majority of Western democratic nations have departed from the 
practice of punishing their citizens by death,
67
 a majority of US jurisdictions maintain capital 
punishment statutes. Available to sentencers in 31 states, the death penalty is also sanctioned 
by the federal government and the military,
68
 though in the latter cases its imposition is rare.
69
 
Currently, the most prevalent method of capital punishment is the lethal injection, used in 
87.5% of executions since 1976.
70
  Since the introduction of this method in 1977,
71
 a three-
drug cocktail, known as a “protocol”, was originally used to carry out such executions.72 Seen 
to prevent unnecessary pain or suffering, this protocol combined the use of the barbiturate 
sodium thiopental, followed by the muscle relaxant pancuronium bromide and finally the 
cardiac-arrest-inducing electrolyte potassium chloride.
73
 The Court sanctioned such a 
concoction in 2008, insofar as it did not present a ‘substantial’ or ‘objectively intolerable’74 
risk of serious harm. The Court in Baze clearly did not see death as a form of serious harm, a 
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bizarre form of backwards logic,
75
 and noted that lawful capital punishment must have a 
means of being carried out.
76
 The Court was satisfied that three-drug protocol provided such 
means, and the issue was seemingly put to rest. 
In 2015, however, lethal injection controversy has reignited and the post-Baze capital 
picture is already quite different. Following a nationwide shortage of the three-drug 
protocol’s first two ingredients, sodium thiopental and pancuronium bromide,77 the states 
most active in implementing the death penalty have altered their lethal drug protocols. Seven 
have used a single drug in all of their post-Baze executions.
78
 Moreover, of the 16 carried out 
in the first half of 2015, 14 executions used a single drug: pentobarbital,
79
 heavily criticised 
as creating an extreme risk of serious harm.
80
 Numerous media reports documented botched, 
seemingly torturous executions in 2014 and,
81
 in June 2015, the Court revisited the Baze 
question, this time regarding the new single-drug protocol. 
In that case, Glossip v Gross,
82
 the petitioner alleged that the Oklahoma authorities 
would offend the Constitution’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments if they 
neglected to provide ‘a protocol substantially similar to the one that [the] Court considered in 
Baze’.83 While the case had the potential to provide wide-ranging consequences to the 
abundance of Baze-deficient capital statutes across the US, Justice Alito took the opportunity 
to block any such argument. In the face of an abundance of scientific professional consensus 
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proffered by amicus briefs,
84
 Alito condemned their ‘outlandish rhetoric’,85 dismissing the 
claim. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer abhorred the death penalty in general, dissenting: ‘[t]he 
circumstances and the evidence of the death penalty’s application have changed radically’.86 
While the lethal injection has remained the principal and, since 2013, sole method of 
execution in the US, other methods were more frequently used throughout the last century. 
Death by hanging was the method of choice of capital sentencers from the foundation of the 
Union to the early-20
th
 Century, when a more publicly appeasing mode was sought. Change 
was introduced after numerous botched hangings in the late-19
th
 Century,
87
 giving rise to the 
observation that it was the public’s perception of decency that drove this change, an early 
form of evolving standards based policy.
88
 Electrocution, first introduced to the US in 1886,
89
 
became the primary method as hangings declined and after SCOTUS sanctioned its use in re 
Kemmler.
90
 The Constitutional test for “cruel”, noted the majority, ‘implies there is 
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life’.91 
Kemmler was handed down towards the end of the long line of post-Fourteenth Amendment 
cases where the Court refused to incorporate the Bill of Rights. While not in itself an Eighth 
Amendment case, it was the Court’s silence in Kemmler on the punishments clause that 
provided an incentive for nationwide enactment of electric-chair statutes. 
Throughout the Court’s involvement with the constitutionality of execution methods, 
similar deference has been displayed towards the role of state legislatures in determining 
appropriate approaches to types of punishment. While very seldom used, a small number of 
states still provides for hanging,
92
 firing squad,
93
 and the gas chamber
94
 as forms of capital 
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punishment. These provisions generally reside in dormant statutes, which have not been 
invoked for a number of years.
95
 Nonetheless, recent hysteria surrounding the lethal injection 
has reinvigorated efforts to renew,
96
 or in some cases introduce,
97
 methods of execution. The 
Supreme Court has rarely had occasion to review specific methods, but on those occasions it 
has invariably deferred to the states, expressly permitting both the firing squad and electric 
chair,
98
 with the latter remaining on the books of seven states in 2015.
99
 
Judicial review of the nation’s ultimate penalty is now so commonplace it would be 
easy to view such scrutiny as an historical tradition. Quite to the contrary, the picture just 
over fifty years ago was very different. In the early 1960s, following the incorporation of the 
Eighth, few SCOTUS Justices considered that capital punishment would ever fail 
constitutional muster.
100
 It was accepted that the framers brought capital punishment with 
them from the English,
101
 though contemporaneous popular sentiment seemed to support its 
abolition.
102
 A line of litigation led by the Legal Defense Fund (LDF), the same civil liberties 
organisation which helped secure victory in Brown, would challenge the age-old assumption 
that the death penalty was immune from Eighth Amendment scrutiny. That challenge began 
in 1968. 
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2.4.1 THE PRECURSORS TO FURMAN 
In 1968 the Supreme Court decided a case, which would provide vital support to the 
LDF in its struggle against the death penalty. The importance of the case to this thesis rests 
with its role as the origin of the first Supreme Court condemnation of a capital system, 
demonstrating a lurch forward in Eighth Amendment adjudication for the first time since its 
framing. Arriving just six years after punishments clause incorporation was provided by 
Robinson, Witherspoon v Illinois concerned a state scheme where broad discretion had been 
available to the prosecution when composing juries in capital trials.
103
 At an earlier stage in 
Witherspoon half of the venire of potential jurors had been deemed unsuitable, giving rise to 
the claim.
104
 The Court ruled that such a legislative scheme, permitting juror-exclusion on the 
basis that they felt unable to impose death or had some principled opposition against capital 
punishment, was insufficiently impartial by due process standards.
105
 While the decision 
involved other areas of law besides the Eighth Amendment, the majority judgment positively 
cited Trop, noting the importance of ‘the conscience of the community on the ultimate 
question of life or death.’106 
Witherspoon had set the pace and arrived during a period when around 20 states were 
seriously considering limiting their death penalty statutes, and seven already had.
107
 In 
addition, recorded public support for capital punishment had plummeted to an historic low, 
and the rate of executions slowed. Just one man was executed in 1966, and two in 1967,
108
 
during a de facto abolition which would last for ten years while the states fine-tuned their 
capital statutes and the Court faced various challenges to those regimes for the first time. Any 
motion promised by Witherspoon’s condemnation of Illinois looked to be short-lived, 
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however, and progress was on the verge of failure just one year later, when Warren stepped 
down as Chief Justice. Further compounding the LDF’s struggle against capital punishment, 
both Justices Black and Harlan died within three months of one another in 1971.
109
 It was left 
to Justice Brennan, described by some as ‘the most influential justice of the twentieth 
century’,110 and its ‘liberal champion’,111 to secure an extension of Witherspoon. 
2.4.2 FURMAN V GEORGIA REACHES THE COURT 
The Justices nominated to replace Black and Harlan were far from moderate. Justice 
Powell was noted as having criticised Martin Luther King,
112
 sacrilege to civil rights 
proponents, and Justice Rehnquist was on the record defending Plessy,
113
 the case upholding 
segregation overruled by Brown two decades prior. It would clearly take more than 
conventional appeals against the death penalty in and of itself to challenge the nation’s 
ultimate penalty, and the LDF had the ideal candidate to do so. 
At oral argument in Furman v Georgia,
114
 the LDF’s lawyer Anthony Amsterdam 
posed an objective element for his argument, an approach never before faced by the Court. If 
a punishment would ‘be unacceptable to general contemporary conscience and standards of 
decency,’115 he argued, it would offend the Constitution’s proscription of cruel and unusual 
punishments as informed by the Weems-Trop standard.
116
 In effect, the decision of which of 
these ‘standards’117 to follow rested with the Justices’ views about the death penalty itself, 
something they had already faced in Witherspoon but not so explicitly. Where Amsterdam’s 
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argument differed to those the Court had faced previously, however, was with his reference to 
‘objective indications’.118 This required the Justices to interpret value into the Eighth 
Amendment, through “objectivity” rather than through subjective facts. Amsterdam’s line of 
attack permitted them to do so without the risk of perceived personal value judgements. 
Ultimately, Amsterdam won the day and the Court held in favour of Furman (and a 
co-defendant, Jackson), and in the case of a cross-appeal from a Texan death row inmate 
sentenced in similar circumstances.
119
 Abruptly striking down capital statutes in Georgia and 
Texas, SCOTUS held in a one-page per curiam decision that the level of discretion those 
states provided to judges was unacceptable and violated the punishments clause.
120
 Such 
schemes, a plurality held, lead to ‘wanton’ and ‘freakish’121 imposition of the death penalty. 
Whilst the judgment was notoriously fractured – nine separate decisions spanning 200 pages 
and 66,000 words,
122
 a record at the time – Furman had the effect of invalidating the death 
penalty across the US and imposing a de facto moratorium on the punishment for the first 
time, reprieving 589 death row inmates.
123
 
Supporters of the death penalty were outraged by Furman. In a manifest 
demonstration of national consensus at the state legislative level, immediately after the 
decision 35 states scrambled to rewrite their capital statutes, and quickly enacted fresh 
legislation to restart executions and clear the now five-year backlog since Witherspoon.
124
 A 
majority in Furman might have deemed capital punishment unconstitutional as applied, but 
not per se. Retentionists knew this, and Florida was the first state to act. Furman was handed 
down on the 29
th
 June 1972; Florida’s renewed capital scheme followed in December that 
                                                          
118
 ibid. 
119
 Branch (n 114). 
120
 Furman (n 114) 238. 
121
 ibid 310. 
122
 Mandery (n 51) 236 (noting that Furman was longer than many novels). 
123
 Joan Cheever, Back from the Dead (Wiley 2006) (Painting a picture of the monumental result of Furman and 
why it is worthy of the otherwise overused label “seminal”). 
124
 Victor Streib, ‘Executions under the Post-Furman Capital Punishment Statutes’ (1984) 15 Rutgers LJ 443 
(providing an overview of these reforms). 
Chapter II: The Evolution of the Eighth Amendment 
 
27 
 
year.
125
 Broadly speaking, post-Furman legislation could be separated into two groups. The 
first, in which some states narrowed discretion by providing guidelines for aggravation and 
mitigation in sentencing, was where Florida rested.
126
 Adopting the Floridian scheme were 
Georgia and Texas, the states directly involved in Furman. The second group contained states 
that attempted to remove the arbitrariness condemned by the Court by requiring mandatory 
death sentences for capital crimes. North Carolina and Louisiana took this approach, in 1974 
and 1975 respectively.
127
  Both sets of schemes were to face the Court just four years after 
Furman. 
2.4.3 GREGG V GEORGIA AND ITS PROGENY 
Ruling on the constitutionality of the fresh legislation, SCOTUS held in 1976 that the 
death penalty was capable once more of being exercised lawfully. In that case, Gregg v 
Georgia,
128
 mandatory sentencing, where the death penalty was the legislated minimum 
penalty for certain offences, failed constitutional muster. To pass the Furman test, SCOTUS 
held that states were required to show their capital penology to uphold human dignity,
129
 
redolent of the decency element of the ESD principle. Importantly, the death penalty must 
also not be inflicted arbitrarily; nor be seen by society as wrong, or excessive.
130
 In so doing, 
statutes must not create ‘a substantial risk that the death penalty would be inflicted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner,’131 something which Louisiana and North Carolina 
neglected when enacting mandatory schemes.
132
 Moreover, capital legislation should provide 
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judges and juries with individualised sentencing, taking into account the ‘circumstances of 
the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.’133 
The schemes in Georgia, Florida, and Texas, and by proxy those others which had 
adopted the weighing and balancing approach of aggravation versus mitigation, were 
upheld.
134
 In those states, with Georgia as the principal example on the docket, specific 
crimes were defined as capital,
135
 and guilt was determined in the first stage of a bifurcated 
trial.
136
 Next, at sentencing, ‘additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation 
of punishment’137 was to be provided. Moreover, before a sentence of death could be 
imposed, at least one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances must have been found 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
138
 This scheme, the Court held, passed constitutional muster and 
satisfied the requisite individualised approach.
139
 When considering consensus, a majority 
determined that ‘[t]he most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty 
for murder is the legislative response to Furman [which] make[s] clear that capital 
punishment itself has not been rejected’.140 That element of ESD, the consensus among states, 
or “state counting”, is one for which much criticism exists, and will be addressed in Chapter 
IV. 
Furman and Gregg demonstrated that the punishments clause was applicable not just 
to the states in abstract, but also to the nation’s historic death penalty. Incorporation, coupled 
with the Court’s new willingness to engage in evolutive interpretation of the Eighth, meant 
that while Gregg reinstated the death penalty, states’ liberty to execute their citizens would 
never again be so unfettered. Furman might have fallen, but the new era of capital 
punishment jurisprudence meant the death penalty would become litigated like never before 
in the ensuing decades. 
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The Gregg condition of individualisation of punishments would soon be clarified in 
Lockett v Ohio,
141
 where the Court examined a capital scheme, which provided for only a 
restricted consideration of mitigation, such as the ‘history, character and condition of the 
offender’.142 Lockett made the assessment stricter, mandating that sentencing juries must be 
able to consider ‘as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense’.143 Eddings v Oklahoma expanded the standard 
further,
144
 requiring the inclusion of family history and emotional disturbance in mitigation. 
In the following term, Zant v Stephens and Lowenfield v Phelps further clarified that such 
aggravating factors in capital trials ‘must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for 
the death penalty’,145 at either trial phase.146 
In essence, Gregg determined that the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel 
and unusual punishments operated in a far broader context than simply methodological. Not 
only was the ESD principle now applicable to the Court’s punishments clause jurisprudence, 
including the death penalty, but also the Eighth was interpreted to contain a fundamental 
proportionality standard, one derived from the early decision in Weems. It was in the year 
following Gregg, 1977, when the Court first struck down the death penalty as 
disproportionate in respect of an entire category of offences as opposed to just the individual 
application of a punishment. Gregg’s progeny, as will become clear as this thesis progresses, 
founded a generation of punishments jurisprudence, so it is important to this thesis that these 
cases are understood in full. 
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2.4.4 POST-GREGG EVOLUTION  
Considering the constitutionality of capital punishment for rape in Coker v 
Georgia,
147
 the Court developed a bipartite proportionality test, which comprised an objective 
determination of current national consensus, and a subjective analysis. Under that assessment, 
the Court condemned death as an unconstitutional punishment for non-homicidal rape of an 
adult, an offence the majority viewed as falling short of the requisite ‘“severity and 
irrevocability”’148 for capital punishment to be imposed. Justice White’s majority judgment 
was confined to cases in which death did not result, and left the position of child rape and 
murder untouched. Half a decade later the Coker position was expanded to incorporate a 
restriction on capital punishment for felony murderers, those who were accomplices to a 
distinct criminal offence where a murder took place, in Enmund v Florida.
149
 Forging the 
objective and subjective elements of the ESD assessment into one, the Court focused on the 
defendant’s ‘moral responsibility’150 through his intent, to examine whether the correct 
sentence was one of death. 
In Enmund the defendant acted as a driver for two accomplices who murdered two 
Floridian pensioners during a robbery.  He was subsequently sentenced to death despite 
lacking homicidal pre-meditation, under the state’s felony murder rule.151 In the Court’s view 
an insufficient demonstration of moral responsibility for capital punishment had been 
presented by the prosecution, and Enmund’s life was spared. By undertaking a review of state 
legislation to find ESD against this practice,
152
 indicia that are considered in Chapter IV, 
SCOTUS overturned Enmund’s sentence and categorically prohibited capital punishment for 
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felony murder.
153
 Although Enmund symbolised a significant evolution of the Eighth and a 
consequent restriction of capital punishment, it was not to be for another three decades that 
the Court held in Kennedy v Louisiana that death was unconstitutionally excessive when 
imposed on all non-murderers.
154
 
Through Kennedy SCOTUS dissolved any residual uncertainty remaining after 
Enmund by creating a per se exclusion of capital punishment for all non-homicide offences. 
While undoubtedly an important case, the Court’s reasoning has been criticised as an ill-
founded demonstration of a dubious consensus.
155
 This contention is revisited in Chapter IV 
when majoritarian state counting as a method of ESD-framing is considered. It can be 
concluded that Kennedy symbolises a degree of finality with regard to Eighth Amendment 
evolution in the realms of “restricted categories”. Through an expansion of the punishments 
clause, death is now permissible only for aggravated murder.
156
 More recently the Court has 
clarified the Zant-Lockett-Eddings standards developed to adhere to Furman-Gregg scrutiny, 
noting in 2006 that there is no specific scheme required in the weighing of aggravating 
factors against mitigating factors.
157
 Moreover, factors which are ‘unconstitutionally 
vague’158 under Gregg are those which have no ‘common-sense core of meaning…that 
criminal juries should be capable of understanding’.159 In essence, death can be imposed only 
in the most severe, individualised, and narrow of circumstances. 
In addition to the permissible categories of capital crimes and relevant factors in 
determining their severity, the Court has also engaged in evolutive interpretation with respect 
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to categories of death-eligible offenders. In so doing, the punishments clause has been 
expanded to protect juvenile offenders and those affected by intellectual disabilities, 
categories that will now be visited. 
2.4.5 CLASSES OF CAPITAL OFFENDERS 
The next sphere of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence evolution to be considered is the 
constitutional applicability of the death penalty to different classes of offenders. This section 
will evaluate age and mental capacity as relevant factors when determining the constitutional 
permissibility of capital punishment. 
2.4.5.1 JUVENILES 
Age was first declared a valid mitigating factor in 1978. In Bell v Ohio
160
 and Lockett 
v Ohio,
161
 the Court reversed two death sentences for aggravated murder committed by 
juveniles, aged under-18 in the US, holding that ‘the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character’,162 including age. 
Further clarifying the Gregg requirement of individualisation, the relevance of age to 
proportionate punishment was later noted in Eddings v Oklahoma.
163
 In that case Justice 
Powell declared that age ‘is more than a chronological fact’,164 striking down a capital 
sentence imposed on a 16 year old, because of a lack of consideration for his individual 
mitigating circumstances. While the juvenile in this case was protected from death, a 
categorical bar on the death penalty was not to follow for a decade. Decided in 1988, two 
years after a similar categorical case would protect insane offenders from death row,
165
 
Thompson v Oklahoma provided the Court with such an opportunity to extend Eddings.
166
 
Undertaking further evolution of the Eighth Amendment, a Justice Stevens-led majority in 
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Thompson declared that ‘it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person 
who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense’167 and declared the death 
penalty unconstitutional in those circumstances. 
SCOTUS was next presented with an opportunity to refine the juvenile death penalty 
in 1989, in Stanford v Kentucky.
168
 In the majority’s opinion the Eighth Amendment’s 
standards of decency had not yet evolved to exclude under-18s from death row, as no national 
consensus persuaded them as such.
169
 Nonetheless, Justice O’Connor admitted in her 
concurrence that ‘the day may come’170 when legislative consensus would bar the juvenile 
death penalty. The next shift in punishments clause jurisprudence saw the Court undertake a 
dramatic evolution against the holding in Stanford, realising Justice O’Connor’s prediction.171 
Though O’Connor herself dissented, a 5-4 majority in Roper v Simmons found a 
national consensus against the execution of all juveniles.
172
 In holding unconstitutional a 
Missourian statute, which provided for the execution of offenders aged under-18 at the time 
of the offence; the Court deemed all such statutes per se unconstitutional.
173
 This significant 
leap in evolutive jurisprudence has been described as ‘extremely important’,174 and hailed for 
finally enabling evolving standards ‘to join the civilized world’.175 The relevance of such 
transnational comparativism will be discussed in Chapter V, where this thesis will seek to 
develop the evolving standards approach to the Eighth Amendment beyond its state counting 
basis. Before exploring further objective indicia for ESD-framing purposes, however, another 
category of offenders must be considered. 
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2.4.5.2 INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED OFFENDERS 
In the same period that Thompson and Stanford were decided, the Court granted 
certiorari in two important claims regarding the mental state of capital defendants. It had long 
been accepted at common law that insanity precluded an offender from execution.
176
 The 
Court visited this issue again in 1986, in Ford v Wainwright.
177
 Declaring explicitly for the 
first time that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of defendants with severe 
mental disorders, Ford was criticised for merely re-emphasising the common law defence of 
insanity, in line with a long-standing national consensus among the states.
178
 Regardless of 
any hypothesised constitutional impact of the case,
179
 its prohibition did not extend to 
individuals with ‘intellectual disabilities’180 and such conservativism regarding punitive 
punishment continued. 
Soon after Ford was decided, SCOTUS experienced significant changes. Towards the 
end of a period when a strong conservative bloc held sway on the Court, one which 
consistently favoured states’ rights in criminal justice issues,181 Chief Justice Burger stepped 
down in 1986, delivering a significant blow to that bloc. President Reagan appointed William 
Rehnquist to replace him, and Antonin Scalia occupied Rehnquist’s vacant Associate seat. 
Far from the ‘myth’182 of Supreme Court Justices’ fidelity to the Constitution above all else, 
it is accepted that they operate with an underlying positioning on an ideological spectrum,
183
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a phenomenon that is observable and can be measured.
184
 By any measure, Rehnquist and 
Scalia brought deep conservativism to the bench, by design on Reagan’s part.185 The 
restrictive approach of the later Burger years promised to be strengthened by the new 
appointments, and that promise was soon fulfilled. 
Woodhouse doubted any expansion of the Eighth to intellectually disabled defendants 
following Ford, remarking that it was ‘unlikely that the Court would make an unpopular rule 
even more controversial by expanding its application to accommodate other mental 
disabilities’.186 This prediction proved accurate in Penry v Lynaugh where, in the same year 
that the Court refused to protect under-18s shortly into the newly inaugurated Rehnquist 
Court, it similarly declined Eighth Amendment protection to intellectually disabled 
offenders.
187
 This perspective was to be mirrored in the following Presidential election and by 
the subsequent Republican government, where eventual winner Bill Clinton made clear his 
steadfast support for the death penalty. On the 1992 Presidential campaign-trail Clinton 
returned to his home state of Arkansas to oversee the execution of a man rendered acutely 
intellectually disabled when he failed to commit suicide following an equally botched 
robbery.
188
 Clinton’s backing of congressional policies to secure the most severe sentences, 
and to cut back on the capital appeals process followed,
189
 sustaining an attack on the 
judiciary’s Eighth Amendment progress over the two decades prior.190 
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Nonetheless, the rule in Ford was to be evolved even further, at an even faster rate 
than was demonstrated by Roper,
191
 just 13 years later. Atkins v Virginia,
192
 handed down in 
2002, was to step off the restrictive approach demonstrated in the 1980s and 1990s, both on 
the Court bench and in the government. With a Court-composition that the liberal Justice 
Stevens was able to turn into a majority, Atkins finally prohibited the execution of any 
individuals with intellectual disabilities, after finding a national consensus against such 
imposition.
193
 The ruling did not escape criticism, concerns which are discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter IV. One point was irrefutable: the decision marked a revival for evolution of 
the Eighth Amendment, strengthening the protection of mentally impaired defendants, casting 
the punishments clause’s net further while tightening its hold. 
2.4.5.3 RACE 
One sphere of death penalty jurisprudence that has yet to experience the same 
application of the Eighth Amendment is the issue of racial bias in capital sentencing. One 
scholar noted  in 1981 that, ‘[i]f a black man kill a white man, that be first degree murder; if a 
white man kill a white man, that be second degree murder; if a black man kill a black man, 
that be manslaughter; but if a white man kill a black man, that be excusable homicide’.194 
Though hyperbolic to a certain degree, the message is not so far from the truth. Race plays a 
large role in the probability of a sentence of death, ‘throw[ing] into serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system’,195 that ‘arbitrary and capricious 
punishment is the touchstone under the Eighth Amendment’.196 This extract from the 
majority opinion in McCleskey v Kemp ‘capture[s] the twisted radical soul of American 
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criminal justice.’197 The meteoric rise of African-American overrepresentation in prison (and 
on death row) continues, and is termed ‘The New Jim Crow’198 by Michelle Alexander, who 
condemns the current American criminal justice framework for instituting a new caste 
system.
199
 
Writing for SCOTUS in McCleskey, Justice Powell accepted that ‘the criminal justice 
system was probably inherently racist,’200 but denied Eighth Amendment protection until 
deliberate bias could be proven.
201
  In an extensive review of McCleskey published in 2015, 
Kirchmeier expressed a sense of disbelief at the Court’s fundamental failure to heed the 
warnings of the statistical evidence it cited favourably in 1987.
202
 Emphasising that the case 
had a major impact in many different ways, Kirchmeier describes a missed opportunity for 
the Justices, noting that three of them who upheld the death penalty – Stevens, Powell, and 
Blackmun – would later regret their decisions.203 Amsterdam, who had successfully argued 
Furman for the LDF, described McCleskey as ‘the Dred Scott decision of our time’,204 in 
comparison to the decision 130 years earlier, which upheld slavery.
205
 Falling in what was, as 
noted above,
206
 a staunch conservative period for SCOTUS, McCleskey represented a 
departure from evolutive decency jurisprudence. 
Stevens, Powell, and Blackmun’s regret was fruitless. The Supreme Court grew more 
conservative after Powell departed and, though lower courts might have shown willing to 
condemn the decision,
207
 the nation’s highest tribunal has yet to resolve the issue of race in 
capital sentencing. While race is reported to have been the elephant in the room during 
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Furman,
208
 racial disparities in sentencing are an unavoidable reality.
209
 A July 2015 a 
Missouri study concluded that 81% of individuals executed in that state since 1976 had killed 
white victims, even though whites account for less than 40% of all murder victims in that 
state.
210
 Similar results were reported from South Carolina.
211
 Until recently, any hope of a 
reconsideration of a McCleskey claim appeared unlikely, with silence at the Court 
surrounding the matter, but a grant of certiorari in June 2015 offers some solace. That 
challenge, Foster v Chatman,
212
 asks whether the Georgia Supreme Court failed to recognise 
racial discrimination in a capital appeal when it had become apparent that, at trial, 
prosecutors wrongly offered ‘race-neutral’213 justifications for what could in fact be deemed 
wilful and unconstitutional discrimination.
214
 
Returning to the central question posed by this thesis, namely the future evolution 
of the Constitution’s punishments clause, this chapter will now turn to another area of 
sentencing. The Eighth Amendment does not end at capital punishment and, since its 
incorporation, progress has been made in the non-capital sphere as much as in the death 
penalty cases. This area will now be examined. 
2.5 NON-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Since its dominance in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the 1970s and 80s, capital 
punishment has crawled towards a vanishing point.
215
 In the non-capital sphere, however, the 
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picture is somewhat different. This is an area generally left to the discretion of the states. 
Imprisonment is now utilised in the US at a rate never before witnessed anywhere in the 
world,
216
 with average periods of incarceration similarly snowballing. The constitutionality of 
mass incarceration has yet to be addressed head on,
217
 though a number of limits are imposed 
on sentencing by the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth. The Court with a view of evolving 
standards doctrine, for example, has adjudicated the use of mandatory minimums for specific 
offences and the application of these methods to juveniles. It is on those areas of non-capital 
sentencing which this chapter will now focus. 
2.5.1 PROPORTIONALITY IN NON-CAPITAL SENTENCING 
The Supreme Court delivered a trilogy of judgments in the 1980s, which considered 
the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle and contributed to a marked development 
of the relevance of the Constitution to non-capital sentencing. In Rummel v Estelle
218
 
SCOTUS reviewed a sentence imposed under a “three-strikes” statute mandating life 
imprisonment for a third felony theft.
219
 Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court’s opinion, 
declaring that ‘a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment’220 and 
concluding that Weems was inapplicable in this context. The Court justified this conclusion 
by relying upon a case heard just after Weems,
221
 with a majority in Rummel holding that any 
nationwide trend moving away from recidivist statutes - those which aim to punish 
reoffenders more severely - must be demonstrated by state legislatures, not federal 
judgments.
222
 The effect of the ruling was to uphold the Texan statute, designed to punish 
habitual offenders with severe sentences after three offences.
223
 The Court left open the 
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question of how Eighth Amendment proportionality applied to non-capital sentencing, with 
one commentator noting that the limited guidance left the punishment clause’s non-capital 
arm ‘in limbo’224 and initiated an increasing prison population in the US. 
Confusion among the lower courts caused by Rummel was noted in Hutto v Davis,
225
 
where SCOTUS considered a sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment for a first-time drug 
conviction.
226
 The Fourth Circuit had affirmed the sentence, claiming that any other decision 
would be the first of its kind.
227
 On review, the Supreme Court condemned the lower courts 
for abandoning the rule it believed was set in Rummel. The Hutto majority chided the federal 
courts, warning that ‘unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a 
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how 
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.’228 Justice Powell, who had dissented 
in Rummel,
229
 conceded that Hutto’s punishment was grossly disproportionate, but explained 
that he was constrained by precedent.
230
 Once again, the Court upheld its view that the 
duration of prison terms was ‘purely a matter of legislative prerogative’,231 other than in 
exceptionally severe cases. 
Further clarification of the proportionality principle came soon after in Solem v 
Helm,
232
 with Justice Powell delivering the opinion. The immediate result was that the 
sentence of life imprisonment imposed on petitioner Jerry Helm, convicted in South Dakota 
for a seventh nonviolent felony under a recidivist statute,
233
 was deemed unconstitutional. 
Solem would, however, evolve the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle far beyond 
these immediate ramifications. One key importance of the holding was that it gave credence 
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to the notion that proportionality was deep-rooted in the punishments clause and that it 
applied to all criminal sentences, including those which were non-capital.
234
 Demonstrating 
that proportionality can also evolve as time works changes, Powell laid out a test 
subsequently criticised as ‘unobjective’ and ‘readily manipulable’.235 The tripartite 
assessment laid out for unconstitutional gross disproportionality first compared the gravity of 
the offence with the subjective harshness of the penalty. This was followed by both a 
comparative reading of sentences for other crimes in the trial court’s jurisdiction, ‘ordinal 
proportionality’,236 and the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
In Solem SCOTUS read into its recent capital punishment cases, Enmund and Coker, 
in which death had been condemned as unconstitutionally excessive punishment in certain 
circumstances,
237
 distinguished Rummel, and found no basis to assert ‘that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences’.238 Dissenting, Chief 
Justice Burger warned that the Court had ‘launch[ed] into uncharted and unchartable 
waters’.239 The notion that navigating proportionality in the prison setting is unchartable is 
contestable, given that the Court has so readily navigated the waters of punishment in other 
contexts and, more importantly, that Marbury v Madison has long established that ‘it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’.240 
Judicial review or “chartering the waters” in this context is therefore the duty of the Court, a 
role Burger readily took on elsewhere.
241
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The evolution evidenced by this series of cases demonstrates the increased 
justiciability of non-capital sentences under the cruel and unusual punishments clause. It 
would soon transpire that the non-capital foundations laid by Solem were prophetic of a much 
darker phenomenon building on the legislative plane. Crack cocaine had arrived on the streets 
and,
242
 in response, a much more aggressive form of penal policy followed. 
2.5.2 MANDATORY MINIMUMS 
In the decade after the proportionality cases the Court was faced with a challenge to 
the constitutionality of mandatory life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) sentences. 
Implemented in response to the onset of crack cocaine in urban areas across the US as part of 
Reagan’s “War on Drugs”, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 created mandatory minimums 
for first-time drug offences.
243
 Examples of sentences were ten years’ imprisonment for the 
first offence of possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine,
244
 and for the second such 
offence, life.
245
 The states followed suit by enacting similarly punitive policies, akin to those 
in the capital sphere deemed unconstitutional in 1976 by Woodson and Roberts,
246
 Gregg’s 
companion cases. One example reached SCOTUS in 1991. 
The petitioner in Harmelin v Michigan
247
 had been sentenced to mandatory life 
imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for the possession of around 650 grams of crack 
cocaine.
248
 Upholding the sentence, a 5-4 majority opinion was driven by two distinct 
rationales. On one hand, Justice Scalia denied that the Court had ever identified a 
proportionality principle in the Eighth,
249
 binding that conclusion to an ‘eighteenth century 
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interpretation’250 which accepted only torturous punishment as violative of the cruel and 
unusual punishments clause. Scalia’s approach has been described as unjustified and 
offensive to the evolving nature of the Amendment, failing to consider evolving standards 
over an outdated (originalist) standard.
251
 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, justified the 
mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on Harmelin by focusing on the secondary effects of 
drug use, namely ‘a direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence’.252 
In reaching a conclusion in favour of the state, the majority in Harmelin betrayed the 
duty it owed to apply the Eighth to non-capital sentences, as established in Solem and Hutto. 
This omission of responsibility provided legislatures with ‘carte blanche to impose severe 
sanctions for petty crimes’253 without the prospect of judicial review. Though six of the 
Justices in Harmelin agreed that there was a ‘narrow’254 proportionality principle, which 
applied to non-capital sentences, the case represented a failed opportunity to clarify the non-
capital punishment proportionality test from Solem and left the lower courts with further 
uncertainty. It would take another decade and a revision of the bench to revitalise the Court’s 
approach. 
In 2003 SCOTUS handed down two landmark Eighth Amendment decisions on the 
same day: Lockyer v Andrade
255
 and Ewing v California.
256
 Both concerned petitioners from 
California, and the same Justices split 5-4 in each case.
257
 Delivering both judgments, Justice 
O’Connor noted in Ewing that the narrow proportionality principle, which had been identified 
in Harmelin, was applied with extreme rarity.
258
 She concluded that the Solem test could not 
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be applied in this instance as Ewing concerned a recidivist statute,
259
 rather than a first-time 
grossly disproportionate sentence.
260
 The effect of the ruling was to uphold mandatory 
sentences of 25 years’ imprisonment before parole eligibility as applied to those convicted of 
a third violent felony.
261
 O’Connor directed that any challenges to such state statutes should 
be deferred to state legislatures, continuing the hands-off theme demonstrated in Rummel.
262
 
Lockyer concerned a sentence of two consecutive 25-year terms for two counts of 
petty theft with a prior conviction,
263
 each triggering the ‘three-strikes’264 mandatory 
minimum. Assessing whether to follow Rummel, where a life sentence imposed on a third-
time felon was deemed proportionate, or Solem, where a life sentence for a seventh 
nonviolent felony was disproportionate, Justice O’Connor held Lockyer’s sentence to fall 
between the two, but most closely to Rummel. As such, Eighth Amendment protection was 
not afforded to Lockyer and the sentence was deemed proportionate, thus constitutional. 
While it must have seemed through Lockyer as if the Court was unwilling to broaden 
the Eighth Amendment’s scope in order better to protect non-capital convicts from lengthy 
sentences, thereby rendering the Solem direction merely historical,
265
 two cases handed down 
in 2010 and 2012 demonstrated a shift in this unwillingness. This shift was the greatest 
towards evolution in the non-capital sphere since Solem was heard. 
2.5.3 JUVENILES 
In 2004, Roper marked the death knell of juvenile capital punishment, with SCOTUS 
holding by a narrow majority that the US was to join the rest of the world in banning the 
practice. One year later, in US v Booker,
266
 the Court held that the Federal Sentencing 
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Guidelines were only advisory, not mandatory,
267
 affording greater discretion to sentencing 
judges. Booker also indicated a renewed willingness by the federal judiciary to engage in 
non-capital proportionality review. Following the introduction to Congress of the Fair 
Sentencing Act in 2009,
268
 which finally reduced Reagan’s residual mandatory minimums, 
the Court granted review in Graham v Florida
269
 to a challenge against sentences of LWOP 
imposed on juveniles. 
Jamar Graham, a 16-year-old Floridian schoolboy, entered a home armed with a 
firearm, thereby violating the probation conditions of a plea deal following a previous armed 
robbery conviction. As a result of the latter conviction, Graham received a sentence of 
LWOP.
270
 Reviewing the Floridian scheme, which mandated the punishment, the Court 
deviated from the Solem proportionality assessment and noted that the case ‘implicated [an] 
entire class of offenders’.271 The Justices compared national consensus counting and 
contemporary sentencing practices to inform their decision on ESD grounds. Justice Kennedy 
noted that, while 37 state legislatures permitted LWOP for some juvenile non-homicide 
offences, in practice more than 60% of those sentences were from Florida alone,
272
 indicating 
a national consensus against Florida’s practice and thus against the penalty itself.273 The 
Graham Court reasoned that there were fundamental psychological differences between 
adults and juveniles, which rendered the latter less culpable.
274
 In addition, a majority noted a 
similar consensus in opposition to the practice of sentencing under-18s to whole-life 
sentences, this time at the international level, an indicator of ESD considered in Chapter V. 
Through Graham, Powell’s statement in Eddings that age ‘is more than a 
chronological fact’275 was extended to non-capital sentences, and the Eighth Amendment’s 
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protection was evolved far beyond its early origins or even its Robinson incorporation. A 
willingness to engage in a review of professional consensus, another element analysed in later 
chapters, was also evidenced. The evolution in Graham was to be progressed, perhaps sooner 
than expected, just two years later, in Miller v Alabama.
276
 This time concerning two 14-year-
olds who had received mandatory LWOP sentences for murder,
277
 Justice Kagan’s majority 
opinion referred expressly to the ESD principle within the Eighth Amendment. Re-
emphasising that young people are constitutionally different from adults,
278
 but rather than 
barring a specific penalty for a class of individuals, as it had done in Graham, the Court 
insisted that LWOP was not per se unconstitutional when imposed on under-18s. Instead, the 
judgment expanded the Graham reasoning to ban mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles, 
bringing the non-capital standard into line with that imposed by Gregg. 
Four dissentients
279
 protested that homicide is ‘special’280 and, in any case, the 
demonstrable objective indicia of society’s standards were not nearly as compelling as in 
Graham. Justices Alito and Scalia dissented even more vehemently against the ESD element, 
declaring that the Constitution does not provide the Court with authorisation to ‘take the 
country on this journey...toward some vision of evolutionary culmination.’281 In spite of that 
dissent, through Miller the current bench demonstrated a renewed commitment to evolving 
standards of decency surrounding penalties other than death, especially in the context of 
juveniles and those with reduced culpability.
282
 
Despite the promise of proportionality from Booker, the individualisation in Graham 
and Miller, and a patent commitment by the Court to expand the protection of the Eighth, 
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Adelman has urged caution. ‘In comparison to the immense scope of the public policy 
disasters that gave us mass incarceration,’ she warns, ‘the positive changes of the last decade 
are small beer’.283 Furthermore, these shifts deal only with one issue: proportionality in 
sentencing, not the lived-experiences of prisoners who are suffering in worsening conditions 
of imprisonment. Such conditions are most acutely experienced by those held in solitary 
confinement, now numbering around 81,000.
284
 In recent decades SCOTUS has extended the 
reach of its non-capital punishment jurisprudence beyond the prison walls, to conditions of 
confinement and treatment of prisoners. That sector of Eighth Amendment evolution is 
reserved for later chapters, where solitary confinement will be assessed under the ESD 
framework reworked in Chapter III. 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARK 
In 1816 Thomas Jefferson wrote that ‘[w]e might as well require a man to wear still 
the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of 
their barbarous ancestors.’285 As this chapter has shown, this tenet of evolutive interpretation, 
addressed on a theoretical level in Chapter III, pervades the Eighth Amendment. Since Justice 
McKenna applied such reasoning to the Constitution’s punishments clause in 1910,286 and 
Chief Justice Warren after him,
287
 the ESD principle has markedly transformed the 
Amendment’s scope and application. Since Gregg, the Court has narrowed capital 
punishment to near vanishing point and non-capital punishment has recently faced similar, 
albeit not so conclusive, judicial activism. 
In Graham and Miller, the Court’s commitment to proportionality and 
individualisation in non-capital sentencing demonstrates a willingness further to evolve the 
punishments clause. As Chapter VI will show, the constitutional rights made available to 
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prisoners have similarly flourished. Nonetheless, rates of incarceration continue to rise and, 
in addition, an ever-increasingly oppressive use of solitary confinement pervades criminal 
justice in the US. In 2014 Ferguson described the American criminal justice system as having 
‘gone astray, lost in a dark wood of its own making.’288 This thesis will demonstrate a way 
out, by applying evolutive interpretation of the punishments clause to the hidden corner of the 
prison: solitary confinement. Before doing so, the analytical components of the ESD 
assessment must first be examined. In the next chapter, Chapter III, a framework will be built 
using Dworkin’s concept of law as integrity, by which this thesis will later seek principles of 
political morality, which provide for the best interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 
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CHAPTER III 
A DWORKINIAN APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION 
The Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency (ESD) principle provides a 
strong example of the Supreme Court’s willingness to consider the Constitution in light of 
contemporary values. An understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the ESD will be 
essential to inform analysis of its potential to evolve the Eighth Amendment’s reach beyond 
the prison walls, into solitary confinement. To that end, this chapter will make the case for 
one approach, namely that ESD is best understood through Ronald Dworkin’s explanation of 
constitutional interpretation as one of morality, rather than living versus dead 
constitutionalism. The discussion will begin with an overview of the key tenets of such 
interpretation. 
This introduction will then be followed by an assessment of Dworkin’s opposition to 
traditional post-Enlightenment understandings of law (Section 3.2); an examination of 
Dworkin’s interpretivism and the tenets of this theory of adjudication relevant to the ESD 
assessment (Section 3.3); a consideration of the forces opposing such methods of enquiry 
(Section 3.4) and, finally, a framework for analysis which will shape the following chapters 
(Section 3.5). Throughout this chapter it will be argued that the Eighth Amendment’s 
evolution is best explained by an interpreter’s recourse to moral principles, not to policies. 
This tenet of rights being trumps is a key feature of Dworkinian jurisprudence, and one which 
will be defined and discussed shortly. Before doing so, a theoretical review of the legal 
theory which prevailed prior to Dworkin’s arrival will serve as the foundation of this 
chapter’s discussion. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION: THE CONSTITUTION: LIVING, DEAD, MORAL? 
During the framing of the punishments clause, one First Congress delegate noted that 
it was ‘too indefinite’,1 with another expressing that, ‘as it seems to have no meaning in it, I 
do not think it necessary.’2 Originally intended as ‘an admonition to all departments of the 
national government to warn them against such violent proceedings as had taken place in 
England’,3 the Eighth is now understood to be tied to a principle of evolutive decency which 
gives it the meaning lamented as missing in 1789. Chapter II showed the line of punishments 
clause jurisprudence, which has developed over the past fifty years, and this chapter aims to 
tie those constitutional developments to a coherent theory of adjudication. 
Strauss describes the concept of a living constitution as ‘one that evolves, changes 
over time, and adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended.’4 Such an 
approach to interpretation was endorsed by Thomas Jefferson,
5
 who believed that each 
generation of citizens and governments should be viewed as independent of the one 
preceding it, and that the Constitution must ‘keep pace with the times’.6 Broadly speaking, 
the polarisation of “living” versus “dead” (or original) interpretation was accepted as the 
dividing line in constitutional law throughout the last century.
7
 In 1980 Ely notably 
distinguished between two principal methods of interpretation: those which look to the text 
and values explicit in the text, which might be viewed as a “dead” theory, since the text 
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cannot change merely by interpretation, and those which venture beyond it: “living”.8 One 
author identified as many as 72 types of originalism,
9
 though broadly speaking the theory can 
be separated into two main areas. First is textualism,
10
 where the literal meanings of the 
words prevail, known as “narrow” originalism. The next type is original intent,11 where the 
text’s definition is informed by the intention of its authors. It is unsurprising that originalism 
has been equated to ‘fundamentalism’,12 for its seemingly secular commitment to the text. 
On the other side of the division again different approaches exist to the “living” 
method of constitutional interpretation. While the various theories need not be explained in 
depth for this discussion, a helpful overview is provided by Waluchow,
13
 who explains the 
living Constitution in terms of common law constitutionalism, with the analogy of a tree. In 
that analogy the trunk is rooted by the Constitution, planted by the People, but the branches 
are tended to by SCOTUS, which controls the direction and height of the Constitution’s 
eventual growth. Friedman and Smith discuss the sedimentary Constitution,
14
 an approach to 
living historicism which encourages interpreters to take heed of all relevant historical changes 
up to the present day, not just the history of the Constitution’s founding. This is a 
modification of Ackerman’s thesis,15 which distinguishes between mere historical change and 
‘constitutional moments’.16 The latter “moments” are arguably the only changes worth noting 
when interpreting the Constitution. 
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Recalling the Court’s invocation of evolutive interpretation in Trop v Dulles,17 that 
‘[t]he provisions of the Constitution are...vital, living principles’,18 the Eighth Amendment’s 
ESD principle appears on its face to fit neatly with Strauss’s definition of a Constitution 
which is alive. In Ely’s terms, the ESD principle seems to equip judges with the opportunity 
to venture beyond the document. The punishments clause’s constraint on governmental 
power to punish has been defined by a set of collective values that adapt over time.
19
 As a 
consequence, SCOTUS, both in capital and non-capital sentencing, to protect more 
individuals from disproportionate punishment or that which offends decency, has expanded 
the clause.
20
 
What this chapter will argue, however, is that a theory of law informed by morality 
need not ask whether judges should ‘change’21 the Constitution, but asks only how they 
interpret its existing provisions.
22
 Such a reading does not require, or indeed permit 
interpreters, in practice Supreme Court Justices, to adapt the Constitution. The assessment is 
not about whether the text is read as being alive or dead, but about an approach to 
interpretation that views rights in light of background values intertwined within the 
community. Elements of fidelity to the framing of the Constitution are respected by this 
approach, as will be shown, as are principles of living constitutionalism. 
3.2 POST-ENLIGHTENMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Age of Enlightenment ended the ‘god intoxicated’23 age of philosophy and 
natural law, instead giving rise to epistemology, where rights depended on convention. Porter 
notes that this period should not be viewed simply as ‘a canon of classics, but as a living 
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language, a revolution in mood, a blaze of slogans, delivering the shock of the new’.24 Within 
the new framework of identifiable, describable proscriptions, men, for men, created law.
25
 
The school of jurisprudence, which gained momentum during this philosophical departure 
from natural law,
26
 legal positivism, can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes’s mid-17th 
Century writing.
27
 Positivism was introduced to the wider discourse through Bentham’s work 
two centuries later,
28
 where he reproached natural rights as ‘simple nonsense...nonsense upon 
stilts’,29 denying the idea of rights being inalienable and ‘imprescriptible’,30 instead endorsing 
‘expository jurisprudence’,31 wherein laws are a subset of sovereign commands. Austin 
propagated Bentham’s original endorsement of this more empirical approach to legal theory, 
delivering to the broader political community the edict that the province of jurisprudence was 
concerned only with imperative legal commands.
32
 
Austin sought to push jurisprudence in the direction of science, casting aside all non-
legal principles along the way.
33
 To do so he defined what he viewed as truly “genuine” laws; 
those, which were ‘a species of commands’,34 issued by a sovereign and backed by sanctions. 
This became known as Austin’s ‘Command Theory’.35 Under the command theory, no place 
is reserved for the normative; the intangible concept of morality is merely law by analogy: 
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composed of a set of desirable principles that are insufficiently “legal” to constitute 
enforceable restrictions or rights. Austin’s foundations in legal positivism would serve the 
basis for a much larger following in the 20
th
 Century, at the same time that the US 
Constitution’s incorporation to the states was beginning to gain steam. 
3.2.1 MODERN POSITIVISM 
A significant contributor to legal positivism at this time was Hart, who edited a 
significant yet previously unseen Bentham treatise alongside his own extensive work and,
36
 
more recently, Raz.
37
 Indeed, Hart’s theoretical commitments, which will be explored shortly, 
are ones from which Dworkin developed his opposing theses. Without Hart’s endorsement of, 
and updates to, Austinian positivism, Dworkin’s grounds for criticism would have been much 
shakier. 
In the 1960s Hart mounted a defence of positivism, which he viewed as remedying 
the shortcomings of the Austinian approach,
38
 providing three theoretical claims regarding 
the criteria of legality. As a legal positivist, Hart agreed with Austin, that morality is 
conceptually distinct from law. This is the first claim: the Separability Thesis.
39
 In Hart’s 
words, ‘it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of 
morality, though in fact they have often done so’.40 It is argued simply that law and morality 
are separate when legal validity is being ascertained, has nonetheless been split into two 
further categories: soft and hard. Soft Separability emerged in later Hartian writing, which 
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acknowledged that sometimes morals are included in law.
41
 Hard Separability remains loyal 
to the original premise that strict or ‘exclusive’42 separation is required by the conceptual 
distinction between law and morality. In positivism, law may (and in many cases probably 
will) in itself be conceptually related to morality, as both Hart and Raz have acknowledged,
43
 
but law never defers to moral authority; a rule does not depend on a moral value-judgement 
to provide it with legal validity. 
Hart’s second criterion of legality is the Rule of Recognition, which, according to 
Hart, holds that law derives only from rules of social convention.
44
 By considering a 
community without law in the form of rules, Hart demonstrates that the hypothetical social 
problems encountered by that lawless community would be solved only by a series of rules, 
including the Rule of Recognition, where members of the community recognise and accept 
those rules by which they are bound.
45
 Shapiro summarises Hart’s conclusion as providing 
legal systems with a method to resolve uncertainty surrounding the binding nature of rules 
since through ‘the “rule of recognition” – normative questions can be resolved without 
engaging in deliberation, negotiation or persuasion.’46 This theoretical commitment is 
accompanied by the assumption that behaviour is governed only by those legal rules 
established by elected officials: ‘Conventionality’.47 Coleman notes that modern positivism is 
best understood through this tenet of Hartian jurisprudence, wherein positivist jurisprudes are 
‘committed to explaining law as ultimately resting on a social convention’.48 
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Hart’s third commitment to positivism, the rule most closely derived from Austinian 
theory,
49
 is the ‘Social Fact Thesis’, or ‘Pedigree Test’.50 This holds that the viability of law 
depends on the threats of sanctions, which officials are able to carry out.
51
 While adopting 
elements of Austin’s more traditional positivist jurisprudence, Hart identifies a lacuna in 
Austin’s thesis: secondary rules.52 Secondary rules contain the procedures through which 
primary, right-granting rules can be created, modified, and extinguished.
53
 These secondary, 
or ‘meta’54 rules, should unite, according to Hart, with primary rules, to provide the final 
word on what is law. 
Positivism, in any of the forms introduced above, does not fit with the Eighth 
Amendment’s ESD principle. That principle, which underscores the Court’s jurisprudence in 
this field, is one which is morally inquisitive and has been shown to contain value judgements 
of decency for which positivism’s exhaustive rules cannot cater. To attach interpretation of 
the punishments clause to an adequate theory of adjudication, this thesis therefore proposes 
an alternative theoretical approach, which integrates morality with law. From a theoretical 
perspective this approach will be derived from Dworkin’s ‘interpretivism’,55 crafted in direct 
opposition to Hartian positivism in order to effect a ‘fusion of constitutional law and moral 
philosophy.’56 
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3.3 DWORKIN’S ANSWERS 
Dworkin’s work attempts to carry out the fusion of law and morality,57 concepts torn 
apart by Hart’s positivism, to appreciate more clearly how judges interpret legal rules and 
constitutional principles. Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation, provides for more than 
simply moral objectivity.
58
 Interpretivism directly depends on answers to moral questions in 
order to address legal questions.
59
 The moral questions posed by the ESD enquiry form the 
subject matter of the remainder of this chapter, which deems Dworkin’s interpretivism to 
provide the best framework for Eighth Amendment adjudication. To understand the value of 
interpretivism to this thesis, it is necessary to explore the main tenets of Dworkinian theory. 
3.3.1 MORALITY 
Hume, widely considered a leader in empirical Western philosophy during the 
Enlightenment,
60
 adopted a naturalistic position on moral values: no amount of observable 
empiricism could ever discover morality, identifiable only though normative judgements of 
what the law ought to be, rather than descriptive assessments of what the law is.
61
 This 
marked a departure from the predominant empiricism of Locke, who had centered his moral 
philosophy on reason and had asserted that there was not a single idea which was universally 
held, and so morality could only arise from experience.
62
 Hume, however, insisted that 
morality arose out of a moral sense,
63
 which reason could not explain. Under this reading, 
morality is best understood as a normative combination of core values of human dignity, 
including equality, fairness, justice, and self-respect.
64
 Morality is, thus, a ‘separate 
                                                          
57
 According to 2007 rankings, when the vast majority of Dworkin’s work had been published, he had gained 
3,070 citations from 2000-2007, a similar number to those accumulated by Nussbaum, Waldron and Alexander, 
combined. Brian Leiter, ‘Most Cited Law Professors by Specialty, 2000-2007’ (2007)  
<www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2007faculty_impact_areas.shtml> accessed 18
th
 October 2014. 
58
 Dworkin, JFH (n 23) 17. 
59
 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (FL) (HUP 1997) 32-39. 
60
 Bryan McGee, The Great Philosophers (OUP 2000) 146. 
61
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Treatise) (1738) (Penguin edn, 1985) 494. 
62
 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) (Prometheus edn, 1995) Book I, ii, 3-5. 
63
 Hume, Treatise (n 61) 522. 
64
 Dworkin takes pain to define these concepts in JfH (n 23) 62-209. 
Chapter III: A Dworkinian Approach to Interpretation 
58 
 
department of knowledge with its own standards of inquiry and justification’,65 requiring a 
rejection of the Enlightenment’s epistemology and of Locke’s insistence on scientific 
rationality. The ESD principle underlying the Eighth Amendment depends on a sense of 
justice which pervades the Constitution’s punishments clause; a provision which exists to 
guard citizens against excessive power. It is fundamental to that tenet of interpretation that 
the ESD is a normative value, and one which provides interpreters with the momentum to 
view the law in its best light. 
 Dworkin explains that moral judgements are made only through second-order 
assessments of morality: for a moral judgement to be true it must be made ‘by an adequate 
moral argument for their truth.’66 In this sense, the accuracy of moral convictions cannot be 
tested without recourse to further moral convictions.
67
 This endeavour, ‘moral 
responsibility’,68 is idealistic and practically troublesome. It can only be achieved by seeking 
‘the most comprehensive account’69 of morality that a given interpreter can achieve. This, 
Dworkin wrote, is an ‘interpretive goal’.70 
Adopting Hume’s position on normative moral values,71 Dworkin explains that there 
is a value judgement to be found in all forms of interpretation, and that this judgement 
constitutes ‘background morality’.72 When discussing legal adjudication, Dworkin extends 
Hume’s position and argues that a form of moral assessment is also observable when courts 
assess the rights or obligations envisaged by legal rules. In undertaking this interpretive 
project, judges draw on ‘political morality’,73 providing interpreters with the tools to ‘di[g] 
deeper into the law to find the strongest moral and political principles that could justify an 
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authoritative decision.’74 Those principles are identified through an internal investigation into 
‘the integrity of legal practice.’75 Interpreters who read law as integrity reject Hart’s 
Separability Thesis, instead advocating for law to be understood not as parallel to, but 
intertwined with morality. That concept, “integrity”, in Dworkinian terms, will now be 
applied by this thesis to the ESD principles of decency and political morality underlying the 
punishments clause. 
3.3.2 LAW AS INTEGRITY AND BEST FIT 
Dworkin introduced his integrity thesis in Law’s Empire, by denying the conventional 
assumption that legal interpretation was split between looking back (at rules) and looking 
forward (at application of those rules), instead seeing the role of judges as a combination of 
both: ‘an unfolding political narrative.’76 As noted in the introduction, this theory – integrity, 
essential to interpretivism – is an approach to interpretation, not some kind of judicial 
amendment process. The concept of integrity leads judges to understand rights and duties as 
informed by the political morality underlying the community from which they originated. 
Those rights and duties can therefore be interpreted in the future through a consideration of 
the core principles of justice, fairness, and due process,
77
 with a view of the past and the 
present. Complementary to these principles, political integrity is part of law as integrity, 
entailing that like cases should be treated alike.
78
 This is referred to by Dworkin as 
‘coherence in principle’79 and ties into the idea that interpretations of the law should 
ultimately ‘express a single and comprehensive vision of justice’.80 An example arises from 
one of the values of majoritarian democracy: if the government applies majoritarianism to 
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voting and permits one-person-one-vote, which it does,
81
 then interpretivist coherence 
requires that government to adhere to the same principle when voting-apportionment takes 
place, to ensure coherence in the principle of one-person-one-vote.
82 
Assumptions must be made, Dworkin explained, in order to view community 
principles in the best possible light.
83
 While assumptions might give rise to a lacuna in 
interpretation, the interpretivist project strives for an optimistic reading of rights, whereby 
judges are capable of reflecting on a given community’s practices and doctrines without 
necessarily making recourse to rigid text-based originalism.
84
 These judges select the best 
interpretation of the right or duty to show a community in the best possible light; the sources 
of integrity, which provide the ‘best fit’.85 On this view of law, Anderson describes law as 
integrity as ‘an ongoing project of interpreting...social practices’.86 This thesis intends to 
undertake that project in the following chapters, but only after two further tenets of 
interpretivism are considered: the concepts of hard cases and of principles trumping policies. 
3.3.3 HARD CASES 
Dworkin wrote that legal structures, rights and obligations, have ‘become too 
complex to suit positivism’s austerity’.87 If positivism constructs law only out of rules; where 
rules run out, so does law. Often involving questions of constitutional interpretation or of 
clashing rights, ‘hard cases’88 are situations of novelty where rules and policies (with which 
positivism is preoccupied)
89
 will not provide comprehensive answers. Where Hart failed, in 
allowing judges to reach their own subjective value-judgments when sources of positivism 
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run out, a judge led by interpretivism seeks guidance through integrity (moral principles), 
ensuring that interpretation is unhindered.
90
 
Because it treats law as informed by morals, which are viewed as part of the 
framework of legal validity, Dworkin’s interpretivism succeeds here where positivism fails, 
by tying jurisprudence to a theory of adjudication, and one which this thesis will tie to the 
Eighth Amendment’s ESD. Dworkin ‘embarrass[es] positivism’91 by filling the gap it leaves 
behind in hard cases. He achieves this with his theories of ‘right answers’ and ‘best fit’.92 
Law, under interpretivism, must always depend at least in part on what it ought to be.
93
 To 
this end, the Dworkinian interpreter must identify principles of political morality, which are 
interlaced with rules to form law. As well as the principles of integrity and best fit discussed 
in the previous subsections, Letsas identifies further examples such as justice, democracy, 
liberty, and equality.
94
 Guidance sought through an application of these principles and 
community standards closes the gap in the hard case, reading a provision in its most 
optimistic and aspirational moral light.
95
 
Under Dworkin’s theory, law is seen as a branch of evolving political morality,96 
where the law must be pliable to socio-legal-political forces.
97
 ‘We must’, Dworkin insists, 
‘therefore do our best...to make our community’s fundamental law what our sense of justice 
would approve’.98 To provide definition to evolution expedited by such a theory of law, 
Dworkin applies his ‘best fit’99 thesis, with the aspiration to answer hard questions with 
“principled” answers. Within this concept of interpretation, Dworkin explains that 
constitutional evolution is not achieved by unfettered judicial amendment, but accommodates 
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a principled method of interpretation ‘by appealing to an amalgam of practice’.100 In doing 
so, interpreters ensure that principles always trump policies: the next tenet of Dworkin’s 
theory that must be explained. 
3.3.4 PRINCIPLES TRUMP POLICIES 
Filling the void left by positivism’s exhaustiveness in the hard case, Dworkin makes 
recourse to principles. Here he describes ‘a fundamental distinction within political 
theory’:101 that between policies and principles. Policy arguments, Dworkin explains, justify a 
political decision with a functional community goal.
102
 Principles, however, are grounded in 
‘past official acts (for example, the text of statutes, judicial decisions, or constitutions).’103 
Moreover, interpreters of rights should, and do,
104
 seek information from those principles 
cited or implicit in ‘past political decisions of the right sort.’105 The right sort, another 
problematic phrase, depends on a decision, which is based on the key principles of political 
morality: justice, democracy, liberty, and equality.
106
 Pre-interpretive data (in the Eighth 
Amendment sphere this might include opinion polls and counted states, for example) is 
selected by an interpretivist judge, who then ‘puts the object or practice [of interpretation] in 
the best possible light’107 in the interpretive stage. In the post-interpretive stage, the judge 
interprets, often improves,
108
 and attempts to view moral sources at their highest value.
109
 
Take the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, inter alia, that ‘[n]o State 
shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’110 The 
initial (pre-interpretive) policy goal behind that clause was to guarantee African Americans 
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citizenship, no more, no less. A positivist might draw the line at the understanding explicit in 
the Conventionality of the right: the text; original legislative intention; and accepted 
community practice. In a move which aligns neatly within an interpretivist framework, 
however, the Fourteenth’s due process clause has been interpreted to contain a broader 
(interpretive) principle of equal treatment; one which would later become the basis for 
revolutionary cases such as Brown v Board of Education.
111
 Brown was at first condemned as 
an expression of judges acting as the ‘third legislative chamber’.112 This charge, commonly 
phrased “legislating from the bench” is faced by activist judges who are viewed by legal 
conservatives with suspicion. Moreover, the decision in Brown spoke against the tide of 
public opinion, and certainly against the public opinion at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption, hence an interpretivist example of constitutional evolution.113 The 
case provided the Court with the tools to dismantle racial segregation in earnest, applying the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to racist school practices (post-
interpretive refinement). Dworkin saw Brown as: 
‘a potential embarrassment to any theory that emphasizes the importance of the 
framers’ intentions...there is no evidence that any substantial number of the 
congressmen who proposed the Fourteenth Amendment thought or hoped that it 
would be understood as making racially segregated education illegal.’114 
Policies, therefore, fall by the wayside when trumped by principles. Brown provides 
an example of this interpretivist tenet, demonstrating that positivism’s limited rubric is 
enlightened by moral guidance. This approach arrived after ‘generations of increasingly 
refined utilitarian thought’,115 with Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously provoking ‘familiar 
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family squabbles’116 with positivists. Majority and utility are trumped under this heading by 
rights-oriented principles, informed by morality. 
Writing at the same time as Dworkin, Rawls also drew more patently on the 
construction of law through principles of morality rather than the mere identification of rules-
driven positivism.
117
 Moral judgements, Rawls wrote, allow interpreters to fix communities 
by creating suitable morals out of the principles embedded in that community.
118
 While this 
refusal to accept the Separability Thesis speaks to Dworkin’s interpretivism, Dworkin rejects 
Rawls’s constructivist attempt to find some kind of morally neutral consensus regarding the 
‘account and justification of the liberal traditions of law and political practice.’119 
Challenging Rawls’s project, Dworkin explained that, ‘[i]f you ask the present judges on the 
United States Supreme Court to describe [those embedded principles] you will receive nine 
different answers’120 and, therefore, Rawls’s undertaking is impossible without a moral value 
component. 
Dworkin’s search for the right moral answer is not immune to the same criticism. 
When describing a hypothetical situation in Justice for Hedgehogs, he reveals his idea of a 
‘conscientious judge’121 who tests a principle by ‘casting the net wide’122 and asking what the 
best answers would provide. ‘We may not succeed,’ Dworkin wrote of the interpretive 
endeavour, ‘but the struggle is better than the pretense.’123 Moral responsibility requires what 
Dworkin terms “integrity” and, in that vein, the philosophy of someone who is morally 
responsible is ‘interpretivism’.124 In adjudication, this optimistic endeavour requires an 
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interpretive judge: Hercules, to whom this chapter has alluded, and whom Dworkin 
introduced through his earlier work. The jurisprudence of Hercules must now be revealed. 
3.3.5 HERCULES 
Dworkin’s interpretivism holds that there is always a right answer which provides the 
best fit to every legal question; it is through moral inquiry that this answer is found, filling, in 
hard cases, the gaps left by conventional rules.
125
 Whilst real-world interpreters can but strive 
to achieve the formidable standard of the “right” answer to a problem, Dworkin’s Hercules is 
the only judge capable of delivering the most right answer.
126
 Hercules is an omnipotent 
interpreter due to his unfettered access to any information on any topic, and his unlimited 
capacity to process that information without time constraints.
127
 Hutchinson and Wakefield 
note that it is plain that Hercules ‘adopts a cavalier attitude towards rules,’128 but will defer to 
those textual sources where they are adequate to reach the best result.
129
 
Dworkin explained that Hercules is useful in elucidating exactly what it is judges 
should do.
130
 They cannot transform into Hercules in hard cases, but they can certainly strive 
to think in the same, ideal,
131
 way that Hercules would, and one way to achieve that is by 
viewing legal interpretation as dependent on an intertwined system of morality.
132
 In practice, 
Dworkin continues, his judge must show pre-interpretive data in its best light.
133
 Dworkin 
relies on the analogy of a hypothetical chain-novel to explain this concept, with the 
interpreter positioned as the author. The author must choose the best fit for her portion of the 
story, which follows various interdependent chapters, and the underlying target before all 
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authors is to write the best novel possible.
134
 Perhaps only the Herculean author is able 
practically to find the truly “best” outcome, but the authors can strive for that standard. 
Equally, a judge can attempt to interpret the law as best possible, given the constraints on him 
as a human interpreter, warts and all. 
As the principal architect in Dworkin’s interpretivist solution, Hercules has 
unsurprisingly met numerous criticisms. The criticisms of this solution provide the fuel of the 
next section, which serves to examine the potential shortcomings of Dworkin’s work. 
3.4 RESPONDING TO OPPOSITION 
Dworkin’s theories have been described as ‘distressingly obscure’ and ‘tantalizingly 
incomplete’,135 though it is worth remembering that he later clarified that interpretivism does 
not purport to find the right answer to hard questions, only to explain that there exists such an 
answer and that it can be found through an assessment of moral principles.
136
 During 
Dworkin’s thirty years of further scholarship he refined his approach,137 incorporating 
responses to critics alongside the developments of his own legal and political philosophy. 
Despite descriptions of Dworkin as ‘besieged and friendless’138 and ‘something of a tragic 
figure’139 in the history of jurisprudence, his work often resulted in far more positive legal 
citations than others in the academy over the past thirty years.
140
 Raz, who is argued to have 
had the greatest influence in the field of jurisprudence,
141
 has criticised Dworkin’s 
interpretivism, accusing the theory of proffering answers to legal questions through abstract 
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considerations of fit and morality, without solving those problems in an empirical and logical 
manner,
142
 positivism. 
This thesis has demonstrated how positivism provides an unhelpful fit for ESD 
adjudication, a stalwart of contemporary Eighth Amendment adjudication for which the 
moral, decency, component is vital.
143
 Positivism provides a restrictive approach to the 
inclusion of morality. In straightforward cases, this might be quite sensible since precedent 
controls the outcome. In hard cases such as novel constitutional evolution, positivism is less 
helpful.
144
 The positivist’s pedigree test therefore cannot cater for the complexity of hard 
cases, for which, under a Dworkinian interpretation, only moral questions can find the right 
answer.
145
 There remain, however, significant challenges to Dworkin’s work. The remainder 
of this section seeks to address those charges in order properly to appreciate the providence 
of interpretivism’s abstract, often-idealistic ideas, and their efficacy for Eighth Amendment 
adjudication. 
3.4.1 SUBJECTIVITY 
A core criticism of Dworkinian theory is that it is guided by unconstrained 
subjectivity.
146
 This reading of Dworkin seems to be based on his concept of integrity, which 
requires judges to reach beyond rules into principles such as equality and fairness, requiring a 
degree of individual discretion by the interpreter.
147
 Guest points out that all legal 
interpretation has, at its base, the requirement of arguments made to reconstruct an ideal.
148
 
Any such arguments rely on individual reasoning and therefore subjectivity. Unlike 
positivists, Dworkin does not urge judges to use unbridled discretion in seeking answers left 
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by the gaps in hard cases.
149
 Instead, judges are encouraged to take interpretive guidance 
beyond rules by considering community principles of political morality, which are already 
established within the framework of the law. In order to oppose accusations of unbridled 
discretion at this juncture, Dworkin insists that moral judgements must be made true ‘by an 
adequate moral argument for their truth’:150 moral responsibility.151 Moral responsibility is 
ensured where interpreters act with the guidance of ‘the most comprehensive account’152 of 
principles of morality. 
To condemn Dworkin for imposing subjectivity is therefore to misunderstand both the 
underlying precepts of interpretation, and the role of integrity as a rational sieve for 
discretion. Rationality in this sense is ensured by responsibility. A level of abstraction must 
be accepted for analysis: real-world judges are objects of fallible human agency with 
subjective insights and varying world-views, but this should not lead to a dismissal of an 
aspirational approach to adjudication. Interpretivism, as adopted by this thesis, guides 
interpreters to strive for moral responsibility and best fit.
153
 
3.4.2 FIDELITY 
That US citizens should pay respect and “fidelity” to their Constitution is described 
by Balkin as ‘pretty much an unquestioned good.’154 Such loyalty is embedded in political 
culture, as represented by the Pledge of Allegiance.
155
 Levin provides a comprehensive study 
of the cultural permanence of constitutional fidelity in the US, demonstrating its ‘perceived 
capacity for preserving civil virtue, and the perceived necessity for recreating that virtue’.156 
He tracks the Constitution’s status as a ‘symbol of popular sovereignty’,157 with evidenced 
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cultural acceptance of the Constitution as a symbol not just of American community, but of 
deeply embedded ‘normative agreement among fellow citizens’.158 All judges in the US are 
required to pledge allegiance to ‘all the duties incumbent … under the Constitution’,159 and 
the idea of a Constitution ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’160 is fundamental to 
American representative government. As such, a high degree of fidelity can be expected in 
the branches of government. 
It is clearly destructive, or at least controversial, to describe a legal philosopher’s 
jurisprudence as invidious to such constitutional allegiance without strong evidence for such 
a claim. Narrow originalists such as Scalia and Bork refute the constitutional fidelity of moral 
reasoning such as that found in interpretivism, as it deviates from the text of the 
Constitution.
161
 In fact, even authors with sympathy for constitutional evolution have decried 
Dworkin on similar grounds.
162
 Ackerman, Lessig, and Sunstein, despite having little in 
common with narrow originalist ideology,
163
 each argue that fidelity requires a rejection of 
Dworkin’s moral reasoning, for interpretivism is seemingly less concerned with faith to the 
text than with its improvement.
164
 This criticism is part of Fleming’s ‘originalist premise’,165 
the assumption that the only method of fidelity to the Constitution is originalism. Under this 
line of thought Dworkin is a constitutional revisionist, an accusation that misunderstands 
moral interpretation. 
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The further charge from Lessig, that Dworkin is a constitutional ‘infidel’,166 is an 
ungrounded ad hominem attack against an aspirational understanding of law as informed by 
morality. This thesis accepts that interpretivism is an approach, which aspires to ‘purify and 
perfect’167 rights, and that such aspiration brings challenges due to its abstract and indefinite 
status, but it is not revisionist because it accepts political morality as having been part of the 
background framework of the law since its drafting. Notwithstanding, the existence of 
challenges should not stifle moral ambition, nor should they lead a critic wholly to disregard 
the interpretive approach. The ‘Rule of Law’ (RoL),168 which gathers virtually unanimous 
support, but brings with it conflicting definitions and components,
169
 provides a familiar 
example of another aspirational tenet of legal rights and obligations. Naturally, Dworkin 
approaches the RoL differently from positivists like Raz, and this is unsurprising given the 
nature of their conflicting views of a ‘dichotomy between form and substance’,170 which 
interpretivism opposes. Nonetheless, even the phrase “Rule of Law” ‘has a power or force of 
its own. To criticise governmental action as contrary to the rule of law immediately casts it in 
a bad light’.171 Similarly, interpretivism seeks the best light when defining a constraint on 
government. Rather than amending the constraint, such as the punishments clause, in a 
revisionist way which disregards history, the interpretivist judge seeks to inform that 
restriction according to its background morality. Definitions of such morality might differ 
from judge to judge, but harmony and consistency should come from their unified 
commitment to interpreting the clause in the best light. 
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Contrary to accusations of infidelity, this thesis makes the claim that a turn to history 
should not descend into an escape into that history.
172
 In the face of accusations of infidelity 
to tradition, Dworkin’s theory of interpretation in fact encourages a review of history and 
precedent, with an added moral lens.
173
 It understands morality to have been an undercurrent 
in the drafting, adoption, application, and therefore the future interpretation of the 
Constitution.
174
 Fidelity to the Constitution is thereby upheld by adjudication, which 
exercises political morality-driven judgments, guided by principles and inclusive of a critical 
view of historical and cultural sources. Interpretive coherence is ensured by best fit. 
Similar falsehoods have been propagated through arguments that interpretivism 
cannot explain the rigidity of the Constitution. Eisgruber bases this claim on a distinction 
between history and substance.
175
 As argued previously, for Dworkin there is no distinction 
between these two concepts. Historical facts cannot possibly be identified as distinct from 
their moral substance, since that moral substance was present during the Constitution’s 
framing, and its various amendments since. Arguments against interpretivism founded upon 
this distinction are therefore viewed by this thesis as contradictory from the outset, for 
misunderstanding the connection of history with political morality. 
While it is understandable that a critic may sustain a challenge against such a theory, 
which seems to have the answer to everything, it is important to emphasise that Dworkin 
provides this model as one of best practice. By championing that model, his idealistic judge 
Hercules is also prone to attack. 
3.4.3 HERCULES 
In Law’s Empire Dworkin admits that Hercules, his ‘mythical reigning jurisprude’176 
best equipped to rise to the interpretive challenge, can be accused of being a ‘fraud’.177 This 
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objection hinges on the belief that there is no one right answer: a direct contradiction to 
Dworkin’s ‘right answer thesis’.178 On this charge, Hercules is exposed as offering only his 
own opinion about how the law should apply. Dworkin admits that this objection ‘will seem 
powerful to many readers’,179 and forges it into two prongs. In the first prong, Hercules’s 
right answer is fraudulent because political morality is always subjective: there cannot be a 
single right answer, only varying levels of good and bad answers. Dworkin describes this as 
the challenge of moral scepticism.
180
 Such scepticism is ill founded on the critic’s quest for 
“subjectivity”, for the reasons outlined previously.181 Hercules’s omnipotent nature is 
inherently objective; his judgements of morality and principles are implicit and need not be 
side-tracked by hyperbolic terminology such as “really” or “objectively”.182 His endeavour is 
one of the right answer, not his right answer. 
In the second prong, Hercules’s answer is fraudulent even if it is objective, because he 
has discovered an answer to the wrong question. By recourse to morality, a Herculean 
interpreter establishes what she thinks the law ought to be, not what the law is. Again, this 
constitutes a misunderstanding. Dworkin explains that ‘[t]he spirit of integrity...would be 
outraged if Hercules were to make his decision in any other way than by choosing the 
interpretation that he believes best from the standpoint of political morality’.183 Integrity 
operates under the assumption that the interpreter is able and willing to value fairness and 
justice. Hercules is able to do this, and Herculean interpreters must strive to do the same. The 
resultant answer is indeed one of normative ought,
184
 but not of personal value. 
At this juncture rationalisation with sceptics is difficult, if not impossible. Those who 
refute the existence of moral values will of course refute the ability of an interpreter (even 
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one of Hercules’s calibre) to reason with the guidance of principles. Dworkin dedicates a 
significant portion of Justice for Hedgehogs to arguing that even disparities about the 
existence of morality are themselves moral arguments,
185
 but that meta-moral analysis is far 
beyond the scope of the current study. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that 
principles need not compete: in negligence cases, for example, Dworkin admits that both 
sympathy and responsibility can find a place in the interpretivist search for the right moral 
answer to difficult legal questions.
186
 That does not guarantee ease in finding answers, but it 
makes their detection possible.
187
 
Before moving to the final category of criticism faced by Dworkin’s work it is worth 
considering another attack on Hercules, that he is a myth;
188
 that he is merely idealistic and 
does not act as a real judge would act. In reality, this criticism sustains, a judge has more 
reliance on facts and doctrine and must consider the burden of an overflowing docket, 
worsened by the time-consuming theoretical enquiries Hercules has to undertake. Rather than 
reject this argument with his traditional defensiveness, Dworkin is helpful on this point, 
clarifying that Hercules is not designed to be a model judge.
189
 Hercules is a method by 
which to critique the way in which judges interpret rights. Like the RoL, the theoretical judge 
Hercules offers a view of the best and most aspirational traits in legal interpretation. 
Tamanaha describes the RoL as ‘just one aspect of a larger social-political complex and what 
matters is not any one piece on its own but how it all comes together.’190 Herculean 
interpretation is not so different; it is the bringing together of the right political moral values, 
albeit in the abstract, which sparks the interpretive thrust. The action fuelled by this 
aspirational method of understanding law can only really lead to a positive force for good, 
despite its level of abstraction. 
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3.4.4 CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
The final core criticism of Dworkin to be considered is that of the Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) movement,
191
 a body of scholars who gained ground following the Civil 
Rights Movement but whose views,
192
 according to one author, have only been considered 
‘text-book-worthy’193 since 1989. CLS scholars, “Crits”, have claimed Dworkin’s philosophy 
to be ‘elitist’194 and they denounce it for having insufficient concern for those disadvantaged 
within society. This is misdirection. Dworkin’s Hercules may appear as an elite when taken at 
face value, but he strives for (and succeeds in finding) results, which are ultimately 
egalitarian in substance. The communities from which the objects of interpretivism’s inquiry 
are derived are treated as the ultimate sovereign: the members’ rights are upheld as trumps 
against the power of the state.
195
 It is not Dworkin’s philosophy or Hercules’s judgments, 
which are elitist, but the rights themselves. 
Kennedy, considered one of the founders of the CLS movement,
196
 accepts the 
Dworkinian concept of law infused with morality.
197
 Beyond this acceptance, however, the 
CLS movement rejects Dworkin’s assumption that underlying principles exist within the 
framework of law. Kennedy describes this contradiction as on a ‘deeper level’,198 wherein 
individuals are supposedly divided by their different aspirations for the future. Conversely 
Dworkin accepts the existence of a right answer, which can be found when recourse to the 
right sources is made. Without such acceptance, the pursuit of evolutive principles such as the 
ESD is futile in hard cases.
199
 This thesis has consistently argued that the questions posed by 
Eighth Amendment adjudication requires the interpreter to search for the best moral answer, 
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and Dworkin’s right answer thesis is fit for that purpose. Dworkin condemned some unnamed 
members of the CLS movement for wanting ‘to show law in its worst rather than its best 
light’,200 setting it aside as a dam to the waters which interpretivism seeks to navigate in 
search of the best moral fit.
201
 Dworkin later maintained that his noted
202
 lack of response to 
the Crits was intentional,
203
 because there was ‘nothing in what they once said for [him] to 
answer.’204 
With similar ferocity Gardner has attempted to prove that Dworkin’s theories are in 
fact positivistic,
205
 because Dworkin ‘descriptively incorporate[d]’206 moral judgements. 
Gardner attempts to do so through a series of bewildering
207
 Greek letters and elaborate 
personifications of law as rules. This demonstrates a fatal misunderstanding of Dworkin, who 
would not accept pre-interpretive data (descriptive positivism) without first filtering it with 
morality (the interpretive stage), which Gardner fails to do.
208
  An interpretivist will only 
accept guidance from sources and practice when they are seen through a lens of morality, 
interpretive strategies that rely far more heavily on principles than Gardner acknowledges.
209
 
Dworkin is an optimist, at least to the extent that his theory is embraced, and those who rival 
him are thereby pessimists and sceptics.
210
 He is staunch in his support of moral and social 
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improvement,
211
 and has ‘convincingly argued’212 that a number of provisions found in the 
Bill of Rights, either expressly or by interpretation,
213
 operate as ‘liberal-egalitarian trumps 
over’214 governmental policy.215 
That Dworkin is idealistic and non-empirical is not a criticism, it is a commendation 
of his resolute defence of morality and something that should and will be embraced. It has 
been shown that communal principles of political morality are vital to the Eighth 
Amendment’s pursuit of ESD. Dworkin provides a coherent view of such a pursuit, and this 
thesis deems it fit for the interpretive assessment intended in the following chapters. To 
assess how the Court has and should further evolve the punishments clause, the objective 
indicia available to interpreters must first be assessed through the theoretical framework 
developed by this chapter. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Dworkin may not have converted many disciples,
216
 and the critics highlighting the 
shortcomings of his theories are not wholly without merit, but a piece of advice endorsed by 
Fleming becomes relevant at this stage: ‘[d]o as Dworkin says, not as he does’.217 Dworkin’s 
adjudicative theories arguably did not always do the “fit” work called for by his own tenets of 
interpretivism, but to use that flaw as a charge against his jurisprudence is again to over-
expect of the very idea of theory. Instead Dworkinian interpretivism provides the “best fit” 
for considerations of evolving standards of decency. Throughout this thesis respect will be 
paid to the idea of general, communal will, not merely pre-interpretive statistics about 
                                                          
211
 Exemplified by Brown (n 111) which Dworkin describes as an embarrassment to positivism, (Dworkin, ‘The 
Bork nomination’ (n 113)) for its moral improvement of the majoritarian standard. Interpretivism seeks to refine 
and improve the law and, subsequently, society. 
212
 George Letsas, ‘Dworkin on Human Rights’ (2015) 6 Jurisprudence 327, 333. 
213
 The Ninth Amendment provides for ‘[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights’. US Const, 
Amend VIX. See Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) 485, where SCOTUS found a right to privacy 
contained in the Constitution’s ‘penumbral rights’. 
214
 Letsas (2015) (n 212) 333. 
215
 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is There a Right to Pornography?’ (1981) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 177. 
216
 Thom Brooks, ‘Book Review’ (2006) 69 Modern LR 140. Brooks remarks that ‘[i]t is quite rare to find 
anyone in the field identifying herself as a “Dworkinian”’.  
217
 Fleming in Hershovitz (ed) (n 162) 35, endorsed as ‘very good advice’ by Dworkin in Hershovitz (ibid) 294. 
Chapter III: A Dworkinian Approach to Interpretation 
77 
 
collectivity such as those provided by quantitative, morality-devoid empiricism.
218
 For the 
ESD principle underlying the punishments clause to have any real evolutive value beyond its 
text, deference must be shown to the morality inherent in its framework. Any less is to risk 
the Eighth becoming a mere ‘parchment barrie[r] against the encroaching spirit of power’.219 
Respect for the morality underlying the punishments clause can be sustained by 
making the case for legal sources and social facts to be sifted by a ‘rational sieve’,220 which is 
developed from a more morally principled basis than the strictures of positivism and was 
justified through Section 3.2. The details of that sieving process need not be repeated, and in 
fact to bracket them into an empirical-style formula is tantamount to hypocrisy, since 
interpretivism rejects any form of “test”. Notwithstanding, this thesis adopts the following 
schema as a guide for clarity of explanation: 
Pre-interpretive stage: data comprising rules, practices, precedents and other sources 
of social normativity are considered to constitute community principles of political morality, 
which are established within the legal framework of the law. These are identified and held in 
their best possible light. 
Interpretive stage: moral principles identified by this process are viewed as coexisting 
with rules to form law. Judgements of political morality (the “moral lens” or “rational sieve”, 
as guided by moral responsibility and political integrity – consistency in decision-making) are 
applied to the pre-interpretive data. Integrity is essential to this process, whereby rights and 
duties are interpreted through consideration of the core principles of justice, fairness, and due 
process. 
Post-interpretive stage: the interpreter views the object of her interpretation in the 
best moral light to reflect the greatest possible conception of political morality. This permits, 
even encourages refinement, improvement, consistency, and ultimately an expression of legal 
rights at their moral zenith. 
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Turning to political morality in adjudication, Dworkin describes imprisonment as an 
example of a ‘dramatic violation of dignity’,221 and torture as ‘the most profound insult to [] 
dignity’,222 where dignity is a vital component of morality. The question of whether solitary 
confinement is an example of such a violation will be investigated in Chapters VI and VII. 
Through the framework outlined above, this thesis will argue in the affirmative, and will 
make the case that such a moral violation gives rise to a constitutional infirmity. For such a 
conclusion to be met, it is essential that scrutiny of the prevailing sources of political morality 
in ESD jurisprudence (such as those exposed in Chapter II) is first provided. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MAJORITARIAN STATE COUNTING 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter positivism was shown to contribute an unsatisfactory model 
for Eighth Amendment interpretation. Instead a ‘fusion of constitutional law and moral 
philosophy’1 was sought, by reference to Dworkin’s theory of interpretivism. Morality, it was 
explained, is best understood as a combination of core values of human dignity.
2
 With respect 
to legal interpretation, interpreters draw on a form of ‘political morality’,3 providing them 
with the tools to dig ‘deeper into the law to find the strongest moral and political principles 
that could justify an authoritative decision.’4 That endeavour is known as reading law as 
integrity, which understands rights and duties as having been expressed by the community 
from which they flow, and therefore interpreted through consideration of core principles 
embedded in that community. Elements of a living constitution and originalism are both 
demonstrated by this approach, but its overriding character is one of morality. 
The principal source of political morality on which the Court has relied in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence manifests as a form of state counting. That source, comprising a 
nose-count of the fifty state jurisdictions, plus the federal government and the military, forms 
the subject matter of this chapter. Before analysing state counting, one further theoretical 
concept must be defined, that of ‘coherence in principle’.5 Once this has been introduced, 
Section 4.2 will provide an overview of how the Court has so far relied on state counting, in 
the pre-interpretive stage of Eighth Amendment analysis. Section 4.3 will then assess the use 
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of state counting under interpretivism; whereafter Section 4.4 will provide a conclusion 
regarding this indicia’s propensity to inform the evolving standards of decency (ESD) 
underlying the punishments clause. A framework for the use of state counting intended later 
in this thesis will also be developed in the conclusion to this chapter. 
4.1.1 COHERENCE IN PRINCIPLE 
Interpretivism describes the way that judges read political morality into law ‘by 
appealing to an amalgam of practice’,6 and in combination with principles of integrity. One 
such principle of particular relevance to this chapter is consistency, or ‘coherence in 
principle’.7 Since the American system of democracy provides for one-person-one-vote,8 for 
example, it can be argued that interpretivist coherence should extend to state counting, 
compelling the Court to give equal weighting to all citizens. As a matter of practicality, 
however, when adjudicating over this one-person-one-vote standard it is unworkable, and it is 
unsurprising that the Court has never adopted it.
9
 Short of a nationwide referendum on every 
permutation of every issue (in the death penalty context this could include race, gender, age, 
methods, appeals, intellectual capacity, aggravation, mitigation, to name a few potential 
considerations) weighting citizens equally in this way is impossible. 
The next best alternative could therefore be to gauge the harmony between state 
legislatures, the elected representatives of the People. That process is reflected by the 
Constitution’s procedure for legislative ratification of its Amendments, requiring a 
supermajority (two-thirds) of the votes in both houses of Congress to propose, and three-
quarters to approve an Amendment, or an equally burdensome state convention option.
10
 In 
the judicial sphere, specifically with respect to Eighth Amendment interpretation, it is that 
method, majoritarianism, which has found favour with a majority of the Justices. 
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Majoritarianism in this setting manifests as jurisdictional or “state counting”, where the 52 
American systems are considered to symbolise national consensus on a given legal issue, for 
ESD interpretation. As the next section will now show, far less than a supermajority of 
concurring states has been held sufficient by SCOTUS to justify evolutive interpretation of 
the Constitution’s punishments clause. In Section 4.3 this thesis will discuss limitations to 
majoritarian methods, including the counter-majoritarian problem, before arguing that a much 
more careful use of state counting is required for future adjudication of the punishments 
clause. 
4.2 THE COURT’S USE OF STATE COUNTING 
 Stacy notes that, since state-imposed punishment is applied only once guilt has been 
determined, local sentencing procedures have naturally been followed, and those were set in 
place by democratic processes at the state level.
11
 As such, it is reasonable to expect judicial 
restraint when deferring to states’ legislative consensus, and this section will show this to 
have been emphasised throughout Eighth Amendment case law. Legislatures, it seems 
obvious to conclude, are far better placed to make local, socio-politically oriented decisions 
surrounding their states’ punishment regimes than the federal judiciary is.12 In simple terms, 
by relying on jurisdictional analyses to inform ‘objective indicia of society’s standards’13 the 
Court maintains judicial restraint and defers to the majority in its decision-making. In reality, 
however, the picture is far more complex. 
On a theoretical level, this thesis has rejected a majoritarian approach to constitutional 
interpretation. The mere quotation of statistics about the populace, as measured by state 
counting, is insufficient for reasons which Section 4.3 will examine. First, a better 
appreciation of the Court’s treatment of state counting must be developed. It will not be 
argued that state counting is wholly without merit, but that the way in which the Court has 
                                                          
11
 Tom Stacy, ‘Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess’ (2005) 14 W&Mary Bill of Rights Journal 475, 521. 
12
 ibid 522. 
13
 Roper v Simmons (2005) 543 US 551, 563. 
Chapter IV: Majoritarian State Counting 
 
82 
 
dealt with this data is inadequate under an interpretivist assessment. The present section will 
demonstrate the inconsistency with which SCOTUS has treated legislative consensus, by 
referring to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in its principal arena, the death penalty. Section 
4.3 will then point to some of the immediate interpretivist concerns surrounding state 
counting in order to provide a conclusion regarding this method of ESD analysis and its 
status as indicative of political morality. 
4.2.1 CAPITAL CRIMES 
In Coker v Georgia,
14
 handed down just a year after Gregg v Georgia,
15
 the Court 
reviewed the national picture with respect to crimes punishable by death. Considering 
Georgia’s post-Furman v Georgia statute once again,16 the Court focused on the state code’s 
provision for death as a punishment for rape.
17
 Ehrlich Coker had been charged with escaping 
custody, armed robbery, vehicle theft, kidnapping, and rape,
18
 and was sentenced to death by 
electrocution on only the rape count. Before agreeing with Coker’s contention that death was 
too severe as a penalty for the offence of rape, the Court undertook an analysis of nationwide 
legislative policies. 
Delivering the judgment for a 7-2 majority, Justice White first utilised a simple 
majority to frame his consensus argument. White noted that it had been more than half a 
century since a ‘majority’19 of states, more than 25, had provided for capital punishment in 
such circumstances.
20
 He supported this statistic with the fact that, by 1971, only 16 states 
authorised capital punishment for rape.
21
 Bolstering a consensus claim even further, White 
referred to the Court’s statement in Gregg that the post-Furman legislative response had 
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demonstrated a ‘marked indication of society's endorsement’.22 Similarly, in Coker, the Court 
found it a ‘telling datum’23 that none of the pre-Furman capital state schemes that had 
originally excluded rape had altered their post-Furman statutes to subsequently provide for it. 
Furthermore, of those 16 states which had included rape as a capital offence in 1971, in 
addition to Georgia only two others contained such provisions in their post-Furman statutes: 
North Carolina and Louisiana.
24
 
Both of those states saw their entire capital schemes struck down by Gregg’s 
companion cases,
25
 and their post-Gregg attempts at legislation removed rape as a capital 
crime. As a consequence, Georgia stood alone in Coker as the sole American jurisdiction to 
permit the execution of adult-rapists in 1977. Concluding, Justice White noted that although 
there was no demonstration of unanimity among the states, the Court was satisfied that this 
majoritarian analysis evidenced a very clear rejection of Georgia’s policy.26 Dissenting, Chief 
Justice Burger ‘scolded the plurality for employing a narrow timeline in its examination of 
state capital rape statutes’,27 claiming that by restricting its focus to the five years since 
Furman, SCOTUS had provided insufficient time for an evaluation of evolving standards 
among the legislatures.
28
 Instead, Burger would have looked to the accepted practice before 
Furman, ‘where more than one-third of American jurisdictions ha[d] consistently provided 
the death penalty for rape’.29 Nonetheless, the plurality concluded that the contemporary, 
post-Furman ‘legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape’30 was sufficient to 
evidence that ‘decency’31 had evolved beyond accepting death as a proportionate punishment 
for the rape of adults. 
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In Enmund v Florida,
32
 discussed in Chapter II, the Court invoked Coker when 
discussing the proportionality of executing felony murderers who did not themselves ‘kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend that…lethal force [would] be employed’.33 In Enmund the Court 
struck down a Floridian provision,
34
 under which a non-triggerman accomplice (here a 
driver) in a double first-degree murder had been sentenced to death.
35
 Lending similar weight 
to state counting as he did in Coker, Justice White began his majoritarian analysis by 
excluding the states that did not provide for similar capital schemes to Florida.
36
 In total, only 
eight US jurisdictions would have sentenced to death a defendant in Enmund’s situation.37 In 
nine others an accomplice guilty of felony murder could not receive the death penalty absent 
aggravating circumstances.
38
 Even including these nine in the consensus count, now totalling 
17, Justice White concluded that only those states would permit a defendant such as Enmund 
to be sentenced to death.
39
 
Having undertaken the state counting process and concluding that there was concord 
between ‘most legislatures and juries’,40 the Court forbade imposition of the death penalty in 
Enmund’s circumstances, a murderer who did not himself kill or intend to kill. To bolster its 
judgment the majority included all state jurisdictions in the count, regardless of their capital 
punishment provision. As a consequence, just 17 of 50, one-third, adopted a scheme similar 
to Florida’s. This is represented more clearly by Figure 4.2. 
The most recent case in which the Court considered the constitutionality of capital 
punishment for a particular type of crime was Kennedy v Louisiana.
41
 While Coker had 
barred the death penalty for those convicted of adult-rape, and Enmund had removed felony 
murderers from potential capital charges, Kennedy concerned the last non-homicidal bastion 
                                                          
32
 458 US 782 (1982) 789. 
33
 ibid 797. 
34
 Fla Stat Ann § 782.04(1)(a) (1981). 
35
 Enmund v State 399 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 1981) 1370. 
36
 Enmund (n 32) 789-791. 
37
 ibid 789. 
38
 ibid 791. 
39
 ibid 792. 
40
 ibid 797. 
41
 128 S Ct 2641 (2008). 
Chapter IV: Majoritarian State Counting 
 
85 
 
of capital crimes jurisprudence: child-rape. Writing for the Kennedy majority, Justice 
Kennedy extended Coker’s deference to majoritarian state counting in ruling that death was 
unconstitutional when applied to any non-homicidal offence.
42
 The Justices, emphasising that 
the ESD enquiry was not limited to identifying a societal consensus,
43
 nonetheless engaged in 
a lengthy discussion of the majoritarian position among the states. 
Tentatively describing any identifiable consensus as having been merely ‘a relevant 
concern’44 in Coker and Enmund, the majority took the same track in Kennedy. The judgment 
noted the scarcity of capital punishment for child rape, pointing out that the most recent 
execution of a child-rapist was in Missouri, four decades earlier.
45
 Moreover, following 
Furman in 1972, only six states created capital child-rape provisions, all of which had since 
been invalidated for various procedural errors.
46
 Louisiana was the first to re-introduce child 
rape as a capital offence in the post-Furman era, doing so in 1995.
47
 Five states followed suit 
between 1999 and 2007.
48
 Instead of focusing on this small minority, Justice Kennedy noted 
that 44 of 50 states still did not permit the execution of child-rapists.
49
 Moreover, while the 
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 had expanded the number of capital crimes available to 
the national government,
50
 in an era of punitiveness described in Chapter II, non-homicidal 
child-rape was still excluded. 
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Despite identifying what Justice Alito described in dissent as ‘a new evolutionary 
line’51 in support of Louisiana’s scheme, the Kennedy majority held that such a demonstration 
was too slow and insignificant to persuade them that such change indicated Eighth 
Amendment evolution. A consensus prevailed, and while it indicated ‘divided opinion...on 
balance’52 the scales were tipped against the practice. Consequentially, the Court barred the 
death penalty for all non-homicidal offenders, including child-rapists, further vanishing the 
death penalty towards an ever-nearing end. 
While Kennedy represents the penultimate restriction of “capital crimes”, leaving only 
murder, majoritarian state counting has permeated another principal area of the Eighth 
Amendment. The classes of “capital offenders” cases to enjoy state counting-informed ESD 
analysis were introduced in Chapter II, but the details of the Court’s method in those cases 
was reserved until a theoretical framework had been established in Chapter III. This chapter 
will now consider how the Court has engaged with majoritarian methodology when 
restricting the death penalty for more vulnerable offenders. 
4.2.2 CAPITAL OFFENDERS 
In Ford v Wainwright,
53
 SCOTUS first expanded Eighth Amendment proportionality 
review to classes of offenders. The line of cases initiated by Ford, considering whether 
individuals with personal characteristics which lessened their culpability should be executed, 
will now be considered, further demonstrating how the Court has engaged in majoritarian 
methodology when narrowing the scope of the national death penalty. 
4.2.2.1 INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
In Ford, SCOTUS held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the insane. 
National consensus formed a small but important part of the holding, with Justice Marshall 
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noting that, since the Court had last discussed the issue of sanity in executions in 1950,
54
 
interpretation of the punishments clause had ‘evolved substantially.’55  
Noting an originalist ‘ancestral legacy’56 against execution of the insane, Justice 
Marshall’s majority held that this centuries-old legacy had ‘not outlived its time.’57 While 
Ford asked a procedural question regarding the determination of legal insanity, the adequacy 
of those procedures was dependent on a further, substantive, constitutional question 
surrounding the state’s power to execute insane defendants. Responding in the negative, the 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment restricted substantively the state’s ability to execute 
such prisoners. The majority noted that there was an ‘intuition’ against applying this penalty 
in such circumstances; that it ‘simply offends humanity’.58 Reinforcing the majority’s moral 
“intuition” was majoritarian data derived from a state legislative consensus, unanimous in its 
opposition. Concluding, the Court found itself compelled by such widespread condemnation 
to find that the Constitution prohibited the execution of the insane in all circumstances, 
another display of judicial deference to majority practices. 
The next case where SCOTUS considered the existing landscape of capital mental 
capacity jurisprudence was Penry v Lynaugh.
59
 A significant holding for its treatment of state 
consensus under the Eighth Amendment’s ESD principle, the consensus found among state 
legislatures in Penry painted a very different picture to that in Ford, demonstrating 
widespread applications of capital punishment against offenders with intellectual disabilities 
(ID). ID is a form of mental incapacity which often falls short of legal insanity and, therefore, 
reprieve, but nonetheless reduces understanding and culpability. Penry’s defence claimed he 
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had ‘the reasoning capacity of a 7-year-old’,60 yet his sentence had been upheld at every 
appellate level. First considering the common law position to be ‘well settled’61 against 
execution of the insane, Justice O’Connor noted that offenders who were ‘profoundly or 
severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their 
actions’ were ‘not likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment.’62 
Penry, however, had unsuccessfully argued for such (Ford) protection. Justice 
O’Connor disagreed with Penry’s claim that an ‘emerging national consensus’63 prohibited 
executing offenders with intellectual disabilities under the majoritarian element of the ESD 
assessment. Instead, she held, only one state limited executions in those circumstances,
64
 and 
another was considering a similar provision that year.
65
 The majority agreed that this figure, 
two states out of 50, did not demonstrate a sufficient national consensus against such 
executions.
66
 The majority opinion did acknowledge that a consensus in favour of Penry’s 
claim could eventually ‘find expression in legislation’.67 Indeed, such a change in legislative 
appetite arrived, perhaps sooner than expected, in 2002 in the form of Atkins v Virginia.
68
 
Atkins provided the most striking contemporary example of the Eighth Amendment’s 
evolution through state counting. Reversing Penry after just 13 years, the Court found an 
emerging national consensus against the execution of offenders with intellectual disabilities. 
To evolve the Eighth Amendment away from a consensus settled so recently broke from 
earlier ESD tradition. In Coker and Ford the statistics had been long-settled. Instead, in 
Atkins, the Court relied on a high-velocity trend; a ‘recently-reached consensus’.69 At what 
point in time a trend is ‘settled’70 and to what degree it can be said to be truly stable are both 
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issues arising from the requirement of a temporal component for consensus-finding, issues 
that will be returned to in Section 4.3. 
Delivering the Atkins judgment, Justice Stevens drew attention to the fact that, 
although Penry was scarcely over a decade old, much had changed.
71
 Following Georgia and 
Maryland, the only two states which had banned the execution of intellectually disabled 
inmates in 1989, nine states adopted similar legislation between 1990 and 1995.
72
 From 1998 
to 2001, a further seven enacted “counter-Penry” legislation.73 This total, 18 state statutes 
against the execution of intellectually disabled individuals, or 32 of 50 when including those 
which provide no death penalty at all, was the lowest consensus thus far required by the 
Court for ESD evolution: Coker had demonstrated 49 in support of the Court’s conclusion; 
Enmund, 33; and Kennedy, 44. Nonetheless, the Court found Atkins’s demonstration 
sufficient to evidence an evolved standard of decency. 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, described this demonstration as ‘embarrassingly feeble’.74 
Justice Stevens insisted, however, that the proportion of states was far less significant than 
the ‘consistency of the direction of change’;75 in this case, such direction was demonstrated 
by the legislative shift in favour of Atkins. The Court also noted a complete absence of any 
states introducing capital punishment for intellectually disabled offenders since Penry, noting 
that this ‘unquestionably reflect[ed] widespread judgment’76 regarding the culpability of 
intellectually disabled offenders, providing them with constitutional protection against 
execution.
77
 
Atkins had demonstrated that the state counting assessment of ESD had taken on a 
new, aggressive form. No longer would SCOTUS look to mathematical majorities, but also to 
the velocity of legislative change, an important addition to the consensus element which 
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enabled the Court to engage in evolutive interpretation beyond the constraints of strict 
majoritarianism. In parallel to this reformed approach a number of further sources of ESD 
were starting to gain steam due to the Court’s renewed activism in the capital sphere. These 
will be returned to in Chapter V. Age was another characteristic to find favour in the Court’s 
punishments clause jurisprudence in 1988, where a consideration of the effects of youth 
would come to the fore.  
4.2.2.2 JUVENILES 
In addition to its capital guidance in the “intellectual disabilities” category of 
offenders, SCOTUS has considered the constitutionality of executing young offenders. In 
Thompson v Oklahoma the Court heard argument in the case of a boy who had,
78
 when 15, 
committed first-degree murder by beating, stabbing, and shooting his victim, eventually 
throwing them into a river.
79
 Despite qualifying as a child under an Oklahoman capital 
statute,
80
 the severity of Thompson’s crime led to his conviction as an adult, and he was 
sentenced to death. 
When his appeal reached the Supreme Court,
81
 Thompson’s defence argued that to 
execute a minor for a murder committed when he was under-16 would violate the 
punishments clause. Justice Stevens delivered the Court’s judgment, lending significant 
weight to nationwide legislative consensus in his consideration. Beginning his argument by 
pointing to ‘complete or near unanimity’82 among the states, Stevens noted numerous 
examples of 15 year olds being treated as minors in a variety of legal issues, such as their 
nationwide inability to vote, serve on a jury, and, with one exception, drive without parental 
consent.
83
 No clear line, however, had been drawn with regards to the capital punishment 
question posed by Thompson. Of the states which provided for the death penalty, 36 at the 
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time, only 18 expressed a minimum age for execution.
84
 Confining his attention to those 18 
states, Stevens found all of them to set the minimum age at 16. In addition, the most recent 
execution of an under-16 had been in 1948,
85
 further demonstrating a societal shift away from 
such practices.
86
 ‘[I]t would offend civilized standards of decency’,87 and consequently the 
Constitution, the Court held, to permit the execution of minors. 
In a departure from the earlier cases of Coker and Enmund, where SCOTUS had 
looked to the full national picture when carrying out state counting, not only did the 
Thompson Court count state laws, it also counted imposition of the death penalty by juries. 
Moreover, Stevens’s majority narrowed the majoritarian assessment significantly. If taken as 
a proportion of the 50 states (one-third), the mathematical consensus drawing a line in 
Thompson is less compelling than Stevens purported: just 18 of 50, or 36%. It is noteworthy 
that in capital jurisprudence the Court is inconsistent in the way it weighs and measures 
majoritarianism. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, state counting is clearly not as 
straightforward as it might at first seem. If it is to form a substantive part of the ESD 
assessment under the theoretical approach of this thesis, it is becoming clear that more rigour 
must be applied than merely taking mean averages or 50%+1 majorities, methodological 
issues to which this chapter will soon return. 
After Thompson the Court was soon faced with another age of execution challenge, 
this time regarding the constitutionality of executing offenders who were juveniles, under-18, 
at the time of their crimes. In Stanford v Kentucky a majority sided with Justice Scalia,
88
 who 
had dissented in Thompson. Scalia engaged in evolutive analysis despite his originalist 
predilections, looking to state statutes in a showing of judicial deference.
89
 Again counting 
only the active death penalty states, which by this point totalled 37, Scalia noted that just 15 
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limited executions to under-16s, and only 12 barred under-17s, concluding that the 
Constitution permitted the execution of juveniles.
90
 When taken as a national count, which 
the Court conveniently evaded in Stanford, the data would show 28 states against executing 
under-16s, and 25 in the case of under-17s; at least 50% of state jurisdictions. 
Though once again faced with a scarcity of actual impositions of this legislative 
‘consensus’,91 which could in itself have led to an argument of substantive inactivity among 
the states, Scalia’s majoritarian argument prevailed. Scalia held that the dearth of juvenile 
executions reflected not a restriction of such punishment in principle, but an intention to 
reserve its use for the most deserving of young offenders.
92
 Comparing the figures in this case 
(15 of 37 active states, or 12 of 37) to the successful 18 of 36 showing in Thompson 
underscores the difficultly of predicting a national consensus solely on the basis of a 
majoritarian state count. Combining this precedent with that from Atkins (where 18 of 36 
active states was held sufficient) nods to 50% or more (a simple majority) of active states as 
the Court’s accepted tipping-point for state counting based evolution, assisted by reform-
velocity. A further demonstration of the fragility and incoherence of the state counting 
method was provided in 2005, in Roper v Simmons.
93
 
 In Roper, the final case to be considered by this chapter, Justice Kennedy 
reconsidered Stanford. In the same way that a majority had treated Furman in Gregg, and 
Thompson in Atkins, in Roper the Court looked to legislative change since its earlier decision 
upholding the juvenile death penalty. While the bulk of academic commentary arising from 
Roper focuses on the influence of transnational comparativism on the majority’s holding,94 an 
element of ESD discussed in Chapter V, the judgment also demonstrated a concession in 
                                                          
90
 ibid. 
91
 Only 45 of 2,106 death sentences from 1982 to 1988 were imposed on under-18s. Victor Streib, ‘Imposition 
of Death Sentences For Juvenile Offenses, January 1, 1982, Through April 1, 1989’ [1989] Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law 1, 2. 
92
 Stanford (n 88) 374. 
93
 543 US 551 (2004). 
94
 See Roger Alford, ‘Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise’ (2005) 53(1) 
University of California Los Angeles LR 1, 26; an extensive review in Ryan Black, Ryan Owens, Daniel 
Walters and Jennifer Brookhart, ‘Upending a Global Decline’ (2014) 103(1) Georgetown LJ 1, 10. 
Chapter IV: Majoritarian State Counting 
 
93 
 
national state counting terms. Rather than the absolute minimum 50% of states supporting an 
evolutive direction seemingly established by Eighth Amendment precedent, the Court in 
Roper accepted a lower bar. 
Of the 38 active states (those with the death penalty), only 18 set a minimum age for 
execution,
95
 a very similar statistic to those found in Thompson and Atkins, though there were 
two subtle differences. First, Roper's 18 of 38 is a slightly more tenuous consensus than the 
18 of 36 demonstrated in Atkins, given that the proportion in Roper drops under half, if half is 
to be considered convincing at all. Granted, including non-death penalty states provides more 
weight to the Court’s consensus argument (30 of 50 outright rejecting juvenile executions), 
but when contrasted with Enmund, Kennedy, Coker, and Ford (see Figure 4.2) it becomes 
clear that SCOTUS has lowered the floor for a finding of consensus, whichever way the 
numbers are cut. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the rate of change argument which was so 
convincing to the majority in Atkins, where 16 states had legislated in one direction over 13 
years, was invoked in Roper, despite a less compelling five-state change in 15 years.
96
 Justice 
Scalia was vehement in his dissent, marking the majority opinion as providing ‘a perfect 
example of why judges are ill equipped to make the type of legislative judgments the Court 
insists on making here’97 and concluding that the result would ‘crown arbitrariness with 
chaos.’98 While the Roper decision itself might have expounded the moral component of 
ESD, something this thesis insists is vital to interpretation of the punishments clause, Scalia’s 
condemnation of the majoritarian method clearly does have substance. Inconsistency, 
arbitrary line-drawing, and the other concerns raised by this section will be addressed in the 
following section, whereby this chapter will attempt to provide a conclusion regarding the 
providence of state counting in interpretivist adjudication. 
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Figure 4.2: Level of Consensus Established in Capital Evolving Standards Cases 
Categories & Party Names State Count Decision 
   
Capital Crimes     
Coker v Georgia (1977) 49/50* against DP
†
 for rape of an adult Evolution 
Enmund v Florida (1982) 33/50 against DP for felony murder Evolution 
Kennedy v Louisiana (2008) 44/50 against DP for rape of a child Evolution 
Offenders: Mental Capacity     
Ford v Wainwright (1986) 50/50 against DP for insane offenders Evolution
‡
 
Penry v Lynaugh (1989) 2/50 against DP for intellectually disabled No Evolution 
Atkins v Virginia (2002) 32/50 against DP for intellectually disabled Evolution 
Offenders: Juveniles     
Thompson v Oklahoma 
(1988) 
32/50 (18/18
αα
) against DP of <16s Evolution 
Stanford v Kentucky (1989) 
15/37
α
 against DP of <17s 12/37
α
 against DP of 
<18s 
No Evolution 
Roper v Simmons (2005) 18/50 against DP for intellectually disabled Evolution 
 
* States 
†
 Death penalty 
‡
 Confirmation of existing common law 
α
 Of active DP states 
αα
 Of active DP states which expressed a minimum age  
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4.3 AN INTERPRETIVE ASSESSMENT 
As discussed in Chapter III, Dworkin provided ‘soaring, confrontational celebrations 
of individual rights as broad antimajoritarian immunities’.99 In Freedom’s Law he maintained 
that rights override utilitarian policy goals or majority preferences, ‘even when the majority 
thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for having 
it done.’100 Under the interpretivist understanding adopted by this thesis, the principle of 
rights as trumps pervades moral interpretation of the Constitution, and overrides 
majoritarianism. Such an approach therefore adheres to counter-majoritarian interpretation, 
where judicial review upholds individual rights on a moral, rather than a popular basis. 
This section will demonstrate how the data provided by state counting, without the 
assistance of a rational ‘sieve’,101 renders mere statistics of collectivity rather than a rational 
form of communal will.
102
 To identify such communal will the Eighth seeks moral answers to 
legal questions, achieved when the interpreter (SCOTUS) makes references to community 
standards and principles which show the law in its best moral light.
103
 This section will 
attempt to apply interpretivism to the discussion, drawing on the shortcomings of the state 
counting approach in order properly to appreciate how to strengthen such analysis. It will be 
shown that majoritarian statistics are not without merit, but that care must be taken if they are 
to provide a moral basis for adjudication. 
4.3.1 THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY 
An early proponent of the ‘majoritarian thesis’,104 that the Court's primary function is 
to enforce majority views,
105
 was Dahl. He noted that ‘the policy views dominant on the 
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking 
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majorities of the United States.’106 Prominent supporters of Dahl’s thesis, who identify as 
“Popular Constitutionalists”, include Friedman, Levinson and Balkin.107 They favour 
majoritarianism as it should result in greater political participation due to direct democratic 
input by the people’s elected representatives, into local legislation which then feeds into 
consensus-based interpretation of the federal Constitution, by the Supreme Court. Levinson 
and Balkin note that the principal method of constitutional change has typically been 
influenced by political partisanship.
108
 Under a Popular Constitutionalist approach, SCOTUS 
should pass power from those parties to the People by taking heed of majoritarian concepts of 
moral and social issues, interpreting legal provisions only in a way which is favoured by the 
masses, through structured politics. Instead of acting as an elitist arbiter of constitutional 
change, which could work against the majority’s wishes, a Popular Constitutionalist Court 
would instead look to collective values, as judged by recourse to majoritarian assessments. 
The foregoing is an apt description of Eighth Amendment precedent, which favours the state 
counting approach. 
Bickel condemned Dahl’s majoritarian position for not upholding majoritarian views 
in earnest, as the power of judicial review is in fact granted to unelected federal judges who 
are far less accountable, once appointed, than political representatives. In addition, judges in 
such a position are at liberty to usurp the actions of those officials elected into the others 
branches of government.
109
 Such opposition was termed ‘the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty’,110 by Bickel, described as ‘the central obsession of modern constitutional 
scholarship’.111 The concept has become such a great fixation that, according to Friedman, 
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‘the proposition hardly requires citation.’112 León noted that the principal “difficulty” was the 
undemocratic nature of unelected federal judges with Constitutional interpretation in their 
reach.
113
 To the contrary, as this thesis has argued in Chapter III, the nature of constitutional 
rights is not tied exclusively to this sort of procedural democratic positivism.
114
 
Two points are worth elaborating: First, an interpretivist understands democracy like 
any principle of political morality, by its substance and not simply its procedure. That 
substance is inherent in the framework of the community in question. The precise definition 
of the rights created by democratic procedures can be reached only by recourse to principles 
of political morality. Those principles are identified by an examination of objective indicia of 
society’s standards, not merely by mathematical consensus framing. Second, interpretive 
judges are inherently the best equipped to use all resources at their disposal to purify and 
perfect rights. Legislators, even those with the best will, cannot carry out the task of an 
interpretive judge, not least because they are held to account by the majority, the electorate, 
and are therefore explicitly majoritarian. Interpretivism rises above the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’115 by applying minority rights in the face of raw consensus, where rights trump. 
As Chapter III conceded, Hercules is an aspirational figure, and not intended to be a 
model judge.
116
 Instead he provides a model of adjudication which, while abstract, facilitates 
a critique of the way in which interpreters identify and scrutinise rights. This thesis will apply 
the core tenets of Herculean interpretivism in Chapters VI and VII, where solitary 
confinement will be assessed by the Eighth Amendment’s sources of political morality. For 
the present assessment, the procedural concerns surrounding state counting must be outlined 
before a counter-majoritarian alternative is presented. 
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4.3.2 THE RISK OF BAD SCIENCE 
As Section 4.2 demonstrated, counting states is not as easy as “1-2-3”. If a simple 
majority defines national consensus, then 26 out of 50 states would be sufficient for a 
conclusion which identifies evolving standards and consequentially extends constitutional 
protection. Even supermajorities, as required for Article V constitutional amendments,
117
 
would offer clear guidance. Again, the issue is far more complex. From the outset, a problem 
arises. If ESD, even in its positivistic strictures of majoritarianism, is becoming more of an 
art than a science consistency falls by the wayside, and purported deference to the states is 
overridden by apparent arbitrariness. 
Consensus can be understood to mean the ‘middle ground’118 between set points, or 
‘collective opinion’,119 which might be between 25 or 26 states. A judgement that most states 
agree with,
120
 or ‘general harmony’121 between legislatures could also be proposed as 
demonstrations of consensus, along with a significant rate of change,
122
 though no set point is 
provided by any of these loose benchmarks. An agreement by “most” states could arguably 
require a higher standard, more towards an Article V two-thirds or three-quarters 
supermajority, but far less has been accepted by SCOTUS for Eighth Amendment evolution. 
Atkins’ amicus Church argued that a state counting consensus could only exist once an 
‘overwhelming majority of legislatures condemn a particular punishment or procedure.’123 
While this might at first glance present a useful guideline, defining the term “overwhelming” 
is no less troublesome than the original definitional challenge. The consensus assessment, 
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rather than defending objectivity, remains subjective and open to manipulation. Such 
manipulation can be seen throughout the Court’s capital precedents.124 
A further methodological consideration is the issue of inactivity among states. If a 
statute provides for the death penalty, for example, but that state has not invoked such a 
sentence for several years, even decades, the Court should at least pause to consider whether 
that jurisdiction is counted as supporting or rejecting capital punishment. If the Court decides 
that the jurisdiction in question is “inactive”, in that it does not sentence offenders to death, it 
could be argued that this state should fall on the “non-death penalty” side of the scales in 
state counting terms. Take New Hampshire, which provides for the death penalty in certain 
circumstances but has not executed an inmate since 1939.
125
 The state has no execution 
chamber and no specific protocol for the lethal injection, the two resources on which its 
capital statute depends.
126
 Under examination, what becomes clear is that New Hampshire is 
an inactive death penalty state, despite providing for the death penalty in a strict, statutory 
sense. This presents a quandary for the Court, which must decide whether to weigh it as 
active or inactive when undertaking a state nose-count for evolving standards purposes. 
Despite a clear demonstration that New Hampshire is inactive, and has been for three-
quarters of a century, SCOTUS has held this fact to be irrelevant to its state-counts. 
In Roper,
127
 for example, an appendix to the Court's opinion included New Hampshire 
in its list of ‘states that permit the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles’.128 Following 
the argument of this chapter, “permits” might be true on its face. That conclusion is certainly 
no more indicative of some form of societal acceptance of capital punishment in New 
Hampshire than another state, such as Connecticut, which has no death penalty at all, but last 
executed someone in 2005.
129
 A residual statute such as that in New Hampshire, it can be 
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argued, is not a reaffirmation of consensus. Within a footnote in his Furman judgment, 
Justice Brennan had acknowledged this line of argument, noting that New Hampshire ‘made 
virtually no use’130 of the death penalty and that such inactivity could deem a state 
abolitionist. Regardless, the plurality placed that state on the consensus-forming side of the 
scales, and continues to do so forty years later. There have also, at the time of writing, been 
de facto moratoriums for at least five years in 13 of the 31 “active” death penalty states;131 
with 138 of 179 (77%) executions during that time having been carried out by just seven of 
those states.
132
 Any state count which disregards inactivity treats the consensus assessment as 
uncontroversial, and as more simplistic than its reality. 
There is also a flip-side to this argument. Take Wisconsin, which, as the first state 
permanently to abolish capital punishment,
133
 legislated itself away from the death penalty 
162 years ago. Despite this long and settled consensus in chronological terms, the most recent 
Wisconsin public opinion poll paints a very different sentiment. That poll, an element of ESD 
critiqued in Chapter V, found over 55% of voters favouring the re-establishment of capital 
punishment despite the state’s long history of abolition.134 On a raw consensus-framed basis, 
Wisconsin appears to be a de jure inactive state, with a de facto retentionist force of public 
opinion. Clearly, to rely solely on state counting as a method of establishing consensus is 
accurate only to the extent that state legislation reflects public opinion, it is a naïve 
presumption. 
It cannot be taken for granted that, because a state legislature has acted in one way, 
this reflects the sentiment of the public majority of the nation, or even of that state. 
Chemerinsky notes that there have been powerful demonstrations of state legislative action 
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frequently differing from the opinions of the constituent voting majority of that state.
135
 A 
number of reasons for this phenomenon arise,
136
 not least that minority interest groups 
arguably have the greatest impact on politics.
137
 State legislation cannot be presumed to 
reflect a state-voter consensus if that legislation was influenced by special interest groups, as 
they represent a loud minority, not a consensus. A degree of engagement might count for 
something, however, and it would be unwise for any critic to completely reject the 
participation of special interest groups, especially when the input contains subject-specific 
experience and expertise. Again, if state counting is to be viewed as a serious contributor to 
ESD analysis, greater scrutiny than merely asking dichotomous questions must be applied. 
Any form of expert consensus, whether from an interest group, a professional body, or a 
collection of knowledgeable contributors, must be viewed in light of integrity. This is 
returned to in Chapter V, where professional consensus is examined. Without the closer 
analysis encouraged by this thesis, the data provided by majoritarian collections becomes the 
mere statistic of collectivity Dworkin warned against.
138
 
A further weighing issue is one identified in Section 4.2, namely the pool of states to 
which a state policy is compared. The agreement of 16 states, when taken from a total of 50 
(32%), for example, is unlikely to convince the Court of an overwhelming consensus. When 
taken as a proportion of all states with the death penalty (whether “active” or not), however, 
this would constitute a mathematical majority, 16 of 31, or 52%. This issue was faced in 
many of the cases outlined by the previous section.
139
 Defining a tipping-point for a 
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majoritarian consensus is clearly far more complex than looking for a majority or a 
supermajority. 
Considering the direction and speed at which a collection of states has altered their 
legislation provides further means of navigating these issues. Atkins,
140
 which developed the 
‘consistency of the direction of change’141 part of state counting analysis, was described in 
dissent as ‘a perilous basis for constitutional adjudication’.142 Indeed, when relied on without 
support from further objective indicia, this thesis agrees with the warnings from that dissent. 
Rates of change are, again, subjective standards to which interpreters must apply their own 
meanings, resulting in arbitrary and unpredictable precedents. This in turn offends the 
interpretivist tenet of coherence,
143
 a point introduced early in this chapter and which will 
now be addressed. 
4.3.3 INCOHERENCE IN PRINCIPLE 
That judges will have different opinions across a range of cases is a key tenet of the 
doctrine of precedent. Novel, or ‘hard’144 cases require interpreters to look beyond previous 
jurisprudence when adjudicating over the definition of a right. That does not give interpreters 
the discretion to diverge from principles, however, and the coherent application of such 
principles is crucial for an interpretivist reading of rights. 
Such coherence has not been evidenced throughout capital jurisprudence. Not only 
has the Court dabbled with different methods of state counting, noting that the rate of change 
plays an important role in supporting mathematical shortcomings, but there is a further 
methodological flaw. The distinction between the Court’s approaches to different types of 
capital cases outlines this problem. In categorical cases (capital offenders and capital crimes) 
the Court has undertaken a majoritarian state counting exercise which, while convoluted, is at 
least relatively consistent. In methods of punishment cases, however, the Court has ignored 
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state counting, instead looking for ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’.145 That 
standard is a different, counter-majoritarian approach from consensus. By this ‘unnecessary 
and wanton’146 standard the Court has declined to review the merits of consensus when 
upholding the constitutionality of certain punishments schemes. Such an approach undercuts 
the coherence in principle required by an interpretive theory of rights. 
A case in point is hanging. While, as Chapter II showed, lethal injection has remained 
the principal and, since 2013, sole method of execution in the US, hanging is retained by two 
states.
147
 The last judicial hanging was in Delaware in 1996,
148
 while the only other two since 
the Eighth Amendment’s 1962 incorporation149 occurred in Washington in the early 1990s.150 
One of those final visitors to the gallows was Charles Campbell. After a lengthy appeals 
process and twelve years since his conviction for a triple-murder, SCOTUS denied 
Campbell’s petition for certiorari the day before his execution. A per curiam judgment 
declined to hear his claim that death by hanging was forbidden by the Constitution’s 
punishments clause.
151
 
Dissenting from the denial, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, invoked the Court’s sole majoritarian assessment in the case, noting that ‘[f]forty-
six of the forty-eight States that once imposed hanging have rejected that punishment as 
unnecessarily torturous, brutal, and inhumane’.152 Blackmun would have granted a stay of 
execution, but the majority upheld the constitutionality of the method, dismissing Campbell’s 
appeal without taking account of the majoritarian argument proposed by the dissent,
153
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despite recent Eighth Amendment precedent to the contrary.
154
 If dabbling in the social 
science of counting states in some areas of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, coherence in 
principle mandates that execution cases should also be considered through the same lenses. 
Without such consistency, a core tenet of interpretivism is denied. The exercise should not be 
a pick-and-choose endeavour between the objective and the subjective elements of evolving 
standards. The Court should consider all available indicia of political morality, and the denial 
of certiorari in Campbell removed that opportunity.  
Had SCOTUS permitted the review and displayed the same deference towards state 
counting for its objective analysis as it had done in its categorical capital cases, the decision 
would have been clear. Hanging would prove contrary to the consensus measure of evolution. 
While after Campbell only one further hanging would have been prevented,
155
 the Court’s 
unwillingness to respect coherence in principle is nonetheless concerning, not least for its 
seemingly arbitrary selectivity. Criticism does not end with consistency, however, and there 
is one principal and fundamental critique of the state counting approach to ESD which must 
be considered. In The Federalist, Madison maintained that, ‘[a]mong the numerous 
advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately 
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.’156 It is that principle 
of American government, federalism, from which the next area of critique arises. 
4.3.4 THE LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY 
 An ideal envisaged by the federalist forefathers was that the independence and 
diversity of the states would guard against the ‘tyranny of the majority’.157 Forming a 
consensus from a crude nose-count is an obtrusive affront to this principle. Judgments that 
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employ this method are ‘junk social science’,158 which is often vague and inefficacious. In 
addition, and more fundamentally, they are reminiscent of Gerrymandering, a term coined in 
1812 to describe intentional partisan pioneering of electoral districts.
159
 Diversity among state 
legislatures should be regarded as the raison d'être of the federal system, not as the basis for 
informing federal constitutional law and subsequently constraining minority states. 
Drawing on the metaphor of states-as-laboratories, Jacobi condemns the Court’s use 
of state counting as entirely antithetical to the ‘federalist ambition’160 of states’ sovereignty. 
Whilst earlier literature ‘scratch[ed] the surface’161 of this federalist issue,162 Jacobi insists 
that those commentators underestimated the deleteriousness of state counting. The states as 
laboratories metaphor first appeared in a dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis, who noted in 
1932 that it was ‘one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory’.163 Gardner has warned against taking 
this now ubiquitous metaphor too literally, noting that ‘[s]tate courts do what they do, the 
Supreme Court does what it does, and from time to time some court somewhere may learn 
something useful by observing what the others have done.’164 Under an interpretivist reading, 
it must also be noted, some lessons are taught by recourse to principles embedded more 
deeply than in explicit legislative provisions. The Constitution places procedural and 
substantive limits on state power, and SCOTUS does not require the results of 
experimentation to find or impose those limits. 
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Under federalism states are permitted, even encouraged, to engage in legislative 
experimentation. Where moral principles of decency come into play, however, such as those 
contained in the Eighth Amendment, individual rights trump such experimental privileges. 
Although the states-as-laboratories metaphor is now prolific in discussions of constitutional 
law,
165
 and deference to state power is the jewel in the crown of federalism, states must also 
be required to uphold the basic principles underlying the Constitution.
166
 Schwarz captures 
this argument well: ‘the laboratory of state experimentation is not a sealed room’.167 Indeed, 
where the Court finds an evolution of the Eighth Amendment against a certain practice, or 
experiment, laboratories in contravention of a constitutional right must be shut down, and 
future laboratories be prevented from opening. 
Since Chief Justice John Marshall’s initiation of judicial review,168 and Chief Justice 
Warren’s incorporation revolution,169 judicial oversight is a rule in the constitutional law 
setting, not an exception. The Constitution is not an optional protocol, nor a set of guidelines, 
but a collection of basic minima. Take for example a state, which introduces a punishment 
not explicitly barred by existing Supreme Court precedent. The long-term intensive solitary 
confinement of juveniles or inmates with serious mental illnesses provides a good, real 
example. Any state should, in adherence to the states-as-laboratories metaphor, be free to 
experiment with such a punitive policy until the judiciary intervenes. The latter stages of this 
thesis will argue, however, that the principles underlying the Constitution require a different 
reading, where morality can prevent the onset of an experiment. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter permits the conclusion that, where state counting is relied on as the 
principal indicator of society’s standards, the concept of consensus is treated as simplistic, 
mathematical majoritarianism, at risk of being devoid of morality. Interpretivism requires 
stricter scrutiny than that, and the assessments carried out in this chapter point to some of the 
immediate concerns surrounding state counting. On a more abstract level, state counting 
creates data, which is at risk of providing meagre statistics of collectivity when that 
information is not sieved rationally. Such moral refinement, it must be concluded, can only 
be achieved by looking beyond the text, beyond the policies of the elected representatives, 
and into the framework of the community. That framework, Chapter V will show, is far more 
multi-faceted than a nose-count suggests. 
In Chapters VI and VII specific reference will be made to the solitary confinement 
concerns alluded to in the foregoing discussion, presenting an opportunity for this research to 
offer an original contribution to Eighth Amendment scholarship by tying a real-world 
punishment issue to a theory of interpretation. More broadly, the implications of this analysis 
of the Eighth’s application to solitary confinement will extend to other areas of academic 
commentary, including the growing professional consensus literature, and transnational law. 
By undertaking this research, a conclusion will be reached regarding the limits on state 
punishment, when the Constitution is approached as being enriched by its moral principles. 
To make such claims, and to sustain an argument in favour of stricter scrutiny of extreme 
imprisonment, the next chapter must examine more closely the sources of political morality 
which inform the Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency principle. 
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CHAPTER V 
FURTHER MEASURES OF EVOLVING STANDARDS 
The origin of the constitutional principle of the evolving standards of decency (ESD), 
Weems v US,
1
 contains direct reference to public opinion, where Justice McKenna talked of 
the Eighth Amendment ‘acquir[ing] meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a 
humane justice.’2 This notion of collective consciousness is often treated as a straightforward, 
almost whimsical concept in populist media, but is far from uncontroversial in constitutional 
interpretation. Battle-lines are drawn over the Supreme Court’s role as an influence on, or 
even sympathiser with public opinion for interpretive purposes, not only on the national 
election stage but also in the heavily politicised judicial appointments arena.
3
 Remembering 
that this thesis has already rejected originalism,
4
 raw majoritarianism,
5
 and recalling the 
scepticism placed on positivist notions of law as separate from morality,
6
 the remaining 
sources of ESD analysis must be considered carefully. It is acknowledged that accusations of 
idealism or naïveté are expected in response to a theoretical enquiry that merely condemns 
the status quo and offers no alternative. As such, this thesis seeks to provide a way ahead; 
examining the remaining sources of ESD through the same Dworkinian rational sieving 
process applied to majoritarian state counting. The conclusion to this chapter will 
subsequently provide a new frame of analysis for Eighth Amendment challenges. 
Before arriving at that point, however, this chapter must analyse the remaining 
fragments of political morality relevant to the ESD enquiry, by applying the first and second 
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stages outlined above. Pre-interpretive sources comprise rules, practices, precedents, and 
other elements of social normativity. Applied in context, this chapter will draw on public 
opinion polling; penology; transnational law; and professional consensus, definitions and 
analyses of which will be presented in the respective sections. 
By a Dworkinian reading of these sources, they are considered to constitute 
community principles of political morality, which are intertwined with the legal framework 
when shown in their best possible light. At the interpretive stage of each section, moral 
principles will be derived from the data unveiled by these sources. Judgements of political 
morality (the “rational sieve”, as guided by moral responsibility and political integrity; 
consistency in decision-making) will be applied to the otherwise “pre-interpretive data” first 
unearthed. Integrity is essential to this process, and interpretation will depend on respect for 
core principles of justice, fairness, and due process. What will result is a refined, principled 
approach to ESD analysis, reading integrity into the Eighth Amendment’s punishments 
clause. 
5.1. PUBLIC OPINION POLLING 
In recent years interest in public attitudes to criminal justice issues has risen, with 
‘sample surveys’ or ‘representative surveys’,7 usually known as “opinion polls”, purporting 
to provide the principal tool for measurement of attitudes towards a variety of topics.
8
 The 
poll, a quantitative research method, provides an unsurprising link between a prevalent 
modern practice and democratic decision-making. By taking measurement of opinions 
straight from the People themselves is arguably to represent societal standards of decency, as 
sampled at the lowest, most “representative” level. The reality is more complex and opinion 
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polls, sources of pre-interpretive data, must be viewed in light of interpretive principles to 
establish their providence in interpretivist ESD analysis. 
5.1.1 THE PROMISE OF POLLING 
Over the last century public opinion polling has flourished the US,
9
 growing far 
beyond its relatively modest roots in British sociology, behavioural psychology, and 
marketing research.
10
 Quantitative surveys have become pervasive tools with the principal 
aim of identifying representative opinion of the public at large.
11
 By this measure consensus 
is provided with an instrument of empiricism, desirable under the Conventionality thesis of 
Hartian positivism, which considers legal validity to derive from social convention.
12
 
Advancing that empirical cause in the 1960s was George Gallup, founder of the poll that 
bears his name. Gallup declared in 1965, during Warren’s incorporation revolution, that 
‘[p]olls can make…a truer democracy.’13 Direct participation by citizens in the decision-
making process theoretically enables a circumvention of the “middleman”, the elected 
representative. Asher notes that a similar assumption is held by policymakers, who take for 
granted that this form of survey is the best method by which to construct a picture of societal 
acceptance or rejection of a policy.
14
 In order to instil faith in the criminal justice system, 
polling promises to provide a link between public opinion and criminal justice procedures 
and arrangements,
15
 while ensuring ‘moral credibility’16 of the system, through its deference 
to public sentiment. 
Turning to the Eighth Amendment, the argument so far points to opinion polls 
providing constitutional law with a democratic and malleable personality, which is desirable 
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to proponents of an adaptable constitution and, specifically, to the moral principles of ESD. 
Whilst this instrument of empiricism might be satisfactory for purposes of discussion, and for 
legal interpretation when a positivist approach is taken, it will be shown limited when 
exposed to interpretivist scrutiny. As members of the sole major Western democracy to retain 
capital punishment, US citizens are regularly polled for their opinion regarding the practice. 
It is these capital polls and the way they have been utilised by SCOTUS, therefore, which 
provides the most fertile ground for analysis of public opinion with respect to the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Recalling Dworkin’s theory of interpretive adjudication, which seeks the guidance of 
moral integrity to ensure that the interpretation of law is principled and inexhaustible,
17
 an 
examination of the prevailing use of opinion polls for Eighth Amendment interpretation must 
be carried out before conclusions can be drawn. It will be argued that the providence of 
opinion polling as an objective indicator of ESD is limited, because of practical concerns 
such as methodological shortcomings, and due to the expense of conducting more effective 
polls. In addition, on a theoretical basis, while it must be accepted that some data is more 
useful than no data, poll results are theoretically suspect due to their inability to pass through 
the interpretivist rational sieve. 
Dworkin’s ‘fundamental distinction within political theory’18 between policies and 
principles, with the latter trumping the former, is important at this stage. Policy arguments 
grounded in polling data might be sufficient to justify a political decision, for example. 
Principles, however, paint a moral gloss on primary sources of consensus. Opinion polling 
data can provide relevant support for an evolutive practice, but only if it is based on 
principles cited or implicit in ‘past political decisions of the right sort.’19 The right sort was 
identified in Chapter III as another problematic concept, which depends on justice, 
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democracy, liberty, and equality,
20
 and exemplified by cases such as Brown v Board of 
Education
21
 and Lawrence v Texas,
22
 cases fifty years apart but both demonstrating 
constitutional evolution in spite of strongly opposing public sentiment. 
Without wading too far into the waters of post-interpretive analysis, which is reserved 
for Chapter VII, this chapter must focus on two present stages of scrutiny. First the practical 
reality faced by interpreters seeking to rely on opinion polling must be introduced, before 
theoretical concerns can be addressed. 
5.1.2 PRACTICAL CONCERNS 
In a compendium of discussions relating to ‘popular constitutionalism’,23 a method by 
which courts deal with the counter-majoritarian difficulty by basing decisions on popular 
sentiment, Persily warns of the nature of polling.
24
 That nature, he argues, is sometimes 
sporadic and often constrains the ability of interpreters to track changes in public sentiment 
by quantitative measures.
25
 A degree of acceptance must be presumed when discussing any 
theoretical enquiry; interpretivist moral adjudication is far more idealistic and aspirational 
than practical. That said, if opinion polling is shown to be at risk of methodological infirmity 
from the outset, an interpreter must be wary of including any data produced by polls in ESD 
analysis.
26
 The sticking point is not that poll results cannot be significant, but that the 
methods of testing are not rigorous, the actual sentiment is malleable and possibly un-
informed, and numerous selection biases undermine the chosen results. 
Methodological concerns are not dispositive of the discussion. Not all polls are 
wholly without merit, though the more helpful surveys will naturally incur greater expense 
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and therefore dissuade pollsters from commissioning them. While strict majoritarianism, such 
as that exemplified by a state count which produces conclusions from mathematical 
majorities, was ousted at an early stage in this thesis, polling has provided the steam for a 
number of Eighth Amendment precedents. Some of the same concerns that arose in the state 
counting chapter might apply to polls, but the survey’s prevalence warrants a careful 
examination if it is to be understood properly. Two main enquiries will provide the basis of 
this critique, at the practical stage: the quality of the sample and the quality of the questions.
27 
5.1.2.1 QUALITY OF THE SAMPLE 
A public opinion researcher is first faced by respondent selection, which requires 
surmounting a number of methodological hurdles. Sampling error is one such hurdle,
28
 which 
occurs when a sub-group within a population is included in the survey. For public opinion to 
represent ‘national consensus’,29 as an indicator of ‘society’s standards’,30 the population 
implicated is the entire country. Since sub-groups are always relied on in polling, sampling 
error is invariably a risk.
31
 One method of inferring the generalisability of samples is to test 
the significance of the results, using a one sample t-test for example. That test provides 
interpreters with an inferential statistic which can be used to determine whether there is a 
significant difference between the average and a hypothesised average, ergo whether the 
results can be applied to the population at large. 
It is acknowledged that some studies show sample size to contribute little to 
representativeness, but the position generally accepted by the survey literature is that sample 
sizes must be relatively large in proportion to the population.
32
 Take for example a poll of 
100 respondents, where 55% “Agree” and 45% “Disagree” with a given statement. An 
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interpreter seeking to establish whether this sample represents the population might apply the 
hypothesis “at least 50% of the entire population agrees with the polled statement”, or “H0: 
μ>50%” in statistical notation. Running a t-test on these figures provides a significance point 
of 1.0050.
33
 Compared with critical values, by which significance is judged, generates a 70-
80% confidence interval that at least 50% of the population will agree with the statement.
34
 
Applying the same test with the same results to a poll with 1000 respondents, however, 
provides a significance point of 3.1786,
35
 which yields 99.8%-99.9% confidence interval for 
the hypothesised outcome.
36
 Clearly, sample size has a significant impact on the 
generalisability of data derived from qualitative polls. Significance is limited to the final data, 
however, and the interpretivist must first have confidence that the data can be relied on as an 
indicator of political morality, before significance testing can solve the problem of small 
samples. As such, the present discussion will focus on the shortcomings of data collection, as 
opposed to the mathematical reliability of poll results. 
“Coverage error” may occur when attempting to conduct representative polling. This 
occurs where members of the targeted sub-group, which has been targeted, are not reached, 
probably through lack of contact details such as telephone numbers or email addresses.
37
 
Sampling to represent national consensus, let alone the opinion of a sub-group, is therefore 
problematic from the outset. “Nonresponse” is another issue, which arises from coverage 
error. Lynn notes that the principal focus is often placed on survey design when discussing 
the precision of data, under the assumption that the sample is responsive.
38
 He notes that this 
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is not reflective of reality, with nonresponse affecting even the best-resourced surveys.
39
 
Noncontact (which results in nonresponse) can arise within telephone surveys from incorrect 
or wrongly labelled phone numbers, or by the potential respondent simply refusing to answer 
the phone, or declining to answer questions when he discovers the purpose of the call. Non-
participation is easier over the phone than in person due to the lack of interpersonal 
relationship, another limitation of the method.
40
 This is a particular issue with respect to death 
penalty opinion, as the bulk of polls are conducted using household telephone surveys.
41
 The 
prevalence of unsolicited telephone calls has increased in recent decades, and consumers, 
thus potential respondents, have become even more willing to refuse calls from unknown 
numbers,
42
 worsening nonresponse. This could lead to accusations that survey results do not 
provide an objective representation of their sample. 
From the nonresponse problem comes another, fundamental limitation of 
contemporary opinion polling: demographic under-representation. Stoop has observed that 
the elderly and those with lower socio-economic backgrounds are less likely to respond to 
telephone surveys,
43
 with Berinsky adding that non-respondents are also likely to be black.
44
 
Furthermore, it has been shown that surveys routinely over-represent women,
45
 painting a 
skewed picture with respect to average public support for punitive policy. This is a particular 
issue since an overwhelming majority of incarcerated Americans is male.
46
 
Further research has shown differing demographic groups to provide wildly different 
opinions on criminal justice issues;
47
 a further display of the potentially ungeneralisability of 
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polling data.
48
 This critique could itself be caught by the same net cast by this chapter’s 
analytical framework, but divergent results from multiple sources demonstrate that 
demographic-misrepresentation is at least questionable, if not decisive. Constitutional law 
must rest on firmer ground than that. Roberts et al note that large-scale surveys are often 
factored out due to resource constraints, so samples may be selected for their convenience 
rather than their reliability.
49
 The student population is one example of this economical 
approach, confounding the problem of generalisation. Despite this group’s obvious 
differences from the population at large, both in terms of age and socio-economic 
background, students are often relied on for easy-access, affordable sampling.
50
 It is patent 
that consensus on any given issue is built on very shaky foundations if the initial 
representativeness of a sample is questionable. Regardless of a researcher’s good intentions, 
using polls as a quantifier of public opinion, it seems, could constitute ignorance of the 
pluralistic nature of public sentiment and oversimplifies the challenge.
51
 
One final issue regarding the quality of the sample relates to “non-attitudes” which, 
unlike non-responses, describes a respondent’s state of mind, which is genuinely indifferent 
towards a subject.
52
 Non-attitudes are often difficult to reveal as respondents are at liberty to 
invent their answers with little difficulty, thus affecting the true nature of the eventual results. 
Shuman and Presser assessed the impact of including “No Opinion” or “Don’t Know” (DK) 
options in polls, aimed to counter the problem of non-attitudes.
53
 They concluded that there 
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exists no short-term solution beyond offering DK as an alternative.
54
 While these DK 
opinions might evidence genuine public opinion – or apathy – such responses provide 
unsatisfactory gaps in the otherwise adversarial challenges brought before SCOTUS. 
“Don’t know” or “don’t care” provides little by way of public opinion measurement 
for constitutional law purposes, beyond displaying ambivalence or highlighting a need for 
clearer, more carefully constructed information. This might warrant wider social concern, but 
for present purposes it is destructive to any defensible reliance on polling data. Apathetic or 
uncertain respondents do not demonstrate evolving standards, or even any standards. 
Nonetheless, DK options must be accepted for what they are, ubiquitous in criminal justice 
polling. 
While the size and the quality of the sample might provide significant hurdles for any 
interpretivist to overcome, the data-collection is also hindered at an early stage if the question 
design is not rigorous. The principal question form in criminal justice polls, especially those 
concerning capital punishment, is dichotomous: “Yes” or “No”; “Agree” or “Disagree”. 
Respondents are therefore faced with quantitative negative or affirmative choices, without the 
opportunity to provide a rationale or a measure of strength for their opinions, which might be 
provided by a qualitative interview. Since quantitative research forms the bulk of polling, 
question quality is a vital consideration for any critique.  
5.1.2.2 QUALITY OF THE QUESTIONS 
Unnever et al note that attitudes about such fundamental and often controversial 
topics such as the death penalty are seldom ambivalent,
55
 with Roberts et al insisting that 
these attitudes are ‘far more nuanced and complex’56 than the simple “Yes” or “No” 
dichotomy of the prevailing quantitative research would suggest. One alternative is the 
deliberative poll, where respondents are given more opportunity to respond to a set of 
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questions, rather than simply filling dichotomous boxes. This method is thought to ‘provide a 
clearer picture of the informed public will that is less susceptible to distortion and selective 
interpretation.’57 What is more, Green noted that most regular polls provide no means of 
distinguishing between volatile, ‘mushy’58 opinions that change with time, or stable and 
durable opinions. 
As it has been shown, quantitative polling encourages rigid expression of opinion. In 
addition, the “public” nature of opinion has been decayed, with surveys intentionally made 
closed and private, and with no forum for discussion between respondents or even between 
the respondent and researcher, the territory of qualitative research.
59
 Simple, closed questions 
ignore ‘the complexity with which members of the public view criminal justice issues.’60 
Payne et al placed greater emphasis on this criticism, arguing that research design itself can 
provide a source for sentencing attitudes, rather than simply a measure.
61
 Their study 
concluded that closed-questions provided insufficient data to extrapolate from their sample to 
generalise “public opinion” on types of punishment.62 There is a flip side to this argument, 
however: that the risk of complex questions in fact worsens the reliability of the results. One 
such instance is with ‘roll-off’,63 where respondents only fill out a portion and return an 
incomplete survey. This is demonstrably more frequent when question-wording features 
obscure legalese or complex language, which is difficult for the average respondent to 
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understand.
64
 In a similar vein to the caution of roll-off, survey literature typically advises 
avoiding obscure terminology and complicated word order.
65
 
A further consideration with respect to the quality of polling questions relates to the 
human urge of acquiescence: a type of response bias where respondents are compelled by the 
‘natural desire’66 to portray themselves in a favourable light. Answer-distortion is effected in 
two ways here: either the affected respondent answers as they think they should answer, 
morally, or as they think they are expected to answer, socially. Without the researcher 
delving into answer rationales, it is impossible to determine which bias has the greater impact 
on a given respondent. Moreover, respondents have been found to shift their responses to 
satisfy the researcher, a process known as ‘satisficing’.67 In a comprehensive review of 
survey methods conducted by Biemer et al it was demonstrated that structured interviews 
with personalised cues, such as in telephone surveys,
68
 have been shown by an abundance of 
literature to encourage further acquiescence.
69
 This would indicate that polls conducted 
without such an element of personalisation are less vulnerable to the same extent of 
acquiescence effects, and are therefore more reliable by that measure.
70
 Clearly, where poll 
results are taken at face value there is a lack of checks and balances on the potential 
psychological force of satisficing.
71
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There is a great deal of further psychometric literature to demonstrate that “agree” or 
“disagree” surveys forgo the methodological rigour provided by other forms of question-
construction and qualitative survey methods.
72
 Alternatives which have been shown to yield 
richer results include analogue categorical methods, where a respondent has the choice of a 
scale of opinion (very strongly for to very strong against, with points in between, for 
example);
73
 ranking different choices; and tick all that apply options.
74
 This latter form of 
data provides the opportunity for interpreters to code responses and apply goodness of fit 
tests, where sample data can be analysed before it is extrapolated to the whole population. In 
order to determine whether the measured sample frequencies differ significantly from the 
overall expected population frequencies, for example, the sample data is tested and the 
resultant probability is compared to a significance level to determine whether it is 
generalisable, with a similar method to the t-test introduced in Section 5.1.2.1. 
Accepting that polls play an important role as ‘useful indicators of social discourse’75 
and as instigators of public debate, this thesis makes the claim that public opinion polls 
generate data which is insufficiently rigorous as a source of morality. Statistical tests can 
examine in more detail the mathematical significance of purported results, and can provide a 
degree of clarity to interpreters of data, but the substance of those polls and selection biases 
remain issues. Interpretivism requires more than quotations of scientific proof, regardless of 
statistical significance, if the generated data is unreliable. Before this claim is elaborated, the 
precedent for the use of polls in Eighth Amendment adjudication must briefly be outlined to 
facilitate an understanding of Court’s use of this indicia in ESD jurisprudence. 
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5.1.3 THE COURT, POLLING, AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
In considering the Supreme Court’s precedent for using polls in ESD jurisprudence, 
Furman v Georgia provides a natural starting point.
76
 Since the Eighth’s incorporation the 
Court had not considered objective indicia of ESD. Amsterdam’s oral argument for the LDF 
provided an opportunity to do so,
77
 giving rise to the first judicial discussion of polls in a 
punishments clause context. 
 5.1.3.1 FURMAN 
In Furman Justice Marshall cautioned against the use of polls, condemning the 
‘shocks the conscience’78 test, one which relies on the public’s sense of justice when 
informing societal decency.
79
 He warned that this test failed to provide a true representation 
of decency, which should instead be measured on the basis of ‘whether people who were 
fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty 
shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.’80 This standard, one of three statements which have 
become known as the Marshall Hypotheses, is noted in Section 5.2 in the context of 
penological goals and principles of sentencing. 
As shown in previous chapters, the several authors of the fragmented Furman 
judgment explicitly mistrusted polls when finding that the death penalty was, as practiced at 
the time, unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
81
 In concurrence, Justice Brennan 
concluded that ‘contemporary society views this punishment with substantial doubt’,82 after 
making general reference to opinion polls, without offering specific sources.
83
 Chief Justice 
                                                          
76
 408 US 238 (1972). 
77
 Oyez, (1971) ‘Furman v. Georgia - Oral Argument’ <http://bit.ly/1KALOWV> accessed 1st September 2015. 
(Furman Oral Argument). 
78
 Rochin v California 342 US 165 (1952) 172. 
79
 Furman (n 76) 361. 
80
 ibid 362. Justice Marshall cited results but did not base his opinion on them, acknowledging that ‘the polls 
have shown great fluctuation.’ ibid 361 fn44. 
81
 Furman (n 76) 240. For a helpful analysis of the fragmented plurality, see Lockett v Ohio 438 US 586 (1978) 
598-599. 
82
 Furman (ibid) 299-300. 
83
 Justice Brennan referred to polls which, in the abstract, underscore ‘the extent to which our society has in fact 
rejected [capital] punishment.’ ibid 300. 
Chapter V: Further Measures of Evolving Standards 
122 
 
Burger wrote one of the four separate dissents and attempted to caveat the Court’s use of 
polls: ‘[w]ithout assessing the reliability of such polls, or intimating that any judicial reliance 
could ever be placed on them’.84 Burger, however, implied that they were adequate indicators 
of societal decency.
85
 Recalling non-attitudes and the methodological pitfalls arising from 
dichotomous question design outlined in Section 5.1.2, it is worth considering the specific 
polls selected by Burger in Furman. 
Burger relied on two Gallup polls,
86
 in claiming that favour for the death penalty rose 
from 42% in 1966 to 51% in 1969.
87
 Respondents in both polls faced the closed question: 
‘Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?’88 Answers were 
confined to ‘For’, ‘Against’, or ‘No Opinion’.89 On its face, a net-increase of 9% was 
demonstrated by Burger’s comparison of the 1966 and 1969 polls; a compelling shift in 
public sentiment. Closer examination, however, reveals imperfections. Demographic 
breakdowns of the poll results cited by Burger were provided by Gallup, but omitted from the 
Chief Justice’s opinion. Take, for example, the percentage of women in favour of capital 
punishment for murderers: just 38% in 1966 (rather than 42% overall, as cited in Furman) 
and 44% in 1969 (rather than 51%):
90
 far from the majority indicated by Burger’s footnote.91 
Absent, too, was any attempt to analyse the statistics to determine whether there was a 
significant inference to be drawn from the results, such as via the t-test introduced in Section 
5.1.2.1.  
Alongside the Gallup poll cited by Burger in Furman was a Harris poll, published in 
the same edition of Public Opinion Quarterly, and purporting to measure opinion using the 
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same methods as Gallup.
92
 Overall death penalty support according to the Harris poll was a 
mere 38%, significantly lower than Gallup’s 51%. Without justification, the Chief Justice did 
not select the Harris poll, again falling short of the rigour encouraged by survey literature and 
by any call for objectivity. For an interpretivist analysis, Burger should at least have cited the 
varying results. Interpreters cannot be expected to act as Hercules would,
93
 with all available 
information, but a patent and silent disregard for one result in favour of another is nothing 
short of unprincipled cherry picking. 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, made similar remarks to the effect that the judiciary’s 
relationship with popular sentiment was ‘remote at best’,94 though he declined to cite specific 
evidence or explain whether he referred to polling here. Justice Powell’s concurrence made 
reference to opinion polls, describing them as having ‘little probative relevance’,95 but 
commenting that capital punishment opinion was ‘“fairly divided.”’96 To reach this 
conclusion, Justice Powell selected just three polls from the 1960s to demonstrate a visible 
change in opinion regarding the death penalty during this decade. Powell compared a 1960 
national poll demonstrating 51% favour for the execution of murderers,
97
 with the same 
Gallup polls cited by Burger (1966: 42%; 1969: 51%), collated by Goldberg and 
Dershowitz.
98
 Each poll asked the same closed question regarding support for executing 
murderers, with “Yes”, “No” and DK (or equivalent) options.99 Again, Powell ignored the 
1969 Harris poll showing just 38% favour in 1969,
100
 and also failed to mention, in a similar 
                                                          
92
 Erskine (n 86) 295. 
93
 Dworkin, TRS (n 18) 105-130; Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Belknap 2011) (JfH) 265. 
94
 Furman (n 76) 468. 
95
 ibid 441 fn36. 
96
 ibid, quoting Louisiana ex rel Francis v Resweber 329 US 459 (1947) 470. 
97
 Keesing's Systems, ‘Polls’ (1967) 2 International Review on Public Opinion 84. This poll was first relied 
upon in Witherspoon v Illinois 391 US 510 (1968) 520 fn16. 
98
 Arthur Goldberg and Alan Dershowitz, ‘Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional’ (1970) 83 HLR 1773, 
1781 fn39. 
99
 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Association on Mental Retardation et al, McCarver v North Carolina, No 
00-8727 (533 US 975 (2001)) refiled for Atkins v Virginia, No 00-8452 (536 US 304 (2002)) (Atkins AAMR 
brief) Appendix B. 
100
 Erskine (n 86) 295. 
Chapter V: Further Measures of Evolving Standards 
124 
 
vein to the Chief Justice’s demonstration of selectivity, that Goldberg and Dershowitz had 
also displayed favour as low as 42% in 1958.
101
 
Such demonstrations of selectivity among the Justices reveals a problem with the use 
of polls, but not necessarily with polling itself. This thesis makes the case for very careful 
consideration of public sentiment. If polls are to be accepted as indicative of that sentiment, 
one form of consensus which is instructive to the interpretivist challenge, their selection must 
be based on clear principles. The principles of justice, fairness, and due process for example 
require interpreters to make justified selections and to apply rigour when generalising from 
poll results. Justifications ensure transparency and quell accusations of cherry picking, while 
rigour, in the form of a statistical significance test, provides a more accurate inference of 
consensus. While Justices will always seek to inform their opinions with supporting evidence, 
picking polls merely in support of a personal value judgement, without a justified exclusion 
of competing results, undermines the integrity of the process of political morality. Integrity is 
inherently objective and relies on consistency in decision-making,
102
 and the objective arm of 
ESD requires a more considered approach than the Court considered in Furman, one which 
this thesis will attempt to carry out in Chapter VII. 
5.1.3.2 ATKINS 
An opportunity for SCOTUS to review the seemingly noncommittal and unprincipled 
use of opinion polling for ESD interpretation demonstrated in Furman appeared three 
decades later, in Atkins v Virginia.
103
 In that case, analysed fully in Chapter II, the six-Justice 
majority evolved the Eighth Amendment’s punishments clause to exclude the execution of 
intellectually disabled offenders.
104
 In Atkins SCOTUS cited a national consensus against this 
practice, expressly incorporating into its analysis polling data, which the majority claimed to 
show ‘a widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, 
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that executing the mentally retarded is wrong.’105 The cited data comprised all national polls 
known by the amici.
106
 Delivering the Court’s opinion in Atkins, Justice Stevens conceded 
that these factors were ‘by no means dispositive’,107 but maintained that ‘their consistency 
with the legislative evidence’ and international opinion ‘lends further support to our 
conclusion that there is a consensus’.108 
Typically,
109
 questions asked by the polls cited in Atkins were restricted to simple, 
closed answers.
110
 Only one poll cited by the Court provided for a more open response, 
giving respondents the opportunity to explain how, if deliberating over the punishment for a 
defendant convicted of murder, their choices would be affected.
111
 Response choices were not 
restricted to the uncomplex closed answers among the other polls, but to the broader: ‘much 
less likely’, ‘somewhat less likely’, ‘no difference’, or ‘not sure’.112 Opposition to the 
execution of intellectually disabled defendants varied from 56%
113
 to 83%
114
, demonstrating 
‘contingent[,] malleable’115 and inconsistent public opinion across the country. All polls 
provided for a DK option.
116
 
Recalling the issues with sampling and question-design, all but one of the cited polls 
utilised uncomplex, dichotomous methods, predominantly through household telephone 
sampling.
117
 As explained, this simplistic integration of polling data with constitutional 
interpretation underestimates the complexity of sampling and forgoes the methodological 
rigour provided for by other, multi-dimensional forms of question-construction.
118
 A number 
of such criticisms were raised in the Atkins dissent, with Chief Justice Rehnquist warning that 
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reliance on polls for ESD purposes was misguided and that SCOTUS lacked ‘sufficient 
information to conclude that the surveys were...capable of supporting valid empirical 
inferences’.119 
Whilst this thesis acknowledges that opinion polls play an important role in 
contributing to contemporary debate, they are insufficiently informative for constitutional 
interpretation, including ESD analysis. It should be recognised that the Justices who cited 
polls in Furman did not explicitly purport to demonstrate public consensus merely through 
the use of such evidence. That said, the Court’s selectivity demonstrated early on a weak link 
in the chain between opinion polling and Eighth Amendment adjudication. This weakness 
was redisplayed in Atkins, where ‘blind faith credence’120 in potentially unreliable polls was 
accorded by the majority. If interpreters of ESD are able, and seemingly willing, to base their 
decision-making on subjective values devoid of moral scrutiny and determined by cherry-
picked polls, the moral legitimacy of this unbridled value-judging is called into question. 
That claim must now be considered in light of an interpretivist framework. 
5.1.4 INTERPRETIVISM 
Developing the methodological concerns shown to pervade the Court’s use of opinion 
polls, this subsection will attempt to sieve rationally that indicator of ESD. The selectivity of 
polls seen in Furman and Atkins undermines the integrity of their inclusion in constitutional 
interpretation. If polls are able to provide any form of objective measurement, which is itself 
at least questionable, cherry picking adds a layer of unbridled discretion, which discredits the 
idea of an interpretivist judge. On the theoretical level, cutting into the providence of polls for 
constitutional interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, the claim will be made that judges 
should be guided by background principles of political morality which are not found through 
a merely positivistic emphasis on empirical poll results. 
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The cherry picking of poll resources in Atkins, an act described in strong terms by 
Raeker-Jordan as ‘potential fudging of the numbers’,121 suggests a selection of those numbers 
by the Justices to achieve consistency with the direction of their opinions. The obvious desire 
of the majority to exempt a class of defendants from execution in Atkins was complemented, 
not coincidentally, by the calculated references to polls demonstrating results, which cohered 
with that desire.
122
 The debate over ‘[w]hether these sorts of evidence should inform the 
analysis’123 of the Eighth Amendment is informed by Dworkinian interpretivism which 
rejects pre-interpretive data such as that provided by poll results, whether methodologically 
sound or otherwise.
124
 The empirical use of polling is characteristic of positivism, which 
provides an example of something Dworkin described as an austere statistic of collectivity,
125
 
rather than a rational use of moral communal will.
126
 The Eighth Amendment’s ESD seeks 
moral answers to legal questions and the Court must make principled references to the 
community standards that show the law in its best moral light.
127
 When selected in such an 
unprincipled and seemingly arbitrary empirical fashion as that showcased in Furman and 
Atkins,
128
 polling data is not sieved rationally in the way interpretivism understands political 
morality.
129
 When cited in constitutional interpretation, the poll is a methodologically 
unsound measure of consensus, given the complexity of public opinion,
130
 and pays even less 
respect to the existence of principles of morality in law. 
‘Sensationalism sells’,131 often to the detriment of disseminating accurate information, 
over-representing a ‘crime master narrative’,132 first referred to in the English system as 
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‘penal populism’.133 The potential effects of this phenomenon on opinion polling results 
could include a skewing of responses to attitudes about sentencing, an ill-conceived notion of 
crime trends and the impact of crime, and an under-justified insistence on more punitive 
practices. Those opinions might be strongly held, and might be accurate, but if social 
narrative generates penal populism, and its onset plays a role in changing attitudes, then poll 
results cannot be viewed simply as measuring opinion. Instead, they should be viewed in the 
context of their setting. 
The functionality of public opinion polling data as an indicator of ESD is redolent of a 
Hartian pedigree test,
134
 rejected by the core of interpretivism. Such a pessimistically 
dismissive approach to the inclusion of morality in interpretation undercuts the concepts of 
communal will and public sentiment, and therefore the evolving standards of decency of a 
maturing society by which the Eighth Amendment is guided. Moreover, the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’,135 against which the Federalist papers sought to safeguard, is captured by an 
unguided use of the ‘bad science’136 provided for by contemporary polls.137 Morality plays no 
role in the majoritarian ‘effects of occasional ill humors in the society’138 such as that 
contained in penal populism, if in fact these ill humours are provided with citation by the 
Supreme Court. 
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5.1.5 CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM BROWN AND GREGG 
Stinneford has warned that, if relying upon polling as indicative of moral standards, 
the Eighth Amendment ‘provides little protection when public opinion becomes enflamed’.139 
Even if, for the sake of analysis, polls are presumed at least somewhat representative of the 
public sentiment they purport to quantify, they still fail to provide the sound moral footing 
called for by interpretivist adjudication when they are selected in an unguided way. One 
remedy for the shortcomings of current polling selectivity is, therefore, for Justices to ensure 
the transparency of their opinions by justifying survey choices. In addition, recourse to 
greater precision, in the form of a statistical significance test including a calculation of 
standard error, would ground the use of polls in principles of justice, fairness, and due 
process. Loveland poses the question: ‘is it for the Court to lead or to follow the views of 
America’s citizens?’140 SCOTUS adopted the former option in Brown,141 endorsed in Chapter 
III as a paragon of the interpretivist tenet of principles trumping policies,
142
 demonstrating 
that positivism’s exhaustible approach to law is enlightened by moral guidance. A citizenry, 
as measured by polls, may support a policy, but the ultimate moral question faced by the 
interpreter is one of principle, which is counter-majoritarian in nature. 
The majority opinion in Gregg v Georgia,
143
 which reignited the American death 
penalty in response to post-Furman reforms, provides a satisfactory mid-way for the 
inclusion of polls in constitutional adjudication. The Eighth Amendment assessment, 
concluded the majority in Gregg, finds relevance in ‘objective indicia that reflect the public 
attitude towards a given sanction.’144 That attitude, however, is not conclusive. Sanctions 
‘also must accord with “the dignity of man,” which is the “basic concept underlying the 
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Eighth Amendment.”’145 With this basic concept of dignity in mind, the remainder of this 
chapter seeks out the sources that can provide clear examples of the morality-driven element 
of the ESD assessment. Penology, the philosophy of punishment and the goals that drive its 
imposition, is one such example.  
5.2 PENOLOGY 
Just as the Supreme Court announced that the Eighth Amendment’s punishments 
clause must comport with evolving standards of decency,
146
 the Gregg majority also 
stipulated constitutional requirements of dignity,
147
 and proportionate punishment.
148
 These 
criteria require that punishments do not ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain’,149 and are not excessive in comparison to the wrongful conduct.150 Aarons notes that, 
while these other formulations of the Eighth Amendment assessment were presented in 
Gregg, the Court’s subsequent focus has been squarely on a majoritarian ESD element.151 It 
can be argued that, in order properly to understand the ESD of the Eighth Amendment, 
respect must be paid to the basic concepts announced in Gregg: dignity and 
proportionality.
152
 The Gregg-standard ties in with Dworkin’s emphasis on ‘moral 
responsibility’153 and ‘political integrity’,154 fulfilling the principle of consistency in decision-
making and therefore fairness and justice.
155
 Under interpretivism, ESD can be viewed as 
complementary to, not in competition with, dignitarian and proportionality assessments.
156
 
On that basis it will be argued that, when penological principles are analysed in their best 
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light, aided by the same sieving process employed previously, they can contribute meaningful 
analysis to the interpretivist ESD assessment. 
This section will argue that sentencing rationales, which are policy goals, are only 
relevant to the executive and legislative branches. Crime control and other questions of 
policy, for example, are dealt with under the heading of “sentencing rationales”, 
“justifications”, or “purposes”. In judicial adjudication, however, the Eighth Amendment’s 
non-empirical evolutive doctrine aligns best with principles of just sentencing, rather than 
rationales. Proportionality and individualisation, found throughout modern Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, will provide a Dworkinian integrity-driven approach to the 
inclusion of penology in ESD interpretation. Before this argument can be developed fully, an 
introduction to the history of penological development prior to the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment activism is necessary. 
5.2.1 HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
Beccaria’s declaration in 1764 that every punishment must first be necessary,157 and 
second lenient,
158
 influenced countless Enlightenment philosophers including Blackstone and 
Bentham.
159
 Bessler notes that Beccaria’s writing had a ‘special influence’160 on 
Enlightenment figure Voltaire,
161
 with whom American founders Franklin and Rush had 
frequent contact, and both are said to have been influenced by Beccaria’s conceptions of 
proportionality.
162
 Furthermore, it has been argued that Beccaria even influenced Jefferson, 
the architect of the Declaration of Independence.
163
 Described as a ‘revolutionary 
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principle’164 which to this day underlies the Western democratic criminal justice process, 
Beccaria’s theory of proportionality laid the foundations for both principal tenets in 
punishment jurisprudence: consequentialism and deontology. Ferrajoli, who has described 
Beccaria as ‘the father of modern criminal law’,165 uses the example of the USA PATRIOT 
Act to show that 
‘[t]here has never been a moment when Beccaria’s teaching, and the example 
he offered as a civically engaged philosopher, ceased to be topical in standing 
up to these horrors [of] violent methods...the useless amplification of criminal 
norms, from excessive punishment to the obscurity of the laws.’166 
Beccaria’s idea that ‘the greatest happiness shared among the greatest number’167 
should provide the objective for rational legislation, was adopted by Bentham in 1776.
168
 
Although Bentham adopted this principle from a philosophy strongly concerned with dignity, 
and therefore deontological, the English philosopher, adopting a consequentialist approach 
where outcomes were most relevant, considered that everything could be determined by 
weighing and balancing the two human vices: pleasure and pain. In the punishment setting, 
Bentham’s consequentialism is described as ‘penal utilitarianism’169 and justifies sanctions 
insofar as they balance against the level of pain caused by the relevant offence, again 
appealing to methodical assessment of aggregate benefits and costs.
170
 Beccaria’s appeal to 
humanity was ‘subsumed by Bentham’s insistence on logic’,171 driven by a typical post-
Enlightenment drive to measure everything empirically, through reason. Hart, himself a legal 
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positivist, described Bentham’s utilitarianism as having ‘an almost inhuman flavour’;172 one 
which neglected the moral virtues of safeguarding against excessive governmental power. 
According to Hart, Bentham opened an ‘epoch which is now closing’,173 and still is, due in 
part to Dworkin’s influence on legal philosophy and to the shift towards a more humanity-led 
approach to sentencing. 
While Beccaria’s work was first observed as providing the foundations for Bentham’s 
strictly utility-driven approach to penology,
174
 an alternative explanation has been observed 
more recently. Young, for example, observes that Beccaria was far more concerned with 
justice beyond mere utility than many critics have claimed, and that ‘he was at least as much 
a retributivist as a utilitarian.’175 By re-examining his work, Beccaria’s statement that ‘[t]here 
is no freedom when the laws permit a man in some cases to cease to be a person and to 
become a thing’176 can be found embedded in Kant’s conception of deontological ethics,177 
which views law in contradiction to utilitarianism. Kant’s response to penal consequentialism 
through deontology argued that governments had the duty to act in such a way that they 
‘always treat humanity...never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’.178 
The “means”, which refers to the practical utility of punishment with goals such as 
reformation of character, something that would later become rehabilitation; deterrence; or 
incapacitation,
179
 is that with which Bentham was concerned.
180
 The “end”, according to 
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Kant, was just as important, and led him to argue for deserved punishment; just deserts, 
where retribution provided for everyone to ‘realize the desert of his deeds’.181 
One of the best known paragraphs of the Holy Bible contains the principle of lex 
talionis, retaliation, framed within Exodus as ‘[e]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, 
foot for foot’.182 Commentators have referred to such Old Testament quotes as this and 
Genesis 9:6: ‘[w]hoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed’,183 in 
concluding that the Bible supports retributive justice.
184
 While this may in fact not be the 
case,
185
 as shown by the law of the New Testament, which condemned the old principle of 
eye for eye,
186
 a strong foundation for public retributivism
187
 is grounded in Old Testament 
teaching. Therefore, whilst Kant’s 18th Century work certainly did not create retributivism, its 
conceptualisation of duty ethics as requiring just deserts can be seen to contain a revival of 
Biblical retributivism, divisive in an era when religion was abandoned in favour of 
empiricism. 
Kant’s deontology was unconcerned with practical consequences, instead occupying 
itself ‘with ensuring that every criminal violator receives his or her just desert’.188 Kant’s 
penological ethic resembles more closely the human aspect of Beccaria’s charge that ‘[e]very 
punishment which is not derived from absolute necessity is tyrannous’.189 Beccaria’s 
necessity principle is now explained through modern conceptions of proportionality review: 
offenders must be punished in a way, which is justified; they must receive their just 
deserts.
190
 Pronounced alongside the ESD principle in Weems,
191
 the basic ‘precept of 
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justice’192 of sentencing proportionality first requires offenders to be punished with similar 
severity to their crimes.
193
 That assessment is applied in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as 
the ‘objective’194 arm of the excessiveness inquiry.195 The Court’s non-lethal capital 
offending jurisprudence provides a rich example of such an assessment. In Kennedy v 
Louisiana SCOTUS held the death penalty disproportionate when applied to defendants who 
had committed non-lethal rape, regardless of the victim’s age.196 In so holding, the majority 
looked to objective proportionality when concluding that rape caused far less ‘moral 
depravity’197 than murder, due to its lower cause of ‘injury to the person and to the public’.198 
Next, contemporary applications of proportionality in retributivism also require a 
comparative reading of sentences with those of other crimes in the trial court’s jurisdiction, 
‘ordinal proportionality’,199 and the same crime in other jurisdictions.200 This arm of the 
proportionality assessment, the ‘subjective’201 element, also demonstrated in Kennedy,202 
contributes equal treatment to the goal of just deserts, where an offender should receive a 
punishment which is ‘exactly as much as he deserves, no more, no less.’203 Dworkin defends 
the importance of equality throughout his work,
204
 a principle respected at the interpretive 
stage of analysis. By applying the interpretivist tenet of political integrity to this 
discussion,
205
 consistency in decision-making is championed by subjective proportionality. 
Principles such as justice and fairness trump policies at every stage, and in the penology 
setting those principles manifest as an ordinal reflection on punishment. Political integrity, a 
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form of moral responsibility, provides the gap between morality and law, which Dworkin 
seeks to fill. 
Turning to the past century, Western societies have generally, within a jurisdiction, 
become more pacifistic and orderly in their sentencing practices than in Kant’s day, and 
Garland notes that the ‘emergence of cultural practices embodying civilized and humanitarian 
sensibilities have softened state power’.206 This “softening”, combined with a loss of 
confidence in social institutions arising out of the 1960s and 70s political turmoil; the 
struggle for civil rights; and soaring crime rates,
207
 led to the realisation that utilitarian 
sentencing policies such as deterrence were failing to deliver.
208
 Another aspect of 
consequentialism, the ‘rehabilitative ideal’,209 the idea of caring through coercion,210 also 
reached its peak.
211
 Martinson would declare in 1974 that ‘nothing works’,212 evidencing that 
rehabilitative and deterrent efforts ‘had no appreciable effect on recidivism’.213 These 
findings would provide the ‘foundation for what was to become one of the most significant 
shifts in modern American corrections.’214 Again, penology was shown to be a product of its 
context. The re-revival
215
 of retributivism would provide an alternative punishment theory 
resulting from the widespread disillusionment with consequentialist policies. 
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It will be proposed that, following Martinson’s rejection of utilitarian policy 
objectives which continues to find reaffirmation in contemporary literature,
216
 the principles 
embodied by just sentencing provide an integrity-driven approach for the future inclusion of 
penology in ESD interpretation. To that end, this thesis adopts Beccaria’s foundational 
principles of limited punishment, as read through a contemporaneously applicable form of 
proportionality, to cater for the rational sieve required by an interpretivist reading. Before 
finalising this chapter’s inclusion of penological principles in ESD analysis, a review of the 
Court’s treatment of that indicator will provide a better understanding of the Court’s 
precedent in this area. 
5.2.2 THE APPROACH OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Before reflecting on the inclusion of penology by SCOTUS in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, these decisions must first be viewed in context. During a period when the 
rehabilitative ideal had given way to cynicism and fatigue,
217
 and shortly following a 
declaration that the punishments clause contained an ESD standard,
218
 the late 1960s saw the 
creation of a Model Penal Code (MPC)
219
 by the American Law Institute.
220
 The MPC, 
described as ‘one of the great intellectual accomplishments of American legal scholarship of 
the mid-twentieth century’,221 coincided with a period of low confidence in public institutions 
and disquiet regarding punishment rationales.
222
 At its root, the Code, which serves as the 
framework for around two-thirds of US state criminal codes,
223
 identified five penological 
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tenets, namely prevention; rehabilitation; individualised sentencing; general deterrence; and 
safeguarding against excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary punishment.
224
 
The Code’s eclectic mix of utilitarian sentencing rationales and principles has since 
been refined with a renewed focus on retributivism,
225
 arguably in order to serve the social 
function of preventing vigilante-style private retribution, placing that power with legitimate 
state actors.
226
 With this in mind, and given that the emphasis of this thesis is on adjudication, 
the remainder of this section will shift the attention back to the Eighth Amendment’s judicial 
evolution. In the wake of the MPC’s introduction and the Warren Court’s extensive 
revolution of due process,
227
 the punishments clause was to experience a more refined 
penological assessment during the 1970s. 
While the 1972 decision in Furman was notably fractured, one of the few points on 
which the concurring Justices agreed was penology; every opinion addressed ‘deterrence’ and 
‘retributivism’.228 Radelet and Borg note that,229 despite the public’s general lack of appetite 
for utilitarian sentencing rationales, the deterrent effect of capital punishment was widely 
accepted, following a prominent 1975 study
230
 purporting to show that during the 1950s and 
1960s one execution could deter up to eight murders.
231
 Despite a declaration by the 
dissentients in Furman that deterrence was an area best left to state legislatures, which ‘can 
act far more effectively than courts’,232 the majority upheld it as a legitimate goal to inform 
ESD analysis.
233
 Reversing the constitutional ruling in Furman, Gregg nonetheless 
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reaffirmed this commitment to deterrence as a legitimate objective, in the face of this 
utilitarian goal’s empirical complexity and uncertain moral footing.234 
5.2.2.1 DETERRENCE 
Unconvinced by the promise of deterrence, critics would heavily criticise this 
principle. A Commission formed by the National Academy of Scientists in 1978
235
 would 
enflame academic disputes,
236
 with authors claiming to prove or disprove the controversial 
results of the 1975 study. Radelet and Akers claim that an abundance of conflicting outcomes 
from that battling results in a ‘net gain of zero’.237 Moreover, Radelet’s own study observed 
83.6% of expert criminologists feeling that their careers’ worth of experience led them to 
believe that there was no proven deterrent effect of the death penalty.
238
 In practice, 
‘individual deterrence’239 has a number of failings. Many people are undeterred and therefore 
reoffend, due either to ignorance of the potential sentences they might face,
240
 a lack of 
confidence in the penal system (or perhaps confidence in their ability to escape arrest or 
punishment), other motivations for crime such as necessity, or a combination of all these 
factors. In the case of capital punishment, clearly individual deterrence plays no part. An 
executed criminal is not deterred, he is dead. 
In addition deterrent effect, even if it has been successful, is nonetheless extremely 
difficult to measure. Proving a negative, demonstrating that less crime has been committed 
because of deterrence rather than a host of other socio-economic or political factors, is only 
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measurable in terms of individual deterrence, by interviewing each offender. Even then, 
issues prevail surrounding similar participant biases as those found with opinion polling. 
Nonetheless, Ashworth points to a strong general deterrent effect as evidenced empirically.
241
 
He notes that the existence of a penalty for the criminalisation of drink-driving, for example, 
causes desistence.
242
 While this may not be the case with the existence of the death 
penalty,
243
 deterrence clearly has some merit with regards its effect on potential offenders. 
Despite the shortcomings of deterrence, especially in the capital sphere, SCOTUS has, 
in ESD analysis, cited deterrence continually.
244
 As noted above, in Gregg the Court renewed 
its commitment to deterrence,
245
 providing a point of departure for this thesis. Deterrence, 
like all policy-goals, is an example of descriptive positivism.
246
 Morality, more readily found 
in Kant’s deontological reading of Beccaria, is not given even a minor role in utilitarian 
penology; this falls short of interpretivism’s ‘law as integrity’.247 Dworkin’s interpretivism 
requires policies to be trumped by principles, and this thesis argues that studies which purport 
to quantify deterrent effect support only policy goals, which are best left to the other branches 
of government. ESD analysis is required by this thesis to be informed not only by collectivity 
but by background principles of morality.
248
 Having departed from the Court’s reliance on 
deterrence, measured by a Dworkinian yardstick, consideration of the second rationale of 
penology regularly cited by SCOTUS, retributivism, must now be considered. 
5.2.2.2 RETRIBUTIVISM 
Kant’s revolutionary deontology occupied itself in the punishment context with ‘just 
deserts’;249 resembling Beccaria’s proportionality principle more closely than the Old 
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Testament’s punitive charge of ‘eye for eye’,250 lex talionis. This chapter has explained the 
bridge between traditional, Kantian deontology and modern proportionality review.
251
 As a 
summary, just deserts is a punishment which is deserved.
252
 The principle requires offenders 
first to be punished with similar severity to that of their crimes.
253
 Second, a contemporary 
understanding of retributivism requires a comparative reading of sentences with those of 
other crimes in the trial court’s jurisdiction, ‘ordinal proportionality’,254 and the same crime 
in other jurisdictions.
255
 These criteria ensure that any state-imposed retributivism is 
proportionate and adheres to just deserts, rather than an emotionally-motivated display of 
personal vengeance.  
In Eighth Amendment precedent, however, numerous Justices have regularly, and 
wrongly, conflated state retributivism with personal vengeance, including Justice Brennan’s 
concurrences in Furman and Trop.
256
 Justice Marshall made the same mistake in Furman, 
agreeing with Brennan that ‘[r]etaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly 
condemned as intolerable aspirations for a government in a free society.’257 Marshall made 
explicit reference to Beccaria in reproving ‘[p]unishment as retribution [which] has been 
condemned by scholars for centuries’.258 Sigler has noted that this misunderstanding of 
‘retribution-as-vengeance’,259 referring to the conflation between state retributivism and 
personal vengeance, has been cited and followed in an abundance of subsequent punishments 
clause jurisprudence.
260
 
                                                          
250
 Cf Beccaria (n 157) 10, 63; KJV (n 182) Exodus 21:24. 
251
 See (nn 177-184). 
252
 Weems (n 1) 367: ‘punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense’. 
253
 Kant (1996 ed) (n 177) 141; Hegel (n 193) 129; von Hirsch and Ashworth (n 191) 68-70; Weems (ibid) 367; 
Atkins (n 103) 311; Roper (n 29) 560. 
254
 von Hirsch and Ashworth, (eds) (ibid) 68-70.  
255
 Coker (n 194) 613; Kennedy (n 196) 424-426. 
256
 Furman (n 76) 304: ‘criminals are put to death because they deserve it’ quoting his own concurrence in Trop 
(n 145) 112: ‘But I cannot see that this is anything other than forcing retribution from the offender - naked 
vengeance.’ 
257
 Furman (ibid) 343. 
258
 ibid, citing Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764) (Henry Paolucci ed, Prentice Hall 1963). 
259
 Sigler (n 179) 1182. 
260
 In addition to Furman (n 76), Gregg (n 143), and the subsequent cases which make direct citation of those 
judgments - and which are therefore founded on this misunderstanding of retributivism - other Supreme Court 
Chapter V: Further Measures of Evolving Standards 
142 
 
A review of jurisprudence outside the Eighth Amendment sphere shows that this 
misunderstanding permeates the Court’s precedents from much earlier than Furman, with the 
1952 holding in Morissette v US making the same mistaken retribution-as-vengeance 
conflation.
261
 Additionally, the majority in Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez,
262
 a 1963 Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments case which has since been cited widely by the Court,
263
 described ‘an 
exaction of retribution’ as ‘naked vengeance’,264 the same terms witnessed in Trop.265 It 
seems that Furman simply perpetuated this mistake by bringing it to the punishments clause, 
demonstrating that a majority of SCOTUS has persistently considered state retributivism as 
personal vengeance, not in its Beccarian-Kantian proportionate form which this thesis adopts. 
5.2.3 INTERPRETIVISM 
As explained both in Chapter III and in Section 5.1 to this chapter, interpretivism 
lends moral readings into background principles of the law to interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s ESD.266 The retribution-as-vengeance conflation demonstrated throughout 
generations of Supreme Court jurisprudence stalls such a consideration, as it foregoes the 
moral scrutiny of just deserts. This thesis argues, along with the Court,
267
 that personal 
vengeance is an archaic,
268
 illegitimate penological goal, and claims that a moral reading of 
that goal views it as unacceptable in modern, principled penology.
269
 The recent fixation on 
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“law and order” introduced in the discussion of polling may lead an observer to argue that 
vengeance is in fact a legitimate popular goal, with mass media and politics proliferating this 
rhetoric.
270
  
In a vein that resembles Federalist No 10’s warning against tyrannical majorities,271 
von Hirsch has cautioned that the principle of proportionality could become jettisoned by 
penal populism.
272
 The Californian three strikes law introduced in Chapter II is one such 
example of US political appeasement of the punitive populace leading to disproportionate 
sentencing schemes. For ESD adjudication, at least, interpretation should be guided by an 
approach which defers to moral principles, one for which a fixation on law and order for its 
own sake cannot adequately cater. 
Instead, the model refined by Kant and refined further by Robinson as ‘deontological 
desert’273 is adopted by this thesis for the purposes of including such principled penology for 
assessments of ESD. While Kant’s retributivism was ‘sketchy’274 in that it did not expand on 
the reasons for his preference of just deserts over utility, Robinson’s framework embodies a 
clearer ‘set of principles derived from fundamental values, principles of right and good’.275 
The principle of just desert, including proportionality and individualisation, can be relied on 
to ensure a moral approach to the inclusion of penology in ESD adjudication. The side-lined 
Gregg conditions of dignity
276
 and non-excessive punishment
277
 are also championed by this 
approach, something that is so far lacking in the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
278
 Instead 
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of focusing on utilitarian deterrence,
279
 as the Court has done on occasion, deontological 
desert leaves policy goals to the other branches of government, by squaring the judiciary’s 
focus on constitutional interpretation of background principles of morality. This theory of 
penology, adopted by Robinson,
280
 aligns with interpretivism, by seeking aspirational 
answers through an appeal to ‘an amalgam of practice’281 and by championing principles of 
morality over policy objectives.
282
 
Before concluding this section, a claim that Eighth Amendment principles cannot be 
reconciled with one another must be addressed. It has been stated that consistency, derived 
from the holdings in Furman and Gregg,
283
 and individualisation, required by the Lockett and 
Eddings doctrines,
284
 cannot be reconciled.
285
 Sigler explains that the Furman-Eddings line of 
jurisprudence might have led to ‘a system of guided discretion that yields sentences that are 
neither entirely consistent nor fully individualized.’286 Under the interpretivist reading 
propagated throughout this thesis, a claim of contradiction collapses. Constitutional values 
are not ‘all-or-nothing propositions’,287 and nor are penological rationales. Through a rational 
sieve, values of the Constitution are cast as principles,
288
 informing the interpreter. For 
example the strong discretion afforded by Lockett and Eddings permits open-ended 
mitigation, while Furman and Gregg channel that discretion through the principle of restraint. 
This channelling function upholds interpretivist principles and allows for individualisation to 
co-exist with consistency. Such argument aligns with the classical, deontological, review of 
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just deserts by incorporating subjective, ordinal, and intra-jurisdictional elements of 
proportionality into the excessiveness assessment. 
Harmelin v Michigan is the controlling precedent for terms-of-years 
proportionality,
289
 where sentences are assessed according to their objective severity. Torti 
has noted, however, that very few Harmelin-disproportionality claims have been 
successful;
290
 leading some authors to conclude that the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality 
principle is a dead letter.
291
 On the contrary, this thesis argues that the proportionality 
principle of the Eighth Amendment is very much alive, but has not been given recent 
expression. The overabundance of capital challenges has a large role to play in casting a 
shadow over the non-capital docket, creating a sense that these cases are less important to the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis. To bolster the claim that proportionality review is 
fundamental to the assessment of solitary confinement, Graham v Florida exists as recent 
precedent suggesting that subjective severity is an important consideration.
292
 In Graham the 
Court concluded that the defendant’s age is an important factor to take into account when 
assessing severity,
293
 holding mandatory life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) 
unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles.
294
 While Graham concerned sentence length 
rather than conditions, Ristroph argues that the case paves the way for confinement 
conditions to feature in future proportionality assessments.
295
 That consideration of subjective 
severity was certainly hinted at in Brown v Plata,
296
 where SCOTUS applied the Eighth 
Amendment, to condemn the conditions and lack of psychiatric care in California’s prison 
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system, and Chapters VI and VII will seek to extend this rationale to solitary confinement 
scrutiny. 
By reproving the Court’s reliance on utilitarian rationales such as deterrence, and its 
conflation of vengeance with retributivism, this thesis places the highest value on principles 
of deontological desert for the purpose of informing ESD adjudication.
297
 Having dealt with 
penology in practical and theoretical terms, this chapter must now consider two further 
elements of the ESD principle. Transnational sources of law will first be considered, before 
professional consensus, an extra-legal principle that has received recent support from the 
Court, is introduced. 
5.3 TRANSNATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW 
In addition to its introduction of the ‘evolving standards of decency’298 principle to 
the Eighth Amendment assessment, two further points from Chief Justice Warren’s opinion 
in Trop warrant reflection at this stage. First he noted that, ‘in an enlightened democracy such 
as ours’,299 it should have been expected that the punishments clause had rarely required 
definition. Second, he cited a United Nations (UN) survey,
300
 indicating that, with the 
exception of the Philippines and Turkey,
301
 ‘[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual 
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime’.302 The first 
statement has already been addressed by previous chapters, which showed that Warren’s 
optimism, perhaps imperialism,
303
 in Trop was followed by half a century of judicial 
engagement with and delineation of the Amendment. While such optimism, activism, and 
subsequently evolutive interpretation of ESD shown by this line of jurisprudence must be 
commended, a consideration of the further controversy surrounding Warren’s statement in 
support of transnational constitutionalism is inescapable. 
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On the framework outlined in Section 5.1, Dworkin’s theory of interpretivist 
adjudication provides that principles of morality and law should be established by appealing 
to ‘a whole set of shifting, developing and interacting standards’.304 By employing a 
Dworkinian rational sieve, this section will make the claim that transnational law makes 
valuable contributions to that set of standards for ESD adjudication. 
5.3.1 TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARATIVISM 
The term “transnational constitutional comparativism” incorporates the comparison of 
varying sources of law from outside the US, both legislative and constitutional. 
“Transnational law” as a single term has become accepted to include a greater variety of legal 
sources than the categories “international” and “foreign” law.305 Transnational law also 
includes rules or agreements, which transcend domestic boundaries but might not have been 
formally adopted by states, such as customs.
306
 
First, transnational law includes international law, or strictly “public international 
law” (PIL).307 Formerly ‘the Law of Nations’,308 PIL is now accepted to unite jus inter gentes 
(treaty law),
309
 which constitutes multilateral or bilateral agreements between states, with jus 
gentium (customary law).
310
 Custom in this sense is derived by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) from the collective practice of states, traditionally evidenced by a behavioural 
element (what a state does)
311
 and a psychological element (what a state believes it must do, 
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opinio juris).
312
 The ICJ has expanded this doctrine, holding that the existence of widely 
adopted treaties may demonstrate elements of customary law in their own right,
313
 regardless 
of the signatory status of a given state. As such, the US could be bound at international law 
by a treaty-created custom (or ‘norm’)314 despite not having signed that particular treaty. This 
area of international law is itself a source of great controversy,
315
 but not one with which the 
remainder of this thesis is concerned. The inclusion of PIL, along with other forms of 
transnational law, in US (Eighth Amendment) constitutional law by its own Supreme Court is 
the topic of the present discussion. 
As noted, the concept of transnational law includes “foreign law”, which relates to 
legal sources from third-party states, for example national constitutions and regional 
agreements outside the US. Unlike international law, where binding effect occurs through 
self-execution when agreed by Congress,
316
 foreign law does not have the same impact on the 
US, unless the judiciary integrates it with constitutional doctrine. Transnational constitutional 
comparison therefore includes a variety of sources of law and norms, which transcend state 
boundaries and were created without the approval of the US legislature. It is this category of 
law that provides the focus for inclusion in ESD analysis. 
One of the last opinions of Chief Justice Marshall resorted ‘to the great principles of 
reason and justice...The decisions of the Courts of every country [which] will be received, not 
as authority, but with respect.’317 Marshall’s call for such respect will be honoured by the 
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remainder of this section, which will call for a degree of the same reverence in interpretivist 
approaches to ESD. 
5.3.2 THE COURT’S USE OF EXTERNAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
Reviving Marshall’s call, in a landmark decision which considered anti-sodomy laws 
existing in several states across the US,
318
 the Court in Lawrence
319
 cited the approach taken 
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to determine what restrictions on personal 
conduct were ‘necessary in a democratic society’.320 Toobin has described Justice Kennedy’s 
idea ‘of law as a transmitter of society’s values’ as ‘central to his identity’.321 Part of that 
identity clearly includes a predilection for transnational comparativism,
322
 as Kennedy 
reflected on ‘values we share with a wider civilization’323 when condemning the Texan 
restriction on homosexual intimacy in Lawrence. His majority opinion coalesced with the 
ECtHR’s and concluded that the state statute offended substantive due process,324 as 
protected by the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.325 
The decision triggered severe criticism from the dissentients, with Justice Scalia 
scolding the majority for bringing a constitutional entitlement into existence ‘because foreign 
nations decriminalize conduct.’326 Scalia cited an unrelated denial of certiorari where Justice 
Thomas warned against imposing ‘foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’327 
Furthermore, Scalia hinted in Lawrence at cherry picking, lamenting the Court’s discussion 
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of transnational law for ‘ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal 
prohibitions on sodomy’.328 In addition to Scalia’s and Thomas’s suspicions and overriding 
hesitance to include transnational comparisons in their domestic constitutional interpretation, 
this comparative area of law has attracted a great degree of extra-judicial and academic 
discussion. Before the themes of such discussions are described (in Section 5.3.3), a 
refutation of one criticism in particular is compelling: that of unprecedented decision-making. 
As indicated, a major criticism of Lawrence revolved around stare decisis, with one 
commentator describing the Court’s use of transnational comparisons for domestic 
interpretation as ‘unprecedented’.329 That particular comment, strongly rooted in positivistic, 
historical originalism,
330
 deviates from the trajectory intended by this section, which seeks 
moral analysis of transnational comparisons.
331
 Nonetheless, exposing the Court’s use of 
transnational comparativism, both before Lawrence was decided, and more recently can make 
an important addition to the foregoing discussion. An explanation of this jurisprudence will 
reveal the Court’s reliance on transnational law to be far from unprecedented. In addition, it 
will be shown that transnational comparativism is inherent in the framework of law. 
Black et al claim that the Constitution should be read according to ‘legal positivism-
influenced dualism’,332 requiring the formal incorporation of international law into domestic 
law by the legislature, not the judiciary. Such formality is provided for by the Constitution’s 
Treaty Clause in Article II.
333
 In SS Lotus international law was described by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ),
334
 the precursor to the ICJ, as: ‘[t]he rules of law 
binding upon States’ which ‘emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or 
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by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law’.335 On the same lines as Black 
et al’s endorsement of dualism, Delahunty and Yoo argue that to use foreign law as an 
interpretive tool is to override and therefore undo formal, dualistic, domestic law.
336
  
 Black et al remark that, given the strength of Delahunty and Yoo’s positivism-laden 
charge, it is unsurprising that scholars have responded in similar language, resorting to 
originalist tenets of interpretation to defend transnational constitutionalism.
337
 Such responses 
look to the Declaration of Independence,
338
 the Federalist papers,
339
 and Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s opinions in support.340 By recognising that the Framers and early Supreme Court 
Justices respected and anticipated the use of transnational law, originalist claims against 
constitutional comparativism fall flat. Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy is one such 
example,
341
 wherein Chief Justice Marshall declared that an act of Congress should never be 
construed to violate the Law of Nations, creating what has become known as the ‘Charming 
Betsy canon’.342 Later Marshall would also cite English law,343 European codes,344 and the 
foreign climate of opinion.
345
 Foreign law was also cited in Reynolds v US,
346
 where Justice 
Gray assured that the Court’s commitment in this area had not weakened over the century, 
declaring in The Paquette Habana that ‘international law is part of our law’.347 These 
opinions therefore serve as early and enduring indications that SCOTUS, granted with power 
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by Marbury v Madison,
348
 also held the power to take into account international law, and that 
this commitment strengthened over the century following Charming Betsy. 
It could be contended that these early references to transnational law served simply as 
guides for the historical underpinnings of the American system and the development of 
SCOTUS in its maiden century. Owing to the roots of American common law in the English 
system, the use of transnational law was arguably as much for originalist, historicist purposes 
as it was for comparativism in and of itself. That said, the originalist argument only stands up 
if further precedent wavers and the record demonstrates nationalism prospering. Closer 
inspection shows that this is not the case, as demonstrated in a lengthy rebuttal by Calabresi 
and Zimdahl.
349
 They track the last two hundred years of Supreme Court practice with respect 
to comparative constitutionalism, citing numerous supporting cases and demonstrating that 
Payne’s description of this source of interpretation as ‘unprecedented’350 has no substance.351 
Transnationalism has been viewed by many judges as an integral part of the Constitution’s 
political morality. 
In light of the interpretivist framework applied by this chapter,
352
 it is vital to return to 
an assessment of the Court’s more recent jurisprudence in the punishment sphere. Around ten 
years ago SCOTUS decided a duo of Eighth Amendment cases, which were placed on the 
docket either side of Lawrence,
353
 with both decisions citing transnational comparisons to 
varying degrees of significance. Debating the juvenile death penalty in Roper,
354
 the majority 
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looked to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC),
355
 despite the US existing 
as only one of two UN member states, alongside Somalia,
356
 not to ratify the Convention. The 
Court also cited relevant articles of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),
357
 
again not ratified by the US, in addition to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),
358
 which the US has ratified, with reservations.
359
 Notably, the second of 
these reservations retains the right of the US to impose capital punishment on juveniles.
360
 
Nevertheless, the Court disregarded Congress’s non-ratification or reservation of these 
treaties and, fortified by a review of all UN states,
361
 concluded that, ‘[i]n sum, it is fair to say 
that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile 
death penalty’.362 
Following Justice Kennedy’s transnational law-laden majority opinions in Roper and 
Lawrence, SCOTUS embarked on further evolution of the Eighth Amendment’s ESD in 
Atkins, this time placing more relevance on opinion polls, as discussed in Section 5.1.3. 
Confining its reference to transnational law within a footnote, the Court paid respect to ‘the 
world community’363 and quoted from a European Union brief,364 again demonstrating a 
willingness to invoke transnational comparisons to inform domestic constitutional decency. 
Bringing the analysis to the present day, the most recent ESD assessment citing transnational 
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law was handed down in 2010. In Graham v Florida the majority, again led by Justice 
Kennedy, reflected on a ‘sentencing practice rejected the world over’,365 namely the infliction 
of Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentences on juveniles convicted of non-homicide offences. 
The Court, caveating that the consensus among other nations was ‘not dispositive as to the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment’,366 held the ‘climate of international opinion’367 against 
such a practice to be of growing relevance.
368
 Once more citing Article 37 UNCRC, in 
addition to an academic review demonstrating ‘global consensus’,369 the majority concluded 
that transnational comparisons were fundamental to the ESD assessment.
370
 This recent 
commitment to comparative law, with eight of the nine sitting Justices incumbent at the time 
of writing,
371
 provides a contemporary display of the Court’s potential approach to 
transnational constitutionalism in future cases, bolstering the interpretivist argument that this 
element of interpretation is vital to the Constitution’s moral character. 
Clearly, cases decided both historically and contemporaneously with Lawrence, have 
made direct reference to transnational comparisons when seeking to establish the Eighth 
Amendment’s ESD.372 This finding supports one claim of the present thesis, that any strictly 
originalist principle is rebutted. Nonetheless, subsequent to Calabresi and Zimdahl’s 
jurisprudential review, Zaring found the Supreme Court’s constitutional cases, which made 
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reference to transnational law to be rare.
373
 Black et al agreed, labelling ‘the highly salient 
“troika”’ of Roper, Lawrence and Atkins as ‘rare and unrepresentative.’374 Nonetheless, 
precedent clearly exists, and steering away from questions of exactly how, when, and to what 
extent SCOTUS cites transnational law, the case for a rebuttal of the positivist argument has 
been made. The normative question of whether such citations to transnational law are 
appropriate as interpretive tools in ESD adjudication must now be visited, with the remainder 
of the chapter arguing in the affirmative. 
5.3.3 REFUTING THE LEADING CRITICISMS 
 A number of ways exist to split the arguments for and against transnational 
constitutionalism, the method of informing domestic constitutional interpretation by 
reflecting on transnational sources. McClosky admitted that there was no consensus on 
defining “ideology”, but that there was widespread acceptance that the term related to 
‘systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, [and] that justify the exercise 
of power’.375 Ideology helps to identify right and wrong and to ‘set forth the interconnections 
(causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity’.376 While this definition 
still holds true, the modern employment of the term ideology holds far broader implications 
than merely to political philosophy, now communicating ‘a broad, abstract concept’.377 In the 
context of political philosophy, ideology provides the first criticism of transnational 
constitutionalism for reasons which will now be discussed.  
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5.3.3.1 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Political philosophy is often over-emphasised with respect to the citation of 
transnational law.
378
 Far from the ‘myth’379 of Supreme Court Justices’ fidelity to the 
Constitution above all else, it is accepted that they operate with an underlying positioning on 
an ideological spectrum.
380
 Epstein et al refute this, demonstrating that ideologies can shift 
over a judge’s tenure.381 One of the most notable examples on the Supreme Court was Justice 
Blackmun, whose ideological history was tracked at length by Greenhouse, concluding that 
Blackmun’s ideology shifted significantly from its starting position as strongly conservative, 
far towards the liberal left.
382
 
Debates surrounding the impact of those ideologies on decisions are wide-ranging,
383
 
but it is now accepted that judge ideologies do exist and can be measured.
384
 With respect to 
the current discussion of transnational law, however, the effect of ideology is often 
overstated.
385
 Black et al claim that, following their assessment of SCOTUS decisions that 
cite transnational law, ‘the assumption that citing foreign law is a principled disagreement 
between judicial ideologies is a red herring’.386 It has been shown that all Justices, regardless 
of their positioning on any type of ideological spectrum, seek to support their opinions with a 
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variety of sources, including transnational law.
387
 As such, ideology does not provide a clear 
line for how a judge will treat transnational legal sources. Moreover, it is a reflection on when 
Justices might cite transnational law, rather than the present assessment: whether, 
normatively, these sources should be included in analysis. The next criticism resembles a 
traditionally nationalist ideology,
388
 namely exceptionalism. 
5.3.3.2 AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
The idea of America as ‘quite exceptional’389 featured prominently in de 
Tocqueville’s writing on America in the mid-19th Century. Quigley notes that the Western 
rise of democracy, exemplified by the American and French revolutions away from 
hereditary monarchy and towards republican government, was tied to an evolution of a sense 
of ‘modern nationalism and citizenship’.390 Such sense of nationalism is easily conflated with 
emotional “patriotism” or “loyalty”, which Barrington distinguishes, noting that nationalism 
also encompasses a strong, formal sense of a state’s territorial and legal sovereignty.391 The 
reinforced unity and statehood which followed the Revolutionary War built on Madison’s 
early ideal that, ‘[w]ith a union of its citizens, a government thus identified with the nation, 
may be considered as the strongest in the world’.392 Such a perception of strength is prevalent 
in American political discourse, representing a sense of ‘grave responsibility’393 to share the 
nation’s success, in spite of the hypocrisy underlying its exclusionary background.394 
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Nationalist ideology is predominantly aligned with positivist originalism, where the 
Constitution’s raison d'être is to uphold the sovereignty of the American people and to protect 
their rights, only insofar as originally intended by the Framers. Within constitutional law, 
American exceptionalism can be exemplified by the enhanced protection of the right to bear 
arms and the right to free speech enforced by the US Supreme Court.
395
 While numerous 
examples of charges against transnational comparisons arise from academe,
396
 John Yoo is a 
leading figure. Writing with Delahunty in 2005, Yoo noted the main reasons for avoiding the 
use of foreign and international law ‘to decide questions of constitutional interpretation.’397 
Yoo first invoked Marbury to argue that the Constitution is the highest form of law in the US 
because it stems from the People.
398
 Further, he relied on originalism when quoting verbatim 
the Supremacy Clause, noting that it makes no mention of “transnational” law when 
describing ‘the supreme law of the land’.399 Finally, Yoo claimed that allegiance to the 
Constitution compelled the conclusion that transnational sources cannot be applied, due to the 
divergence in socio-political, governmental and historical differences between the US and the 
rest of the world.
400
 
This convoluted set of caveats and hedges takes exceptionalism literally, in a similar 
vein to Lessig’s description of Dworkin as an ‘infidel’401 for seeking to perfect the law at the 
cost of traditionally originalist principles. As Chapter II sought to clarify, Fleming’s 
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‘originalist premise’402 that the only method of fidelity to the Constitution is originalism is 
rejected, as is Lessig’s reliance on that false premise. Dworkin’s moral reading upholds 
fidelity to the core values underlying the Constitution, which he views as interlaced 
throughout the framework of rights. In the face of accusations of infidelity to tradition, 
Dworkin’s theory of interpretation in fact encourages a review of history and precedent, and 
embraces the text of the Constitution, including the Supremacy Clause, simply clarifying the 
interpreter’s view of the sources of law by recourse to moral principles.403 The present 
discussion has adopted, through Chapter III, an understanding of law as informed by 
morality, which was a fundamental part of the framing and amending process. Consequently, 
fidelity and supremacy are not undermined if morality is sought by recourse to wider human 
values supported by transnational legal sources, since those sources were inherent in the 
political morality of the community. Exceptionalism should not serve as an excuse for 
immorality, regardless of tyrannous,
404
 ill-humoured
405
 majorities. 
Whilst this chapter has focused on theoretical assessments, rather than the 
applications of ESD, which will be introduced in Chapter VI, an overview of comparative 
statistics aids the present discussion. At the time of writing, around 2.29 million Americans 
are being held in confinement; 70,000 are juveniles.
406
 These figures translate to 743 per 
100,000 of the national population; a 500% rise over the past thirty years,
407
 ensuring the US 
retains its position as the leader in mass incarceration.
408
 China imprisons at a rate of 122 per 
100,000, with England and Wales at 153.
409
 Likewise, the leadership of a Northern European 
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bloc demonstrates positive moral exceptionalism, that which is consistent with principles of 
proportionality and humanity, Sweden (78); Denmark (74); Norway (73); and Finland (59). 
Writing in what he described as ‘an era of penal excess’410 in 2008, Pratt described 
Scandinavian imprisonment as exceptional, reflecting not simply on low levels of 
imprisonment,
411
 but also humane prison conditions.
412
 From this reflection it becomes 
obvious that the US is no longer “exceptional” in the positive sense that the word connotes. 
Rather, the US is exceptionally poor in terms of its excessive rate of imprisonment, a record 
which is condemnatory rather than celebratory. Further information about this situation, 
making specific reference to the US addiction to solitary confinement, its related conditions 
and human consequences, will be introduced throughout Chapter VI. 
In addition to their refutable claims of American exceptionalism, Delahunty and Yoo 
argue that the use of transnational comparativism has ‘the potential to turn into a standard of 
deference’413 which would erode the separation and the democratic bases for law making in 
the US. This line of argument appeals to the checks and balances envisaged by the three-
branch system,
414
 which would be circumvented by appealing to transnational law, a serious 
claim that must next be redressed if this thesis is to argue strongly for transnationalism. 
5.3.3.3 THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
A principal issue before SCOTUS is the separation of powers, considered a 
fundamental part of the framework of American government and observed since its 
founding.
415
 As noted, international law is traditionally incorporated into US law by the 
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express consent of the elected legislative branch, Congress.
416
 The judiciary’s reliance on un-
incorporated international law, as seen in Roper,
417
 therefore creates a potential competence 
creep. By recognising an element of the ICCPR in domestic law, the Court in Roper can be 
argued to have legislated from the bench and usurped Congress’s role. The enraged dissent is 
therefore understandable,
418
 given this perceived over-step. Reading law as integrity,
419
 
however, points to support for the Roper majority, due to its commitment to interpreting the 
morality fundamental to law; observing principles inherent in the Eighth Amendment and 
upholding a commitment to decency by protecting juveniles from execution. It can be also be 
claimed that the Rule of Law, another integral tenet of the US Constitution, is in fact 
strengthened by the increased transparency provided by the Court in cases such as Roper and 
Lawrence. By clearer articulation of constitutional principles, each of the Kennedy opinions 
in those cases has ameliorated any weakness in this area, by committing to transparent 
decision-making through transnational constitutionalism.
420
 Such increased transparency 
provides a strong footing for the elected branches to constrain this element of judicial 
activism, the use of transnational law in constitutional interpretation. 
Indeed, there have been attempts to suffocate that practice more directly, both at the 
federal and state levels.
421
 Following Lawrence, members of Congress attempted to pass the 
Constitution Restoration Act (CRA),
422
 recommending that, ‘[s]hould the Supreme Court 
resort to the law of foreign nations or the European Court of Human Rights for authority, 
impeachment and removal from office are appropriate remedies.’423 Tushnet highlighted the 
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Act’s potential unconstitutionality,424 noting that its success in Congress was highly unlikely 
and that the statute was ‘purely symbolic’.425 Ultimately, Tushnet’s suspicions proved true 
and the CRA languished early in Congress. Ten further years have passed without proposal of 
a similar bill or constitutional amendment.
426
 Turning to the state level, the only legislature to 
have successfully amended its constitution to restrict in absolute terms the judiciary’s use of 
foreign law was Oklahoma in 2010. The Save Our State Amendment provided that Oklahoma 
courts ‘shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures’427 and passed with 
70% approval in a state-wide referendum.
428
 Because of its direct reference to sharia law,
429
 
however, the amendment was struck down as discriminatory by the Tenth Circuit and 
permanently enjoined in 2012.
430
 
Other states have attempted unsuccessfully to enact similar amendments,
431
 with the 
2004 American Laws for American Courts (ALAC) Bill model providing a less restrictive 
and so far more successful alternative to constitutional amendments.
432
 ALAC provisions 
restrain the use of foreign legal sources where a less protective outcome than that provided by 
domestic law would be delivered.
433
 Despite its textual base appearing nationalistic, elements 
of the ALAC approach may align with this thesis, since its position also encourages greater 
use of transnational perspectives when community standards can be shown in a better moral 
light.
434
 Chapter II made reference to the principles identified by Letsas: justice, democracy, 
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liberty, and equality.
435
 These principles provide a solid footing for a Dworkinian interpreter 
to make the moral assessment required by ALAC: whether the outcome is the most 
favourable; the best fit.
436
 
Judges, in the real, non-Herculean sense,
437
 make mistakes. Racusin provides Dred 
Scott as the pre-eminent example of an ‘unfortunate’438 case of the Court’s transnational 
citation. The majority in Dred Scott reflected on the world’s agreement with the inferiority of 
the ‘negro race’.439 Under an interpretivist reading, legal adjudication must uphold the 
treatment of people as equals,
440
 and political integrity, which seeks consistency in decision-
making.
441
 Dred Scott contains an example of neglect for those principles, and a particular 
demonstration of the discretion judges are afforded when choosing tools for interpretation, 
transnational or otherwise. This concern, judicial selectivity, was dealt with when discussing 
state counting, and is considered next with respect to transnationalism. 
5.3.3.4 JUDICIAL SELECTIVITY 
One further criticism surrounding the Court’s use of transnational sources arises from 
what Posner has termed ‘promiscuous opportunities’;442 situations where Justices simply pick 
and choose outsourced authority which supports their conclusions. In political science this is 
referred to as ‘confirmation bias’443 but can be less favourably referred to as “cherry-
picking”, or ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’444 Dixon and Moon studied 
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with whom the US is most likely to trade,
445
 finding that relationships with democratic 
regimes provide the least risk for the US, thus the most profitable enterprises. This 
economics-centred logic can be applied to the citation of foreign law, since the Justices feed 
on legitimacy, something which can be derived from public support for comparisons with 
allies or similar states.
446
 Black et al support this, noting that, ‘if Justices seek to bolster their 
opinions with additional logic and support, looking to the most respected foreign countries 
simply makes the most sense.’447 The presumption of picking respected countries can be 
applied to states with similar (common law) legal systems, where concepts of precedent and 
incremental constitutional change are acknowledged, and major English-speaking states.
448
 
Dzehtsiarou argues that courts can uphold legitimacy if they do not exercise bias when 
selecting transnational sources.
449
 Inherent bias might be impossible to avoid, but its effects 
can be curtailed by a form of weak discretion, encouraged by interpretivism, where decision-
making is channelled by integrity.
450
 
While the objective use of penology as an indicator of ESD is guided by 
proportionality,
451
 integrity in the context of transnational sources ensures coherence in 
decision-making and transparent reasoning. Mere selectivity of sources for a stated (or 
unstated) goal does not adhere to interpretivism’s aspirations; the right choices must be made 
according to the right sources, a tricky yet achievable goal. Essentially, the selective citation 
of transnational sources is a practical reality; judges will naturally select interpretive support 
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for their decisions.
452
 The discussion must now refocus on the normative question of the 
inclusion of these sources, to establish how best to measure transnational guidance, when put 
through an interpretivist ‘rational sieve’.453 
5.3.4 TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A MEASURE OF POLITICAL MORALITY 
Dworkin described positivism as providing a pessimistically restrictive approach to 
the inclusion of morality, being preoccupied by constructing law from teleological rules and 
policies.
454
 Selectivity of sources, such as comparative law, without any consideration of 
morality results in an unprincipled collection of pre-interpretive statistics about 
collectivity,
455
 rather than communal will. Selectivity is inoffensive under interpretivism, 
however, if those seeking guidance from transnational sources read the sources in light of 
moral principles.
456
 The interpreter must instead unearth background principles of political 
morality with the aspiration of providing principled answers ‘by appealing to an amalgam of 
practice’,457 among other community understandings which must be read through a ‘rational 
sieve’.458 
In Law’s Empire Dworkin clarified that a judge must interpret binding principles with 
reference to community standards, which show the principle in its best moral light.
459
 The 
framework for this endeavour was established in Chapter II and summarised at the start of the 
current chapter. Applying that framework to this section, it will be concluded that such 
“moral light” can be generated by reference to transnational comparativism, not as a binding 
source of law in and of itself, but as a font of guiding principles. 
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Yeh and Chang define this practice as follows: ‘By making normative links across 
national borders, courts are actually constructing a constitutional regime under which 
generally accepted norms, regardless of their...origin, may become the supreme law of the 
land.’ 460 These norms might be viewed as ‘transcending politics into a high moral normative 
order’,461 though this will not always be the case due to the prevalence of compromises at the 
international level. By utilising all the sources at its disposal, the Court makes ‘the sturdiest, 
best-reasoned decision possible’,462 and the effects of partisan forces should to a great extent 
be diluted by overarching moral principles. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the comparative approach highlighted by 
Section 5.3.3, it is accepted that transnational law can provide a guide for interpreters seeking 
to define principles of political morality. Such morality transcends boundaries and 
sovereignty. Restraints for the use of moral guidance are guaranteed when interpreters use a 
version of weak discretion, channelled by integrity.
463
 That channelling appears in the form 
of reasoned opinions, objective decision-making, and the portrayal of community standards 
in the best light, which reflects integrity. Integrity in this sense ensures principles of due 
process, equal treatment, and justice. If this framework is followed, issues of democratic 
deficit should fall by the wayside along with the originalist notions outlined above. 
As such, the dignitarian assessment called for by the ESD principle can be informed 
by the ‘accumulated legal wisdom of mankind’.464 Waldron argues that this accumulated 
wisdom should be considered a ‘latterday ius gentium’,465 a ‘set of principles’ that represents 
‘a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, and lawmakers around the world’.466 Murkens 
expands this position, noting that, when adjudicating over moral aspects of constitutional 
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interpretation, the Court should ‘feel compelled to consult widely’.467 Scalia’s objections to 
transnationalism are easily criticised under interpretivism but, as noted by Murkens, this 
leaves an interpretive gap not so easily filled.
468
 It is the continuing aim to fill that gap with 
interpretivism. Michelman and Kahn provide further support for this endeavour, claiming that 
comparative analysis clarifies ‘our picture of ourselves’,469 and helps Americans ‘to 
understand who [they] are’.470 Naturally, there are various self-reflections to understand: 
internal, external, relative. The only understanding sought by interpretivism is that which 
provides the right, moral answer. By gaining a clearer picture of the political morality 
underpinning the Constitution, interpreters are able to decide hard cases in the best way, 
which is their duty. 
The ESD assessment asks a ‘human question, and the Americans are human – and so 
is everybody else’,471 including the Justices who make interpretive choices. Fundamental 
interests and rights can be interpreted in light of their associated normative and moral values. 
This section concludes that these values cannot fully be appreciated when restricted to 
domestic assessments. Instead, ‘the evolving standards of decency which mark the progress 
of a maturing society’472 are enriched by transnational comparativism. Chapter VI will 
establish the transnational comparisons, which can inform an ESD assessment of solitary 
confinement’s constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment. However, one final objective 
indicator of ESD must be dealt with under interpretivism. This criterion, professional 
consensus, emerges from the most recent Supreme Court decision to evolve the Eighth 
Amendment, handed down in 2014.
473 
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5.4 PROFESSIONAL CONSENSUS 
The final consideration for Eighth Amendment analysis is one which, until recently, 
largely escaped the Court’s attention. Throughout the last forty years of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence SCOTUS has measured the ‘consensus’474 pertaining to punishments clause 
evolution by reference to legislative communities;
475
 the broader national community;
476
 and 
the even broader transnational community.
477
 The final community to be considered in the 
ESD assessment,
478
 is ‘epistemic’.479 Epistemic communities are those which pool knowledge 
by bringing together scientists and other experts, working with rigorous peer-review 
processes, shared normative and principled beliefs, and common notions of validity and best 
practice.
480
 Such communities are dynamic, ‘they differentiate, shift and transform’.481 Haas 
sees the product of consensus from these groups not as raw, proven data, but ‘the centrality of 
agreed knowledge’.482 
The ‘agreed knowledge’483 accepted by epistemic communities has been referred to in 
recent ESD jurisprudence as ‘professional consensus’.484 When the Court re-ignited the death 
penalty and stipulated the rather abstractly termed ‘objective indicia that reflect the public 
attitude toward a given sanction’485 it made no mention of professional consensus. This 
position has shifted, however, and incorporation of epistemic knowledge into general 
constitutional interpretation has undergone something of a revolution since Gregg. This 
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revolution, its contribution specifically to Eighth Amendment evolution, and the suitability of 
professional consensus as a further objective indicator of ESD for interpretivism, are topics 
which will each be discussed in this section. 
5.4.1 AMICI CURIAE AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Interest groups have been described as a ‘mainstay in American politics’;486 their 
definition extending to virtually any non-governmental organisation seeking to effect changes 
in public policy,
487
 including professional bodies, which can be extended to incorporate 
epistemic communities.
488
 Such groups have made significant contributions, in the judicial 
field, to the electoral process,
489
 and to health politics.
490
 The predominant form of their 
participation in the judicial sphere is through amicus curiae briefs, friends of the Court who 
are invited to provide expert knowledge or interested insights to a case. This subsection will 
draw on a recent shift towards a greater inclusion of these briefs, both in the Court’s decision-
making process and within its judgments. It will be maintained that the inclusion of 
professional consensus in amicus briefs is the most likely route for its sustained impact in 
constitutional adjudication.
491
 Before assessing the viability and indeed desirability of such an 
inclusion, an overview of Supreme Court precedent is vital. 
Green v Biddle saw the first acceptance of amicus curiae by the US Supreme 
Court.
492
 Representing Kentucky in a land dispute with Virginia,
493
 statesman Henry Clay 
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undertook the traditional role of amicus curiae, a friend of the court, and combined it with the 
role of an advocate. Lowman has remarked that ‘Green perhaps presented the most opportune 
time for the amicus curiae to emerge in the federal courts’,494 after SCOTUS derived 
significant benefit from Clay’s intervention in that case, drawing on his expertise in defining 
complex land patents which had clashed for decades. In the centuries following Green the use 
of amicus briefs proliferated significantly, with Kearney and Merrill remarking that the 10% 
minority of Supreme Court cases in receipt of amicus briefs in the early-20
th
 Century 
burgeoned to over 85% by the 21
st
 Century.
495
 Notably, amicus briefs contributed a 
significant impact to the Civil Rights Movement in the mid-20
th
 Century.
496
 Brown provides a 
stark example,
497
 where Chief Justice Warren’s ‘footnote eleven’498 included a dossier of 
psychological scientific authority,
499
 supporting the Court’s opinion that the “separate but 
equal” doctrine was repugnant to the Constitution and prevailing professional consensus.500 
Amicus briefs, according to Supreme Court Rule 37, which governs their inclusion, 
‘may be of considerable help to the Court’,501 due to the expertise of the authors, and to 
anchor the Court’s judgments with a sense of their real-world impact. A brief analysis of 
recent usage statistics reveals the true extent of the assistance provided by amici. The 2012-
13 term saw an unprecedented 1,001 amicus briefs submitted for consideration in the 73 
cases decided by the Supreme Court,
502
 a record average of 14 per case. Significant cases 
Hollingsworth v Perry (Proposition 8, same-sex marriage)
503
 and Fisher v University of Texas 
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(affirmative action in university admissions)
504
 garnered many more, with 96 and 92 amicus 
briefs submitted respectively.
505
 Overall, the term saw a record 96% of cases receiving at 
least one amicus brief,
506
 with SCOTUS citing briefs in 53% of its judgments. In contrast, 
Brown, considered a high watermark for amicus briefs at the time, received six.
507
 
The most recent term for which finalised records are available is 2013-14, where the 
Supreme Court received 805 briefs, another significant dossier,
508
 one higher than any 
records prior to 2012.
509
 A conclusion derived from these figures that the trend towards 
greater amici involvement is declining is misdirected, since the citation rate was in fact 
higher than ever in 2013-14, with the Court citing amicus briefs in 60% of its decisions.
510
 
The likelihood of citations rose significantly when the Court was split, with 80% of 5-4 
holdings citing briefs, contrasted to 54% in 9-0 holdings.
511
 From this consideration of 
figures it becomes clear that the submission and citation of amicus briefs is now the rule 
rather than the exception. Narrowing the assessment to Eighth Amendment precedent, the 
Supreme Court has a chequered record with respect to amicus citation. As noted in the 
introduction to this section, the Gregg majority provided no view of professional consensus, 
merely stipulating that the ESD assessment must be ‘objective’.512 More recent cases show 
that the Court’s position has evolved to consider extra-legal, epistemic knowledge. 
The majority judgments in Thompson and Stanford
513
 both made notable references to 
professional consensus in assessing the Eighth Amendment’s evolution with respect to the 
age of executable offenders.
514
 Restricting capital punishment to offenders aged over 16 due 
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to ‘civilized standards of decency’,515 the Thompson majority felt that its decision was 
‘consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected professional 
organizations’.516 Such views were seen as irrelevant in Stanford,517 however, where 
SCOTUS reasoned that the Eighth Amendment should not protect 16 and 17 year-olds from 
execution and rejected the relevance of interest groups and professional associations for ESD 
purposes.
518
 Justice Brennan dissented from the Court’s rejection of professional consensus, 
noting that expert organisations have greater proficiency than the Court ever could and that 
‘there is no reason why that judgment should not be entitled to attention as an indicator of 
contemporary standards.’519 Roper reversed the Court’s position and brought it in line with 
Brennan’s Stanford dissent,520 with the majority in Roper placing as much reliance on 
professional consensus as it did on international standards
521
 and state head-counting.
522
 
Although the term “professional consensus” would not feature in the Court’s 
judgments until later, Roper represented a shift towards respect for epistemic knowledge in 
informing ESD assessments. SCOTUS noted that ‘youth is more than a chronological fact’523 
and that expert psychologists have difficulty differentiating ‘between the juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’524 Similar reliance on accumulated professional 
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knowledge can be found in the majority judgment in Atkins.
525
 Whereas most respect was 
paid to other measures of consensus,
526
 the Court in Atkins noted that the views of ‘several 
organizations with germane expertise’527 were complementary to other objective indicia,528 
‘reflect[ing] a much broader social and professional consensus.’529 These organisations, 
including the American Psychological Association (APA) and the American Association on 
Mental Retardation (AAMR) participated as amici curiae in Atkins,
530
 providing a 
comprehensive demonstration of consensus, which was eventually adopted by the majority. 
5.4.1.1 PSYCHIATRIC DEFINITIONS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
Intellectual disability (ID) is defined by the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM-5) as a disorder ‘that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in 
conceptual, social, and practical domains.’531 Specifically, it stipulates three essential features 
for a manifestation of ID: general objective deficits in mental ability (Criterion A); subjective 
(case-by-case judgement of) impairment in adaptive functioning (Criterion B); and 
developmental (pre-maturity) onset (Criterion C).
532
 Psychometric tests such as those which 
assess an individual’s Intelligence Quotient (IQ) are properly relied on in assessing Criterion 
A. When developing IQ tests, the median score taken from the norming sample is defined as 
100 IQ points, with scores each standard deviation from 100 defined as ±15 IQ points.
533
 By 
this definition, two-thirds of the American population scores between 85 and 115 IQ 
                                                          
525
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points.
534
 Individuals who score approximately two standard deviations or more below 100 
on these tests, specifically 70±5, or 65 to 75,
535
 are defined as having ID under Criterion A.
536
 
DSM-5 cautions against reliance on IQ tests alone, ‘because it is adaptive functioning, that 
determines the level of supports required.’537 Criterion B, ‘impairment in everyday adaptive 
functioning’,538 is therefore a vital factor in establishing strong evidence of ID. 
In addition to citing the DSM,
539
 the Atkins majority relied on the AAMR’s 10th 
edition Manual.
540
 The Association, known since January 2007 as the American Association 
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) ‘is generally regarded as the leading 
authority in defining [ID]’.541 Whereas the APA’s DSM defines over 300 disorders, the 
AAIDD Manual has focused solely on ID for over a century,
542
 placing the Manual as the 
Bible of psychiatric diagnoses and standard-setting for ID. The Manual uses different 
language to the DSM, but has been described by the APA Council as ‘conceptually 
equivalent.’543 Like the DSM, the Manual requires not only significant limitations in 
functioning, but also adaptive behavioural limitations arising before the age of 18 years.
544
 
With similar concern to that emphasised within the DSM, the AAIDD Manual also cautions 
against bright-line limits, describing IQ scores as ‘flexible’.545 
While accepting these definitions and referring prudently to an ID-indicative IQ as 
below ‘approximately 70’546 in Atkins, Justice Stevens’s majority later made reference to only 
ﬁve states, which have executed individuals ‘possessing a known IQ less than 70 since we 
                                                          
534
 ibid. 
535
 DSM-5 (n 531) 37. 
536
 ibid. 
537
 ibid 33. 
538
 Gottfredson in Phelps (ed) (n 533) 31-32. 
539
 In its fourth, text-revised (IV-TR) edition at the time. 
540
 American Association on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of 
Supports (10
th
 edn, AAMR 2002) (10th AAMR Manual). 
541
 Marc Tassé, ‘Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases’ 
(2009) 16 Applied Neuropsychology 114, 115. 
542
 ibid. 
543
 Richard Bonnie, ‘The American Psychiatric Association’s Resource Document on Mental Retardation and 
Capital Sentencing’ (2004) 32 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 304, 305. 
544
 10
th
 AAMR Manual (n 540) 8. 
545
 ibid 14. 
546
 Atkins (n 103) 309 (quoting DSM-IV-TR (n 524) 42-43). 
Chapter V: Further Measures of Evolving Standards 
175 
 
decided Penry.’547 This explicit mention of bright-line IQ cut-offs (“less than X”), while 
intended to support the decision with an element of state counting, backtracked on the earlier 
conclusion that IQ was approximate and not independent of behavioural criteria. Indeed, this 
misguided portion of the judgment would stoke the flames for state legislative disagreement 
about ID assessment in the years after Atkins. Against this backdrop, by far the most 
compelling demonstration of the Supreme Court’s willingness to engage in an assessment of 
professional consensus for Eighth Amendment ESD interpretation arrived in a judgment 
handed down in May 2014. Hall v Florida,
548
 which raised a procedural question surrounding 
ID assessments, would provide a vehicle for further evolutive interpretation. Importantly, the 
Court referred explicitly to ‘professional consensus’,549 adopting this indicator of ESD for the 
first time. 
5.4.2 HALL V FLORIDA: TRANSFORMING ESD ANALYSIS 
The most contentious appeals citing Atkins in support invariably arise from those 
appeals brought by offenders with IQ scores in the low 70s or high 60s, the tide-mark 
deposited by Justice Stevens.
550
 Chaftez and Biondolillo have noted that, in light of the 
inevitability of the lower courts following only the IQ portion of Stevens’s judgment, other 
elements of the ID assessment become vital in assessing competence for lawful execution.
551
 
An opportunity to review the legislative discord presented itself in Hall, where the Justices 
considered the death sentence imposed on a Floridian man convicted of murder. 
5.4.2.1 BACKGROUND 
In February 1978 Freddie Lee Hall kidnapped, raped and murdered a pregnant woman 
before killing a police officer who attempted to apprehend him.
552
 Tried and convicted for the 
double murder, Hall was sentenced to death on both counts in 1981. On appeal, Hall’s capital 
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sentence on the first count was upheld.
553
 His sentence was handed down well before the 
holding in Atkins, and before the Supreme Court had even considered the imposition of 
capital punishment on intellectually disabled offenders in Penry v Lynaugh.
554
 After a decade 
of post-sentencing review, which aligns with the average stays on death row in the US,
555
 
Hall was resentenced in 1993 so that adequate consideration of mitigation could be taken into 
account,
556
 following the Court’s instructions to that effect in Hitchcock v Dugger.557 
Atkins provided Hall’s counsel with the impetus to introduce psychometric evidence 
on his behalf and, at resentencing; a significant amount of evidence purported to demonstrate 
ID. Information regarding Hall’s upbringing was introduced, noting that his mother would 
‘strap him to his bed at night, with a rope thrown over a rafter [and] awaken Hall by hoisting 
him up and whipping him’,558 among reports of even more serious physical abuse.559 School 
reports described Hall as ‘[m]entally retarded’;560 a defence lawyer testified that he could not 
understand anything Hall was saying;
561
 and a number of medical professionals described 
him as significantly mentally impaired, with levels of cognition observed ‘typically with 
toddlers’.562 Nevertheless, the resentencing jury found no substantial evidence that he was 
intellectually disabled to the extent that his sentence would be disproportionate to his 
crime.
563
 Following the curtailment of the death penalty for intellectually disabled offenders 
in Atkins, Hall’s sentence was reconsidered once more, this time by the Florida Supreme 
Court, 34 years after his original offence. 
Nine IQ evaluations over four decades had scored Hall at varying points between 60 
and 80. After the (re-re)sentencing court excluded, on legitimate evidentiary grounds, the two 
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tests below 70, Hall’s lowest result was 71.564 Citing Cherry v State as state-level precedent 
for Florida’s definition of ID, the Florida Supreme Court rejected Hall’s appeal, holding that, 
‘under the law, if an [IQ]  is above 70, a person is not mentally retarded’.565 Restricting the 
definition even further, SCOTUS interpreted the state statute categorically to prohibit a 
defendant with an IQ score of above 70 from introducing any evidence of Criterion B, 
adaptive disability.
566
 The Florida Supreme Court weakened the protection afforded to 
intellectually disabled offenders by raising the bar arbitrarily above a psychometrically-naïve 
minimum. The Supreme Court finally granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of 
Hall’s case in 2013, providing a platform for the clarification of Atkins and the intended 
scope of its Eighth Amendment protection. 
5.4.2.2 THE SUPREME COURT 
Through lengthy recitals to detailed amici, again provided by the APA and AAIDD, a 
5-4 majority discovered an evolving standard of decency in the Eighth Amendment.  
Florida’s bright-line rule neglected consideration of the medical and behavioural history of 
offenders, which could determine that individuals with IQs above 70 on the standard scale 
were in fact intellectually disabled.
567
 The professional consensus identified by SCOTUS to 
represent an evolving standard of decency in Hall was borne out of two principal amici 
curiae, each containing empirical, peer-reviewed literature from a variety of scientific 
journals.
568
 
Determining that the Court’s assessment required a consideration of ‘psychiatric and 
professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and meaning of IQ scores’,569 the majority 
noted that it should be unsurprising ‘[t]hat this Court, state courts, and state legislatures 
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consult and are informed by the work of medical experts’.570 The crux of this medical 
consensus determined two main points. First, Florida’s rule abandoned the medical and 
behavioural history of offenders, focusing unduly on IQ scores, and giving rise to wrongful 
diagnoses.
571
 Second, the Floridian statute under which Hall had been sentenced to death 
failed to account for a ‘standard error of measurement’,572 a preeminent statistical measure 
similar to that introduced in the discussion of polling.
573
 In essence, the professional 
consensus surrounding IQ measurement is that scores should be read as a range, not bright-
lines: ‘Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number.’574 
The main criticism of the majority’s reliance on professional consensus came, 
unsurprisingly, from the dissent in that case.
575
 The dissentients criticised this approach as ‘a 
new and most unwise turn in our Eighth Amendment case law’,576 providing three main 
practical concerns arising from this precedent, namely that professional consensus can change 
or be rescinded; that the judiciary must now follow or judge the validity of such changes; and 
that the majority had provided no interpretive guidance for the selection of professional 
authorities.
577
 The next section of this chapter will next address those issues, with a view to 
analysing the interpretivist potential of professional consensus as an adjudicative tool of the 
Eighth Amendment’s ESD. 
5.4.3 CONCERNS ARISING FROM HALL 
For an extra-legal source of political morality to form part of an interpretivist 
assessment, its shortcomings and limitations must be acknowledged and addressed. As with 
other objective indicia, professional consensus is not immune to criticism, both from inside 
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and outside the Court. Procedural and substantive concerns will first be outlined in this 
subsection, before a conclusion can be made regarding the use of professional consensus as 
an adjudicative tool. 
5.4.3.1 PROCEDURAL CONCERNS 
The principal procedural concerns surrounding the use of professional consensus for 
constitutional interpretation include issues identified by earlier subsections. Recall that, when 
assessing transnational comparativism in Section 5.3, flagged concerns included the impact 
of political ideologies on judicial selectivity, and of selectivity in itself. Political ideology 
was highlighted as an unavoidable practical fact,
578
 but one that is often overstated when used 
to condemn the choice of transnational interpretive sources.
579
 The same conclusion applies 
to professional consensus. 
Collins examined the Court’s citations to amicus briefs and revealed that an increase 
in the number of ideologically similar briefs has a marginal impact on the judgment’s 
ideological direction.
580
 Whilst Collins concludes that pressure groups have some success in 
persuading courts,
581
 he acknowledges a flaw in deriving conclusions regarding ideological 
swing (extrapolating decisions based on the ideology of amicus submissions). The Supreme 
Court’s prospective ideological direction in a case is often predicted and publicised by Court-
watchers and political science publications well before oral arguments and, subsequently, a 
professional organisation’s decision to participate as amicus is likely to be affected. Members 
of the group will seek support for their cause and publicity for the group itself when they are 
more confident that SCOTUS will cite their brief.
582
 As such, correlating the proportion of 
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“liberal” or “conservative” briefs submitted in a case with the ideological direction of the 
outcome is unwise.
583
 
A further issue dealt with in previous sections was the selectivity of sources as a 
criticism in itself. Cherry picking, as concluded with respect to transnational law, stems from 
the inevitable tendency of legal interpreters to seek real-world bases for their decisions,
584
 
and for advocates to base their arguments on similar lines. Justice Holmes declared in 1880 
that ‘the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience’,585 a statement described as 
‘the central … truth of American legal thought’.586 Holmes’s decree reflected the Legal 
Realist movement of the late-19
th
 and early-20
th
 Centuries, where legal reasoning began to 
take heed of the tangible impacts of court decisions, and Realists sought to tie adjudication to 
sociology. The movement declined, but its impact on legal teaching continues. Judges will 
inevitably look at bases for their arguments, since that is what modern lawyers are taught to 
do. To use cherry picking as an attack on the objectivity of interpreters is therefore to 
misunderstand how lawyers operate. Instead of rejecting selectivity, under interpretivism 
discretion is channelled by integrity, to ensure that moral principles are read into abstract 
rights when source-selection takes place. 
Given the Realist backdrop of legal education, it is unsurprising that much of the 
literature on amicus briefs avoids a normative approach. As such, relevant discussions can be 
found in political science journals and focus on, inter alia, frequency of citations to briefs, 
which Justices cited them, when, and in what circumstances.
587
 The normative question of 
how interpreters should make the best use of professional consensus sources is one for the 
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interpretivist. Another issue is the legitimacy of these citations. Bürli splits legitimacy into 
coherence and consistency, institutional legitimacy, and procedural legitimacy.
588
 She claims 
that amicus briefs can aid these forms of legitimacy by contributing to the decision-making 
process, so long as they are selected objectively.
589
 Indeed, evolutive legal analysis can be 
aided by amicus briefs, objective citation of which arguably strengthens democratic values 
such as public participation, when utilised as a complementary, rather than exclusive, tool for 
interpretation.
590
 In addition, coherence in principle is upheld by such an approach. This will 
be considered in an interpretivist light in Section 5.4.4. 
Flango et al define the roles of amicus briefs as: to amplify or support legal 
arguments; to inform the Court of potential implications arising from the decision; and to 
communicate the importance of the case.
591
 The possibility for rational interpretivist inclusion 
of professional consensus for these purposes, rather than for arbitrary selectivity, will soon be 
considered. Before this can be carried out, fundamental concerns regarding the content of 
briefs pertaining to such consensus remain unaddressed. These issues, based on the substance 
of the citations rather than the procedure by which they are cited, may undercut the values 
presumed to be strengthened by their inclusion. 
5.4.3.2 SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS 
A review of recent amicus briefs, including those cited in Hall,
592
 instantly reveals 
their far more adversarial role than the name would suggest.
593
 A deeper consideration of 
associated literature unveils two prevailing interpreters’ presumptions. First, the role of amici 
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has evolved into that of a friend of the party, not the court.
594
 Second, the contents of amicus 
briefs are correct and constitute expertise, in a similar vein to the collective knowledge of 
epistemic communities.
595
 The first of these presumptions is generally accepted as a caution, 
which must be taken into account when placing reliance on information provided by amici. 
Objectivity is called into question when organisations answer the ideological battle-call.
596
 It 
must be conceded that to reference an amicus brief with blind faith as to its objectivity would 
be naïve.
597
 Such naïveté transcends the brief itself, too, and relying on amicus facts as hard 
science also risks overstating their role. ‘[C]onventional wisdom’598 presumes that amicus 
facts are reliable and demonstrate professional consensus. Such a ‘chorus of praise’599 for 
amicus briefs was demonstrated most recently by all nine Justices in Hall,
600
 where 
professional consensus surrounding ESD was discussed with extensive reference to 
supporting briefs. In contradiction, Alford has contended that even with the best intentions 
SCOTUS ‘lacks the institutional capacity’601 to undertake proper considerations of external, 
extra-legal sources. Yovel and Mertz have similarly noted ‘translation difficulties’602 between 
the fields of social science and law, including but not limited to ‘difference[s] in methods, 
aims, and epistemologies’.603 
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In a similar way, Epstein and King note a key distinction between the disciplines. 
Social science scholars are taught to subject hypotheses ‘to every conceivable test and data 
source’,604 whereas judges are instructed by legal briefs which typically ‘amass all the 
evidence for [that] hypothesis and distract attention away from anything that might be seen as 
contradictory’.605 This leads to an overconfident conclusion being drawn in the judicial 
world, based on an extract of empirical knowledge, which drew substantial debate in the 
empirical world. 
Amicus briefs can, however, provide interpreters with a vital tool for adjudication in 
specialised areas of law. Take the definition of intellectual disability, for example. When 
Atkins was decided SCOTUS had never before struck down a capital statute for neglecting 
considerations of developmental disability. In effect, Atkins represented a movement by the 
Justices into the psychiatric thicket. Without professional insight, subsequent decisions such 
as that in Hall would have been at risk of misdirection and error in judgment. There is a 
reported agreement among Supreme Court clerks that briefs are most helpful when they 
advise on ‘highly technical and specialized areas of law’.606 Clerks play a major part in 
placing briefs before their Justices,
607
 effectively wielding the final ‘rational sieve’608 before 
the Justices exercise discretion. Under the common presumption that amicus facts are 
representative, or even relatively accurate, this process is uncontroversial in substantive 
terms; the Court is informed by expertise. 
Serious concern arises, however, when briefs are wrongly cited as representing 
scientific truth. Larsen presents the most recent analysis of relevant examples, providing 
Hollingsworth as one case in point.
609
 In the controversial Proposition 8 same-sex marriage 
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case, handed down in 2012, one brief provided by ‘Social Science Professors’610 purported to 
demonstrate that children of homosexual couples were less likely to finish school.
611
 This 
study sits on file with a Canadian University and its methods, results and possibility of peer-
review remain private and untested.
612
 While this type of weak evidence is not an isolated 
example,
613
 no explicit reference to the Social Science Professors brief was made by 
SCOTUS in Hollingsworth. A degree of confidence must be presumed in the Justices, who 
look for bases to their arguments, and political morality plays a part in this analysis. 
According to Larsen’s examination of the 417 cases decided by the Court between 
2008 and 2013, 61% of the 124 citations to amicus briefs that purported to provide factual 
expert information were citations only to the brief itself, not to scientific papers or published 
results.
614
 This has a potentially damaging effect on the reliability of a claimed “consensus” 
which is based on these results, as there is no chance for scrutiny of the study by peers or by 
the Court. Three-fifths of the citations to “expert knowledge” could therefore be described 
more accurately as displaying “amici knowledge” which, as demonstrated previously, is not 
necessarily expertise,
615
 and might not represent a consensus at all. Care must be exercised if 
professional consensus is to form part of the interpretivist assessment. For its inclusion to be 
taken seriously, an assessment of the potential for this form of epistemic knowledge to be 
incorporated into moral judgments of ESD must be undertaken. The following subsection 
will examine through an interpretivist lens the functionality of amicus curiae briefs for 
interpretive analysis of the Eighth Amendment. 
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5.4.4 AN INTERPRETIVE ASSESSMENT OF PROFESSIONAL CONSENSUS 
An argument presented earlier, rejecting the pre-interpretive data provided by poll 
results, can be extended to the current discussion.
616
 Professional consensus, comprising the 
accumulated knowledge presented within amici curiae briefs, provides an example of 
something Dworkin described as a mere statistic of collectivity,
617
 rather than a rational use 
of moral communal will.
618
 The Eighth Amendment’s ESD seeks moral answers to legal 
questions and the Court must make principled references to the community standards that 
show the law in its best moral light.
619
 To shed moral light on professional consensus, that 
information must be treated as a collection of background principles interlaced with rules to 
inform law. Respect must be paid to the concept of integrity, which acts as a moral driver in 
legal questions. Professional consensus can provide objective, measured, principled 
contributions to the interpretive tools sought by ESD analysis when seeking moral answers to 
legal questions. 
It is contended that, if amicus curiae briefs from professional bodies are considered 
carefully, and the reality of amici as adversarial proponents of either side of a given case is 
acknowledged, professional consensus can be utilised as a non-binding interpretive tool in the 
ESD analytical process. The flaws highlighted by the last subsection are concerning, but do 
not provoke as much disapproval, under an interpretivist analysis, as merely pre-interpretive 
statistics such as poll results or mathematical averages. Gorod, who rebukes the inclusion of 
amici curiae from the outset, takes a positivistic approach to constitutional interpretation, by 
excluding all sources arising outside formal advocacy.
620
 Nonetheless, she concedes that 
some guidelines should exist for the inclusion of extra-record facts so that judges ‘do not 
simply engage in the ad hoc cherry picking of facts out of amicus briefs, their bedtime 
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reading, or their nightly news program’.621 This call for guidelines will provide an integrity-
driven approach to the selection of sources for political morality assessments. 
In his rebuttal of Hart’s master rule of recognition,622 which advocates for law to be 
binding only when it is adopted by legal institutions, Dworkin emphasised the role of 
principles.
623
 Principles, he explained, may or may not draw support from the acts of 
institutions (statutes and case-law), which Hart would describe as rules, which combine to 
form law.
624
 Whilst he departed from Austin’s strict rejection of non-legal community 
principles,
625
 Hart failed to clarify how to measure these ‘secondary rules’.626 Dworkin’s 
thesis offers to fill the gap Hart left open,
627
 appealing to an ‘amalgam of…community 
practices and understandings’628 such as those found in Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, 
Inc.
629
 In Henningsen a state court cited a ‘general principle’630 of ‘a society such as ours,’631 
which had otherwise not been afforded Hartian legal recognition.
632
 It is contended that such 
an ‘amalgam’633 of practice and understanding cannot be considered in the absence of a 
review of professional consensus, which may be the best-informed authority on many 
technical and scientific issues. Indeed, professional consensus may not be unanimous. It may 
be equally divided, or there may be no consensus whatsoever. Nonetheless, interpreters must 
always seek the most aspirational moral answers to legal questions. While those answers may 
not be carved into stone, an attempt to derive guidance from epistemic communities is an 
important part of the aspiration to find those answers. Without recourse to the information 
provided by the professions in Hall’s amici, for example, SCOTUS would remain ignorant of 
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the intricacies of IQ assessments and a man deemed intellectually disabled by a consensus of 
experts could have been executed.
634
 
Nonetheless, in practical terms, partisan and selective usage of scientific consensus 
pays little respect to principles of morality identified throughout this chapter, and a proposed 
degree of stricter scrutiny for the inclusion of these sources will now be outlined. In Daubert 
v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
635
 plaintiffs sought damages for birth defects allegedly 
caused by the respondent company’s drug. A federal trial court rejected the claim, relying on 
expert testimony and an amicus brief consolidating scientific studies. The decision was 
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
636
 which relied on standards for the inclusion of expert 
testimony prescribed by a federal district court in Frye v US.
637
 The Supreme Court vacated 
that decision, rejecting the old (Frye) standard of “general acceptance in the field” as too 
rigid. The relevance of Daubert can be found in the Court’s consideration of science not as 
‘an encyclopedic body of knowledge [but] a process for proposing and refining theoretical 
explanations’.638 To clarify which principles could aid the determination of reliability with 
respect to expert testimony, the Court outlined four main items for consideration by trial 
courts:
639
 Methodology, peer-review and publication,
640
 knowledge of the rate of error,
641
 and 
‘general acceptance’642 among the expert community, which was later extended by the Court 
to include technical and specialist “non-science” communities.643 The latter consideration, 
which connotes professional consensus, was held not to be a ‘necessary precondition to the 
admissibility of evidence’,644 but a relevant consideration.645 
                                                          
634
 This would have neglected the purpose of Atkins (n 103), to protect ID offenders from execution. 
635
 509 US 579 (1993). 
636
 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 951 F2d 1128 (1991) (9th Cir). 
637
 54 App DC 46, 293 F 1013 (1923). 
638
 Daubert (1991) (n 636) 590, original emphasis. 
639
 ibid 593-594, though SCOTUS emphasised that it was not a definitive checklist. 
640
 ibid 594, though the majority opinion acknowledged that publication (or lack thereof) is ‘a relevant, though 
not dispositive, consideration in assessing...scientific validity’. 
641
 The quantifiable for the likelihood of measurement errors. 
642
 Daubert (1991) (n 636) 594. 
643
 Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 119 S Ct 1167 (1999) 1171. 
644
 Daubert (n 635) 597. 
645
 These criteria were broadly incorporated by the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 USC §702 (2011)). 
Chapter V: Further Measures of Evolving Standards 
188 
 
The adoption of similar control measures to those laid out by Daubert is 
recommended, which aligns with the notion of a general, current, and rigorously tested 
‘scientific community’.646 Again, the nature of judging is worth noting here.647 Few judges 
have scientific backgrounds, so rely on presentations of fact by their clerks, who have similar 
backgrounds to judges, and counsel. Neither of the parties in a case seeks impartial 
presentation of fact, so it is for the interpretivist to weigh evidence in a way which is 
objective.  By facing similar quality control requirements on fact-bearing amicus curiae 
briefs before the Supreme Court,
648
 those claiming to provide expert consensus when they are 
in fact lobbyists or one-sided advocates are received with greater caution.
649
 Through this 
control measure Gorod’s concerns about cherry picking are also alleviated. The methodology, 
peer-review processes and publication details of facts claiming to represent expert opinion 
would be required;
650
 as would the Court’s knowledge of the rate of error.651 Additionally, the 
interpreter deriving sources of political morality must consider the possibility that the 
professional consensus is, itself, evolving. Judgments must be made with this in mind, 
otherwise the malleable character of morality is lost in interpretation. 
Necessarily, too, is a consideration of ‘general acceptance’652 amongst the expert 
community, though such an indicator is supplementary. Together, these requirements would 
‘push back on the natural tendency to “cherry pick” the factual authorities’,653 and provide a 
rational fit for professional consensus within Dworkinian interpretivism, where interpreter 
discretion is encouraged when informed by moral principles.
654
 Selectivity is therefore sieved 
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by rationality; the impact of ideologies is significantly hindered; and guiding principles are 
provided to facilitate greater moral inclusion when citing professional consensus.
655 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The current and preceding chapters have sought to outline an interpretivist approach 
to adjudication, evaluating the principles of political morality which form the Eighth 
Amendment’s ESD. It is accepted that, when considering abstract, aspirational theories of 
law and deciphering the role of morality in legal interpretation, real-world applications risk 
suffocation by theory. To use selectivity as an attack on the objectivity of an interpreter is to 
misunderstand how lawyers operate. Selectivity need not be an inherent evil; the moral sieve 
applied throughout this chapter has developed a framework for the future inclusion of indicia 
of ESD, in order further to scrutinise punishment under the Eighth in a way which respects its 
inherent morality. 
Opinion Polling 
Interpretivism rejects pre-interpretive data such as that provided by poll results, 
whether methodologically sound or otherwise. Policy arguments grounded in polling data 
might be sufficient to justify a political decision, but principles of constitutional law require a 
moral gloss to be applied to primary sources. If polls are accepted at the base level for what 
they are: ‘useful indicators of social discourse’,656 they are somewhat representative of the 
public sentiment they purport to quantify. That said, polls still fail to provide the sound moral 
footing called for by interpretivist adjudication when they are selected in an unguided way. 
Cherry picking and argument-basing source selection might be the prerogative of the judge, 
but an interpretivist must heed principles of political morality. 
Those principles, which include justice, fairness, and due process, require interpreters 
to justify their selections of indicia for ESD adjudication, and to apply rigour when 
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generalising from data such as that provided by polls. Justifications ensure transparency and 
quell accusations of cherry picking. Rigour, such as is found by statistical significance tests, 
provides a more accurate inference of consensus. Picking polls merely in support of a 
personal value judgement, without a justified exclusion of competing results, undermines the 
integrity of the process of political morality. Integrity is inherently objective and relies on 
consistency in decision-making,
657
 and the objective arm of ESD requires respect to be paid 
to this principle. 
It is concluded that the majority opinion in Gregg provides a satisfactory mid-way for 
the inclusion of polls in constitutional adjudication. ‘[O]bjective indicia that reflect the public 
attitude towards a given sanction’,658 polling in this example, can only guide the ESD 
assessment where sanctions ‘accord with “the dignity of man,” which is the “basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment.”’659 
Penology 
Vengeance, which the Court has muddled with state retributivism, is an archaic and 
illegitimate penological goal. To ensure that due respect is paid to proportionality, the 
Framers’ warnings against tyrannous majorities are recalled.660 By heeding that call, the 
model of proportionality set out by Beccaria, refined by Kant, and refined further by 
Robinson as ‘deontological desert’661 is adopted. Robinson’s framework embodies a clearer 
set of principles which are derived from the fundamental values underlying the Eighth. 
Principles of just desert, which includes proportionality (subjective, and objective: 
‘ordinal’662 and across jurisdictions663) and individualisation, ensures a moral approach to the 
inclusion of penology in ESD adjudication. 
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Further, the often side-lined Gregg conditions of dignity and non-excessive 
punishment are paid respect by this approach, something which is so far lacking in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Instead of focusing on utilitarian deterrence, as the Court 
evidently has done, deontological desert leaves policy goals to the other branches, by 
squaring the judiciary’s focus on constitutional interpretation of background principles of 
morality.  This theory of penology aligns with interpretivism, seeking aspirational answers 
‘by appealing to an amalgam of practice’.664 By this tack, principles of consistency (derived 
from the holdings in Furman and Gregg)
665
 and individualisation (required by the Lockett 
and Eddings doctrines)
666
 can be reconciled. These constitutional values are not ‘all-or-
nothing propositions’.667 Through a rational sieve they are cast as principles,668 informing the 
interpreter’s moral reading of the Eighth Amendment; a reading which will inform the 
discussions in the forthcoming chapters. 
Transnational Comparativism 
The dignitarian assessment called for by the ESD principle should be informed by the 
‘accumulated legal wisdom of mankind’.669 Issues of selectivity are inoffensive under 
interpretivism if interpreters read sources in light of moral principles. The Dworkinian 
interpreter must instead unearth background principles of political morality with the 
aspiration of providing principled answers ‘by appealing to an amalgam of practice’.670 To do 
so, interpreters should use a version of weak discretion, channelled through integrity.
671
 That 
channelling appears in the form of reasoned opinions, objective decision-making, and the 
portrayal of community standards in the light that reflects integrity. If this framework is 
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followed in earnest, issues of democratic deficit should fall by the wayside along with the 
originalist notions outlined above. 
Adopting Waldron’s call for a ‘set of principles’ that represents ‘a sort of consensus 
among judges, jurists, and lawmakers around the world’,672 Murkens’s advice that the Court 
should ‘feel compelled to consult widely’ is endorsed.673 The ESD assessment asks a ‘human 
question, and the Americans are human – and so is everybody else.’674 Fundamental interests 
and rights should be interpreted in light of their associated normative and moral values, 
which cannot fully be appreciated when restricted to domestic (American) assessments. 
Instead, ‘the evolving standards of decency which mark the progress of a maturing society’675 
are enriched by transnational comparativism, enrichment which will be sought in the 
remaining chapters. 
Professional Consensus 
Despite their procedural and substantive shortcomings, amicus curiae briefs can 
supplement ESD analysis. The interpretivist’s aim to fill positivism’s void by recourse to 
community practices and understandings benefits from an additional, expert insight into 
community consensus. Rational interpretive safeguards are encouraged, to protect against 
according amicus facts with blind-faith credence. Professional consensus might not be 
dispositive of an Eighth Amendment issue, but an adoption of control measures, first set out 
by Daubert,
676
 brings the assessment in line with the notion of a general, current, and 
rigorously tested ‘scientific community’.677 By applying such rigour, selectivity is sieved by 
rationality; the impact of ideologies is significantly hindered; and guiding principles are 
provided to facilitate greater moral inclusion when citing professional consensus. 
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The unprecedented level of deference accorded by the Court in Hall to professional 
medical opinion gives a clearer picture of the future of Eighth Amendment evolution. Hall 
provides a fresh challenge for further attacks on constitutional law, through professional 
medical consensus. Specifically, by determining that ESD can be informed by such 
consensus, the Court has prepared a Trojan Horse. Loaded with professionals armed with 
epistemic knowledge, this vehicle could prove evolutionary for constitutional challenges 
against practices which ask further medical questions, if SCOTUS is willing to open the 
hatch. 
Such willingness was avoided in May 2015 when the Court rejected Bower v Texas,
678
 
a case challenging inter alia the practice of executing a defendant ‘who has already served 
more than 30 years on death row while exercising his legal rights in a non-abusive 
manner’.679 Had SCOTUS granted review, significant attempts would have been made to 
demonstrate professional consensus in Bower’s favour.680 Since such an opportunity was 
denied, this thesis will seek similar evidence in Chapters VI and VII, to provide a 
comprehensive evaluation of the nation’s use of a form of punishment which exceptional by 
world standards, in terms of both its prevalence and its application: solitary confinement. 
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 Bower v Texas (2015 No 14-292) cert denied. 
679
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bower v Texas (No 14-292) i. 
680
 Indicated in the petition. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE HIDDEN CORNER OF THE PRISON 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In April 2015 a North Carolina prison official acknowledged that the Durham County 
Jail was using a new procedure he defined as a ‘modified detainee walk schedule’.1 That 
procedure limited the amount of time 500 prisoners spend outside their cells to less than one 
hour per day. Neither the County Jail nor the state acknowledged that this modified schedule 
was a form of “solitary confinement”, a method officials claimed was provided for by 
different correctional policies.
2
 The mislabelling of this procedure, solitary confinement by 
any other name, is a clear warning sign for the types of obscure euphemisms adopted by 
prison officials. For analysis of this form of extreme punishment, the demonstrated obscurity 
presents an immediate challenge. Accessing and evaluating data regarding the number of 
inmates held in forms of solitude or segregation across the US is extremely difficult, not only 
given the varying definitions, but also due to the practical issue of access to data: some states 
do not even keep such records, let alone publish them.
3
 
From the available data, on any given day at least 81,000 prisoners are held in some 
form of solitary confinement in the US.
4
 While there is no universal definition of such 
confinement, Riveland’s is the most widely-accepted, defining it as: ‘a highly restrictive, 
high-custody housing unit … that isolates inmates from the general prison population and 
                                                          
1
 Mark Schultz, ‘Durham sheriff acknowledges inmate confinement’ (The News & Observer: Durham News, 17 
April 2015) <https://tinyurl.com/newsobserver172015> accessed 28
th
 April 2015. 
2
 NCDOC Rules and Policies (2010) §§(8)(a)(1); (b)(1); (c)(1); (d)(1). 
3
 Zafir Shaiq, ‘More Restrictive Than Necessary’ (2013) 10 Hastings Race and Poverty LJ 327, 340. 
4
 John Gibbons and Nicholas Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement (Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons 2006) 52-53, 56. Figures vary since classification of “solitary” is not uniformly accepted 
across the fifty state jurisdictions, the federal government and the military. 
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from each other’.5 Riveland’s definition also requires a period of at least 22 hours per day in 
which prisoners are not allowed to leave their cells, known as ‘lockdown’.6 Since there is no 
central US prison system, a variety of labels are used by states and found throughout state 
policy, such as in the North Carolina example above. In addition, various monikers for 
solitary confinement are found in legislation, media, and academic literature, all pointing to 
the previously defined situation. Examples include Special Control Unit (SCU); Intensive 
Management Unit (IMU); Administrative Segregation (AdSeg); Super-Maximum Security 
(Supermax); in addition to other, more colloquial descriptions: “the hole”, “the bing”, “the 
chokey”, “the SHU”, “the box”, or “lockup”. This chapter adopts the acronym most 
commonly associated with legal and psychiatric assessments of solitary confinement: “SHU” 
(Secure Housing Unit). The use of “SHU” refers not only to housing units, but to any 
situation where sentenced inmates are held in isolating confinement for at least 22 hours per 
day. 
It is worth noting that the use of SHU is not unique to the US, but its massive scale is 
very much an American phenomenon.
7
 This chapter seeks to pay close attention to the 
practical impact of sentenced prisoners held in solitary confinement,
8
 and the reality of 
associated constitutional issues hidden in this often overlooked sector of punishment. 
Context, including the history of solitary, the last Century’s boom in civil rights suits by 
prisoners, and the onset of mass incarceration will be introduced in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 for 
discussion-framing. By engaging in the analysis outlined by the interpretivist framework 
developed in the first half of this thesis, Sections 6.4 and 6.5 will introduce the practical 
issues faced by the American experiment with solitary confinement in order to provide the 
                                                          
5
 Chase Riveland, Supermax Prisons (US Department of Justice 1999) 6, emphasis removed. 
6
 ibid. 
7
 Sharon Shalev, Supermax (Willan 2009) 9. 
8
 Pre-trial solitary confinement has been scoped out of this study, with a view to focusing on solitary as 
punishment, but it is noted as deserving further analysis in future work. A current assessment of this separate 
issue can be found in Peter Scharff Smith, ‘The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates’ (2006) 34 
Crime and Justice 441, 445. 
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basis for an analysis of its constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, which will follow 
in Chapter VII. 
Supporters of SHU dismiss its critics as ‘sentimental, bleeding-heart liberals’.9 The 
claim will be developed that, by exposing the reader to the historical, social, and 
jurisprudential background of this form of punishment, a compelling case for greater scrutiny 
of solitary confinement practices arises. Respecting the Eighth Amendment’s evolving 
standards of decency (ESD), which is a principle of morality, is a fundamental part of reading 
law as integrity, where morals are viewed as interwoven within the framework of law.
10
 
Objective indicia of decency relevant to the Constitution’s punishments clause will be 
identified and interpreted by the framework developed in the past two chapters. Ultimately, it 
will be argued in Chapter VII that SHU, as practiced, is unconstitutional under the ‘evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’11 Before arguing as such, 
however, it is necessary to consider the historical overview of solitary confinement. 
6.2 HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
Following high-profile exposés of solitary confinement published by the New 
Yorker
12
 and New York Times,
13
 2014 saw the most widespread reforms to solitary 
confinement in recent memory. Ten states adopted changes to their SHU policies,
14
 in 
addition to the introduction of three national reform bills, the greatest American solitary 
confinement action for nearly two decades. While it is unwise to conflate reform with 
abolition, the Court’s ESD precedent has been shown to include notice of the ‘consistency of 
                                                          
9
 Shalev (n 7) citing Paul Gendreau and James Bonta, ‘Solitary Confinement Is Not Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment: People Sometimes Are!’ (1984) 26 Canadian Journal of Criminology 467. 
10
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘“Natural” Law Revisited’ (1982) 34 University of Florida LR 163, 165 & 171. 
11
 Trop v Dulles 356 US 86 (1958) 101. 
12
 Atul Gawande, (New Yorker, 30 March 2009) <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole> 
accessed 16th March 2015. 
13
 Richard Perry, (New York Times, 14 July 2014) ‘Rikers: Where Mental Illness Meets Brutality in Jail’ 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/nyregion/rikers-study-finds-prisoners-injured-by-employees.html> 
accessed 16th March 2015. 
14
 Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin 
undertook reforms of SHU in their state facilities during 2014. Texas and New Jersey, have pending executive 
reviews or legislative considerations. 
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the direction of change’15 in state and federal statutes. This consensus element of the ESD 
principle, state counting for the purpose of national consensus measurement, will be 
considered in detail in the next chapter and will draw conclusions as to the constitutionality 
of solitary confinement. Before that line of argument is pursued, an overview of the relevant 
history and context prior to 1976 is necessary.
16
 
6.2.1 PENOLOGICAL SHIFT 
By the late-1600s American colonies had undergone major penal reform with 
stimulus from the Quakers movement,
17
 including most notably William Penn, who founded 
Pennsylvania. Penn deplored the brutal conditions of English prisons and pushed for the 
enactment of the ‘Great Code’,18 to provide for the establishment of houses of correction 
where, in theory, moral principles of proportionality and humanity would prevail. Thus, the 
Pennsylvania Prison Society, the first such humanitarian organisation in the world, was 
founded. Efforts were short-lived, however, and England forced the repeal of Penn’s Code 
upon his death in 1718. In Great Britain a 1751 Act of Parliament provided for an early form 
of solitary confinement, decreeing that, after conviction of a heinous offence, ‘[jailers] shall 
confine such prisoner to some cell…separate and apart from the other prisoners, and that no 
person or persons whatsoever, except the jailer or keeper…shall have access to any such 
prisoner.’19 The British public ‘revolted against this severity’20 and, following the American 
Revolution, Parliament repealed the section on solitary.
21
 American reform efforts could only 
reignite if the English reign over the colonies was shaken. 
  
                                                          
15
 Atkins v Virginia 536 US 304 (2002) 314. 
16
 Section 6.3 will explain the relevance of this starting point. 
17
 George Kurian, World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Correctional Systems (Gale 2006) 77. 
18
 Penn debarked at Philadelphia in 1682 and pursued his idea of a ‘civic utopia’, including his mild penal code. 
Jack Marietta and G Rowe, Troubled Experiment (University of Pennsylvania Press 2006) 263. In fact, as 
Marietta and Rowe demonstrate, this led to much higher crime levels than prior to Penn’s reforms. 
19
 Act 25 Geo II c37 (1751). 
20
 In Re Medley 134 US 160 (1890) 170. 
21
 Act 6 & 7 Wm IV c30 (1836). 
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6.2.2 POST-INDEPENDENCE IMPRISONMENT 
In the early United States, following independence from Britain and Jefferson’s 
proclamation that their ‘political bands’ must ‘dissolve’,22 founders Benjamin Franklin and 
Benjamin Rush echoed Beccaria’s European calls for limited punishment in the pursuit of 
life, liberty, and happiness.
23
 To those ends, Franklin and Rush supported the Pennsylvania 
Prison Society’s establishment of Walnut Street Jail,24 the first ever custom-built house of 
correction or “Penitentiary”,25 and the first prison to resemble those found today. Sixteen 
cells were provided within Walnut Street’s solitary wing, each measuring eight by six feet, 
with a small window out of the prisoner’s reach, and no table or bed.26 The thickness of the 
walls was described as so great ‘as to render the loudest voice unintelligible.’27 
Rush, the ‘father of American psychiatry’,28 viewed the solitude provided by Walnut 
Street as creating a moral infirmity, believing that penance in solitary confinement with 
labour would cure prisoners’ psychiatric criminality.29 Others, however, propagated solitary 
for its painful physical and emotional effects.
30
 Both justifications derive from a form of 
utilitarianism, either in terms of deterrence, or an early type of rehabilitation; both focused on 
the consequentialist purposes of the punishment. The early efforts at Walnut Street led to the 
construction of a similar prison in the same state, Eastern State Penitentiary (ESP) or ‘Cherry 
Hill’.31 Unlike Walnut Street, which enforced hard labour, ESP was faithful to solitary 
penance as the principal form of activity for prisoners, redolent of the solitary confinement 
                                                          
22
 Declaration of Independence (1776).  
23
 Borrowing the words from the Declaration, ibid. See Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764) 
(Richard Bellamy (ed) CUP 1995) 10 (punishment must be necessary); ibid 63 (and lenient). As noted in 
Chapter III, Beccaria significantly influenced the work of Voltaire, who was in frequent contact with Franklin 
and Rush. Marcello Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform (Temple UP 1973) 18-19. 
24
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
25
 Rex Skidmore, ‘Penological Pioneering in the Walnut Street Jail, 1789-1799’ (1948) 39 Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 167, 168 (describing the state statutory basis of 1773 for Walnut Street). 
26
 ibid 169. 
27
 ibid. 
28
 Ian O’Donnell, Prisoners, Solitude, and Time (OUP 2014) 39. 
29
 Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement (University of Minnesota Press 2013) 9-10. 
30
 Francis Gray, Prison Discipline in America (John Murray 1848) 37. 
31
 Adam Hirsch, The Rise of the Penitentiary (New Haven 1992) 63-65. 
Chapter VI: The Hidden Corner of the Prison 
199 
 
definition in the 1751 English statute.
32
 The penal revolution instigated by ESP became 
known as the ‘Pennsylvania model’33 and, despite condemnation from prominent writers on 
each side of the Atlantic,
34
 Europe embraced this model. Pentonville was built in London 
(1842), Mazas in France (1850), and Louvain in Belgium (1860),
35
 each framed loosely on 
ESP’s adoption of Bentham’s spoked-wheel shaped Panopticon,36 a prison designed for 
maximum surveillance of prisoners.
37
 The rest of the US, however, took a different turn. The 
prison arrived during a period where public shaming had lost its appeal, due in part to the 
dissolution of close-knit communities, and to the shift away from English practices.
38
 
In 1821 New York built Auburn Prison, adopting the cellular system pioneered in 
neighbouring Pennsylvania, but with less emphasis on isolation.
39
 The Auburn system was 
much less costly than the Pennsylvania model, and provided inmates with work during the 
day.
40
 Against the international trend, the Auburn system became the predominant form of 
imprisonment in the US, which had turned away from the original practice of extreme 
solitary at ESP.
41
 During the latter-half of the 19
th
 Century and the early 1900s the two 
distinct models prevailed on either side of the Atlantic, though the picture would change 
when the Great Depression struck in 1929. At this time a number of events that would shape 
the new era of penology took place in the US. Jacobs notes worsening violence and 
unemployment during the Depression, which in turn led to higher crime rates and 
                                                          
32
 Act 25 Geo II (n 19). 
33
 Skidmore (n 25). 
34
 Dickens described the conditions upon his visit to ESP as ‘cruel and wrong’ (Charles Dickens, American 
Notes (1842) (Penguin Classics edn, 2000) 111); Hans Christian Andersen, In Sweden (1851) (Asad Razzaki 
ebook edn, 2004) Chapter 6 (describing his visit to a Swedish prison based on the Pennsylvania model: ‘by 
solitary confinement, in continual silence, the criminal is to be punished and amended;...It is as though no one 
lived there or it was an abandoned house in time of plague....The whole is a well-built machine—a nightmare 
for the spirit.’) 
35
 John Roberts, ‘History of Prisons’ in Kurian (ed) (n 17) 79. 
36
 Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon (1787) (Miran Božovič ed, 1995). 
37
 Bentham described his Panopticon as ‘a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity 
hitherto without example.’ Jeremy Bentham, ‘Panopticon, Constitution, Colonies, Codification’ in John 
Bowring (ed) The Works of Jeremy Bentham (William Tait 1843) 39. 
38
 Lawrence Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (Basic Books 1993) 77. 
39
 O’Donnell (n 28) 17. 
40
 Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment’ (1992) 16 Crime and Justice 55, 65. 
41
 O’Donnell (n 28) 17. 
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overcrowding in the nation’s prisons.42 The later US involvement in World War II and a 
subsequent economic boom meant that attention was diverted from prisons in favour of 
broader social issues such as unemployment, and inmates became the hidden and ignored 
sector of society.
43
 
At the height of highly politicised state problems in Illinois,
44
 the American 
Correctional Association was founded, and the Model Penal Code (MPC) was introduced in 
the 1960s. The MPC led to the recommendation of a significant proportion of new paroles. In 
combination with the Civil Rights Movement’s ferocious momentum, the politicisation of the 
remaining inmates was generated, especially with respect to racial minorities, who had 
become the majority in prisons.
45
 As noted in Chapter III, the ‘softening’46 of state power 
caused by a humanitarian shift in popular sensibilities in the mid-20
th
 Century, combined 
with a loss of confidence in social institutions arising out of political turmoil; the struggle for 
civil rights and soaring crime rates led to the realisation that utilitarian sentencing policies, 
such as deterrence, were failing to deliver. The ‘rehabilitative ideal’,47 the idea of caring 
through coercion, had also reached its peak. In 1971, following 27 prison riots across the US 
in the previous year,
48
 New York would see the worst one-day encounter between fellow 
Americans since the Civil War, this time in a state prison.
49
 After four days of intensive 
rioting by the 2,200 inmates of Attica, New York, 39 men were killed, including 10 
hostages.
50
 A further 80 suffered non-fatal gunshot wounds.
51
 A Commission created in the 
wake of Attica condemned the race-based abuse of black prisoners and poor planning of 
                                                          
42
 James Jacobs, Stateville (UCP 1977) 26. 
43
 ibid 28. 
44
 Laurence Gonzales, ‘The New Alcatraz’ Chicago Magazine (February 1986); Steven Whitman, ‘The Marion 
Penitentiary - It should be Opened Up, Not Locked Down’ Southern Illinoisan (7 August 1988); numerous 
publications available at Committee to End the Marion Lockdown (CEML), ‘From Alcatraz to Marion to 
Florence - Control Unit Prisons in the United States’  
<http://people.umass.edu/~kastor/ceml_articles/cu_in_us.html> accessed 24 March 2015. 
45
 ibid 57-59; Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (The New Press 2012). 
46
 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (TRS) (Gerald Duckworth 1977) 128. 
47
 Sheldon Messinger, ‘Troubling Questions’ (1983) 81 Michigan LR 1176. 
48
 Robert Case, ‘We Are Not Slaves’ (2015) 102 Journal of American History 73, 74. 
49
 David Lohr, (Huffington Post 13 August 2013) ‘Remembering Attica Prison’ 
<www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/13/attica-prison_n_1880737.html> accessed 19 March 2015. 
50
 ibid. 
51
 Michael Welch, Corrections (3
rd
 edn, Routledge 2011) 298. 
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prison security,
52
 compounded by the warehousing of inmates who were in need of education 
and other reform-based programmes.
53
 
Spurred in part by events at Attica, and another 48 prison riots in 1972 – an historical 
peak –54 Martinson would declare in 1974 that ‘nothing works’,55 and the national Bureau of 
Prisons would abandon entirely the medical model for imprisonment.
56
 Instead, utilitarian 
models of safety and containment would return, with correction cast by the wayside. Solitary 
confinement was seen as a viable alternative to standard General Population, in which the 
vast majority of prisoners were held. Solitary would house the “worst of the worst”, confined 
in isolation, not for correction but for prevention of crime. Along with the decline of the 
rehabilitative ideal and following Attica, the late 1970s onwards saw a massive growth in 
imprisonment in the US.
57
 Widespread closure of mental health hospitals meant that prison 
authorities instead received psychiatric patients.
58
 These inmates struggle to cope with the 
exigencies of everyday prison life even more than standard prisoners, most of whom suffer 
from at least mild mental health disorders and limited sociability.
59
 Incapacitation and 
retribution filled the void left by the rehabilitative model,
60
 and the use of ESP-style solitary 
confinement increased.  
When the US had abandoned the Pennsylvanian model in favour of the less restrictive 
Auburn system, the rest of the world had opted for greater confinement. By the late-20th 
Century, however, with Europe leading the humanitarian call for greater rehabilitation and 
                                                          
52
 Attica Revisited, ‘The McKay Commission’ <http://www.talkinghistory.org/attica/mckay.html> accessed 19 
March 2015. 
53
 Welch (n 51) 296. 
54
 Case (n 48) 74. 
55
 Robert Martinson, ‘What works? Questions and answers about prison reform’ (1974) 35 The Public Interest 
22. 
56
 Kurian (ed) (n 17) 85. 
57
 300,000 prisoners in 1978 grew to 2,300,000 in 2012, such that a country with 5% of the world population 
now has around 25% of its prisoners. 
58
 Elizabeth Bennion, ‘Banning the Bing’ (2015) 90 Indiana LJ 741, 751-755. 
59
 Doris James and Lauren Glaze, ‘Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates’ Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Special Report (September 2006) 1 (reporting percentages of inmates with ‘any mental problem’ in 
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stricter scrutiny over imprisonment practices,
61
 the tables had turned. Those at the helm of US 
prison policy-generation had gained an appetite for more punitive practices than those used 
before, and were much less concerned with avoiding total isolation which would, after all, 
satisfy individual deterrence from crime.
62
 The events of October 1983 would extinguish any 
hope of that appetite diminishing. 
6.2.3 THE MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF SOLITARY 
United States Penitentiary (USP) Marion, in Illinois, was built in 1963 to replace 
Alcatraz, designed as a federal prison for the 500 ‘adult male felons who [were] difficult to 
control’.63 Inmates held at Marion initially underwent a behavioural modification programme 
called Control and Rehabilitation Effort (CARE).
64
 Strict solitary confinement was imposed, 
with pockets of intensive group therapy. On 22
nd
 October 1983 events occurred which would 
reshape the American SHU. Convicted murderer Thomas Silverstein instigated the murder of 
two guards in the prison,
65
 and has been designated “Prisoner Zero”66 for his role in the 
subsequent lockdown across Marion.
67
 Fourteen months after it began, the US House of 
Representatives Judiciary Committee described the lockdown at Marion as the largest in 
history,
68
 with some inmates (most notably Silverstein) not having left their cells once in 
those months. At the time of writing, in June 2015, the lockdown is ongoing. Silverstein has 
left his cell on just a handful of occasions in 32 years.
69
 ESP-style solitary had returned to the 
US. 
                                                          
61
 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (ECHR). 
62
 In absolute solitary confinement, inmates’ violence against others was seriously limited, though not against 
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63
 Jessica Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment (Vintage Books 1973) 199. 
64
 ibid 134-135. 
65
 US v Silverstein 732 F2d 1338 (7
th
 Cir 1984). 
66
 This terminology borrows from medicine, where Patient Zero is the first to contract an infectious disease. 
67
 O’Donnell (n 28) 150. 
68
 David Ward and Allen Breed, Consultants’ Report on the United States Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois, 
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The “success” of the USP Marion lockdown – in the sense that it led to lower crime in 
the prison – has led to what O’Donnell terms the ‘Marionization’70 of the national system. 
Devoid of any considerations of political morality, Marion-style lockdowns are now catered 
for by custom-built institutions (or sections thereof), which are permanently closed off to 
other prisoners. No prisoner is able to have contact with another, even during recreation 
where they are held in single-walk exercise pens. These are SHUs, Solitary Housing Units, 
found in prisons across the US. Death row, protective custody, discretionary segregation, 
administrative segregation, and custom-build “Supermaxes” are all forms of SHU which lead 
to long-term confinement in solitude. An inevitable consequence is very limited access to the 
world outside the inmate’s cell, let alone outside the prison. Often designed on a “pod” basis, 
where around eight cells are further contained,
71
 SHU is accurately described as ‘a species of 
meta-prison’:72 a prison within a prison. 
While Marion was once an exceptional institution, designed to cater for the prisoners 
left unsecured after the closure of Alcatraz, it laid the foundations for a much greater 
creation. The modern SHU, in which around 81,000 inmates are held at any one time, 
evolved out of the Marionisation of prison security. O’Donnell notes that Dickens is often 
criticised for having exaggerated the conditions at ESP,
73
 but that if he were to visit the SHU 
today, his descriptions would certainly apply. The accuracy of this purported return to a 
Dickensian condemnation of prison conditions will be examined in the next chapter. For 
present purposes, however, a refocus on the constitutional law trajectory is warranted. To that 
end, the next subsection will review the Supreme Court’s varied approach to prisoners’ rights 
over the past century. 
  
                                                          
70
 O’Donnell (n 28) 156. 
71
 Shalev (n 7) 101, citing the 1984 approval by the US National Institute of Corrections and the American 
Justice Association of the pod design. 
72
 Loïc Waquant, ‘Foreword: Probing the Meta-Prison’ in Jeffrey Ross (ed) The Globalization of Supermax 
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6.2.4 EXPANSION AND RETRACTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
To varying extents, imprisoned Americans have been afforded limited constitutional 
guarantees. Until the mid-20
th
 Century Madison’s caution against the Constitution’s 
provisions becoming mere ‘parchment barriers’74 with no substantive guarantees was a very 
real risk in prisons. The federal courts treated prisoners as ‘the functional equivalent of non-
citizens’,75 without access to many rights, which free citizens would otherwise have had. 
Local courts left matters of sentencing to the legislature, and its imposition, including 
imprisonment, to the executive.
76
 This exercise of the judicial ‘hands-off’77 doctrine, 
introduced briefly in Chapter II,
78
 left almost total control of prisons to the other branches of 
government. 
6.2.4.1 THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
At the foundation of the US, civil rights simply did not exist as a concept behind the 
prison gate. The Bill of Rights applied only to the national government, at the federal level. 
Local prison systems were at liberty to contain prisoners in the circumstances and conditions 
prescribed by their states. Civil rights as a legal concept was a product of Reconstruction, 
where Congress passed federal provisions dealing with the freedom of US citizens. Take, for 
example, the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act,
79
 accompanied by the Fourteenth Amendment,
80
 
which provided freed slaves with citizenship and the ability to challenge at the federal level 
any restriction of their liberty at the hands of any state. In addition to its role as a guarantor 
against slavery, importantly the 1867 Act also provided federal courts with oversight of 
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 James Madison, The Federalist (Terence Ball ed, CUP 2003) No 47, 241. 
75
 Michael Goldman, ‘Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison Confinement’ (2004) 45 Boston College LR 423, 427. 
76
 John Fliter, Prisoners' Rights (Greenwood 2000) 45. 
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 In Stroud v Swope 187 F2d 850 (9
th
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 14 Stat 385 (39
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nationwide criminal justice.
81
 Nonetheless, despite these promising foundations, it would be 
decades before prisoners’ rights were built. 
In O’Neil v Vermont the US Supreme Court considered the proportionality of a 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment for the first time.
82
 Declining to conclude on the 
merits of a sentence of 54 years at hard labour, and in spite of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee to provide all citizens within ‘the equal protection of the laws’,83 SCOTUS 
explicitly refused to apply the punishments clause to the states.
84
 A majority viewed the 
Eighth as a matter for the federal government, and not one designed to encroach on state 
power. Fliter has noted that an important issue not considered by the Justices in O’Neil was 
solitary confinement,
85
 which up to that point had not come before the Court. The decision 
gained just one dissenting opinion from Justice Field, who decried the barbarity of O’Neil’s 
sentence: ‘it is hard to believe that any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from 
shuddering [at its] severity’.86 Following America’s acquisition of the Philippines during the 
American-Spanish war over Cuba in the same year as O’Neil was decided, the Court was 
provided with another occasion to consider solitary confinement. 
In Weems v US,
87
 SCOTUS reviewed a challenge to the Philippine colony’s solitary 
confinement and hard labour scheme, which held onto the early Philadelphian model. Justice 
McKenna’s majority opinion offered consideration of Field’s sympathy towards offenders 
handed disproportionate sentences. While avoiding the question of incorporation, in a 
judgment noted in Chapter II as somewhat imperialistic, McKenna declared that the Eighth 
Amendment was ‘not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion is 
enlightened by a humane justice’,88 the statement which provides the emphasis for the 
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principle of evolutive decency upon which this thesis is based. It would take much more than 
aspirational statements to deliver the Constitution’s guarantees behind prison walls, however, 
and that opportunity would only arise with a Court willing to adopt a more “hands on” 
approach in the civil rights sphere. Chief Justice Earl Warren provided hope for that 
willingness. 
6.2.4.2 WARREN’S DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION 
Known for its activism in desegregation cases introduced in Chapter II,
89
 the Warren 
Court (1953-1969) played the most significant role in the expansion of prisoners’ access to 
civil rights. After a decade of due process expansion in other substantive areas of 
constitutional protection,
90
 the Warren Court revitalised Weems and declared in Trop that the 
Eighth Amendment contained a principle of evolutive decency.
91
 Four years later the Court 
finally incorporated the Eighth Amendment, applying the punishments clause to the states in 
addition to the federal government.
92
 As a result, the proportion of prisoners alleging 
unconstitutional sentences and prison conditions rocketed. Warren’s criminal due process 
revolution swung into action and the lower federal courts began to hear various frivolous 
constitutional challenges to uncomfortable conditions.
93
 Unsurprisingly, the rights of 
prisoners were litigated like never before. 
The 1960s saw various attempts by the Court to deliver better civil rights protection to 
prisoners. First, in Monroe v Pape,
94
 the applicability of 42 USC §1983 to prison suits was 
considered.
95
 Though §1983 provides that claims can be brought against ‘[e]very person who, 
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
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Territory…depriv[es] any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws’,96 no case prior to Monroe had extended this provision to state officials who had acted 
beyond their lawful authority. Monroe determined for the first time that a public official, here 
a police officer, who exceeded his lawful authority was nonetheless still acting under the 
colour of state law. Consequentially, §1983 was expanded to include actions which were 
outside the official’s authority. While certainly promising for the general cause of expanding 
due process in the US, the application of §1983 to prisoners was not considered. Soon 
thereafter SCOTUS held in US v Muniz that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
97
 made 
damages available to prisoners successfully alleging civil wrongdoing by the State.
98
 Despite 
these efforts, the impact of Muniz on prisoners’ rights was also limited,99 because FTCA 
applied only to inmates held by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP), not the state systems. 
Building on the precedent of Trop, Monroe, and Muniz, SCOTUS in 1964 would fully 
engage with prisoners’ rights for the first time. In Cooper v Pate the Warren Court applied 
Monroe’s expansion of §1983 to prisons.100 State prisoners, as well as those held by the 
federal government, were able for the first time to bring claims against their captors. Such 
expansion, combined with Robinson’s incorporation of the Eighth Amendment, meant that 
prisoners were provided with more legal protection than they had been at any point in 
American history. Thousands of federal court claims were filed in the year following 
Cooper,
101
 yet the tide of Warren’s due process revolution did not stem. Further due process 
was later provided to prisoners, including guarantees of counsel for probation hearings;
102
 
equal protection in prison;
103
 and access to certain legal services.
104
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The expansion of access to civil rights during this period was so significant that it 
became Warren’s legacy, leading some to voice concerns that the Court had become too 
activist, encroaching on state sovereignty like never before.
105
 Chambers, for example, 
described Warren’s efforts as ‘courageous and, to a significant degree, successful’,106 and 
noted that critics exaggerate the Warren Court’s role. With a switch in Chief Justices from 
Warren to Burger in 1969, and the subsequent appointment by President Nixon of the ‘strict 
constructionists’107 Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, it must have seemed certain that the 
expansion would be suppressed. That was not to be the case. 
6.2.4.3 FROM EXPANSION TO CONCERN 
Fliter notes that, ‘surprising many’,108 the Burger Court followed the path Warren had 
paved, increasing the civil rights of prisoners from 1971 to 1974. An expansion of access to 
legal materials and rights of free speech expression in prisons, handed down in Younger v 
Gilmore,
109
 was followed by the holding in Cruz v Beto that prisoners of varying religions 
must be permitted to exercise their beliefs freely.
110
 The per curiam decision emphasised the 
federal judiciary’s seemingly “hands-on” approach to prisoner complaints: ‘Federal courts sit 
not to supervise prisons, but to enforce the constitutional rights of all “persons,” including 
prisoners.’111 Supervision, in the form of closer oversight, would follow and prevails today, 
but the early Burger Court cases affirmed a willingness to at least scrutinise state punishment 
at the highest level. 
In 1974, during the de facto moratorium on the national death penalty stemming from 
Furman v Georgia,
112
 SCOTUS provided inmates with procedural rights for the first time.
113
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Where other cases had focussed on increasing prisoners’ access to substantive guarantees, 
Wolff v McDonnell concerned certain procedural issues, such as the right to appeal the 
decisions of a warden in internal disciplinary proceedings.
114
 Specifically, in Wolff the Court 
provided prisoners with a procedural due process guarantee of evidentiary hearings for 
internal misdemeanours. ‘There is no iron curtain’,115 the majority noted, ‘drawn between the 
Constitution and the prisons of this country’,116 thereby establishing that prisoners have 
certain ‘liberty interests’117, even while imprisoned. Wolff therefore represents another 
amplification of prisoners’ rights, developing the substantive field of constitutional 
protection. 
Despite this further expansion, however, the Burger Court would attempt to backpedal 
on the civil rights it had established for prisoners the decade before, with numerous 
restrictions on due process decided between 1976 and 1986.
118
 Even more significant was the 
emergence of a developing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Immediately following the 
attention that had been paid to capital punishment, in Furman,
119
 Gregg v Georgia,
120
 and 
their progeny, SCOTUS would turn to a new controversy: confinement conditions and their 
acceptability under the punishments clause. 
6.3 POST-1976: THE MODERN ERA 
1976 marked the dawn of the modern Eighth Amendment. Gregg reinstated the death 
penalty after two-thirds of states re-enacted capital codes. Wolff paid considerable lip service 
to the idea of prisoners’ access to the courts and, unsurprisingly, litigation thrived. Indeed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
113
 See Barbara Belbot, ‘Where Can a Prisoner Find a Liberty Interest These Days? The Pains of Imprisonment 
Escalate’ (1998) 42 New York Law School LR 1, 60. 
114
 418 US 539 (1974). 
115
 ibid 555. 
116
 ibid 556. 
117
 A right to remain free from certain constraints. In prison this is inherently limited, but certain rights 
(including due process) are nonetheless guaranteed. 
118
 Examples include Baxter v Palmigiano 425 US 308 (1976) (restricting the right to counsel and cross-
examination in prison hearings, and removing the Fifth Amendment right to non-self-incrimination in similar 
circumstances); Meachum v Fano 427 US 215 (1976) (restricting liberty interests in prison). 
119
 Furman (n 112). 
120
 428 US 153 (1976). 
Chapter VI: The Hidden Corner of the Prison 
210 
 
before 1976, silence surrounded the constitutionality of confinement conditions. Due process 
in sentencing had been the most frequent channel for prisoners’ civil rights suits and, as such, 
that was the matter to which the Supreme Court paid most attention. At the same time that the 
Burger Court was reacting to an overabundance of prisoner litigation in procedural and 
substantive due process,
121
 non-capital Eighth Amendment challenges amplified. Amidst the 
battling for the death penalty’s reinstatement,122 Estelle v Gamble reached the Supreme Court 
in 1976.
123
 SCOTUS was faced with a challenge to treatment during confinement, and the 
next line of Eighth Amendment attack was drawn. 
6.3.1 CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS: BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS 
In 1972 a prisoner in the Texas Department of Corrections had been injured while 
undertaking mandatory work exercises, and alleged that the subsequent treatment he received 
was constitutionally insufficient under the Eighth Amendment.
124
 Considering the role of 
prison authorities with regard to treating the medical needs of inmates, the Court held that 
serious neglect, ‘may actually produce physical “torture or a lingering death”’125 as 
prohibited by the Eighth. Creating a subjective, intent-based standard, the Estelle majority 
held that ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”’126 prohibited by the punishments clause. 
Bennion notes that the decision met with some criticism, since serious illness or injury might 
still occur, without the requisite ‘deliberate indifference’.127 Dolovich extends this argument, 
arguing that negligence standards are troublesome in litigation, and a tendency for prisoners 
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to be viewed as ‘less than human’128 leads to reticence in court. A standard that focuses more 
squarely on the subjective suffering of prisoners might alleviate these concerns. 
The strongest condemnation of the majority’s position in Estelle, however, came from 
Justice Brennan’s dissent. Noting that ‘[p]ublic apathy and the political powerlessness of 
inmates have contributed to the pervasive neglect of the prisons,’129 Brennan described the 
Eighth Amendment’s ‘touchstone’130 as ‘the effect upon the imprisoned.’131 Such aspirations 
for an offender-based assessment reflects the theoretical framework adopted by this thesis. 
Under that framework – interpretivism – moral analysis of the punishment imposed on an 
offender is far more compelling than any positivistic rule. Such an argument is expanded 
throughout the latter section of this chapter and in Chapter VII, where objective indicia of 
evolving standards, represented by political morality, are applied to solitary confinement. 
With a strong conservative bloc comprising Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Rehnquist, Powell, and O’Connor, with Justice White as the swing-vote, the 1981 Court 
consistently favoured states’ rights over prisoners’ rights during the final five years of 
Burger’s chiefdom.132 In Bell v Wolfish the Court had its first opportunity to review double-
celling, a common practice in federal and state prisons.
133
 Describing it as innocuous and 
reasonable, the Bell Court clarified its position in Rhodes v Chapman four terms later.
134
 
While Wolff might have spoken of a lifted iron curtain between prisoners and constitutional 
rights,
135
 SCOTUS in Rhodes held that ‘the Constitution does not mandate comfortable 
prisons, and prisons...cannot be free of discomfort.’136 
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At the same time as Rhodes was decided, USP Marion had gone into lockdown, 
starting the first permanent form of solitary confinement in modern history. In spite of what 
was happening on the ground in Illinois,
137
 the new Rehnquist Court, significantly more 
conservative than any of its predecessors,
138
 continued to limit the due process rights of 
prisoners.
139
 In addition, the Eighth Amendment protection hinted at by Estelle, albeit in very 
limited, intentional circumstances, was not often forthcoming in the following years. A slim 
majority applied Estelle’s “deliberate indifference” test to prison conditions in Wilson v 
Seiter,
140
 admitting in Hudson v McMillan that excessive force could constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment,
141
 but, again, only if inflicted intentionally. In 1994 another confinement 
conditions challenge was placed on the Court’s docket, challenging the “hands-off” 
declaration from Rhodes.
142
 Ferguson notes that SCOTUS continued to ignore the problems 
of contemporary US imprisonment in that case, Farmer v Brennan.
143
 Instead of taking the 
opportunity to outline minimum constitutional requirements the Estelle standard of 
“deliberate indifference” was applied,144 creating yet another subjective recklessness test and 
giving little slack to prisoners seeking to challenge the serious harm they suffered. 
An examination of the cases outlined above makes it clear that a trend was developing 
from 1976 to 1995. Prisoners, while engaging in litigation at a rate never seen before, were 
not finding success with Eighth Amendment challenges. Solitary confinement, which at this 
point had become the norm rather than the exception, had barely been noted by the Court, let 
alone restricted. The limited guarantees provided to non-capital punishments constituted 
subjective recklessness tests, with little regard for societal decency, unlike in the concurrently 
evolving capital sphere. To add insult to injury, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation 
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Reform Act (PLRA) in 1995, to restrict the number of civil (§1983) lawsuits a prisoner could 
bring,
145
 and limit the power of ‘liberal Federal judges’.146 This cross-governmental effort to 
curtail the rights of prisoners was successful, with a sharp decline in the rate of suits brought 
by prisoners from 1995 onwards.
147
 In 2015 the Estelle-Farmer standard is the most recent 
precedent by which to deal with confinement conditions challenges under the punishments 
clause. The evolving standards envisaged by SCOTUS in Trop and relied on to refine capital 
and terms-of-years
148
 sentencing seems to have reached a form of evolutionary saturation. 
This is in spite of an astronomical rise in lower court complaints against confinement 
conditions, massive prison overpopulation,
149
 and a rise in the use of SHU, both in 
prominence and intensity. 
Notwithstanding the significant restrictions developed by the Rehnquist Court and the 
US Congress in response to Warren’s and Burger’s expansions of prisoners’ rights, more 
recent cases have resurrected the precedent created by Estelle and its progeny. While the 
Supreme Court has never extended Estelle’s “deliberate indifference” standard to psychiatric 
care, there is a burgeoning field of academic literature where the introduction of limits to the 
severity of modern imprisonment is called for. Additionally, recent case law has hinted at an 
awakening of the Eighth Amendment in confinement challenges. The following sections will 
present the legal picture of the Eighth’s reach into prisons and combine it with an 
examination of the core controversies which Chapter VII will ultimately analyse under the 
Trop standard of evolutive decency.
150
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6.3.2 CONTEMPORARY CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS POST-1995 
Although the Supreme Court has never upheld a challenge to solitary confinement 
simply in and of itself, it did once accept (in 1890) that such hardship could become so 
extreme that it constitutes psychological torture. In the same term that the Court held that 
electrocution was inoffensive to the Eighth Amendment,
151
 the majority in In Re Medley 
described solitary as creating ‘one of the most horrible feelings to which [an inmate] can be 
subjected’.152 Nonetheless, that dictum seems to have been long forgotten by the modern 
Court. Since Estelle and Farmer, the Court’s attention in punishment jurisprudence has 
fixated on the capital sphere. This evolution of moral standards under the Eighth, while 
encouraging, has distracted the Court from arguably a far more pressing issue. Life without 
parole (LWOP) sentences, confinement in mass overpopulated incarceration, and SHU itself 
(on death row and during non-capital sentences) are issues that affect far more prisoners. A 
consideration of reach is important here. While execution is the ultimate penalty available to 
sentencers in the US, strict conditions of confinement create a far greater unhappiness for a 
far greater number. To tie this utilitarian reflection to an interpretivist assessment, moral 
scrutiny is required. The media may occupy this space for now, but the courts must fill the 
gap if the Eighth Amendment is to reflect contemporary decency into the darkest corners of 
the criminal justice system. 
The only Roberts Court decision to cite Rhodes, the case that announced prisons as 
vestibules of permissible and expected discomfort,
153
 came in a challenge to the Californian 
prison system, Brown v Plata.
154
 Plata arose from a decision handed down by a special, 
PLRA-created,
155
 three judge federal court which had reviewed the system in 2009. In the 
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earlier decision, Coleman-Plata v Schwarzenegger,
156
 the first litigation against mass 
incarceration, the federal court heard how California held approximately 156,000 inmates in a 
network of prisons designed for 85,000, 83% over-capacity.
157
 The system was found unfit 
for purpose, as it had subjected a mass of prisoners to undue hardship in conditions such as 
triple-bunked beds, contained in wards which more closely resembled refugee camps than 
modern prisons.
158
 The three-judge court recommended diversion from prisons, insisting that 
lesser culpability offences should not be matched with custodial sentences, and ordering a 
46,000-prisoner reduction in California’s inmate population within two years.159  
After that time had passed, Plata was decided by the Supreme Court, where the order 
was upheld. SCOTUS acknowledged that ‘[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity 
inherent in all persons’.160 Holding the entire state prison system in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment for lacking adequate safeguards for physical and mental safety,
161
 the Roberts 
Court had a significant impact. As noted previously, until Plata the Court had never equated 
mental health with physical needs. Justice Kennedy’s majority expanded the approach 
significantly, paying particular attention to the ESD element of the assessment. To ‘subject 
sick and mentally ill prisoners in California to “substantial risk of serious harm” cause[s] the 
delivery of care in the prisons to fall below the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.’162 
According to one writer, Plata’s resurrection of federal judicial scrutiny of prisons, 
from the Supreme Court’s twenty-year deep freeze, could cause ‘a legal dismantling of mass 
incarceration.’163 Simon exposes Plata as a mechanism for constitutional revolution, with 
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decency as the driving force.
164
 He argues that the shift in jurisprudence to a dignitarian 
assessment could lead to a shakeup of the punishment system, which has the potential to shift 
the approach from civil rights to human rights.
165
 Through such a shift, the transnational 
comparative element of the ESD assessment becomes even more vital for the Court’s 
assessments of the Eighth Amendment, since the bulk of interpretation in this area arises 
from international and supranational human rights bodies, introduced in Chapter V. By 
placing psychiatric care in the same light as physical medicine, albeit without clarifying the 
constitutional minima required, the Plata majority ‘broke with the posture of extreme 
deference toward imprisonment choices and unleashed a potential sea change’.166 That sea 
change, it will be contended, has the potential to seep into the hidden corner of the prison, 
SHU. 
With no prison conditions cases on the Court’s foreseeable docket, at the time of 
writing, an opportunity for this sea change or a revival of the Estelle-Plata standard any time 
soon seems unlikely. The Justices have refocused on capital punishment,
167
 to the detriment 
of worsening conditions in prisons, specifically in SHU, across the US. This further 
deterioration is the subject of Sections 6.4 and 6.5, which will lay the foundations for Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny. 
6.4 CONTEMPORARY SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ISSUES 
In order to introduce the two main routes of challenge to American SHU, attention is 
given to two important bases of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence fundamental to this thesis. 
The first is Trop,
168
 from which the ESD principle originates. In that case the Supreme Court 
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condemned a punishment of banishment for its extreme nature and the unconstitutional level 
of suffering subsequently caused: 
‘This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution 
stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and 
distress....He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by 
civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international 
community of democracies.’169 
The claim will be sustained in Chapter VII that the ‘ever-increasing fear and 
distress’170 condemned in Trop is perpetuated, to an even greater extent, by contemporary 
SHU conditions. That argument will made through an application of Eighth Amendment 
principles, which are the objective indicia of evolving standards to which Chapters IV and V 
applied an interpretivist moral sieve. The most recent consideration by the Court of prison 
conditions, Plata,
171
 will be relied on in Chapter VII with a view to addressing the wider 
issue of solitary confinement. 
The second base of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to be applied to SHU is the 
incorporation case, Robinson.
172
 In that case SCOTUS noted that society ‘would forget the 
teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted 
sick people to be punished for being sick.’173 It will be argued that imposition of the modern 
SHU on mentally ill inmates ‘forget[s] the teachings of the Eighth Amendment’174 by 
punishing illness. Furthermore, after undertaking a review of professional consensus, it will 
be argued that the use of SHU creates an even greater level of depravity due to the onset of 
psychiatric injury which results from its imposition. The context for each of these claims, 
unconstitutional conditions and unconstitutional imposition, will now be provided. 
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6.4.1 CONDITIONS: THE PHYSICALITY OF SHU 
To understand the impact of SHU on a large portion of imprisoned Americans, its 
extent needs to be appreciated. First, the average time spent by prisoners on death row (a 
form of extreme SHU) rose sharply between 1987 and 2009, and further again in 2010 and 
2011.
175
 According to the most recent Bureau of Justice statistics, the average stay on death 
row is at an historical peak of 198 months (16.5 years).
176
 The delay is so long, in fact, that 
one academic has described modern capital sentencing as life imprisonment ‘in the shadow of 
death’.177 Instead of a death sentence, it can be more accurately described as Life 
Imprisonment with the Chance of Execution. Simmons argues that such inordinate delay 
between sentencing and execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
178
 establishing 
this argument on four main bases, namely: long stays are contrary to ESD; contrary to the 
Framers’ intent; do not further goals of deterrence and retribution; and are inconsistent with 
transnational norms.
179
 While the present discussion is not focused on long execution delays, 
known as Lackey claims,
180
 Simmons’s analytical framework will be drawn on, extrapolating 
it to the intensity experienced by those held in SHU. 
Moving to non-death row SHU, there are three main routes into this form of 
confinement. The most common is administrative segregation where inmates are held, often 
for the duration of their sentences, for reasons such as historic gang-involvement.
181
 Second 
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is discretionary detention where a prison authority imposes SHU on misbehaving inmates, 
sometimes for trivial offences,
182
 and usually for short periods of time. Protective custody is 
the third form of SHU, where inmates are held separately from General Population, under the 
colour of their own “safety”. In addition to the obvious example of protective custody for 
offenders convicted of child sex offences, sometimes safety is defined in such broad terms 
that even former ‘dog caretakers...in state or local correctional facilities’183 are placed in non-
negotiable protective custody for the duration of their confinement. Such is the present 
situation in American prisons. 
Forms of medium or even long-term lockdown also constitute SHU, a situation where, 
in a General Population ward, cells are constantly locked for a period of time, thus prisoners 
are held in solitude. Standards of cleanliness and care will inevitably regress under these 
conditions, since cleaning and airing of the cells will be neglected, and the proximity of 
confinement will become more severe. These forms of pseudo-SHU vary considerably from 
prison to prison, so are difficult to define. Nonetheless, all forms of post-sentencing SHU are 
included in the forthcoming analysis.
184
 That includes SHU which is purpose-built or 
otherwise, and for which statistics are available. 
According to a 2013 report by the ACLU, 93% of inmates held in state SHU do not 
leave their cells for more than two hours per day.
185
 Recreational opportunities are highly 
restricted, and exercise is normally in solitude, often in a roofed cage.
186
 SHU cell sizes 
reported by the ACLU varied from 60 to 90 square-feet in varying forms.
187
 In Marion, the 
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prison subjected to the longest lockdown in US history,
188
 the SHU cells were only 48 
square-feet,
189
 with a width of just six feet. Marion and its several predecessors will form the 
basis of scrutiny intended by the next chapter. Moreover, Shalev notes that new technology, 
building materials, and professional knowledge have brought on a new wave of prison 
design.
190
 Some cells are completely windowless,
191
 and others actively prohibit the use of 
Television sets, creating further sensory limits for SHU prisoners.
192
 Some SHU is so 
extreme that inmates can go years without any skin-on-skin contact with another human; 
guards use cattle-prod style implements attached to shackles, and wear body armour.
193
  
Having drawn a picture of the life of a prisoner in American solitude but without 
delving into the specific, ESD-based objections to these conditions, the next key concern 
must briefly be introduced: the harmful effects of SHU-misuse. 
6.4.2 IMPOSITION: PSYCHIATRIC EFFECTS OF MISUSE 
The empirical research undertaken in the field of psychiatry will be drawn on, with a 
focus on mental disorders created by close confinement, and the impact of mental defects on 
a prisoner’s health. This will be of particular relevance to the evaluation of professional 
consensus, where the psychiatric model of punishment effects will be applied to the ESD 
assessment. As a result, the accepted professional picture of the effects of solitary 
confinement will contribute to the overall assessment of its compatibility with a morality-
driven interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Even more concerning than the fact that the majority (56%) of prisoners held in the 
state system suffer from at least mild mental illness,
194
 is the claim by Abramsky and Fellner 
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that at least 8% of all US prisoners suffer from ‘significant psychiatric or functional 
disabilities’.195 While that statistic is contested, with other estimates of similarly affected 
prisoners at around 5%,
196
 there is a growing body of psychiatric literature in strong 
opposition to the unchecked use of SHU. Guenther notes that hallucinations and dementia in 
SHU have been noted since as early as the 1830s,
197
 and modern enquiries consistently report 
anxiety, paranoia, depression, and headaches.
198
 Kupers has observed that all prisoners held 
in conditions of SHU will eventually deteriorate psychologically,
199
 with Grassian reporting 
‘delirium-like effects’200 including cognitive disturbances. Physiologically, heart palpitations; 
deterioration of eyesight, and diaphoresis have all been linked to solitary confinement.
201
 
It is worth noting that contemporary studies into SHU consistently demonstrate at 
least some negative health effects of such close confinement. Authors examining these effects 
have even attempted to develop specific medical definitions for what they have observed. 
Grassian’s ‘SHU Syndrome’,202 introduced earlier, is just one part of this development. Scott 
and Gendreau defined this syndrome as ‘confinement psychosis’203 in 1969, long before SHU 
became as prevalent and oppressive as it is today. Kaufman claims that inmates held in SHU 
are driven away from morality and become dehumanised, degraded, and demonised by 
society and by the prisons themselves.
204
 On an abstract level, this removal of prisoners from 
the moral conscience of the populace, and the Court, can be deemed unconstitutional. The 
Constitution applies in prisons, applies to SHU prisoners, and should condemn conditions 
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which offend the principles of the Eighth Amendment and which give rise to a ‘substantial 
risk of serious harm’.205 That risk, Chapter VII will show, is very real within American SHU. 
6.4.2.1 CONCLUSION 
The true extent of solitary confinement’s effects cannot be underestimated. Caution 
must be exercised when attempting to understand the severity of any human based on 
doctrine alone. Moreover, measurement of physical or psychiatric damage (or risk thereof) is 
also susceptible to inaccuracy and error. However, these shortcomings should not distract 
from the aspirational pursuit of ESD, which this study has continually sought. The 
establishment of principles of political morality, achieved through the sources exposed in 
earlier chapters will provide the best definition of the Constitution’s limits on SHU. 
6.4.3 THE NEXT STAGE OF ANALYSIS 
Before a connection can be made between the interpretivist framework and 
contemporary issues surrounding SHU, it is worth restating the core tenets of integrity. Law 
is read as being informed by communal principles of political morality (“interpretivism”), 
and can be summarised thus. At the pre-interpretive stage data comprising rules, practices, 
precedents and other sources of social normativity are considered to constitute community 
principles of political morality. These principles are established within the legal framework 
of the law and are identified and held in their best possible light. Without further analysis, 
this data has not been passed through a rational sieve, and another step is required to do so. 
At the interpretive stage moral principles are sought from the pre-interpretive data, and these 
are viewed as coexisting with rules to form law. Judgements of political morality (the “moral 
lens” or “rational sieve”, as guided by moral responsibility and political integrity – 
consistency in decision-making) are applied at this stage. Rights and duties are interpreted 
through consideration of the core principles of justice, fairness, and due process. Finally, at 
the post-interpretive stage, the interpreter views the object of her interpretation in the best 
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moral light to reflect the greatest possible conception of political morality. This permits, even 
encourages, refinement, improvement, consistency, and ultimately an expression of legal 
rights at their moral zenith. 
This framework was applied to the Supreme Court’s use of the ESD assessment in 
Eighth Amendment precedent in Chapters IV and V. It was concluded that majoritarian state 
counting is the foremost indicator of contemporary standards, though caution was urged and 
recourse to further indicia was encouraged in order to strive for the Eighth Amendment’s best 
moral interpretation. Chapter V undertook an assessment of such further indicators of societal 
decency, drawing conclusions as to opinion polling, penological goals, transnational 
comparativism, and professional consensus. A reprise of those conclusions, and their 
application to sources of morality relevant to SHU will now be outlined. These outlines 
establish the precursor to Chapter VII’s analysis and Chapter VIII’s conclusions regarding 
solitary confinement. 
6.5 ANALYTICAL METHOD OUTLINED 
6.5.1 STATE COUNTING 
Chapter IV concluded that state counting was a fundamental starting point for ESD 
assessments. The legislative schemes of the fifty state jurisdictions, in addition to those of the 
military and the federal government, represent the pluralism engaged in by elected 
representatives. While caution must be urged with respect to the counter-majoritarian 
problem and the tyranny of an ill-informed majority, it is accepted that state counting must at 
least provide an adequate introduction to the evolutive assessment. The concept of states-as-
laboratories, when checked, is pivotal to that process. These checks, it was argued, could be 
ensured through the interpretivist exercise of “best fit”, where law is viewed in light of 
principles of political morality. Where an outcome in line with state trends would be 
abhorrent to morality, like in Brown v Board of Education
206
 or Lawrence v Texas,
207
 for 
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example, state counting must be overridden. Where a better fit can be found for the legal rule, 
equal protection in those cases, then that fit should be applied. As a conclusion it was 
proposed by Chapter IV that state counting would provide the initial framework for analysis, 
to outline the nationwide picture. Disposition of the issue in a hard case such as one which 
might invite constitutional evolution, however, is not provided by this state headcount. This is 
where further objective indicia provide a valuable resource. 
6.5.2 PUBLIC OPINION POLLING 
In addition to state counting, another form of majoritarianism is found in the 
quantification of public opinion via polling, a concept referred to explicitly in Trop when 
SCOTUS pronounced the ESD principle.
208
 In Chapter V it was concluded that poll results, 
whether methodologically sound or otherwise, were rejected when read merely as pre-
interpretive data. It was claimed that poll results were fraught with such error and gave rise to 
serious concerns, both substantively and procedurally. Even if, for the sake of analysis, polls 
are presumed to inform the public opinion debate, Chapter V noted that polls still fail to 
provide the sound moral footing called for by interpretivist adjudication when they are 
selected in an unguided way.  
Polling results are not dismissed outright for ESD analysis, but further indicia of 
political morality provide a firmer moral footing for the interpretivist approach. Chapter VII 
will consider available polls on public sentiment towards the treatment of domestic prisoners 
in solitary, where available, but will treat this information with caution. Rigour which 
facilitates such caution includes transparent decision-making, justifications for non-selections 
of opposing poll results, and statistical significance tests. To provide data which pertains to 
community principles of political morality, this scrutiny must be applied to pre-interpretive 
polling data when Chapter VII examines SHU.  
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6.5.3 PENOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES 
In its Eighth Amendment precedents SCOTUS has wrongly conflated personal 
vengeance with retributivism, and the warning within Federalist No 10, against a tyrannical 
majority,
209
 is an important point of departure for Chapter VII’s consideration of penological 
principles. Where state counting and opinion polling might provide a picture of public 
sentiment, these indicia give rise to a risk that proportionality will become jettisoned by penal 
populism.
210
 Interpretivism defers to moral principles, where rights trump policies, in the face 
of majority preferences. Proportionality is fundamental to the interpretivist reading of the 
Eighth Amendment, and a model for its inclusion first set out by Beccaria and later refined by 
Kant and Robinson was adopted in Chapter V. That model, ‘deontological desert’,211 
embodies a clearer ‘set of principles derived from fundamental values, principles of right and 
good’.212 The concept of desert, for Chapter VII, asks whether SHU is subjectively 
proportionate (comparing the gravity of the offence with the harshness of the penalty) and 
objectively proportionate, by a comparative reading of sentences for other crimes in the trial 
court’s jurisdiction and the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
The principles of: consistency, derived from the holdings in Furman and Gregg;
213
 
and individualisation, required by the Lockett and Eddings doctrines,
214
 can be reconciled by 
deontological desert. Instead of focusing on utilitarian deterrence, as the Court evidently has 
done, the approach adopted here leaves policy goals to the other political branches. If SHU is 
imposed arbitrarily or excessively, then disproportionality might be demonstrated. Moreover, 
if in Chapter VII psychiatric concerns demonstrably outweigh the reason for an inmate’s 
confinement in solitary, with proportionality as the yardstick, then further arguments against 
its imposition may arise. Instead of consequentialist concerns, Chapter VII will focus on the 
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constitutional question posed by the punishments clause, one of principle. That principle, 
asking whether SHU is proportionate, might evoke different responses in different situations. 
Nonetheless, Chapter VII will attempt to provide an Eighth Amendment standard adequate 
under interpretivism: casting the punishments clause in its best moral light. 
6.5.4 TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVISM 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the transnational comparative approach 
highlighted in Chapter V, evolutive decency can and must be informed by the ‘accumulated 
legal wisdom of mankind’.215 Issues of selectivity are, again, inoffensive under interpretivism 
if adjudicators read those sources in light of moral principles. Those principles are available 
‘by appealing to an amalgam of practice’.216 That practice, includes the law of external legal 
bodies, most particularly in international and regional human rights instruments designed to 
uphold dignity. 
Additionally, it is accepted that similar issues with transnational law exist as with 
national law; majoritarianism is at least as dangerous at the global level where tyrannous 
majorities are concerned. Nonetheless, value can be found by establishing the transnational 
framework for prisoners’ rights, specifically for humane standards of treatment in SHU, and 
guidelines for the imposition of SHU on more vulnerable inmates. Such value is even more 
compelling given the Court’s human rights framework in Plata, one Simon noted was 
capable of dismantling American punishment,
217
 and which Chapter VII will apply to SHU. 
Seeking a ‘set of principles’ that represents ‘a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, and 
lawmakers around the world’,218 Murkens’s advice ‘to consult widely’219 will be heeded. 
Fundamental interests and rights should, can, and will be interpreted in light of their 
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associated normative moral values. These values will be derived from international and 
regional human rights instruments, the selection of which will be justified. 
6.5.5 PROFESSIONAL CONSENSUS 
Dworkin’s aim to fill the gap left open by positivism by appealing to community 
practices benefits from additional, expert, information regarding community consensus. 
Selectivity of sources remains a concern for the interpretivist, but guiding principles facilitate 
greater moral inclusion when citing professional consensus. Such guidance will be applied in 
Chapter VII, where safeguards such as a search for sources which are general, current, and 
rigorously tested will protect against according amicus facts with blind-faith credence. 
To enrich the ESD assessment beyond penal populist statistics, simple state counting 
(national and international), or abstract considerations of penology, the final assessment of 
Chapter VII will draw on professional consensus as an indicator of the punishments clause’s 
political morality. It has been argued that the unprecedented level of deference accorded by 
SCOTUS in Hall v Florida to professional medical opinion provides a fresh opportunity for 
further Eighth Amendment challenges.
220
 One of those challenges – evolutive decency of the 
Eighth Amendment – will be established with respect to SHU. Chapter VII will consider the 
‘germane expertise’221 of non-profit organisations and professional bodies will be sought, 
with input from an emerging interdisciplinary field of psychiatry and the law. 
Psychopathological and social effects of SHU will be examined, as will the potential 
shortfalls associated with the methodology and reliability of such studies. 
Chapter VII must now establish the prevailing standards of decency within a variety 
of cross-sections of contemporary society with a view to painting the Eighth Amendment’s 
protection against cruel and unusual punishments in its best light, and investigating whether, 
as a result, contemporary solitary confinement practices pass constitutional muster. 
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CHAPTER VII  
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Brown v Plata provided the clearest assurance of the 
relevance of dignity to the Eighth Amendment,
1
 focusing on an often neglected area of the 
Gregg conditions: the ‘dignity of man’.2 The opinion in Plata followed a series of progressive 
federal policies and jurisprudence regarding sentencing proportionality. Most recently, these 
included the Fair Sentencing Act 2010,
3
 which reduced the extreme disparity between federal 
penalties for possession of crack and powdered cocaine, and the Second Chance Act 2007, 
which granted funding to prisoner re-entry programmes.
4
 The Supreme Court had weighed in 
during the 2005 term in US v Booker,
5
 holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
only advisory, not mandatory.
6
 Booker afforded greater sentencing discretion to state and 
federal district judges who had become dissatisfied with the severity of mandatory minimums 
required for certain non-violent drug offences.
7
 
Despite these advances, Adelman has noted that, ‘[i]n comparison to the immense 
scope of the public policy disasters that gave us mass incarceration, the positive changes of 
the last decade are small beer’.8 Furthermore, these reforms deal only with one issue: 
proportionality on paper, not the lived-experiences of prisoners, suffering in worsening 
conditions of imprisonment, most acutely on secure wings or in Supermax facilities, both 
forms of solitary confinement. 
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Life terms have risen, as have multi-decade imprisonment sentences.
9
 In the specific 
context of SHU,
10
 the proportion of prisoners has risen disproportionately in recent years.
11
 
Plata might therefore have offered some promise to opponents of SHU seeking Eighth 
Amendment redress, but clearly far more must be done if Kennedy’s promises of 
constitutional dignity are to be kept. This chapter will seek to expand the reasoning from 
Plata by considering the constitutionality of solitary confinement in light of the evolving 
standards of decency (ESD) assessment set out and refined in previous chapters.
12
 It will be 
argued that the use of SHU in the US is impermissible on the following two constitutional 
bases. 
First, the ‘ever-increasing fear and distress’13 caused by denationalisation and 
condemned in Trop v Dulles is perpetuated, to an even greater extent, by contemporary SHU. 
Second, the warning from Robinson v California that society ‘would forget the teachings of 
the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people 
to be punished for being sick’14 is applicable to SHU, due to its flagrant disregard for the 
psychiatric welfare of the inmates on whom it is imposed. In order to sustain these arguments, 
the remainder of this chapter will apply an interpretivist reading of the data provided by 
public opinion polls (Section 7.1), state counting (7.2), penological principles (7.3), 
transnational law (7.4), and professional consensus (7.5), to argue that today’s use of SHU in 
American punishment is offensive to the evolving standards of decency, particularly with 
respect to human dignity,
15
 being fundamental to the punishments clause of the US 
Constitution. 
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7.1 OPINION POLLING 
A wide-scale review of national, regional, and local news outlets in the US found half 
of the stories reporting on the criminal justice system (CJS) in 2013 focused on one aspect: 
imprisonment.
16
 The sample comprised online reports from mainstream news sites, print 
media, and oral transcripts. Those reports relating to worsening prison conditions were ‘well 
represented’17 by the sample, appearing as the main issue in 16% of CJS topics. Analysis by 
The Opportunity Agenda concluded that one of the three recurring themes of the mainstream 
narrative on American criminal justice was concern surrounding inhumane prison conditions 
and the poor provision of psychiatric healthcare to inmates.
18
 In totality, reporting was 
‘overwhelmingly negative in tone’,19 in that people generally disapproved of the inhumanity 
in prisons. A further examination of the sources found by this review uncovers very few 
opinion polls relating specifically to SHU, in spite of its regular lip service in mainstream 
media. 
Moreover, while headlines and reports might perpetuate a master-narrative of 
inhumanity in American prisons, the few polls that do exist on the issue indicate that 
measured public sentiment favours SHU, indicating either a lack of understanding 
surrounding the conditions and effects of that punishment, or a broadly punitive populace. 
Sample surveys comprising polls, a pre-interpretive source of public opinion with respect to 
the ESD assessment,
20
 will now be analysed.  
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7.1.1 PRE-INTERPRETIVE DATA 
With reference to Figure 7.1 below, a review of these main sources found just five 
opinion polls, which address directly the issue of solitary confinement. Since the most heavily 
funded, widely publicised, and politically impactful polls do not feature in this analysis,
21
 it is 
worth reflecting on their notable absences. While polls by these organisations on other 
elements of criminal justice can be found in abundance, especially with respect to the death 
penalty or LWOP, confinement conditions and SHU appear to be issues often kept out of 
sight, as well as out of mind. The remaining polls are strictly quantitative, and proffer no 
confidence statistics for the extrapolation of the data, rigour that will be applied at the 
interpretive stage in Section 7.1.2. 
FIGURE 7.1: 
  
   
Poll n Support for SHU (%) 
YouGov
22
 998  56.00* 
MSNBC
23
 497 36.82 
OregonLive
24
 209 61.72 
Sodahead
25
 7,102 84.95 
GreatFallsTribune
26
 105  71.00* 
MEAN 
 
 
62.10 
*More accurate rounding unavailable. 
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Further obfuscating the possibility of deriving any form of consensus from these polls 
is their inconsistent results, demonstrating no clear consensus in any direction. A news poll 
carried out online by MSNBC (n=497) showed just 36.82% support for solitary 
confinement,
27
 whereas a similar online poll hosted by discussion forum Sodahead (n=7,102, 
the largest sample size found) reported 84.95% in support of SHU.
28
 The average support for 
SHU from these polls was 62.10%, a simple majority,
29
 but given that the data is taken from 
just five polls, and because of the concerns, which are discussed in the next subsection, 
drawing conclusions would be unwise. In addition, the proportion of Don’t Know (DK) 
responses was generally high, with the YouGov poll (n=998, a large sample) reporting 14% 
respondents answering that they were “not sure” whether SHU was appropriate,30 
demonstrating a lack of awareness surrounding the issues in solitary confinement, in spite of 
wide media reports.
31
 The proportion of respondents to the YouGov poll who were “not sure” 
how long they thought prisoners should be kept in SHU was even higher, 25%,
32
 indicating 
shakier ground. Similar uncertainty was reported in the remaining polls where a form of DK 
option was made available. 
While there is limited pre-interpretive data to work with at this juncture, an attempt 
must be made to view it in its best moral light. In order to do so, the methodological warnings 
heeded by Chapter V should be remembered. These will be revisited and applied in context in 
the next subsection, before any conclusions under ESD analysis can be drawn. 
7.1.2 INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS 
The interpretivist critique of ESD analysis presented by Chapter V concluded by 
stating that, if indeed polling results are able to provide any form of credible measure of 
public sentiment, cherry picking adds a layer of unbridled discretion which undermines the 
                                                          
27
 MSNBC (n 23). 
28
 Sodahead (n 25). 
29
 Fig 7.1. 
30
 YouGov (n 22) 5. 
31
 The Opportunity Agenda (n 16) 55, 59. This extends Marshall’s Hypothesis introduced in Chapter V (n 269). 
32
 YouGov (n 22) 6. 
Chapter VII: Solitary Confinement and Evolving Standards 
233 
 
objectivity of an interpretivist judge. The current assessment has attempted to avoid unbridled 
selectivity by analysing all relevant and available results, but even then that data is scarce. As 
Chapter V demonstrated, a small sample size decreases the stability of data. It was shown that 
a sample size of 100 provides a confidence interval which leaves a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding generalisability, whereas any sample larger, ideally as large as 1,000, provides 
stability. 
As such, although a small handful of other SHU polls was located, found online in 
sources such as un-moderated discussion forums, the samples sizes were all smaller than 50, 
and the foregoing assessment could not include the results in a reliable way. In the interests of 
transparency, those polls are provided in Appendix 1, Figure 7.1A, alongside specific 
justifications for their exclusion. Five polls remained, with sample sizes ranging from 105 to 
over 7,000 (see Figure 7.1 above). Despite the small amount of relevant polling data located, 
further evaluation of these polls can nonetheless be attempted by drawing on the 
methodological cautions expressed in Chapter V, namely the quality of polling samples, and 
quality of the questions posed to respondents. 
7.1.2.1 SAMPLE QUALITY 
Before pollsters can analyse popular sentiment or draw conclusions, they must first 
select their respondents. Sampling error is one hurdle to a representative sample collection, 
which occurs when a sub-group within a population is included in the survey.
33
 The risk of 
sampling error is faced by every pollster seeking to represent ‘national consensus’,34 or 
‘society’s standards’,35 since sub-groups are invariably relied upon. An opinion poll of the 
entire country, an election on every societal issue, would be impracticable. In place of this 
unachievable optimum, the polls introduced in the previous subsection were conducted by 
                                                          
33
 Herbert Weisberg, ‘The Methodological Strengths and Weaknesses of Survey Research’ in Wolfgang 
Donsbach and Michael Traugott (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research (Sage 2008) 226. 
34
 Roper v Simmons 543 US 551 (2005) 572. 
35
 ibid. 
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using varying forms of sub-groups. Of the five, four were conducted online.
36
 The target focus 
of the polls might have been refined to, in the case of OregonLive for example, the population 
of the state of Oregon. Nevertheless, there was no control measure in place to restrict polling 
to Oregon residents. This criticism can also be applied to the polls carried out by MSNBC,
37
 
Sodahead,
38
 and GreatFallsTribune,
39
 where residents of foreign countries could participate in 
the polls, limiting the propensity of the results to represent national consensus. 
Furthermore, respondents to the four online polls could easily vote more than once, 
and there is no data on the proportion of unique or duplicate votes. This constitutes a strong 
form of coverage error,
40
 where polling is not as representative as it purports to be. As noted 
in Chapter V, survey literature has criticised contemporary polling method in strong terms. 
The elderly and those with lower socio-economic backgrounds were shown to be less likely to 
respond to telephone surveys.
41
 That criticism applies only in this chapter to the YouGov 
phone poll,
42
 though the elderly are even less likely to access the internet,
43
 the medium of the 
remaining polls. Since non-respondents to polls are also more likely to be black,
44
 further 
concern is cast over all five SHU polls. Just 13% of Americans are black,
45
 so for more than 
50% of non-respondents to be black constitutes an extreme form of coverage-error for this 
demographic. Moreover, surveys routinely over-represent women.
46
 Given that at least 37.5% 
                                                          
36
 All but YouGov (n 22), a structured telephone survey. 
37
 MSNBC (n 23). 
38
 Sodahead (n 25). 
39
 Greatfallstribune (n 26). 
40
 Weisberg in Donsbach and Traugott (eds) (n 33) 226. Household telephone sampling specifics are outlined in 
Robert Groves, Floyd Fowler, Mick Couper, James Lepkowski, Eleanor Singer and Roger Tourangeau, Survey 
Methodology (Wiley 2004) 128-130. 
41
 Ineke Stoop, Nonresponse in Sample Surveys (Social and Cultural Planning Office 2005). 
42
 YouGov (n 22). 
43
 Research by Pew found that 41% of adults over 65 never used the internet, increasing to 53% for over-75s. Cf 
14% of all adults. Aaron Smith, (Pew, 3 April 2014) ‘Older Adults and Technology Use’ 
<www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/03/older-adults-and-technology-use/> accessed 1st September 2015. 
44
 Adam Berinsky, ‘Survey Non-Response’ in Donsbach and Traugott (eds) (n 33) 311. 
45
 The proportion of ‘Black or African American’ citizens was most recently recorded as 13.2% by the United 
State Census Bureau, ‘State & County QuickFacts’ (2013)  
<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html> accessed 22nd April 2015. 
46
 Robert Groves and Mick Couper, Nonresponse in Household Interview Surveys (Wiley 1998). 
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of the American prison population is black,
47
 and 91.5% is male,
48
 such coverage errors in the 
context of polls about imprisonment are even more concerning to anyone attempting to find a 
consensus applicable to SHU issues. 
Additionally, when statistical rigour is applied to these polls, confidence in the results 
varies. As the one-sample t-test in Figure 7.1B demonstrates, not all data has generated equal 
reliability. Most results might present some promise to proponents of SHU, at least in terms 
of popular support, but the fact remains that these poll results cannot be cited as conclusive 
indicia. Instead, the most that can be derived from this data is that, in three out of five cases, 
the polled support for SHU can be extrapolated to the general population at a confidence level 
of at least 50%.
49
 The outliers were MSNBC and OregonLive, which proffered data too 
insignificant to give 50% confidence in the supporting results. 
 
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the reliance which can be placed on this 
data, the inclusion of these statistics depends on their passing through a rational sieve, since as 
it stands they are examples of pre-interpretive data. Overreliance on these polls could cause 
                                                          
47
 In March 2015 the figure for the federal system was reported as 37.6%, but further reports often state 40% 
nationwide. Cf FBP, ‘Inmate Race’ (March 28, 2015)  
<www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp>; Prison Policy Initiative, ‘Breaking Down Mass 
Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity’  
<http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html> both accessed 22
nd
 April 2015. 
48
 Prison Policy Initiative, ‘United States Incarceration Rates by Sex, 2010’  
<http://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/genderinc.html> accessed 22
nd
 April 2015. 
49 The hypothesis tested was whether the entire population supports SHU at least as strongly as the poll 
respondents (H0: μ≥x̄). x̄ is the sample mean or probability for each poll. σ (standard deviation) is calculated by 
√(x̄(1-x̄)); where SE = σ/√n. t is provided by (x̄-μ)/SE. t figures were then compared to statistical tables to 
produce a confidence level. See San Jose University, ‘t-table’  
<http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/gerstman/StatPrimer/t-table.pdf> accessed 24th August 2015 
Poll n SHU support t-score Confidence
YouGov 998 56.00% 0.6757 50 - 60%
MSNBC 497 36.82% 0.3968 <50%
OregonLive 209 61.71% 0.3300 <50%
Sodahead 7,102 84.95% 3.0303 99.5 - 99.8%
GreatFallsTribune 105 71.00% 0.7813 50 - 60%
Figure 7.1B:
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ignorance of the pluralistic nature of public sentiment, and oversimplify the challenge of 
framing a consensus. This is unsurprising, since the purpose of creating such polls is merely 
to provide an indicator of social discourse and not consciously to provide the Supreme Court 
with the data to evolve the Constitution. The rigour applied by the statistical tests 
demonstrates that reliability varies from poll to poll, and that generalisability arises from 
those in which more respondents were targeted. Nonetheless, sample quality is not dispositive 
of the discussion, and the contents of the questions must be examined before any value can be 
derived. 
7.1.2.2 QUESTION QUALITY 
In addition to concerns about the sampling carried out by the five SHU polls, the 
quality of the questions is another area of contention. As noted in Chapter V, the principal 
question form for criminal justice polls is dichotomous: “Yes” or “No”; “Agree” or 
“Disagree”. Indeed this is the form three of the five SHU polls take.50 Such question-form 
gives very little discretion to the respondent, again ignoring the pluralistic nature of opinion. 
Given that attitudes about fundamental and often controversial topics such as SHU are seldom 
ambivalent,
51
 these three polls ignore the nuanced complexity with which respondents might 
view contemporary issues, especially if presented with background information. 
One of the dichotomous polls provided respondents with powerfully loaded questions 
and answers. Asking ‘Solitary Confinement: Is It Wrong?’52 the available responses 
comprised: ‘Yes, prisoners can mentally suffer from the lack of social interaction’, or ‘No, it 
is an appropriate punishment in prison’.53 The presumption here is that prisoners do indeed 
suffer from mental illness caused by SHU, and that such illness is caused by the lack of social 
interaction and not other conditions. Without further information or an opportunity for a third 
response (such as “SHU is appropriate where prisoners are provided with mental healthcare”) 
                                                          
50
 OregonLive (n 24); Sodahead (n 25); Greatfallstribune (n 26). 
51
 See James Unnever, Francis Cullen and Julian Roberts, ‘Not everyone strongly supports the death penalty’ 
(2005) 29 American Journal of Criminal Justice 187. 
52
 Sodahead (n 25). 
53
 ibid. 
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the possible responses are rather arbitrarily restricted. Perhaps as a result of such a contrived 
and loaded approach, support for SHU was extremely high among Sodahead respondents 
(84.95%).
54
 
A similar issue was demonstrated by the MSNBC poll, though with the opposite result 
(36.82% support).
55
 This poll allowed respondents to say either than SHU was ‘akin to torture 
and the US should end its use’, or ‘[i]t can be necessary for prisoner and guard protection’.56 
Though engaging in a type of deliberative question-form, the poll’s predominantly selected 
response (the latter, in support of SHU) was loaded with the presumption that solitary 
confinement policies have a safety element, regardless of moral questions. Any data derived 
from these results is therefore questionable. There is no definition of torture for example, 
which could have been provided with at least the UN’s definition. Additionally, the pollster 
offered no evidence for protection or deterrence due to SHU. Though it would be to over-
expect of public opinion researchers to include such extensive information, it is nonetheless 
an absence worth reflecting on for the purposes of moral scrutiny under the ESD assessment. 
YouGov is the only SHU poll found to facilitate less rigid expression of opinion when 
designing questions for criminal justice issues, something Chapter V called for.
57
 YouGov 
asked respondents whether they considered SHU to be ‘an appropriate punishment’ or 
whether it was ‘a form of torture’.58 Available answers were placed on a scale of: 
‘[a]ppropriate punishment’, ‘[i]nappropriate punishment, but not torture’, and ‘[a] form of 
torture’.59 Again, torture was not defined. Deliberative discussions were permitted and 
attempts were made to represent a cross-section of the American public,
60
 though the 
methodological criticisms highlighted in Subsection 7.1.2.1 still apply. Irrespective of any 
                                                          
54
 ibid. 
55
 MSNBC (n 23). 
56
 ibid. 
57
 See Shauna Reilly and Sean Richey, ‘Ballot Question Readability and Roll-Off’ (2011) 64 Political Research 
Quarterly 59 (concluding that closed-questions provide insufficient data to generalise public opinion on types of 
punishment). 
58
 YouGov (n 22) 4. 
59
 ibid. 
60
 ibid 1-6. 
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cynicism with which this thesis treats the YouGov poll, it is by far the most comprehensive 
and intricate, and the only SHU survey to use telephone methods. Respondents may have 
fallen foul of ‘satisficing’,61 or response-shifting to satisfy the researcher. In any case, the 
response was more than 50% in favour of SHU,
62
 with confidence greater than 99.9% that the 
result is generalisable to a majority of the wider population,
63
 at least as a statistic of 
collectivity if not moral value. 
The final route of analysis for the question-construction of the five SHU polls is their 
inclusion (or lack thereof) of a “Not Sure” or “Don’t Know” (DK) option, argued in Chapter 
V to contribute a degree of balance to the problem of non-attitudes.
64
 Without this addition, 
poll results are far less reliable, since a number of respondents may have filled in either 
dichotomous response without any real conviction, knowledge, or concern. Two of the five 
SHU polls (Sodahead, which had by far the largest response rate, and GreatFallsTribune)
65
 
did not cater for any DK option. Those which did reported a DK-rate of between 6.7% and 
14%,
66
 evidencing the perennial issue of disinterest, misinformation, or a truthful lack of 
knowledge, each a perfectly understandable form of (non-)opinion, but of little help to the 
interpretivist challenge. Admitting that polls play an important role as ‘useful indicators of 
social discourse’67 and as instigators of public debate, this analysis nonetheless confirms 
concerns highlighted at various stages throughout this thesis. Public opinion data, as measured 
by polls – especially that uncovered by this chapter – is insufficiently rigorous as a source of 
public morality for interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 
  
                                                          
61
 Jon Krosnick, Narayan Sowmya and Wendy Smith, ‘Satisficing in Surveys’ (2004) 70 New Directions for 
Evaluation 29. 
62
 YouGov (n 22). 
63
 See Figure 7.1B. 
64
 Peter Jones, ‘It’s Not What You Ask, It’s the Way That You Ask It’ (1994) 74 The Prison Journal 32, 36. 
65
 Greatfallstribune (n 26). 
66
 Oregonlive (n 24) and YouGov (n 22), respectively. 
67
 Jacob Shamir, ‘Question Wording as Discourse Indicators’ in Paul Lavrakas (ed) Encyclopedia of Survey 
Research Methods (SAGE 2008) 667. 
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7.1.3 DRAWING CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to the paucity of relevant polling data, compounded by the methodological 
infirmities and varied generalisability addressed by the previous subsections, pre-interpretive 
data is only relevant to the ESD assessment where it reads law as integrity. In the context of 
this chapter’s assessment of SHU, integrity can be ensured by interpreting sources of political 
morality in their best moral light. When interpreting the Eighth Amendment, ‘objective 
indicia that reflect the public attitude towards a given sanction’68 – opinion polling in this 
example – can therefore only act as a guide where sanctions accord with ‘the dignity of 
man’69 at the abstract level. Where a sanction is offensive to dignity, a fundamental tenet of 
the punishments clause, the potentially tyrannical majority’s opinion is no longer a relevant 
interpretivist source. 
When continuing the discussion of penology in Section 7.3 it will be argued that a 
form of deontological desert, proportionality guided by morality rather than by utility, is the 
best fit for ESD analysis of SHU. Before developing that line of argument further, a much 
more abundant source of majoritarianism is worth considering. The legislative provisions and 
executive policy implemented by the fifty states, the federal government, and the military 
provide much richer ground for claims of nationwide consensus than scarce polling data. 
Again, sources of political morality must be read in light of interpretivist principles, to view 
them in their best moral light. That is the objective of the next section, which will consider the 
traditionally ‘primary’70 source of ESD in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: state counting.  
                                                          
68
 Gregg (n 2) 173. 
69
 ibid. 
70
 Kevin White, ‘The Constitution Limits of the “National Consensus” Doctrine in Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence; (2012) 4 Brigham Young ULR 1367, 1373-74. 
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7.2 STATE COUNTING 
Jacobs and Lee provided limited data about nationwide solitary confinement in 2012.
71
 
Though a helpful resource, it did not paint the full picture since only state policies were relied 
on. Naturally, policy is prescriptive, not necessarily descriptive. The data provided overleaf 
builds on the framework created by Jacobs and Lee first by updating the inclusion of state 
policies, but also incorporating far more media resources and local information, including 
first-hand reports. The resultant data may not be complete, and the further selectivity by 
journalists is a real concern for any data handler. What can be shown, however, is a more 
comprehensive picture of the extent of national solitary confinement than any others that 
could be located in the existing literature. Further scrutiny will be undertaken in the sections 
that follow this, pre-interpretive stage. 
The present section seeks broadly to represent the current national picture with respect 
to the use of SHU in American state, federal, and military prisons. SHU is defined as any 
period of post-sentencing penal confinement, punitive, administrative, or otherwise, for at 
least 22 hours per day in a locked single cell. The statistics analysed here do not include waits 
on death row SHU, as those are part of a different form of sentence and ask a separate Eighth 
Amendment question.
72
 This pre-interpretive data, regarding jurisdictional use of extremely 
long-term SHU; its imposition on juveniles; and on mentally ill inmates is outlined in Figure 
7.2, overleaf.  
                                                          
71
 Ryan Jacobs and Jaeah Lee, (MotherJones November/December 2012) ‘Maps: Solitary Confinement, State by 
State’ <www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/map-solitary-confinement-states> accessed 1st July 2015. 
72
 See Lackey v Texas 514 US 1045 (1995) cert denied and, most recently, Bower v Texas (2015 No 14-292) cert 
denied, discussed in Section 6.4.1 of Chapter VI. 
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7.2.1 PRE-INTERPRETIVE DATA (as at 1st September 2015) 
Figure 7.2 
     
 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) (E)  
Jurisdiction 
Max 
duration in 
SHU 
Recent MI SHU 
reforms
†
 
Juvenile 
SHU?
‡
 
Without 
review 
After 
review 
Alabama 6 months - YES 8hrs Indefinite 
Alaska 2 months - YES 24hrs 5days 
Arizona 6 years Limited in 2014 YES 24hrs Indefinite 
Arkansas 12 years - YES 8hrs Indefinite 
California 42 years Limited in 2014 YES 24hrs 90days 
Colorado 10 years+ Prohibited in 2014 YES N/A 60days 
Connecticut 1.3 years - NO - - 
Delaware 3 months Pending prohibition NO - - 
Florida 27 years - YES 2hrs 5days 
Georgia 1.5 years - YES 24hrs Indefinite 
Hawaii 5 days - YES N/A N/A 
Idaho 3 months - NO - - 
Illinois 3 months Limited in 2013 NO - - 
Indiana 5-10 years Limited in 2014 YES 24hrs 5days 
Iowa 5-10 years - YES 12hrs 24hrs 
Kansas 5-10 years - YES 30days Indefinite 
Kentucky 2-5 years - YES 24hrs 5days 
Louisiana 40 years+ - YES 8hrs 72hrs 
Maine 1-2 years - NO - - 
Maryland 5-10 years - NO - - 
Massachusetts 10 years+ Prohibited in 2012 YES 24hrs Indefinite 
Michigan 1 month+ Prohibited in 2013 YES 72hrs Indefinite 
Minnesota 2-5 years Limited in 2014 YES 30days Indefinite 
Mississippi 5-10 years - NO - - 
Missouri 12 months - YES 24hrs Indefinite 
Montana 10 years+ 
2013 failed 
prohibition 
YES 23hrs 4days 
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Jurisdiction 
Max 
duration in 
SHU 
Recent MI SHU 
reforms
†
 
Juvenile 
SHU?
‡
 
Without 
review 
After 
review 
Nebraska 10 years+ Very limited in 2014 YES 24hrs Indefinite 
Nevada 2 years - YES 24hrs 72hrs 
New 
Hampshire 
6months+ - YES Data N/A Data N/A 
New Jersey 6 months Pending prohibition YES 24hrs 10days 
New Mexico 1.8 years Reduced in 2014 YES 24hrs 72hrs 
New York 26 years Prohibited in 2008 NO - - 
North 
Carolina 
10 years+ - YES 24hrs Indefinite 
North Dakota 
Several 
months 
- YES N/A Indefinite 
Ohio 2.6 yrs average - YES 8hrs 48hrs 
Oklahoma 1 month+ Limited in 2013 NO - - 
Oregon 1 month+ - NO - - 
Pennsylvania 8 years - NO - - 
Rhode Island 3 months+ - YES N/A 3days 
South 
Carolina 
10 years+ - YES N/A Indefinite 
South Dakota 2-5 years - YES 24hrs 5days 
Tennessee 10 years+ - YES 72hrs Indefinite 
Texas 30 years 2013 Review ordered YES 24hrs Indefinite 
Utah 1.7 years - YES 3hrs Indefinite 
Vermont 1 month+ - NO - - 
Virginia 14 years 2012 Review ordered YES 24hrs 5days 
Washington 10 years+ - YES 1hr Indefinite 
West 
Virginia 
1month+ - NO - - 
Wisconsin 10 years+ Limited in 2014 YES 6hrs 6days 
Wyoming 2-5 years - YES 24hrs Indefinite 
Federal Govt 22 years Prohibited NO - - 
Military 9 years+ - N/A N/A N/A 
National 
(52) 
- 
14 reforms,  Permitted 
(YES): 36  
Average: 
- 
2 pending, 2 reviews 67 hours 
    
Average 
without 
KA/MN: 22 
hours 
 
†
 Adapted and updated from Eli Hager and Gerald Rich, ‘Shifting Away from Solitary’ (The Marshall Project, 
23rd December 2014) <https://tinyurl.com/MarshallP2014> accessed 1st September 2015. 
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In Figure 7.2 Column (A) displays the maximum reported stay in SHU from 2005-
2015. If a legislative provision or executive directive provides for a figure higher than any 
other reported figure for a SHU-stay, the higher is included in the table. Column (C) confirms 
whether SHU is permissibly imposed on juveniles (those under-18 at the time of 
confinement). Columns (D) and (E) also apply to juveniles only, asking how long a juvenile 
inmate many be contained in SHU without further review (D) and after review (E), either by 
an executive or judicial hearing, or by a local Board of Prisons supervisor. A value of 
“Indefinite” signifies that no statutory limit is imposed after review. In all columns a single 
dash represents that the value is inapplicable. For the full references of the data included in 
this table, see Appendix 1, Figures 7.2A-7.2C. 
7.2.2 INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE CONSENSUS 
From the outset every single US jurisdiction permits some form of SHU. The number 
of states providing for purpose-built super-maximum security prisons (‘Supermax’),73 where 
SHU is the principal form of confinement, is a different statistic and one well reported by the 
existing literature.
74
 Digestible information for: the longest reported maximum SHU-stays, a 
jurisdictional headcount of juvenile SHU, and mental illness reforms, however, is something 
which has not yet been forthcoming. That gap will be filled by the present discussion, which 
will demonstrate the pervasiveness of this form of punishment and provide pre-interpretive 
‘national consensus’75 data for the traditional starting point of ESD analysis: state counting. A 
jurisdictional comparison for treatment of the most vulnerable prisoners will first be 
presented, data which will also form part of Section 7.3’s proportionality assessment. The rate 
of change at which states are reforming their approach to SHU must also be considered. 
  
                                                          
73
 Daniel Mears, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Supermax Prisons (Urban Institute 2006)  
<http://webarchive.urban.org/publications/411326.html> accessed 1st May 2015. 
74
 ibid. At least 44 states have built Supermax prisons, in addition to the federal government and the military. 
75
 Roper (n 34) 572. 
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7.2.2.1 MAJORITY CONSENSUS: GENERAL REMARKS 
When compiling this data the first observation to become apparent was the 
inconsistency with which SHU is applied by the 52 American jurisdictions. The longest 
recorded stay, bearing in mind that not all states keep accurate records so these figures depend 
heavily on media scrutiny of specific cases, was experienced by Hugo Pinell, who spent at 
least 504 months in SHU in California.
76
 At the time of writing Albert Woodfox, of the 
“Angola Three”, a trio of prisoners who were placed in SHU in 1972 for the murder of a 
prison guard,
77
 remains imprisoned in SHU as he has done for the past 480 months in 
Louisiana.
78
 Woodfox’s release was ordered in June 2015,79 though the Fifth Circuit stayed 
the release shortly thereafter, pending a retrial.
80
 Aside from these two extreme examples, the 
average is comparatively modest. 
With all American jurisdictions included in the count, the mean of the longest stays in 
SHU located by this research was 91 months (see Figure 7.2, Column (A)). Excluding the 
extremities, California and Louisiana, reduced the mean to 75 months, just over six years. In 
just six states the highest reported stays in SHU were for less than one month.
81
 Moving to a 
pre-interpretive consensus framing exercise, 27 of the 52 jurisdictions (a bare majority) 
provided a recorded maximum of at least 42 months in SHU. Some 32 (60%) jurisdictions 
reported a maximum of at least 22 months. In sum, it can be concluded with relative certainty 
that a mathematical consensus, whether taken as a bare majority (one half) or a supermajority 
(three fifths), of American jurisdictions has held an inmate in SHU for at least 22 months in 
                                                          
76
 Kiilu Nyasha, ‘Hugo Pinell: Is 42 years in isolation about to end?’ <http://sfbayview.com/2012/05/hugo-
pinell-is-42-years-in-isolation-about-to-end/> accessed 29
th
 April 2015. 
77
 Amnesty International, ‘Louisiana’s Angola 3: 100 Years of Solitude’  
<http://blog.amnestyusa.org/iar/louisianas-angola-3-100-years-of-solitude/> accessed 1st September 2015. 
78
 Woodfox v Cain 3:06-cv-00789-JJB-RLB (MD Louisiana 2015); Ed Pilkington, (Guardian, 4 September 
2014) ‘Angola Three inmate in longest solitary confinement seeking damages in court’  
<https://tinyurl.com/GuardianWoodfox3> accessed 1
st
 September 2015. 
79
 Woodfox (ibid). Woodfox’s stay in SHU is estimated to be at least 480 months, and up to 520. The table in 
Figure 7.2 adopts the lower estimate, uncertain due to the lack of early records. 
80
 Mark Berman, (Washington Post, 12 June 2015) ‘Appeals court says last “Angola 3” prisoner must remain 
behind bars’ <http://wapo.st/1LI34b7> accessed 1st September 2015. 
81
 Hawaii, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
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recent years.
82
 This figure represents a consensus far lower than the mean (of 91 months, or 
75 excluding Louisiana and California). 
In Graham v Florida,
83
 where SCOTUS found mandatory juvenile LWOP 
unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy noted that, while 37 state legislatures (74%) permitted 
LWOP for some juvenile non-homicide offences, in practice more than 60% of those 
sentences were from Florida alone.
84
 Kennedy noted that Florida’s overrepresentation in these 
figures indicated a national consensus against Florida’s practice, and thus against the penalty 
itself. Factoring the Graham reasoning into the present assessment of SHU-use results in a 
different outcome. All 52 US jurisdictions, to varying degrees, permit some form of SHU. 
Even excluding the jurisdictions with maximum stays in SHU above the mean (>91 months) 
this leaves 19 states, with an average recorded maximum stay of 16 months. Statistics on the 
numbers of inmates held in SHU state-by-state are seldom made available, a fact confounded 
by the obscure definitions attributed to this type of confinement. Nonetheless, some efforts 
have been made to gather this data. 
SolitaryWatch reported that, between 2003 and 2013, nine of the most punitive prison 
systems in the US held a combined total of 37-44,000 prisoners in SHU,
85
 of an estimated 
81,000 in total.
86
 While not as extreme as Kennedy’s argument about Florida’s wildly 
disproportionate number of LWOP sentences;
87
 some of the same logic can be applied to the 
nine (17%) jurisdictions holding a disproportionate quantity (45-54%) of the nation’s SHU 
inmates. Factoring general population into the equation, however, can account for this 
discrepancy to a certain extent. Those nine states, providing around half of the nation’s SHU, 
                                                          
82
 As Appendix 1, Figure 7.2A shows, data is from 2010-2015, with limited exceptions. 
83
 560 US 48 (2010). 
84
 77 of 123, see Graham (ibid) 12-13, Kennedy, J. 
85
 The federal government (11,000); California (3,000-9,000); Texas (9,000); New York (5,000); Pennsylvania 
(2,400); Colorado (2,100); Virginia (1,800); Arizona (1,600); Michigan (1,300). SolitaryWatch, ‘FAQ: How 
many people are held in solitary confinement?’ <http://solitarywatch.com/facts/faq/> accessed 29th April 2015. 
86
 John Gibbons and Nicholas Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement (Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons 2006) 52-53, 56. 
87
 Graham (n 28) 12-13. 
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account for 41% of the general American population.
88
 While this does not factor out the 
potential criticisms, which can be weighed against a still disproportionate imposition by a 
minority of justice systems, it does reduce the shock-factor that might be represented by a 
simple state nose-count. 
Whether these jurisdictions are imposing disproportionately harsh punishments in 
respect of the physical severity of SHU is a matter for the latter stages of this chapter. That 
said, it is worth noting at this stage that, in 36 of the 52 US jurisdictions, SHU is imposed on 
juveniles. Given the Court’s treatment of individualisation89 – including age – as an important 
factor in Eighth Amendment adjudication,
90
 further investigation is warranted into the 
consistency with which SHU is applied to the most vulnerable inmates, in order to establish 
whether any consensus exists. 
7.2.2.2 MAJORITY CONSENSUS: JUVENILES 
The 69% of US jurisdictions where SHU is imposed on juveniles can be regarded as 
“active states”, in the same language as the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. With respect 
to the maximum period of SHU imposable on juveniles before some form of due process, 
however, only 31 active states provide this data.
91
 The remaining five states either have no 
due process requirement for juvenile SHU, or merely provide no data in the public domain. 
As such, they are excluded from this count, along with inactive jurisdictions. 
With the assessment refined in this way, a juvenile’s average permissible stay in SHU 
is 67 hours before a prison administrator or other executive official must review his case.
92
  
As with the previous assessment, however, two states stand out as extreme outliers. Kansas 
and Minnesota provide for a maximum period of 30 days (720 hours) before juvenile SHU is 
reviewed. Excluding these outliers results in a mean of just 22 hours across 29 states. 
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Moreover, the mode – the most common value, found in 16 states – provides for a maximum 
24 hours before review. It can be concluded that the national consensus element of the ESD 
assessment clearly indicates around 22-24 hours as the legislated optimum period of review 
for juvenile SHU. Kansas and Minnesota swim against a strong tide. 
That said, the assessment does not end with SHU review. Once due process has taken 
place, juvenile inmates can be held in SHU for varying periods. The number of active states to 
provide this data is 35, of a possible 36.
93
 Just over half of these (18) permit juvenile SHU for 
an indefinite period of time, and the remaining 17 provide an average of 12 days before a 
juvenile must be released into the general prison population, or at least onto a less-intensive 
segregation programme with longer breaks from isolation. National averages cannot be 
concluded when indefinite values are presented, so a consensus is difficult to conclude here. 
Nonetheless just 18 of the 52 US jurisdictions permit juveniles to be held in SHU for longer 
than 90 days.
94
 As the detailed data in Appendix 1, Figure 7.2(C) demonstrates, there is no 
indication of any change in this national picture. If anything, the permissibility of SHU is 
waning, and that is a topic which the next and final subsection of interpretivist review will 
address. 
7.2.2.3 THE RATE OF REFORMS 
In addition to prohibitions in federal prisons,
95
 and ongoing reforms, which started in 
New York in 2008,
96
 several more states undertook substantive reforms to their use of SHU 
for mentally ill or juvenile inmates between 2013 and 2015. At this juncture it is worth 
revisiting Justice Stevens’s judgment in Atkins, where the Court held that a national consensus 
had developed against the execution of intellectually disabled offenders.
97
 In Atkins Stevens 
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described an increase in the number of states supporting such a restriction, noting that the 
state count in support had risen from two to 18 states in just 12 years, indicating a growing 
consensus against the execution of offenders who were intellectually disabled.
98
 
Relating this argument to the present assessment, it can be seen from Figure 7.2, 
Column (B) that four jurisdictions have enacted a legislative prohibition on the use of SHU 
for mentally ill inmates in the last seven years.
99
 In addition, 13 more have either significantly 
restricted the use of SHU against mentally ill inmates,
100
 are in the process of legislating to 
this effect,
101
 or have ordered state-wide reviews of the use of SHU against vulnerable 
offenders.
102
 Moreover, only one state is recorded as having failed in an attempt to undertake 
such restrictions in recent years.
103
 While a majority consensus is not represented by these 
figures, it is Stevens’s emphasis on the ‘consistency of the direction of change’104 of state 
action in Atkins which is again relevant. 
Additionally, it is the morality which is sensed by these reforms, which take into 
account lower culpability of offenders with disabilities, thus treat people with dignity, which 
the interpretivist must acknowledge. There is certainly no evidence of harsher treatment of 
mentally ill inmates in prisons, unsurprising in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
condemnation of California’s negligence and resultant lack of prisoners’ dignity in Plata.105 
In Robinson, condemning that same state for criminalising drug-addiction, the Court warned 
that society ‘would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we...permitted sick 
people to be punished for being sick’.106 States are taking action to avoid a similar lapse of 
decency, even half a century after Robinson was decided. If prisoners are to ‘retain the 
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essence of human dignity inherent in all persons’,107 states must take action to stop the 
punishment of sick people for being sick, and follow the evolutionary line drawn by 17 states 
in the last several years and encouraged by the federal government. Anything less offends the 
basic precept of morality underlying the Eighth Amendment. 
7.2.3 POST-INTERPRETIVE CONCLUSIONS 
In 2011 the ACLU released its vision for a Model Solitary Confinement Improvement 
Act (“Model Act”), including, in Section (2)(a), an absolute prohibition on SHU when 
imposed on seriously mentally ill inmates.
108
 Section (1)(a)(i)-(ii) defines SMI by reference to 
the DSM,
109
 a definition which will be discussed in Section 7.5. Such an enactment would 
strive for the type of protection envisaged by the Eighth Amendment, protecting all citizens 
from punishments that are cruel and unusual, and informed by reference to principles of 
political morality such as proportionality and treatment as equals. 
So far this chapter has sought to investigate the ESD of the Eighth Amendment in 
relation to SHU. Opinion polling was shown in Section 7.1 to provide limited assistance to 
this interpretivist challenge, especially given the paucity of relevant data and its 
methodological shortcomings. In the present section, consensus framing by way of 
jurisdictional counting demonstrated a number of points. First, 22 months was shown by a 
mathematical consensus to offer the most representative national average for the imposition of 
SHU. Two states, California and Louisiana, stood out as extreme outliers with maximum 
recorded stays in SHU of 504 and 480 months, respectively. Six more states provided 
maximums of at least 12 years,
110
 joining California and Louisiana in swimming against a 
strong legislative tide. Moreover it was argued, in line with Kennedy’s majority judgment in 
                                                          
107
 Plata (n 1) 1928. 
108
 ACLU National Prison Project, (2011) ‘Model Act: Improving Public Safety, Protecting Vulnerable 
Populations & Ensuring Process in Imposing Long-Term Isolated Confinement’  
<http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/model_stop_solitary_act_-_7-11.pdf> accessed 10th April 2015. 
109
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edn, 
American Psychiatric Press 1994). 
110
 Arkansas (144 months); Virginia (168); Federal (264); New York (312); Florida (324); Texas (360). See 
Appendix 1, Figures 7.2A and 7.2E for detailed and more readily digestible information. 
Chapter VII: Solitary Confinement and Evolving Standards 
250 
 
Graham,
111
 that nine (17%) US jurisdictions holding around 50% of the nation’s SHU 
inmates demonstrated that the figures might be disproportionately skewed by a punitive 
minority. 
Next it was shown that, while juvenile SHU is permitted in 37 jurisdictions, it is 
generally only allowed for 22-24 hours before a form of due process. Half of those “active” 
juvenile SHU jurisdictions permit its imposition indefinitely after review. Finally, most 
significantly, there is a clear trend indicating the restriction of SHU for mentally ill inmates 
due to the velocity of recent reforms. Consistency of application and individualisation have 
been noted throughout the present section, and tie into the next part of this chapter – penology 
– where proportionality will provide the framework for analysis. Importantly, proportionality 
should ensure that any potential tyranny of the majority is constrained by further, objective 
indicia of moral standards. Whether constitutional evolution against current SHU practices is 
supported by the penological element of the Eighth Amendment’s background principles of 
morality is therefore the next question faced by this investigation. 
7.3 PENOLOGY 
The placement of prisoners in SHU constitutes an additional level of hardship, where 
an inmate is held in a more closely confined, isolated, and restricted manner. As a result, SHU 
invariably has a serious impact on the severity of an inmate’s punishment. This increased 
severity is inconsistently caused by the states, which have also had little regard for 
individualisation and the varied effects SHU can have on a person. In the previous two 
chapters it was established that, to seek better moral answers to constitutional questions than 
those revealed by pre-interpretive majoritarian opinion polling and state counting, recourse 
must be made to interpretive strategies. Penological principles champion rights as trumps over 
policies,
112
 and this is a form of such a strategy. 
                                                          
111
 Graham (n 28). 
112
 Chapter V, 5.5.B and Chapter VI, 6.5.3. 
Chapter VII: Solitary Confinement and Evolving Standards 
251 
 
Where state counting and opinion polling might provide a picture of public sentiment, 
these indicia give rise to a risk that proportionality will become jettisoned by penal populism, 
a form of tyrannous majority.
113
 In the present context, the Eighth Amendment right to be 
protected from punishments which might offend ESD should trump the broad discretion 
afforded to state legislatures and state prison executives. Pre-interpretive (consequentialist) 
goals of punishment are viewed as less relevant than principles to the prevailing integrity-
driven approach. Instead, the principle of proportionality permits a number of inquiries that 
are fundamental to the interpretivist reading of the Eighth Amendment. This section will 
undertake such a reading. 
The model of proportionality adopted is Robinson’s framework of deontological 
desert (DD), which refines Beccaria’s classical definition to embody principles ‘of right and 
good’.114 This model applies an interpretivist function by channelling the executive’s 
discretion to punish citizens through principles of restraint. DD pays respect to the often side-
lined Gregg conditions of dignity
115
 and non-excessive punishment.
116
 In effect, DD is both 
subjectively proportionate – comparing the gravity of the offence with the harshness of the 
penalty – and objectively proportionate, by a comparative reading of sentences for other 
crimes in the trial court’s jurisdiction and the same crime in other jurisdictions. Such an 
approach reconciles consistency derived from the holdings in Furman and Gregg)
117
 with 
individualisation (required by the Lockett and Eddings doctrines),
118
 all principles which act 
as a rational sieve for penology in the ESD assessment. 
In the case of constitutional law, the jurisdiction is the entire US, meaning the 50 
states, federal government, and the military. Such a hybrid form of penology permits an 
interpreter to seek the best answer to moral questions in hard cases. Moreover, the DD 
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approach caters for the Court’s hints in Graham, and much clearer expression in Plata, that 
conditions of confinement are relevant to the proportionality assessment. This is because the 
subjective element of proportionality review must consider the individual severity and 
suffering imposed on inmates. That the severity of punishment is measurable in part 
according to the individual harshness it causes is ‘a central aspect’119 of proportionality, and 
one which will be considered next. 
For present purposes, in the context of SHU, this section will first assess the 
consistency with which SHU is imposed (7.3.1), an objective reading of proportionality. Next, 
in Section 7.3.2 the (subjective) individualisation of punishment will be considered, with a 
view to establishing whether SHU causes greater suffering to certain individuals and is 
therefore disproportionate in its application. Finally, Section 7.3.3 will consider the 
dignitarian assessment, and asks whether SHU is morally permissible in any circumstances. 
7.3.1 CONSISTENCY 
For a prisoner’s punishment to be assessed in terms of its objective proportionality, a 
comparison between the several jurisdictions and across sentences for other crimes in the trial 
court’s jurisdiction is required. Undertaking a search of press reporting into the use of SHU 
by state prison systems unveils a web of different standards. In Massachusetts, for example, 
state prisoners can be sent to SHU for up to a week for throwing an empty plastic cup.
120
 In 
California, possessing more than five dollars without official approval can land an inmate in 
SHU,
121
 an offence contained within the states’ penal regulations. South Carolina, which 
permits juveniles to be held in SHU indefinitely,
122
 recently imposed 37.5 concurrent years in 
SHU on a prisoner for ‘Creating and/or Assisting with A Social Networking Site’.123 Whilst 
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an extreme example, sixteen other inmates in that state face confinement in SHU for at least a 
decade on similarly punitive grounds, which are not found in other US jurisdictions.
124
 
Caution must be urged when reliance is placed on press reports, since journalists are 
more likely to document stories that sell,
125
 though it is notable that there has been no 
challenge against the reported facts of these cases by any state officials. While the case 
studies might express the extreme end of the spectrum with respect to SHU-use, that does not 
detract from penological concerns surrounding the proportionality of imposition. Of the 39 
states, which provided a response to a MotherJones investigation into nationwide solitary use, 
13 of them segregate inmates in a form of SHU on account of their being validated as gang 
members or part of “Security Threat Groups”.126 Three: California, South Carolina, and 
Texas, have a policy to segregate such inmates automatically, an emphatic demonstration of 
inconsistent practices in those states. In one, Maine, an official noted that prisoners are 
confined in SHU ‘when they become a danger to themselves’.127 The implication of this latter 
statement is mentally ill inmates who inflict self-harm, which – as the medical literature 
discussed in Section 7.5 will show – is not alleviated by SHU, but compounded. Such 
disregard for the safety of prisoners is a core concern of this discussion. 
At this stage it is worth recalling the states-as-laboratories metaphor discussed in 
Chapter IV, where it was noted that majoritarian state counting undercuts ‘one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory’.128 Under an interpretivist reading, moral lessons are taught by recourse to 
principles embedded more deeply than in explicit legislative provisions, and that applies to 
state experimentation with SHU-imposition. The punishments clause places limits on 
governmental power, and rights arising from these limits trump policies. Schwarz noted that 
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‘the laboratory of state experimentation is not a sealed room’,129 and a punishment which 
offends a prisoner’s dignity is not one which the Eighth Amendment permits. To develop the 
dignitarian element of this argument, and if the morality of a nation (or a state for this matter) 
is indeed to be measured ‘by how it treats its weakest members’,130 juveniles held in solitary 
confinement can provide a clear tidemark. 
As has been indicated, more detailed nationwide use of SHU is difficult to gauge. This 
is especially so given the obscure euphemisms Boards of Correction attribute to their 
confinement policies and the poor record-keeping in this regard. Instead looking to media 
reports of particularly lengthy stays in solitary can provide an interpreter with educated 
estimates. Nonetheless, a more fruitful frame of reference is the jurisdictional comparison of 
juvenile SHU demonstrated in Section 7.2.2. Of the 51 US jurisdictions to imprison 
juveniles,
131
 14 of them (27.5% of jurisdictions, representing 19.5% of the general American 
population)
132
 will not subject juveniles to SHU. It is fair to surmise on this basis that just one 
in five juveniles imprisoned across the US will never be subjected to a form of SHU (for more 
than 22 hours per day). For the remaining four in five who could face SHU, therefore, it is 
quite possible that their imprisonment will become more severe. Since the interpretivist 
endeavour is to seek the best moral outcome from a question of law, the policies of the 
minority of those states striving for better protection of juvenile offenders trump the 
consequentialism propagated by the rest. It is the silent minority to whom this chapter pays 
most attention for an integrity-led Eighth Amendment assessment. At least with respect to 
consistency it is clear to see that juveniles are faced with differences in their treatment on the 
basis of the arbitrary grounds of geography. 
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In the vast majority of states where juvenile SHU is permitted, review takes place by 
the end of the first day.
133
 Juveniles held in Wyoming, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, and Maryland 
may be held in SHU without any due process for between 3 and 30 days. For those juvenile 
inmates, their stays in solitary are permitted for far longer than anywhere else in the nation. 
Moreover, of those states to permit juvenile SHU and also require review after a 
representative average of around 22-24 hours, half of them (18 of 36 active states) allow 
juvenile SHU indefinitely after review. A juvenile unlucky enough to face SHU in one of 
those 18 states could face the back of a locked door in an isolated cell for several years, longer 
than he would ever face in any of the remaining 33 SHU-active jurisdictions.
134
 
Solitary confinement is imposed to varying degrees, with a handful of particularly 
punitive US jurisdictions where a prisoner’s punishment is more likely to incorporate long 
stays in SHU.
135
 Classification of gang status has a lot to do with an inmate’s chances of 
facing SHU, and discrepancies in these policies exist across the nation,
136
 where different 
actions are punished to varying degrees across the US. Such objective disproportionality is 
most marked with respect to the treatment of juveniles, who are handed inconsistent degrees 
of SHU according to the location of their offences. Though this might deem the American 
experiment with SHU offensive to the objective arm of proportionality, the Lockett and 
Eddings principles of individualised, subjective review must be considered for the full picture 
to be painted, and for the reprehensibility of SHU’s overuse to be pinned to the Constitution’s 
ESD assessment. 
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7.3.2 INDIVIDUALISATION 
As noted in the introduction to this section and demonstrated in Chapter II, Lockett 
and Eddings emphasised the importance of subjectivity in proportionality review. The 
touchstone of the punishments clause is the effect a punishment has on the imprisoned and, as 
such, this section must consider those effects. For present purposes, the relevant effects are 
those suffered by inmates held in SHU. 
Arrigo and Bullock note that different inmates react differently to solitary 
confinement.
137
 First, the personality-types of those often found in SHU were more vulnerable 
than average to the psychiatric effects of confinement in solitude. Grassian and Friedman 
noted that sensory deprivation had a more debilitating effect on inmates with mental illness, 
and those with the personality disorders most frequently found in prisoners.
138
 At the outset, 
this is concerning, especially given the statement by a Maine official that prisoners who are at 
risk of harming themselves are placed in SHU.
139
 Take the example of Prisoner X, who 
suffers from no psychiatric illness and no personality disorders, and who is placed in SHU 
due to a rule infraction. This is a common example. Prisoner Y, however, suffers from severe 
psychiatric illness, compounded by various personality disorders which make his confinement 
more difficult to cope with. He is placed in SHU due to exactly the same misbehaviour as 
Prisoner X, and both prisoners spend fifteen days in SHU. So far, the objective proportionality 
of their punishments (remembering that conditions of imprisonment are a relevant part of 
“punishment” under the Eighth Amendment) is upheld. 
When subjectivity is involved, however, the individualisation element causes 
problems for proportionality. Prisoner Y is far more likely to suffer from adverse effects 
which could range from restlessness, regression, and confusion,
140
 to symptoms as serious as 
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tachycardia (over-pulsation of the heart);
141
 serious problems with impulse-control (self-
harm);
142
 and even Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
143
 A widespread lack of psychiatric care, 
such as that condemned in California by Plata,
144
 compounds this issue. Arrigo and Bullock 
note that even advocates of solitary confinement for correctional purposes admit that some 
personality types would deteriorate and should be screened out.
145
 Further, O’Donnell found 
that individuals who cope best with solitary confinement are those who were able to develop 
good attachments during childhood.
146
 Kerr notes that, ‘[n]ot only does mental health erode in 
the highly non-therapeutic conditions of segregation, segregated prisoners often become 
increasingly unable to meet the behavioural standards required for release.’147 It is a cruel 
twist of irony that prisoners, especially those held in SHU, are usually those who did not have 
such fortunate upbringings, so are even more likely to suffer in isolation. 
In addition, the individual’s expectation of a punishment has been shown to be 
relevant to their overall experience in isolation. Grassian and Friedman reported that SHU 
which was perceived to be punitive, rather than administrative for instance, was more likely to 
produce adverse reactions in inmates.
148
 Clearly, where an inmate such as Prisoner Y is more 
susceptible to violent reactions, and anticipates that his confinement is punitive; the 
punishment is more severe when imposed on him than it is on someone like Prisoner X (who 
will still suffer symptoms). Without engaging in a dignitarian discussion of the permissibility 
of a state causing these effects, which is something reserved for the remainder of this chapter, 
it suffices to say that individualisation is neglected when prisoners are treated as one and the 
same. In Taking Rights Seriously Dworkin summarises this problem aptly, stating that moral 
equality concerns the treatment of people as equals, with the same concern and respect, rather 
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than treating people in exactly the same way.
149
 Applied to the example of Prisoners X and Y, 
these individuals have been treated with equality: they have been handed the same 
punishments for the same misbehaviour. However, Prisoner Y’s individual circumstances 
have not been taken into account. He has been treated with no concern or respect for his 
situation. The individualisation element of proportionality is thereby neglected. 
As shown in Section 7.2, a number of states have sought to remedy this problem to a 
large extent by protecting inmates with mental illnesses from SHU, and the Federal 
Government has itself admitted the risks of SHU-imposition on vulnerable inmates, though 
without making any legislative reforms.
150
 Without repeating the call for a consideration of 
the consistency in the direction of the state-level changes,
151
 it can be concluded by noting 
that there is still a strong potential for disproportionality in American SHU. Defended 
ordinally under the colour of equality, due to its blanket-imposition, the effects of these non-
individualised policies can in fact be far more punishing to certain inmates. For individuality 
to undergo proper consideration, it must be acknowledged that proportionality requires a view 
of the subjective effects on the punished, something which appears to be lacking, perhaps 
owing to political pressures to remain “tough on crime”,152 or budgetary constraints. 
In Estelle v Gamble SCOTUS held that neglect of prisoners’ medical needs, ‘may 
actually produce physical “torture or a lingering death”’,153 prohibited by the Eighth. Whether 
deontological desert might include SHU in the Estelle standard, honed most recently by 
Plata,
154
 must now be established. 
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7.3.3 DEONTOLOGICAL DESERT AS A BAR TO SHU 
A final line of argument which can be sustained under deontological desert is that 
some rights are readable in the abstract. That is to say that they are universal, non-relative, 
and absolute in character. Dworkin emphasises this with respect to freedom from torture,
155
 a 
punishment that is so abhorrent that it offends dignity outright. Importantly, for the present 
discussion “torture” is used in the abstract, not in its international legal sense which is 
considered shortly, in Section 7.4. That torturous punishments are condemned by dignitarian 
assessments does not mean to say that there is no-one who advocates such policy, and there 
are infamous historical instances of its imposition by states. Nonetheless, the DD approach 
holds that there is no-one who can morally justify torture.
156
 It is vital, therefore, to 
distinguish justice from democracy. Where democracy might permit harsh punishments, and 
historic majoritarianism has instigated this,
157
 justice requires that harshness that offends 
human decency, a tenet of morality, is not permitted.
158
 Applying this abstract principle of 
decency to the present context, asking whether SHU is compatible with DD leads to a number 
of further questions. 
If it is presumed that torture is morally wrong and therefore unjustifiable, regardless of 
its proportionality, the outstanding question is one of definition. International, regional, and 
domestic definitions and absolute condemnations of torture do exist, but they invariably fixate 
on the mens rea or mental state of the inflictor, rather than the suffering of the victim.
159
 
Stepping back to the Eighth Amendment assessment, the treatment and suffering of 
individuals is the touchstone for analysis.
160
 If a prisoner suffers treatment at the hands of the 
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state, which is so cruel as to offend ‘evolving standards of decency’,161 then that element of 
his punishment is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Punishments that offend a person’s 
dignity in this way, regardless of whether they are imposed proportionately, fall foul of the 
Estelle and Gregg criteria. Linking this argument to classical retributivism, even Kant’s 
reading of Beccaria looks only to “eye for eye” insofar as the result does not degrade 
humanity in a way that is morally impermissible.
162
 Robinson’s refined model of 
deontological desert adds an additional level of interpretive scrutiny, with Ryberg explaining 
that in the severity assessment not everything has ‘moral relevance’.163 Torture, for example, 
can never be morally relevant, regardless of the strength of any proportionality arguments.
164
 
Solitary confinement, as was shown by Section 7.2, is accepted by and imposed to 
varying degrees by all states across the US. In the present section it has been argued that the 
American application of SHU is demonstrably disproportionate, both in terms of its 
inconsistent application and its lack of individualisation. Meeting the higher bar of abstractly 
prohibited “torture”, however, requires further discussion. Establishing whether SHU 
constitutes torture, and therefore infringes an absolute right protected under DD, regardless of 
proportionality, is a matter of definition. That definition is one more routinely carried out in 
the context of transnational law rather than the US Constitution.
165
 The argument will be 
sustained in the following section that a consideration of transnational perspectives on the 
acceptability of SHU will enrich ESD analysis. Aspirational answers to interpretive questions 
are only found when sources of political morality are exhausted, seeking the best fit for 
constitutional interpretation. Chapter IV argued at length that transnational law, when read 
interpretively, is one such source. As such, the next section will investigate the transnational 
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legal landscape to assess the strength of any claims of SHU offending contemporary standards 
of decency, and to discuss whether the high bar of torture is reached. 
7.4 TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVISM 
Any focus on international and regional human rights instruments for constitutional 
interpretation invigorates debate. As Chapter V discussed at length, human rights principles, 
in theory, transcend politics and form part of a higher normative order – one by which the 
interpretivist informs his decision-making. The Supreme Court’s recent expression of a 
human rights framework in Plata, which Simon noted was capable of dismantling American 
punishment,
166
 gives rise to a strong argument for the inclusion of transnational human rights 
sources in ESD adjudication. Transnational comparativism is not argued to be dispositive of 
the Eighth Amendment question, but it will be sustained that the punishments clause benefits 
from the rich body of dignitarian standards which can be found via comparativism. 
The term “soft law”, advisory provisions and instruments which are non-enforceable 
by legal actors, has a range of definitions.
167
 Scholars have disagreed as to its value as a 
source of international law,
168
 though Bianchi et al found a middle ground, noting that the 
search to fill gaps in existing legal regimes can be informed by soft law.
169
 To fill those gaps, 
which are reminiscent of the positivist’s exhaustive rules outlined in Chapter III, 
interpretivism provides a resolution by reading law as integrity. In the context of the present 
discussion the gap is the distance between the current legal protections afforded by the Eighth 
Amendment and the suffering caused by SHU. The question faced by an interpretivist is 
therefore one of political morality: do the principles underlying the Constitution prohibit such 
infliction? Hard and soft legal principles arising from transnational documents, rather than 
merely national rules, serve to provide a constitutional interpreter with further general 
principles of human rights law, through a series of norms, guidelines, and standards. In the 
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present chapter, which is attempting to inform constitutional interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment, Subsection 7.4.1 will analyse the international picture relating to solitary 
confinement. Subsection 7.4.2 will then contribute a discussion of regional human rights law 
to this analysis. 
7.4.1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and 
punishment pervades the International Human Rights system,
170
 existing in various United 
Nations (UN) legal instruments. Moreover, it is widely accepted as a non-derogable (jus 
cogens) norm of customary international law that states must not violate those rights.
171
 
Conley notes that the US has ‘largely insulated itself from judicial review by international 
tribunals’,172 though an entirely separate debate exists surrounding Congressional 
incorporation of international law into US law, touched on in Chapter V.
173
 While an 
expansion of that debate is beyond the purview of this analysis, it is worth noting that there is 
a rich body of hard and soft law arising from the UN system to show that SHU is routinely 
criticised across the world. That body will now be examined. 
Following the introduction of the UN Charter, which established the UN and was 
silent regarding prisoner treatment, the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) expressed the protection against ‘torture [or] cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.’174 One of the most notable changes to follow the adoption of the UDHR was 
a shift towards collaborative international penal policy. In the mid-1950s, while Chief Justice 
Warren was beginning his due process revolution on the US Supreme Court,
175
 the UN held 
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its first ‘World Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders’,176 
replacing the International Penitentiary Commission (IPC).
177
 While the IPC had issued its 
first warning against the use of long-term SHU in 1930,
178
 action would not be undertaken in 
earnest on the international stage until the first UN World Congress. On that occasion, at the 
1955 World Congress, the Member States of the UN adopted the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs).
179
 
While the SMRs are broadly a form of soft law, like the UDHR, their creation during a 
period when civil rights were dominating the political agenda in the US provided the first 
example of a comprehensive (albeit aspirational) set of prisoners’ rights at an international 
level.
180
 Furthermore, Vasiliades has noted that, although the SMRs are not strictly enforced 
by any one body, they ‘have been increasingly recognised as a generally accepted body of 
basic minimal requirements.’181 Notable rules include R21.1’s provision of outdoor exercise 
for at least one hour per day and R32.1-2, which indicates that confinement, which is 
prejudicial to a prisoner’s mental health, should be avoided.182 As Section 7.2 demonstrated, 
the US prison system is not averse to permitting lengthy stays in solitary confinement, often 
irrespective of age or vulnerability. While there may be a general trend away from the use of 
SHU against mentally ill inmates, it prevails in several jurisdictions. Section 7.5 will show 
that the American practice of SHU is offensive to R32.1-2’s principle insofar as it degenerates 
the mental integrity of inmates. 
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In May 2015 the SMRs were updated and renamed the “Mandela Rules” and, at the 
time of writing in September 2015, are pending adoption by the UNGA.
183
 While these 
revisions, the first in 60 years, mainly focus on modernising specific rights such as those 
surrounding prisoner communication,
184
 a notable addition is the explicit condemnation by 
Rule 43 of ‘prolonged solitary confinement’,185 defined as 22 hours per day for at least 15 
days.
186
 As the state count showed, the US currently falls short of those standards, though it is 
notable that Barack Obama became the first sitting American President to visit a federal 
prison in July 2015, and the first openly to speak against SHU.
187
 Given that Guantanamo Bay 
– the US military detention camp which itself imposes SHU on all inmates – remains open 
eight years after the President’s first of two campaign pledges to close it,188 rapid reform 
should not be expected. Further, the US standards fall short not only of the renewed SMRs, 
but also those which had existed for 60 years, spanning 11 American presidencies. That said, 
the widespread acknowledgement of the hardship created by SHU, at both the federal 
executive and judicial levels,
189
 serves only a positive albeit early function for its future 
restriction. 
Further soft law exists in the form of the UN General Assembly’s Basic Principles for 
the Treatment of Prisoners (1990).
190
 The Basic Principles encourage Member States to strive 
for the abolition or at least restriction of solitary confinement,
191
 something that a small 
minority of US states has respected in recent years. Moreover, the 1990 UN Rules for the 
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Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty,
192
 another soft law instrument, expressly 
condemn any form of SHU used against under-18s or inmates with mental illness, principles 
again reiterated by the Mandela Rules.
193
 As the jurisdictional analysis in Section 7.2 
demonstrated, the US also falls short of this standard, giving rise to an argument in favour of 
greater Eighth Amendment protection according to transnational norms. 
In addition to the various soft law sources opposing SHU is an emergent body of 
binding international law. In the latter half of the 20
th
 Century the UN created much clearer 
definitions of international law regarding prisoner treatment.
194
 This clarity was achieved 
most markedly by the introduction of the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), 
ratified by the US in 1990,
195
 and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),
196
 ratified in 1992. While it must be reiterated that the present focus is not on 
investigating US liability for non-implementation of international law, the inclusion in ESD 
analysis of harder forms of law offers a more compelling argument for its relevance to 
comparativism than that of soft law, which could be argued only to exist as a guide. 
The UNCAT is the principal international treaty to prohibit torture, with a 
comprehensive and binding definition in Article 1. For the past two decades the Human 
Rights Council (HRC),
197
 in addition to recent Special Rapporteurs on Torture, have all 
emphasised concern that US solitary confinement is offensive to UNCAT Article 1,
198
 and to 
Article 16 which prohibits ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.199 
Moreover, the HRC and the Special Rapporteurs have insisted that Article 7 ICCPR, which 
provides identically worded guarantees as UNCAT’s Articles 1 and 16, has also been 
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threatened by the American practice of SHU.
200
 Additional concern has been raised 
surrounding the practice of enforcing solitary confinement against juveniles or mentally ill 
inmates, permitted in two-thirds of US jurisdictions.
201
 
Significantly, while these concerns continue to resonate in the international sphere,
202
 
the US remains reluctant to refuse ratification or even signature of the UNCAT Optional 
Protocol (OPCAT),
203
 which would provide the HRC with prison-inspection authority. The 
Bush administration reasoned that such inspections would be ‘overly intrusive’204 to existing 
federal oversight, though issues of transparency still exist, especially given the widespread 
concern surrounding conditions of American imprisonment. This concern might be less 
pressing, and the sovereignty argument more compelling, if federal oversight of a small 
minority of prisons had actually resulted in improvements to conditions. Some promise to that 
effect has been forthcoming,
205
 but – as this chapter has demonstrated – standards continue to 
fall well below those of the international system. Two more UN treaties, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child,
206
 and the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,
207
 have been argued to contain further 
prohibitions on the use of SHU against the most vulnerable inmates.
208
 Though professional 
bodies have reiterated these charges, as it will be shown in Section 7.5, such claims have not 
been upheld by the HRC in as strong legal terms as for UNCAT or the ICCPR. 
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 In sum, if indeed it can be established that SHU does cause ‘severe pain or [mental] 
suffering’,209 this could in turn lead to an accusation of the US wilfully engaging in 
internationally offensive practices throughout its prison system. Not only could such a finding 
be in contravention of America’s commitments to various treaty systems and jus cogens 
norms,
210
 but, vitally, it contributes to the political morality of the Eighth Amendment. Insofar 
as the punishments clause is informed at the interpretive stage by transnational 
comparativism, a widely accepted definition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment might compel the conclusion that SHU is offensive to the evolving standards of 
decency of that clause. For such an argument to be sustained a stronger demonstration of the 
psychiatric harm resulting from the use of long-term SHU must be established, a task for 
Section 7.5. First, the regional human rights system must be examined. 
7.4.2 REGIONAL LAW 
As noted in Chapter V, care must be taken to justify the selection of interpretive 
sources. In addition to international law the Court has looked to foreign law when interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment. To pre-empt accusations of selection-bias when examining regional 
sources, reasoned and transparent decision-making must be demonstrated. As a result, rational 
community standards are unveiled, and the task of reading law as informed by objective 
indicia of political morality is achieved. 
A variety of characteristics can be considered when justifying the selection of a 
foreign comparator. Sartori notes that entities for comparison should have shared and 
unshared attributes,
211
 and Landman highlights the democratic nature of states as a relevant 
frame of comparison.
212
 Additionally, to justify the selection of foreign law, a helpful 
waypoint is posted by the judgment in Thompson v Oklahoma.
213
 In Thompson the Court 
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relied on ‘the leading members of the Western European community.’214 Given that the 
jurisprudence of that category is represented most cogently by the Member States of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it is that transnational system which will 
form the first frame of comparison. After all, ‘if Justices seek to bolster their opinions with 
additional logic and support, looking to the most respected [and relevant] foreign countries 
simply makes the most sense’.215 The ECHR represents the human rights standards of 47 
Western liberal democracies,
216
 for all of whom ‘one of the major mechanisms for 
accommodating difference...is the protection of the civil and political rights of individuals.’217 
In addition to the European Human Rights system is one to which the US might be 
more willing to pay closer attention. The Organisation of American States (OAS) established 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948, the same year as the 
UDHR,
218
 vowing that all prisoners have ‘the right to be free from cruel, infamous, or unusual 
punishment.’219 While the US does not participate in the region’s human rights system which 
will be discussed in Subsection 7.4.2.2, it is an OAS member. Additionally, Conley has noted 
that the Inter-American system is ‘the most vocal global voice against solitary 
confinement’,220 highlighting its poignancy, not just in geographical terms, to the comparison 
against the US use of SHU. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper described the ‘express affirmation of 
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples [that] simply underscores the 
centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.’221 That notion of political 
morality – understood by an interpretivist to reach beyond the rules created by Congress, into 
the principles underlying their creation – is fundamental to the present comparative 
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assessment. Building on Simon’s argument that Plata represents a potential attachment of the 
punishments clause to a human rights framework,
222
 the present section will now attach that 
claim to an assessment of SHU, drawing on the most prominent and relevant regional rights 
bodies of the European and Inter-American systems. 
7.4.2.1 COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
Since the most notable, and controversial,
223
 Supreme Court citation of regional law 
can be found in the 2003 decision of Lawrence v Texas,
224
 that decision provides a suitable 
starting point. In Lawrence the Court cited European human rights jurisprudence to determine 
what restrictions on private sexual conduct were ‘necessary in a democratic society’.225 
Reflecting on ‘values we share with a wider civilization’,226 Justice Kennedy cited foreign law 
in an interpretivist fashion, reading it ‘as a transmitter of society’s values’.227 If society’s 
values are at all represented by supranational agreements, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) is a strong starting point. Adopted by the Council of Europe in 
1950,
228
 the ECHR creates a permanent Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
229
 which accepts 
the ECHR as a living instrument, which should be ‘interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions’.230 
As such, the ECtHR’s ability to overrule its prior case law plays an important role in 
shifting the interpretation of certain provisions in line with societal values,
231
 in a similar vein 
to the ESD assessment under the Eighth. Unlike the punishments clause, Article 3 ECHR 
provides a broader guarantee, reading: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
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degrading treatment or punishment.’232 The Article, unlike other, far lengthier provisions in 
the ECHR,
233
 provides limited definitions and defers to the Court’s evolutive interpretation, 
again closely parallel to the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence introduced throughout this 
thesis. 
Protection from torture, defined by a high threshold of ‘deliberate inhuman treatment 
causing very serious and cruel suffering’,234 is a non-derogable right under the ECHR: 
justifications are not accepted under any circumstances.
235
 SCOTUS has required a high bar 
for torture, including treatment worse than the stress techniques in Ireland v UK,
236
 and 
infliction in order to obtain information or to intimidate prisoners.
237
 In Selmouni the ECtHR 
decided that this bar could be lowered in light of societal values and, as such, acts which were 
previously considered to fall below the threshold may now constitute a breach of the 
fundamental protection guaranteed by the second clause of Article 3.
238
 To sustain a claim of 
ill treatment, the acts must also reach a minimum level of severity before being caught by the 
Convention. This assessment depends on all the circumstances surrounding a case: duration of 
confinement, its particular effects, as well as the sex, age, and health of the victim.
239
 
In the ECHR system, treatment has been held to be “inhuman” within the definition of 
Article 3 because it has caused intense mental suffering,
240
 and “degrading” when it has 
caused extreme levels of fear and anxiety to be aroused.
241
 While at first glance this appears to 
be a much less restrictive reading of fundamental protections than that undertaken by the US 
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Supreme Court,
242
 the ECtHR has re-iterated in a number of cases that the suffering must go 
beyond ‘that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of 
legitimate treatment or punishment’.243 This has been applied to conditions of detention, when 
the cumulative effects of those conditions are so severe that protection is triggered,
244
 and 
during which conditions must be ‘compatible with respect for [prisoners’] human dignity’,245 
a similar standard to the US Supreme Court’s in Plata.246 
Insofar as European human rights jurisprudence is able to inform the present 
assessment of ESD, some important principles regarding SHU can be derived. First, solitary 
confinement must not be indefinite,
247
 although the ECtHR has permitted terms of several 
years in SHU.
248
 Additionally, where there is no justification for placement in restrictive 
SHU, or a justification is whimsical,
249
 the detention could breach Article 3. A number of 
ECtHR cases in the past several years have expanded the Ramirez Sanchez principle of human 
dignity to SHU.
250
 For example, in Onoufriou v Cyprus the Court insisted that SHU ‘should 
be ordinarily ordered only exceptionally and after every precaution has been taken’.251 In 
addition, in 2013 the ECtHR held that extradition of a prisoner who was seriously mentally ill 
was offensive to Article 3 where it was possible that he would be placed in SHU for long 
periods of time.
252
 
In addition to ECtHR jurisprudence is the law arising from the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). 
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The CPT was derived from Article 3 ECHR in 1989 and provides the most detailed regional 
response to questions of confinement conditions,
253
 since the Committee has similar oversight 
and inspection roles as those provided to the UN’s HRC by OPCAT. On its face, the CPT is 
concerned only with aspirational standard setting and insists that its role is not to resolve 
disputes.
254
 That said, Morgan notes that most ‘readers of CPT reports’255 are interested in 
establishing whether a certain jurisdiction has been condemned for poor treatment or 
punishment of its prisoners. The Committee’s reports are undoubtedly influential,256 and 
certainly relevant for the normative exercise intended by this chapter. The CPT adopts a 
cumulative approach to confinement conditions challenges,
257
 in a similar vein to the US 
Supreme Court’s totality of conditions assessment of the Eighth Amendment.258 With respect 
to SHU, the Committee concluded after a visit to Bulgaria that ‘a prisoner, undergoing a 
disciplinary sanction of 14 days in isolation, being held in a small (approximately two metres 
squared), dark and unventilated cell [was] deplorable’259 and amounted to inhuman 
treatment.
260
 While the confinement in solitude itself was not legally offensive, it was the 
cumulative effect of poor conditions which gave rise to stricter scrutiny, reflecting similar 
concerns highlighted by the UN’s HRC condemnation of cumulative suffering in US 
prisons.
261
 
The CPT also publishes a precise and descriptive account of its own minimum 
standards of prisoners’ rights,262 which are not far out of kilter with the Mandela Rules, 
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providing states with the opportunity to react with specific responses to human rights issues. 
Particularly noteworthy provisions of the CPT’s minimum standards include s56(b), which 
provides that SHU should not be used for periods longer than 14 days, and less for 
juveniles,
263
 far below the averages demonstrated across the US in Section 7.4.2. Moreover, 
s57(c) provides for due process review of SHU after 24 hours, a standard generally met in the 
US with respect to juveniles,
264
 but a safeguard with which adult prisoners are seldom 
provided. Specific provisions of the CPT standards relating to confinement conditions include 
a prohibition on any cell smaller than six metres-squared,
265
 and a recommendation of at least 
one hour’s outdoor exercise per day.266 Applying these minima to the US context again shows 
the American SHU in a poor light, since many cells measure just 6x8ft (4.47 metres 
squared),
267
 far less than six metres squared, and exercise is often restricted to within an 
indoor holding pen.
268
 
While it must be accepted that the ECtHR gives a wide margin of appreciation to its 
signatory states with respect to criminal justice,
269
 and the CPT Standards could be seen as 
merely aspirant soft law, clearly there are minimum standards towards which the human 
rights bodies of Europe strive. At least, for the interpretive task of portraying societal values 
in their best moral light, these considerations have a great deal of merit, and the US is clearly 
falling short if Europe is to be taken as any form of bellwether region for ESD assessments. 
The Inter-American system, which can be considered to have made the greatest progress 
towards a comprehensive and dignity-led prisoners’ rights jurisprudence, at least in principle 
if not in practice, must now be considered.  
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7.4.2.2 ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES 
As noted in the previous subsection, the OAS established the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man and vowed that all prisoners have ‘the right to be free from 
cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment.’270 Three decades later, via the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR) the OAS committed to providing every person with ‘the right to 
have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected,’271 and, to that end, established two 
principal organs: the Inter-American Commission (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court 
(IACtHR).
272
 Article 5 ACHR goes much further than the ECHR with respect to prisoners’ 
dignity, stating this right explicitly.
273
 
Conley’s remark274 about the Inter-American human rights system leading the call 
against SHU is demonstrated most clearly by the IACHR’s Principles and Best Practices 
(PBB),
275
 which urge states to abolish juvenile SHU and restrict it significantly in general.
276
 
In addition, Article 5 ACHR includes a requirement that states treat prisoners ‘with respect for 
the inherent dignity of [humans]’,277 wording similar to the US Supreme Court’s call for 
prisoner dignity in Plata,
278
 and the ECtHR’s in Ramirez Sanchez.279 While Plata is a relative 
newcomer to the Eighth Amendment’s history, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights demonstrates the region’s maturity, at least judicially, with respect to its 
high level of prison scrutiny and a “hands-on” approach to confinement complaints. It is 
worth noting that the actual picture is far worse than aspirant case law will suggest, with 
extremely high levels of ill treatment, torture, and death in the prison systems of the OAS 
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member states, even those party to the ACHR.
280
 As such, caution is exercised when relying 
on the OAS system as an indicator of political morality. That said, the case law is the element 
considered by the foregoing discussion, and it is that which has developed the most 
comprehensive set of prisoners’ dignity standards of any transnational system. 
Three significant cases illustrate the scope of Article 5 ACHR with respect to SHU in 
the OAS system. First in 1988 the IACtHR deemed ‘prolonged isolation and deprivation of 
communication’281 a breach of Article 5, since this was in itself ‘cruel and inhuman treatment, 
harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of the person’.282 Next, in 2000, the Court 
noted the development of international jurisprudence condemning psychological torture,
283
 
including ‘acts that produce severe physical, psychological or moral suffering in the 
victim.’284 Finally, in 2006 the IACtHR addressed SHU head on, emphasising the necessity 
arm of proportionality encouraged by Section 7.3: ‘solitary confinement cells must be 
used...only during the time necessary and in strict compliance with the criteria of 
reasonability, necessity and legality.’285 
Of the 35 OAS Member States, just 24 have ratified the ACHR: the US has not. 
Although the US does not accept the jurisdiction of the OAS’s human rights system, the same 
line of argument as for the relevance of the Council of Europe can be applied, namely that the 
dignitarian assessment called for by the ESD principle of the Eighth Amendment can be 
informed by the ‘accumulated legal wisdom of mankind’.286 In addition, the greater relevance 
of the Inter-American regional human rights system than its European counterpart is its 
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geographic proximity to the US, and the fact that the US is of course an OAS member state. 
Echoing the concerns of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, the OAS counterpart noted in 
2009 his ‘distress’287 upon witnessing the extreme use of SHU in the US. Even stronger 
condemnation followed in 2013 when the OAS criticised the US for its neglectful placement 
of juveniles and intellectually disabled inmates in SHU.
288
 
Under the foregoing interpretivist approach, which has consistently sought a ‘set of 
principles’ that represents ‘a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, and lawmakers around 
the world’,289 that the US is out of kilter with this consensus is a relevant consideration for the 
political morality assessment of the Eighth Amendment. Justice O’Connor, though dissenting 
in Roper, noted that the ‘evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither wholly 
isolated from, nor inherently at odds with the values prevailing in other countries.’290 Clearly, 
again the US fails to meet this comparative standard of decency, by reference to the Inter-
American regional human rights system. 
7.4.3 TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: CONCLUDING POINTS 
Through international and regional comparativism it has been shown by this section 
that SHU is routinely criticised across the world. In particular, various bodies within the two 
most developed and relevant human rights systems have singled out the harsh practices of the 
United States for criticism. Any consensus found by the transnational evaluation paints a far 
more dignity led picture, where principles of proportionality, dignity, and individualisation 
are prioritised over consequentialist policy objectives. Additionally, respect is found 
regarding treatment of juveniles and mentally ill inmates, something which has crept onto the 
American agenda but with much less velocity than on the international stage. The extent to 
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which the US swims against a transnational tide is highlighted most notably by the 2015 
Mandela Rules, the CPT minimum standards, and the calls from regional bodies for greater 
scrutiny of SHU. In essence, the totality of the American experiment with SHU falls short by 
this measure of accumulated legal wisdom. 
Focusing closely on the criticisms weighed against the US for its use of SHU, a deeper 
question surrounding the specific human effects is posed. While it has been shown that there 
is a strong consensus among international and regional human rights bodies, who agree to a 
great extent with the concerns surrounding US SHU, closer scrutiny of the justifications for 
that condemnation must be analysed. That scrutiny is the task for the next, and final section of 
this chapter. 
7.5 PROFESSIONAL CONSENSUS 
The 2011 Supreme Court decision in Plata and subsequent media-led investigations 
into America’s SHU shone a light into a previously hidden corner of the criminal justice 
system. Not only has reporting increased, as was shown in Section 7.1, but so has the 
transnational community’s scrutiny of the US experiment with extreme confinement. Chapter 
V first noted the unprecedented level of deference accorded by the Court in Hall v Florida to 
professional medical opinion, arguing that it provides a ripe challenge for further 
constitutional attacks.
291
 In Chapter VI that claim was developed with respect to SHU, laying 
the foundations for a constitutional argument against its imposition. One of the proposed 
grounds of attack was that, by imposing SHU on mentally ill inmates, states ‘forget the 
teachings of the Eighth Amendment [and] permit sick people to be punished for being 
sick’,292 the Robinson principle. 
To substantiate the claim that SHU offends that principle and the Gregg-Plata 
condition of respect for dignity,
293
 a final indicator of political morality must be analysed. By 
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reflecting on a developing professional consensus regarding solitary confinement, throughout 
this final section it will be argued that the Eighth Amendment mandates curtailment of SHU. 
As earlier chapters have emphasised, while professional consensus is not a principal 
determinant of evolving standards, it certainly should factor in the calculation. 
7.5.1 THE EXPERTISE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL BODIES 
While Benjamin Franklin and his fellow framer Benjamin Rush had called for limited 
punishments in the new Union,
294
 their support for the first SHU-style prison in Pennsylvania 
(Walnut Street) was somewhat misguided. Rush, the ‘father of American psychiatry’,295 
viewed the solitude afforded to Walnut Street prisoners as providing them with a moral 
cure.
296
 Just three decades into the 19
th
 Century the first signs of professional sentiment 
regarding SHU materialised, and early reports of hallucinations and dementia of those 
confined in SHU were noted.
297
 The history of imprisonment and the shift in penology was 
traced in Chapter VI, Section 6.2. Martinson’s famous rejection of rehabilitation, the Marion 
riots, and the advent of mass-incarceration all led to a firm belief that Walnut Street-style 
SHU was the only remaining option for “the worst of the worst”. As a result of a more 
oppressive and far-reaching use of SHU starting to emerge in the US, it is hardly surprising 
that lobbying has taken a new turn. Non-profit organisations and professional bodies have 
directed resources to the scrutiny of and opposition to the revival of such a severe 
punishment, which is now the reality for tens of thousands of prisoners. 
The condemnation of SHU in 2015 is harmonious. Amnesty International (AI), the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), large civil 
liberties organisations based in the US, have been quick to endorse a variety of improvements. 
All three organisations recommend more access to meaningful rehabilitation in prisons; daily 
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outdoor exercise; and less frequent use of restraints.
298
 HRW has noted that social isolation 
results in a greater likelihood of rule violations,
299
 and use of force subsequently increases, a 
by-product of SHU. In addition, these organisations have made clear that they oppose any 
long-term SHU for prisoners who are mentally ill,
300
 with the ACLU emphasising further 
concern surrounding juvenile imprisonment in solitary.
301
 
The record generated by professional organisations reads in a similar way. First, the 
American Public Health Association (APHA) stated in 2003 that isolation increases the 
chance of suicide in custody.
302
 As such, the APHA cautions, SHU should be used only with 
extreme care. A psychiatric review of the damage SHU can do will illustrate these concerns in 
Section 7.5.2. In the same year, the American Bar Association (ABA) released its most recent 
edition of its Standards for Criminal Justice.
303
 Standard 23 outlines the guarantees which the 
ABA views as necessary for prisoners’ protection from ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’304 
treatment, containing similar protections to those envisaged by the various international
305
 and 
regional
306
 human rights documents assessed in Section 7.4. Specifically, s23 mandates that 
SHU is used only ‘for the briefest term and under the least restrictive conditions 
practicable’.307 In addition, prisoners with serious mental illness are not to be placed in long-
term SHU,
308
 and an individualised assessment should take place of any juvenile.
309
 More 
specific SHU-related protections are incorporated into the ABA Standards. One example is 
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the requirement that prisoners are always provided with ‘reasonable darkness during the 
sleeping hours’,310 and that no cell should ever be smaller than 80 square-feet.311 
Whilst assessing US conditions under every single minimum standard is not the 
present aim, it is worth pausing to note that the ABA Standards, redolent of the UN’s 
Standard Minimums and the Council of Europe’s equivalent,312 are much more aspirational 
than descriptive of true conditions. Chapter V noted that SHU cell sizes reported by the 
ACLU varied from 60 to 90 square-feet in different forms.
313
 In Marion, the prison subjected 
to the longest lockdown in US history and that which started modern solitary confinement, 
SHU cells were reported as being just 48 square-feet,
314
 far below the ABA Standards. In 
addition, some cells across the US have been reported as subjecting prisoners to unrelenting 
artificial lighting, sometimes for 24 hours per day,
315
 again contradicting the ABA’s 
guidelines. 
The ABA is in a unique position in the US with respect to its ability to represent the 
views of all stakeholders, providing the present discussion with a ‘consensus view of 
representatives from all segments of the criminal justice system’.316 Moreover, the citation of 
the ABA Standards in over 120 US Supreme Court decisions, in addition to 700 federal 
circuit and more than 2,400 state supreme court judgments places them high in the 
informative hierarchy.
317
 Nonetheless, broader bodies of professional consensus aid the 
present analysis with its aim to interpret ESD in light of the strongest base of political 
morality possible, striving for the best moral outcome. The World Medical Association 
(WMA) became the latest prominent organisation to single out solitary confinement in 
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particular, urging in 2014 that SHU ‘should be imposed only as a last resort’.318 In addition, 
the WMA wrote, ‘[a]dverse health consequences should lead to the immediate cessation of 
solitary confinement’,319 including mental health.320 As the next subsection will show, these 
consequences are reasonably inevitable in SHU. 
7.5.2 PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 
In 2014 Miller and Fluent sought to draw attention to the ‘rapidly evolving landscapes 
in the neurosciences and social sciences’.321 An expansion of this emerging interdisciplinary 
field was acknowledged by the majority Justices in Hall, who remarked that ‘psychiatric and 
professional studies’322 informed their interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, citing the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) as the vanguard of this task.
323
 Published in the 
same volume as Miller and Fluent, Kapoor observed that, ‘as a profession, we have stated 
with clarity that persons with mental illness deserve high-quality treatment...and the use of the 
most extreme forms of punishment should be avoided with them.’324 Talking specifically 
about SHU, Kapoor based this conclusion on a 2013 Position Statement by the APA, which 
she viewed as representing a professional consensus against the solitary confinement of 
mentally ill inmates.
325 
7.5.2.1 MENTAL HEALTH 
There are two principal grounds of attack on which psychiatric commentators 
denounce SHU. The first of these grounds is the punishment’s impact on mental health. These 
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‘psychopathological’326 effects, located by the study of mental disorders, have been observed 
for decades. Grassian undertook the earliest contemporary study of SHU,
327
 finding in 1983 
that psychopathological symptoms reported among solitarily confined inmates in a 
Massachusetts prison ‘were strikingly consistent’.328 Of the participants, who were held in 
SHU for an average of two months, a majority experienced perceptual changes including 
hallucinations and ‘derealisation’,329 significant anxiety and tachycardia (extreme over-
pulsation of the heart), partial amnesia, primitive fantasies such as mutilation and torture, and 
problems with impulse control.
330
 All prisoners who were interviewed experienced rapid 
diminution of symptoms when removed from SHU, demonstrating that long-term impact can 
be alleviated. Grassian’s study evoked a generation of psychiatric study into solitary 
confinement, and reports were published with consistent results in the ensuing decades.
331
 
Haney carried out one of the most comprehensive psychiatric studies in 2003, where 
prisoners held by the California Department of Corrections in Pelican Bay were examined by 
a variety of methods. Direct studies (case studies and personal accounts)
332
 were combined 
with correlational analysis (housing type versus psychiatric outcomes).
333
 Haney found 90% 
of prisoners in SHU experiencing extreme anxiety; 80% suffering headaches and interrupted 
sleep, and 70% demonstrated a potential for ‘impending breakdown’.334 ‘[T]here is not a 
single published study of solitary or Supermax-like confinement’, Haney concluded, ‘in 
which nonvoluntary confinement lasting for longer than 10 days...failed to result in negative 
psychological effects.’335 In addition Shalev has noted that, while the psychological effects 
outlined above are the most consistently observed and therefore widely reported, further 
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consequences have been found regarding physiological consequences of long-term SHU.
336
 
Grassian first described the combination of ill effects experienced by SHU prisoners as ‘SHU 
Syndrome’337 in 2006. Symptoms include ‘delirium-like effects’338 such as EEG 
abnormalities,
339
 heart palpitations, and even deterioration of eyesight.
340
 
That professionals are in agreement regarding the psychiatric consequences of SHU is 
a compelling charge. Kupers raised these concerns in federal court testimony in 1993, 
attesting that all SHU prisoners will, without exception, deteriorate psychologically.
341
 That 
contention has been supported by a preponderance of studies into solitary, and is compounded 
by a widespread lack of psychiatric care in US prisons.
342
 Arrigo and Bullock’s point that 
inmates react differently to solitary confinement,
343
 introduced when discussing 
individualisation in Section 7.3, is poignant here. Sensory deprivation, for example, has been 
shown to affect inmates with mental illnesses and personality disorders more acutely than 
those without.
344
 In addition, O’Donnell observed that inmates most able to cope with SHU 
had developed good attachments during childhood.
345
 Given that prisoners, especially those 
likely to find themselves in SHU, are usually those with pre-existing psychiatric disorders and 
those who experienced troubled childhoods, mental health effects are felt disproportionately 
from the outset. Concern does not end with medicine, however, and the social effects of SHU 
are another area to be considered. 
7.5.2.2 SOCIAL EFFECTS 
As well as psychopathological concerns arising from SHU, a second ground of attack 
views consciousness as something that relates more intricately to social interaction. Guenther 
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takes this approach, noting that, unlike Rush’s early view of the mind as a tabula rasa which 
can be wiped clean by penance,
346
 the social view conceptualises consciousness as formed out 
of  noesis (intentional acts) and noemata (intentional objects).
347
 By depriving inmates of 
everyday encounters with people and objects, ‘many inmates become unhinged from 
reality.’348 Guenther uses this approach to explain the suffering which SHU causes, insisting 
that the results are far deeper than mental illness. A person’s existence, her ‘social, 
phenomenological, and ontological pathology’ is ‘beyond the language of the clinic’.349 The 
implication of this approach to an innate held in SHU is he is denied his full personhood. 
While this social line of attack is difficult to sustain as it is measurable only by first-
hand accounts, it offers pause for thought. When a prisoner is locked away in the deepest, 
most oppressive corner of a prison, hidden from the rest of the inmate population and far from 
the outside reality, his concept of social depth is removed. The most relevant impact of such 
detachment is the risk to prisoners’ rights in these situations. Gregg, and more recently Plata, 
emphasised the importance of dignity to the Eighth Amendment. For dignity to prevail in the 
subjugated corners of the criminal justice system, it is essential for all parties to appreciate the 
oppression which SHU can cause. Effects are measurable not just medically but socially; not 
just in terms of health, but in terms of personhood. 
7.5.2.3 POSITIVE OUTCOMES? 
While medical and sociological professional consensus might seem harmonious 
regarding the concerns arising from SHU, a different view does exist. O’Donnell has added a 
new category to the solitary confinement literature, noting ‘a miscellany of positive 
effects’.350 Examples include clarity of thought, heightened feelings of internal life, and the 
chance for prisoners ‘to grow in maturity and wisdom’351 while confined. O’Donnell quotes 
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Prochnik, who described silence as a ‘fertile pause’,352 where virtues of solitude such as 
reflective perspective, ‘attunement’353 to self, and to nature can be pursued uninterrupted. 
That said, O’Donnell’s positive findings from solitude are almost exclusively dependent on 
the experiences of voluntary hermits, such as monks and other self-isolating introverts.
354
 He 
admits that, while silence might provide mental benefits, when forcibly imposed and 
‘uninterrupted for too long, its fecundity threatens to overwhelm.’355 Further, while 
O’Donnell might have tried to shed light on the positives of isolation, his attempt ends with 
an acknowledgement that SHU ‘is insidious because there are no appropriate points of 
reference, no benchmarks of sanity.’356 
Nonetheless, there is one final point of reference to consider in this subsection. That 
point, arising from the “Colorado Study”,357 was met with vociferous responses across the 
combined field of law and psychiatry.
358
 With results indicating that a generation of 
professional consensus might be false, such a rejoinder was unsurprising. The Study 
investigated mental illness in SHU prisoners, testing whether mental illness was in fact caused 
by the solitary confinement they endured, the theory re-emphasised throughout the extant 
literature. The alternative hypothesis posed by O’Keefe and her team in Colorado maintained 
that mentally ill inmates were inherently less able to cope in prison, so were more likely to be 
placed in SHU. The study found in favour of this hypothesis, claiming that the mental 
condition of 20% of inmates held in SHU even improved.
359
 Rather than turning a quarter-
century of consensus on its head, the study was met with condemnation throughout the field, 
the reasons for which will now be considered in order to apply the post-interpretivist stage to 
this indicator of political morality. 
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7.5.3 POST-INTERPRETIVE STAGE AND CONCLUSIONS 
As was inevitable, numerous psychiatrists who had spent their careers warning Boards 
of Correction and federal judges about SHU were quick to voice opposition to the Colorado 
Study, and with good reason. To begin with, Shalev and Lloyd attacked the study, noting 
numerous methodological issues, which render the results unreliable and unrepresentative.
360
 
The participants all had extensive history of prior imprisonment;
361
 meaning results were at 
risk of over-generalisation. In addition, between 50 and 66% of participants were recorded as 
providing inconsistent self-reports,
362
 the sole means of data collection in the study. Shalev 
and Lloyd concluded that it would be a ‘tragic’363 result if the flawed Colorado Study resulted 
in a greater use of SHU. 
Similar concern was raised in the 2011 iteration of the Annual Correctional Mental 
Health Report, where a member of the advisory committee for the Colorado Study itself 
voiced her apprehensions.
364
 That member, Jamie Fellner, emphasised that, although the 
control group (of non-mentally ill inmates) deteriorated at a similar rate to the mentally ill 
inmates in Colorado, many members of both groups ‘were already highly symptomatic at the 
start of the study’.365 She concluded that, if O’Keefe et al ‘had assessed the impact [on] 
inmates who did not already have such symptoms, the results might well have been 
different,’366 raising questions around the claims made by the study. Kupers has added similar 
criticisms, noting that the researchers excluded two groups to whom SHU can be most 
damaging.
367
 By including only prisoners who were willing to volunteer, and those with a 
minimum level of education, the results were made less generalisable by excluding ‘the 
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groups most likely to be adversely affected by solitary confinement’,368 namely prisoners who 
refuse to socialise and those who cannot be stimulated by reading and writing. 
The methodological issues surrounding this professional consensus do not end with 
the Colorado Study, however. A number of authors have warned against equating expert 
testimony with law for constitutional interpretation purposes in general.
369
 Godwin provides 
the testimony of James Grigson as an example.
370
 Grigson was a psychiatrist who frequently 
suggested in capital trials that his predictions were ‘medical opinion[s]’371 and were 100% 
accurate.
372
 He was criticised in the Barefoot v Estelle dissent, where Justice Blackmun 
warned that ‘the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable 
jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words, equates with death 
itself.’373 Indeed, if a high level of credibility is granted to professional consensus, caution 
must be urged. Professional consensus cannot be taken as the sole indicator of political 
morality, and nor has such a claim been made. 
Scharff Smith has summarised the main methodological issues arising in SHU 
studies.
374
 Examples include response-bias; the unrepresentativeness of laboratory based 
studies; lack of control-groups; and error. In addition, Bennion has highlighted the impact of 
small sample sizes and the ‘Hawthorne effect’,375 where studying isolation itself leads to an 
amelioration of the situation: by being studied, the inmate is no longer alone. As such, the test 
results might even under-estimate the negative effects of SHU. Nonetheless, a substantial 
body of professional consensus, arising from both non-profit organisations and the hybrid 
field of psychiatry and the law is unfailing in its persistent and consistent expression of 
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concern for the deleterious effects of SHU.
376
 Sample sizes give rise to further concern. As 
noted with respect to opinion polls, the representativeness of results can be determined – in 
part – by the sample’s population size.377 Since the number of inmates in SHU stands at 
around 81,000, and a number of the studies discussed in this section examined as few as 14 
inmates, the reliability of the resultant data is questionable. Financial and ethical concerns 
surrounding access to inmates are of course a practical reality, but this does not eliminate 
accusations of poor data. Nonetheless, the consonant condemnation of SHU from the 
psychopathological profession remains a compelling indicator of ESD, at least insofar as it 
affirms the trajectory of the transnational consensus discussed earlier, even if not providing 
dispositive evidence. 
Research into human phenomena falls short of fully explaining situations; sometimes 
only first-person statements can give a true account of the full extent. Even then, subjective 
accounts are as fallible as any other measure. Jack Abbott, whose descriptions of lengthy 
confinement in SHU have been labelled ‘the most powerful prison narrative in American 
literature’378 gives one of several personal insights into the effects of SHU. In In The Belly of 
the Beast, Abbott recalled that ‘[s]ometimes I doubt that anyone with a philosophical turn of 
mind is fit to judge anyone’.379 Nonetheless, psychiatric studies can attempt to frame medical 
consensus, and reviewing relevant bodies creates a barometer for professional opinion. 
For an Eighth Amendment interpreter to include all aspects of political morality, an 
objective review of relevant professional consensus is instructive to this venture. As 
jurisdictions across the US continue to subject prisoners to the extraordinary conditions 
created by SHU, they swim further against a rising tide. Long-term solitary confinement, 
especially of juveniles and those with mental illness, is unfailing in its ability to unite the 
views of professionals, who are resolute in their unified opposition. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
‘We must’, Dworkin insisted, ‘do our best...to make our community’s fundamental 
law what our sense of justice would approve’.1 The US Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been shown to embrace this interpretivist approach to adjudication, with the 
ESD principle pervading interpretation of the punishments clause. 2014 and 2015 saw 
numerous landmarks for the scrutiny of solitary confinement, with the most active nationwide 
reforms in recent decades, and high-profile exposés in the national and international media. In 
July 2015 President Obama became the first US President to visit a federal prison while in 
office, following his experience with comments that solitary confinement (SHU) was ‘not 
smart’, and ‘an environment...that is often more likely to make inmates [worse]’.2 
Just one month later, and despite Obama’s call for an executive review of ‘the overuse 
of solitary confinement across American prisons’,3 US Board of Prisons director Charles 
Samuels denied the existence of solitary confinement before a Senate oversight committee.
4
 
As has been shown throughout the previous chapters, Samuels’s statement is emphatically 
false, and Obama’s prudent – albeit overdue – call for judicial scrutiny of SHU is timely. The 
foregoing analysis provided a framework for this scrutiny, and suggested how best the court 
should go about adjudicating it. During the discussions engaged with throughout this thesis a 
number of recurring themes arose, and it is those that will provide the driving force for this 
final chapter. 
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1. Commitment to Proportionality and Individualisation 
Since Justice McKenna declared it in 1910,
5
 and Chief Justice Warren after him,
6
 the 
principle of decency within the Eighth Amendment has markedly transformed the scope and 
application of the punishments clause. Since Gregg v Georgia,
7
 the Court has narrowed 
capital punishment to a near vanishing point. Recent, non-capital punishment has also faced 
similar, albeit not so conclusive judicial activism. Personal vengeance has been conflated with 
the distinct rationale retributivism, an error displayed consistently by the Supreme Court. 
Morality plays no role when the ‘effects of occasional ill humors in the society’,8 such as 
those created by penal populism, are provided with citation by the Court. Vengeance, an 
archaic and illegitimate penological goal, which aligns with a punitive populace, finds no 
place in the principles that underlie the punishments clause. To ensure that respect is paid to 
proportionality, a vital tenet of the Eighth Amendment, the Framers’ warning against the 
‘tyranny of the majority’9 is urged. 
The model of proportionality refined by Robinson as ‘deontological desert’10 
embodies principles found throughout the Court’s punishments jurisprudence. Consistency 
(derived from the holdings in Furman v Georgia
11
 and Gregg) and individualisation (required 
by the Lockett v Ohio
12
 and Eddings v Oklahoma
13
 doctrines) are reconciled by such an 
approach. The Court’s commitment to proportionality in Graham v Florida14 and Miller v 
Alabama,
15
 for example, also demonstrate a willingness further to evolve the punishments 
clause in the non-capital sphere. With respect to imprisonment conditions, specifically those 
in SHU, the treatment and suffering of individuals is the touchstone for Eighth Amendment 
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analysis. Again, the Court’s commitment to proportionality in that area of punishment, 
applied most recently in Brown v Plata,
16
 is promising for future claims. 
2. Human Rights Framework for ESD Claims 
When selected in an unprincipled and seemingly arbitrary, empirical fashion, as shown 
to be the case in Furman and Atkins v Virginia,
17
 polls are a source of political morality not 
sieved rationally in the way interpretivism understands law. Such an argument also applies to 
the selection of states for ESD analysis, which also undercuts the counter-majoritarian 
approach to political morality facilitated by interpretivism. While majoritarian analysis can be 
informative of national consensus, indeed state counting and polling data regarding 
contemporary SHU was provided to show that SHU is gradually being restricted across the 
US,
18
 the Court has also shown a willingness to move away from those strictly majoritarian 
bases. Plata gave rise to a wider element of the ESD principle, attaching a human rights 
framework to the Court’s confinement conditions precedents for the first time. In conclusion, 
it can be contended that evolutive assessments of SHU, and its associated political moral 
principles, should be informed by the normative standards of transnational legal institutions 
and agreements. 
The US can be concluded as swimming against a growing tide in opposition of its 
SHU practices. By delving further into the background of the law than simply reflecting on 
the policies of elected representatives, transnational analysis compels the conclusion that SHU 
neglects the Gregg condition that punishments must ‘accord with “the dignity of man”.’19 
Whether critiqued according to the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
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Prisoners,
20
 the new Mandela Rules,
21
 the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners,
22
 
UN Convention Against Torture’s Optional Protocol,23 or an abundance of declarations and 
decisions by the HRC, ECtHR, and IACtHR, the US falls short of transnational human rights 
standards. Immediate cessation of the incarceration in SHU of mentally ill or juvenile inmates 
should be followed by closer scrutiny of this practice, at least at a domestic level. 
3. Professional Consensus: Unified Against SHU 
In addition to the transnational analysis, America’s use of SHU has also united 
psychiatric and medico-legal professionals, whose condemnation of this punishment forms a 
consensus. The interpretivist’s aim to fill the gap left open by positivism by appealing to 
community practices and understandings benefits from additional, expert information 
regarding community values of political morality. Rational interpretive safeguards, including 
the adoption of stricter scrutiny, ensure that amicus facts are not provided with blind-faith 
credence, something the Court should honour when reviewing challenges to punishment. This 
element of ESD, professional consensus, was cited in an unprecedented way in 2014, where 
the Court in Hall v Florida relied heavily on scientific briefs for its analysis of intellectual 
disability in capital trials.
24
 Hall provides a ripe challenge for further constitutional attacks on 
punishment through professional medical consensus. 
While such an attack was abandoned in May 2015 where the Justices saw fit to deny 
Bower v Texas,
25
 a case challenging inter alia the practice of executing a defendant ‘who has 
already served more than 30 years on death row while exercising his legal rights in a non-
abusive manner’,26 the chance for review has not been missed. The ‘ever-increasing fear and 
                                                          
20
 (Adopted 30 August 1955, entered into force 31 July 1957) UN Doc A/CONF/611, Annex I. For examples of 
provisions which the US falls short of honouring, see RR21.1; 32.1-2. 
21
 UN Economic and Social Council, ‘United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(the Mandela Rules) (2015) ‘E/CN.15/2015/L.6/Rev.1. See RR 43(1)(b); 44. 
22
 UNGA Res 45/111 (1990) UN Doc A/45/49, 45 UN GAOR Supp (No 49A) 200. 
23
 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (entered into force 22 June 2006) UNGA RES/57/199 (2002). 
24
 134 S Ct 1986 (2015). 
25
 Bower v Texas (2015 No 14-292) cert denied. 
26
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bower v Texas (No 14-292) i. 
Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
293 
 
distress’27 condemned in Trop is applicable to contemporary SHU conditions, as is the 
principle in Robinson v California,
28
 in which the Court noted that society ‘would forget the 
teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted 
sick people to be punished for being sick.’29 By confining juveniles and mentally ill inmates 
in SHU, often for indefinite periods of time, a vast majority of states offend the principles of 
dignity vital to the punishments clause. Given the Court’s commitment to dignity in Plata, 
especially in the context of prison conditions, the outlook for further judicial review is 
promising. 
4. Avenues for Future Research 
Optimism on the part of prisoners seeking an alleviation of their conditions should be 
guarded by reality. Glossip v Gross, the Court’s final Eighth Amendment decision of the 
2014-15 term, fell short of Kennedy’s earlier hope in Plata. The outcomes of this research 
have implications for theorists hoping to bolster their understanding of the Eighth’s evolutive 
decency principle, extending it to other areas of punishment, and to petitioners attempting to 
sustain such a constitutional claim. Mass incarceration remains a further route of analysis, 
which Simon began in 2015,
30
 but the Court has yet to revisit since its condemnation of the 
Californian system in 2011.
31
 
Additionally, the meteoric rise of African-American overrepresentation in prison (and 
on death row) continues, and the Court’s reluctance to examine this issue in McCleskey v 
Kemp has not been alleviated. A further examination into the racial disparities found in SHU 
is an additional route of analysis which this author would intend to carry out in the future, and 
one which would further contribute to the proportionality assessment of this punishment. 
Kirchmeier’s32 disbelief at the Justices’ failure to heed the warnings of the statistical evidence 
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they cited favourably in 1987 could be rectified in the 2015-16 term, where SCOTUS will 
consider Foster v Chatman,
33
 which asks whether the Georgia Supreme Court failed to 
recognise racial discrimination in a capital appeal when it had become apparent that, at trial, 
prosecutors wrongly offered ‘race-neutral’34 justifications for what could in fact be deemed 
wilful and unconstitutional discrimination.
35
 
Another area of judicial scrutiny of SHU is one which was scoped out of the 
present discussion, for its exclusion from the punishments clause’s purview. That area, 
pre-trial confinement, is a practical concern for the suffering of inmates who have not yet 
been sentenced, but may still be held in severe conditions of long-term SHU. A recent 
example was Kalief Browder, who was held in New York solitary confinement for three 
years, whilst a juvenile.
36
 Despite being released when his charge of theft was eventually 
abandoned, Browder committed suicide in June 2015, aged 22.
37
 His case was cited by 
Justice Kennedy in a lone concurrence announced the same month.
38
 While pre-trial 
confinement might be better suited to due process claims in the US setting, since the 
Eighth Amendment extends only to post-sentencing punishment, its careful examination 
is nonetheless warranted,
39
 and the human rights model of Plata provides a starting point. 
The conclusions drawn by this analysis also consider the professional literature. In 
particular, O’Donnell’s musings over ‘a miscellany of positive effects’40 arising from solitary 
confinement are not evidenced by the extensive psychiatric review carried out. O’Donnell 
admits that solitude may only be a positive experience if self-imposed,
41
 and the situation in 
American SHU has been shown to be, in reality, far more sinister. In addition the Colorado 
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Study, led by O’Keefe,42 left gaps which, if filled, could benefit professional knowledge of 
SHU. For example, a more rigorous investigation into the effects of solitary confinement 
could provide novel insight into the effects on the confined. Such rigour would be provided 
by a multi-disciplinary, collaborative approach where different participants were studied. 
Those with no or little history of prior imprisonment and prior mental illness would be 
assessed in order to determine the impact on inmates who were not already symptomatic at 
the start of their solitary confinement. In addition, the groups excluded by the Colorado Study 
(prisoners unwilling to volunteer, and those without a minimum level of education) would be 
studied in this future research to understand the effects on those most likely to be adversely 
affected. Naturally, further practical and ethical concerns may arise in this instance, but the 
suggestion is not implausible. 
 
Jefferson’s statement in 1816 that ‘[w]e might as well require a man to wear still the 
coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of 
their barbarous ancestors’43 is pertinent at this point of departure. We might as well condemn 
a man, or indeed a boy, to the conditions of imprisonment found in Cherry Hill – inspired by a 
1751 English solitary confinement statute – as civilised society to forget the evolving 
standards of decency of the Eighth Amendment. To overlook the contemporary injustice 
proliferated by SHU is to neglect ‘the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons’,44 and 
to ignore the moral principles that permeate the Constitution’s punishments clause. 
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APPENDICES 
10.1 APPENDIX 1 
FIGURE 7.1A 
US Solitary Confinement Polls Excluded from Analysis 
  
 
 
  
Poll Source Justification for Exclusion 
   
Debate.org 
Debate.org, ‘Is solitary confinement 
constitutional?’ 
<www.debate.org/opinions/is-solitary-
confinement-constitutional> accessed 1st 
June 2015. 
The only data provided was 
"40% say no" and "60% say 
yes". No sample size was 
available so any generalisation 
is irresponsible. 
CompuServe 
CompuServe, ‘Is Solitary Confinement 
Constitutional?’ <http://bit.ly/1JrOvpo> 
accessed 1st June 2015.    
The sample size was very small 
(6). 
Elev8 
Elev8, ‘Solitary Confinement: Should It 
End?’ 
<http://http://elev8.hellobeautiful.com/111
8407/solitary-confinement-should-it-end-
poll/> accessed 1st June 2015.   
While this poll did provide 
some background context, the 
sample size was small (46). 
Victoria 
Advocate 
(Texas) 
Victoria Advocate, ‘Should jails and 
prisons use solitary confinement?’ 
<http://bit.ly/1JrOKAH> accessed 1st June 
2015.  
The sample size was small (23). 
Appendices 
369 
 
FIGURE 7.2A 
Solitary Confinement State Counting Data: Column (A) – Maximum reported 
duration in SHU in the stated jurisdiction (full references).  
Jurisdiction Max duration in SHU 
Alabama 6 months (Charles Dean, 'Gary White held in prison within the prison: solitary 
confinement' 
<http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/02/gary_white_held_in_prison_with.html> 
accessed 24th April 2015). 
 
Alaska 2 months (Casey Grove, 'Report criticizes Alaska Department of Corrections' 
<www.newsminer.com/news/local_news/report-criticizes-alaska-department-
of-corrections/article_fa0c8958-b422-11e4-92b3-b7bc8d1c6ffb.html> accessed 
27th April 2015). 
Arizona 6 years - Caroline Isaacs and Matthew Lowen, 'Buried Alive Solitary 
Confinement in Arizona’s Prisons and Jails' 
<https://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Buried%20Alive.pd
f> 20 accessed 27th April 2015. 
Arkansas 12years Williams v Norris 277 Fed Appx 647-649 (8th Cir 2008) 
California 42years+ / 7.5 years on average / 89 instances of 20+ years 
 
(Kiilu Nyasha, 'Hugo Pinell: Is 42 years in isolation about to end?' 
<http://sfbayview.com/2012/05/hugo-pinell-is-42-years-in-isolation-about-to-
end/>; 
 
Shira Gordon, 'Solitary Confinement, Public Safety, and Recdivism' (2014) 47 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 495, 497; 
 
Shane Bauer, (MotherJones December 2012) 'Solitary in Iran Nearly Broke Me. 
Then I Went Inside America's Prisons' 
<www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/solitary-confinement-shane-bauer> 
accessed 27th April 2015). 
 
Colorado 10 years+ (The Association of State Correctional Administrators, (2013) 
‘Survey: Segregation’ <https://tinyurl.com/ASCA20131> accessed 20th April 
2015. Hereafter "ASCA"). 
Connecticut 1.3years (Yale Law School, 'The Worst of the Worst' 
<http://yalevisuallawproject.org/film/the-worst-of-the-worst/> (02:33) accessed 
27th April 2015). 
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Jurisdiction Max duration in SHU 
Delaware 3 months (Del Code § 3902). 
 
NB this provides for SHU to be imposed at sentencing, a form of additional 
punishment and therefore directly related to the punishments clause under even 
the most originalist or literal reading. 
 
 
Florida 27 years (Democracy Now, (November 20, 2014), 'The Life and Mind of Mark 
DeFriest: New Film Captures Florida Prisoner’s Shocking Ordeal Behind Bars' 
<www.democracynow.org/2014/11/20/the_life_and_mind_of_mark> accessed 
27th April 2015). 
Georgia 1.5 years (Green Party of the United States, 'Greens Call on Deal to End 
Torture in Georgia Prisons' <www.gp.org/press/pr-state.php?ID=524> accessed 
27th April 2015). 
Hawaii 5 days (Hope Metcalf, Jamelia Morgan, Samuel Oliker‐ Friedland, Judith 
Resnik, Julia Spiegel, Haran Tae, Alyssa Work, and Brian Holbrook, 
Administrative Segregation, Degrees of Isolation, and Incarceration: A 
National Overview of State and Federal Correctional Policies (Liman Public 
Interest Program 2013). Hereafter "Metcalf et al") 
Idaho 3 months (Metcalf et al) 
 
Illinois 3 months (Metcalf et al) 
 
 
Indiana 5-10 years (ASCA) 
 
Iowa 5-10 years (ASCA) 
 
Kansas 5-10 years (ASCA) 
 
Kentucky 2-5 years (ASCA) 
 
Louisiana 40 years When Woodfox’s release was ordered in June 2015 it was reported 
that he could have spent as long as 43 years in SHU, though wide reports state 
40 years, so that record is adopted by this thesis. Woodfox v Cain 3:06-cv-
00789-JJB-RLB (MD Louisiana 2015). 
 
Maine 1-2 years (ASCA) 
 
 
Maryland 5-10 years (ASCA) 
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Jurisdiction Max duration in SHU 
Massachusetts 10 years+ (Hilary Krase, (ACLU National Prison Project 7 August 2013) 'The 
Solitary Confinement Scorecard' <https://www.aclu.org/blog/solitary-
confinement-scorecard?redirect=blog/speakeasy/solitary-confinement-
scorecard> accessed 27th April 2015). 
Michigan 1 month+ (Metcalf et al) 
 
 
Minnesota 2-5 years (ASCA) 
 
Mississippi 5-10 years (ASCA) 
 
Missouri 1 year (Metcalf et al) 
 
 
Montana 10 years+ (ASCA) 
 
Nebraska 10 years+ (ASCA) 
 
Nevada 2 years (Vanessa Spinazola, 'Segregation, Isolation, and Solitary Confinement 
in Nevada' 
<www.leg.state.nv.us/interim/77th2013/Committee/StatCom/ACAJ/Other/12-
September-
2014/ItemXIVVanessaSpinazolaSegregationIsolationandSolitaryConfinement.p
df> accessed 27th April 2015). 
 
New 
Hampshire 
6 months+ (Metcalf et al) 
 
 
New Jersey 6 months (Garly Gately, 'N.J. Solitary Confinement: Extreme Cases of Life ‘In 
the Box’' <http://jjie.org/n-j-solitary-confinement-extreme-cases-of-life-in-the-
box/> accessed 27th April 2015). 
New Mexico 1.8 years New Mexico Center on Law and Poverty and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of New Mexico, (2013) 'Inside the Box: The Real Costs of 
Solitary Confinement in New Mexico’s Prisons and Jails' 
<http://nmpovertylaw.org/WP-nmclp/wordpress/WP-nmclp/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Solitary_Confinement_Report_FINALsmallpdf.com_.
pdf> accessed 19th April 2015). 
New York 25 years (Hamilton Nolan, (Gawker,14 April 2013) 'What It Is Like to Spend 
25 Years in Solitary Confinement' <http://gawker.com/5990592/what-it-is-like-
to-spend-25-years-solitary-confinement> accessed 27th April 2015). 
North Carolina 10 years+ (ASCA) 
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Jurisdiction Max duration in SHU 
North Dakota Several months (Campaign for Youth Justice, (2007) 'A Capital Offense: 
Youth In DC’s Adult Criminal Justice System and Strategies for Reform' 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/FR_DC_CapOffense.pdf> 
accessed 21st April 2015). 
Ohio 2.6 years average (Peter Davis, Inspection Report: Ohio State Penitentiary 
(OH Correctional Institution Inspection Committee of the 123rd General 
Assembly, 1999) 13). 
Oklahoma 1 month+ (Metcalf et al) 
 
 
Oregon 1 month+ (Metcalf et al) 
 
Pennsylvania 8 years (Shoats v Horn, 213 F3d 140 (3rd Cir 2000) 143-144). 
Rhode Island 3 months+ (Metcalf et al) 
 
South Carolina 10 years+ (ASCA) See also 37.5 years (Dave Maass, (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 12 February 2015) 'Hundreds of South Carolina Inmates Sent to 
Solitary Confinement Over Facebook' 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/hundreds-south-carolina-inmates-sent-
solitary-confinement-over-facebook> accessed 15th April 2015). 
South Dakota 2-5 years (ASCA) 
 
Tennessee 10 years+ (ASCA) 
 
Texas 30 years (Eric Dexheimer, (Austin American-Statesman, 25 April 2015) ‘30 
years. One room.’ <www.mystatesman.com/news/news/opinion/30-years-one-
room/nkycs/#st_refDomain=t.co&st_refQuery=/BvGxwfI8BP> accessed 29th 
April 2015). 
Utah 1.7 years (SolitaryWatch, (Utah Prison Watch, 17 December 2012) 'Voices 
from Solitary: “No Wonder There Are So Many Suicides”' 
<http://utahprisonwatch.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/voices-from-solitary-no-
wonder-there.html> accessed 25th April 2015). 
Vermont 1 month+ (Metcalf et al) 
Virginia  
14 years (Anita Kumar, (Washington Post, 7 January, 2012) 'Va. prisons’ use 
of solitary confinement is scrutinized' <www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-
politics/va-prisons-use-of-solitary-confinement-is-
scrutinized/2011/11/28/gIQAkKHuhP_story.html> accessed 26th April 2015). 
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Jurisdiction Max duration in SHU 
Washington 10 years+ (ASCA) 
 
West Virginia 1 month+ (Metcalf et al) 
 
Wisconsin 10 years+ (ASCA) 
 
Wyoming 2-5 years (ASCA) 
 
Federal 
Government 
22 years (Ian O’Donnell, Prisoners, Solitude, and Time (OUP 2014) 150). 
 
 
Military 9 years+ 
 
NB Information is scarce and records are not made public for the US Military 
Prison at Fort Leavenworth (Kansas). It is possible to deduce that James 
Barker's current sentence to that institution, since 2006, will have been entirely 
in solitary confinement as that is the level of security afforded to all inmates. 
Longer stays are possible but difficult to find. 
 
(USA Today, (16 November 2006) ‘Soldier, 23, sentenced to 90 years for 
rape-murder in Iraq’ <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-
16-barker_x.htm> accessed 26th April 2015). 
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FIGURE 7.2B 
Solitary Confinement State Counting Data: Column (B) – Recent reforms of SHU 
policy or legislation in the reported jurisdiction (full detail and references) 
Jurisdiction Recent Mental Illness Reforms to SHU
1
 
Arizona Limited in 2014 
 
The ACLU settled with the Arizona Department of Corrections, resolving a 
class-action on behalf of thirty thousand prisoners. Mental health provision to 
those held in SHU is strengthened, and greater recreation time for mentally ill 
(MI) inmates is provided. 
 
Parsons v Ryan (No CV 12-00601-PHX-DJH) Settlement Stipulation (14 
October 2014) 
<http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/Stipulation.pdf> 
accessed 20
th
 February 2015. 
 
California Limited in 2015 
 
In response to numerous federal rulings, the California Department of 
Corrections commits to the release of MI prisoners held in solitary 
confinement into general population prisons. New regulations also provide for 
careful review of isolation practices. 
 
Julie Small, (The California Report, 18 August 2014) 'California Prisons 
Begin ‘Use-of-Force’ Reforms for Mentally Ill Inmates' 
<https://tinyurl.com/k9q4eu7>; Don Thompson, (Associated Press 11 April 
2014) <https://tinyurl.com/m78phvx> both accessed 1
st
 March 2015. 
 
Colorado Prohibited in 2014 
 
Legislation comes into force banning the solitary confinement of seriously MI 
inmates. 
 
Senate Bill 14-064, Colorado Revised Statutes 17-1-113.8 (2014). 
 
Delaware Pending 2015 
 
A House Bill for the protection of seriously MI inmates is currently pending. 
Bill 36, 148th General Assembly of the State of Delaware (2015-16) Tit 11 
§3902, §6535(c). 
                                                          
1
 Information on recent reforms regarding the solitary confinement of mentally ill inmates is adapted 
from Eli Hager and Gerald Rich, 'Shifting Away from Solitary' (The Marshall Project, 23rd December 
2014) <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/23/shifting-away-from-solitary> accessed 1st 
March 2015. 
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Jurisdiction Recent Mental Illness Reforms to SHU 
Illinois Limited in 2013 
 
A significant super-maximum security prison was closed in 2013, limiting the 
provision of solitary confinement across the state, significantly impacting the 
proportion of MI prisoners held in SHU.  
 
Amnesty International, (10 January 2013) ‘Tamms Supermaximum Security 
prison now closed’ <https://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/latest-
victories/tamms-supermaximum-security-prison-now-closed> accessed 20
th
 
March 2015. 
 
Indiana Limited in 2014 
 
The Indiana Department of Corrections Division of Youth Services confirmed 
in 2014 that the state has reduced the maximum stay in solitary confinement to 
24 hours. 
 
Katie Quandt, (MotherJones, 26 February 2014) ‘Is This the Beginning of the 
End for Solitary Confinement?’ 
<www.motherjones.com/mojo/2014/02/children-pregnant-women-
developmentally-disabled-solitary-confinement-reform-new-york> accessed 
1st March 2015. 
 
Massachusetts Prohibited in 2012 
 
A 2012 settlement agreement from the state DOC (with the Disability Law 
Center) provided for the exclusion of severely MI prisoners from SHU. 
 
Disability Law Center v Massachusetts Department of Corrections (Case 1:07-
cv-10463-MLW) (District of Massachusetts 2012). 
 
 
Michigan Prohibited in 2013 
 
Michigan Public Act No 59 of 2013 (97th Legislature, 2013). 
 
Minnesota Limited in 2014 
 
Inmates defined as having Serious MI are now prioritised to move to general 
population cells. 
 
ASCA. 
. 
Montana 2013 Failed Attempt 
 
A Bill to restrict SHU for seriously MI inmates (LC 2085/ HB 536: Montana 
Solitary Confinement Act 2013) died in Standing Committee in March 2013. 
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Jurisdiction Recent Mental Illness Reforms to SHU 
Nebraska Very limited in 2014 
 
A bipartisan legislative commission reported in December 2014 that SHU-use 
should be significantly limited, including the removal from solitary 
confinement of MI inmates and those with cognitive impairments.  
 
Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Special Investigative 
Committee, Report to the Legislature (LR 424-2014) 
<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1381329-nebraska-
solitary.html> accessed 27
th
 April 2015. 
 
 
New Jersey Pending 2015 
 
At the time of writing, an attempt to ban MI inmates from SHU is currently 
pending at committee stage. 
 
Senate Bill No 2588 of New Jersey (213th Legislature) (referred to Senate 
Law and Public Safety Committee in 2008). 
 
 
New Mexico Reduced in 2014 
 
The New Mexico Correctional Department pledged in 2014 to halve their use 
of SHU by 2015. At the time of writing, fulfilment is to be confirmed.  
 
Eli Hager and Gerald Rich, (The Marshall Project, 23 December 2014) 
'Shifting Away from Solitary' 
<https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/23/shifting-away-from-solitary> 
accessed 1st February 2015. 
 
 
New York Prohibited in 2008 
 
NY Correctional Law §§137, 401, 401(a) (2008). 
 
Moreover, the use of SHU was further limited in 2012, where a federal 
decision resulted in a settlement to protect prisoners with developmental 
disabilities from SHU. Peoples v Fischer 898 FSupp 2d 618 (SD NY 2012). 
 
 
Oklahoma Limited in 2013 
 
In Oklahoma solitary confinement is a “serious and extreme measure to be 
imposed only in emergency situations.” 
 
Okla Admin Code § 377:35-11-4 (2013). 
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Jurisdiction Recent Mental Illness Reforms to SHU 
Texas 2013 Review 
 
In 2013 the Texas Legislature passed a reform to review the state’s use of 
SHU. Results of this review are pending (2015). 
 
Tex Sess Law Serv, Ch 1184 (SB 1003/HB 1266) (2013). 
 
 
Virginia 2012 Review 
 
The Virginia legislature resolved in 2012 to study their state’s use of SHU, 
and to investigate alternatives to extreme confinement. In particular, the 
resolution requires an investigation into the impact of SHU on prisoners with 
mental illness. 
 
2 SJ Res 93, 2012 Leg (Va 2012). 
 
 
Wisconsin Limited in 2014 
 
In 2014, Wisconsin Corrections Secretary Ed Wall released a memo to all 
employees with a view to reforming solitary confinement, with pending 
legislation intended to “affect a positive change in how [the state] handle[s] 
inmates and create[s] better outcomes for all involved”. 
 
Ed Wall (Corrections Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Corrections), 
'Segregation / Cause, Effect and Reforms' 
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1210961/ed-
wall-memo-on-segregation-april-2014.pdf> accessed 27th April 2015. 
 
Federal 
Government 
(Prohibited long-term) 
 
Mental Health clearance is required before inmates are placed in SHU, and 
regular review is provided. 
 
28 CFR §541.20-33. (ASCA 17) 
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FIGURE 7.2C 
Solitary Confinement State Counting Data: Column (C) – 2015 status of jurisdictional 
limitations to the imposition of SHU on juvenile (under-18 year old) offenders (full 
references) 
Jurisdiction Status of Juvenile SHU
2
 
Alabama Permitted 
 
Juveniles can be subjected to isolation subject to checks and ‘the opportunity 
to have the violation reviewed by an uninvolved supervisor.’ (Ala Admin 
Code R 950-1-6-05(3)(d)-(h). 
Alaska Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU can be imposed, not for punitive reasons, but for ‘secure 
confinement…for the purposes of safety, security, or discipline.’ (Alaska 
Admin Code, tit 7 §52.900(16)). 
Arizona Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU can be extended beyond 24 hours at a hearing (Policy 
4061(12)(d)(x)) and beyond 120 hours with Department of Corrections 
director approval (Policy 4061(13)(b)(i)). 
Arkansas Permitted 
 
Juveniles may be confined in SHU, but only with administrative approval after 
eight hours. (Ark Admin Code 016.01.9-3-C). 
California Permitted 
 
Cal Code Regs, tit 15 §4634. 
An attempt to restrict SHU imposed on juveniles failed in 2013. 
(Cal SB No 61 2013). 
Colorado Permitted 
 
In Colorado juvenile SHU cannot be punitive (Colorado Department of 
Human Services Division of Youth Corrections Policies §§ 14.3B(II)(A); 
(C)(1)(c)). 
                                                          
2
 Data on the current status of juvenile SHU reforms is adapted from Catherine Weiss, Natalie Kraner 
and Jacob Fisch, '51-Jurisdiction Survey of Solitary Confinement Rules in Juvenile Justice Systems' 
<www.lowensteinprobono.com/files/Uploads/Documents/solitary%20confinement%20memo%20surve
y%20--%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 23rd April 2015. 
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Jurisdiction Status of Juvenile SHU 
Connecticut Prohibited 
 
‘[N]o child shall at any time be held in solitary confinement.’ 
(CGSA §46b-133(e)(6)). 
 
 
Delaware Prohibited  
 
Some juvenile solitary confinement is permitted only for periods of 2 hour 
slots, for a maximum three slots in one 24-hour period. Under the definition 
adopted by this thesis, this is not SHU. (9 Del Admin Code 105-9.6.1.3). 
 
Florida Permitted 
 
Without authorisation, SHU can be applied to juveniles for 5 days or longer 
when approved (Fla Admin Code RR 63G-2.012.4(a); 4(j)(5)(d)). 
 
Attempts to restrict juvenile SHU to 3 days at one time failed in 2013. See ‘SB 
812 - Youth in Solitary Confinement’ 
<http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=49954> 
accessed 27th April 2015.  
Georgia Permitted 
 
Administrative approval is required for punitive isolation beyond 3 days. 
(Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice, Policies 16.5(I)(3); (L)(2)). 
 
Hawaii Permitted 
 
Limited data is available for Hawaiian juvenile justice, but a self-report 
published in 2012 showed that any SHU, let alone juvenile SHU, is 
exceedingly rare. (Hale Ho`omalu Juvenile Detention Facility, ‘A Self-
Assessment of the Conditions of Confinement’, (January 2012) 
<http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/news_and_reports_ 
docs/2012_Self_Assessment_Report.pdf> accessed 27
th
 April 2015). 
Idaho Prohibited  
 
Some juvenile solitary confinement is permitted only for periods of 8 hours. 
Under the definition adopted by this thesis, this is not SHU. (Idaho Admin 
Code R 05.01.01.244). 
Illinois Prohibited  
A settlement to a federal lawsuit in May 2015 resolved to confine juveniles in 
SHU for no longer than 16 hours at one time, less than the definition required 
by this thesis. Julie Bosman, (New York Times, 4 May 2015) ‘Lawsuit Leads 
to New Limits on Solitary Confinement at Juvenile Prisons in Illinois’ 
<www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/us/politics/lawsuit-leads-to-new-limits-on-
solitary-confinement-at-juvenile-prisons-in-illinois.html?ref=topics> accessed 
5th May 2015. 
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Jurisdiction Status of Juvenile SHU 
Indiana Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to 3-5 days. (Indiana Department of Corrections 
Policies and Procedures 03-02-101 (III)(F)-(I)). 
 
Iowa Permitted 
 
Iowa is a borderline case in this table – juvenile SHU is limited to 24 hours, so 
just fits into the definition of SHU accepted by this thesis, but is one of the 
least restrictive states of those with juvenile SHU (with New Jersey). 
 
(Iowa Admin Code 441-105.10(3)(g)). 
Kansas Permitted 
 
30 days of SHU is permitted for juveniles, with no due process. Approval can 
extended this well beyond that period. (Kan Admin Regs §§123-12-
1301(b)(1); 1308). 
Kentucky Permitted 
 
Confinement in SHU can be applied to juveniles for a ‘major rule violation’, 
with up to 5 days per offense. (DJJ Policy 3.18.3(III)(A)). 
 
Louisiana Permitted 
 
Varying forms of juvenile SHU are permitted for up to 3 days at a time. 
(La Admin Code, tit 67, Pt V, §§7505; 7515(E)(4)). 
 
Maine Prohibited 
 
(Me Rev Stat, tit 34-A §3032(5) (2006)). 
Maryland Prohibited 
 
(Md Human Services Code Ann §9-227(b)(2)). 
 
Massachusetts Permitted 
 
(Mass Regs Code, tit 109, §§5.01-5.04) 
Michigan Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to 3 days at one time, before due process. Written 
approval of chief administrator can extend this. (Mich Admin Code R 
400.10176). 
Minnesota Permitted 
There is no special rule for juveniles. SHU can be imposed so long as it is 
reviewed every 30 days. (Minn R 2911.2850). 
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Jurisdiction Status of Juvenile SHU 
 
Mississippi 
 
Prohibited 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to such an extent in Mississippi that it is listed as 
“prohibited” (SHU is less than 22 hours here, the limit accepted by this thesis). 
 
(Consent Decree, CB v Walnut Grove Correctional Authority (No 3:10cv663 
(SD Miss 2012) 9). 
 
Missouri Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is permitted, but is most regularly used for just several hours. 
 
 
(See Mo RRCP App’x A, 9.5; Richard Mendel, The Missouri Model: 
Reinventing the Practice of Rehabilitating Youthful Offenders (Annie E Casey 
Foundation 2010) 
<http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/Juvenile%20Detention%20Alt
ernatives%20Initiative/MOModel/MO_Fullreport_webfinal.pdf> accessed 
25
th
 April 2015). 
 
Montana Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is permitted for four days in a row. (Mont Admin R 20.9.629).  
 
A 2013 attempt to restrict the use of SHU for juveniles failed. (LC 2085/ HB 
536: Montana Solitary Confinement Act). 
 
 
Nebraska Permitted 
 
Juveniles can be held in SHU for 7 days. (Neb Admin Rules & Regs, Tit 83, 
Ch 13, §005). 
 
Nevada Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is permitted for up to 3 days. (Nev Rev Stat §62B (2013)). 
New Hampshire Permitted 
 
An attempt to restrict juvenile SHU failed in 2014. 
 
(NH HB 480-FN 2013:Relative to Solitary Confinement). 
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Jurisdiction Status of Juvenile SHU 
New Jersey Permitted 
 
Another borderline case. Juvenile SHU is limited to 24 hours, so just fits into 
the definition, but is one of the least restrictive states of those with juvenile 
SHU (with Iowa). (NJ Admin Code §§13:92-7.4; 13:101-6.16(b)(2)). 
 
A prohibition has been pending at the committee stage since 2008. (Senate 
Bill No 2588, of New Jersey (213th Legislature) (referred to Senate Law and 
Public Safety Committee 2008)). 
New Mexico Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to 3 days of non-punitive confinement. 
(NM Admin Code 8.14.14.19(B)). 
New York Prohibited 
Two settlements, following Peoples v Fischer 898 FSupp 2d 618 (SD NY 
2012); Cookhorne v Fischer (PC-NY-0065) (2014) have resulted in a 
settlement to hurry the legislative process and to prohibit juvenile SHU. 
While juvenile SHU is still being phased out of the state, and 2015 reports 
note staff finding loopholes and imposing SHU on juveniles, (Alysia Santo, 
(Marshall Project, 2 June 2015) ‘Who Runs Rikers?’  
<https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/02/who-runs-rikers> 
 accessed 27th August 2015.) the legislation qualifies New York for a 
“prohibited” tick on this table. 
 
North Carolina Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to three days. (NC Department of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Policy R&P/DC 2.3). 
North Dakota Permitted 
 
While there is no special rule for juveniles, reports show that juvenile SHU is 
potentially not in use. (See Casey Traynor, (The Insider, January 2012) 
‘Barbara Allen-Hagan Award’ 
<http://www.nd.gov/docr/media/newsletter/archive/Jan 2012.pdf> accessed 
19
th
 April 2015). 
 
Ohio Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to 48 continuous hours. (Ohio Admin Code 5139-35-
19(6)(e)(v).) 
 
The state Department of Justice (DOJ) agreed with the federal government to 
reduce their use of SHU in February 2014, with a view to eventually 
eliminating the use of juvenile SHU entirely.  
 
(Philip Victor, (Al Jazeera America, 21 May 2014) 'Ohio agrees to reform, 
eventually eliminate juvenile solitary confinement' <http://alj.am/1ohj1tg> 
accessed 20th February 2015). 
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Jurisdiction Status of Juvenile SHU 
Oklahoma Prohibited 
 
(Okla Admin Code § 377:35-11-4(a) (2014)). 
 
Oregon Prohibited 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to such an extent in Oregon (to 6 hours) that it is 
listed as “prohibited”. SHU is defined by this thesis as confinement for at least 
22 hours per day. (Or Rev Stat Ann §169.750(2)(A)). 
 
Pennsylvania Prohibited 
 
(55 Pa Code § 3800.206). 
 
Rhode Island Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is permitted for up to 3 days (RI Code R 14-2-1200.1307(A)). 
South Carolina Permitted 
 
See HRW & ACLU, Growing Up Locked Down: Youth in Solitary 
Confinement in Jails and Prisons Across the United States (HRW 2012) 
<https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/us1012webwcover.pdf> 7 accessed 27th 
April 2015. 
 
South Dakota Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to 5 days (South Dakota Department of Corrections 
Policy 1.3.C(IV)(10)). 
 
Tennessee Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU available without due process for 3 days, then indefinitely after 
review. (Tenn Comp Rules & Regs 14-03-.08(4)-(6)). 
 
Texas Permitted 
Juvenile SHU available without due process for 24 hours, then indefinitely 
after review. (37 Tex Admin Code §343.288). 
 
Utah Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is available but can only be extended beyond three hours after 
facility director approval. (Utah Department of Human Services, Division of 
Juvenile Justice Services, Policy No 05-05(IV)(E)(4)). 
Vermont Prohibited 
 
(Vt Admin Code 12-3-508:659-664). 
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Jurisdiction Status of Juvenile SHU 
Virginia Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is limited to 5 days (6 Va Admin Code §35-140-560(E)). 
 
Washington Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is available but can only be extended beyond five hours after 
supervisory staff review, and only up to 3 days after senior approval. 
(Washington Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration Policy 22-500(3)(D)). 
 
West Virginia Prohibited 
 
In 2012 the Director of West Virginia Juvenile Services Division ordered an 
end to juvenile SHU. 
 
(See Associated Press, (26 April 2012) 'State ends solitary confinement for 
juveniles' <www.wvgazette.com/News/201204260017> accessed 27th April 
2015). 
 
Wisconsin Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is permitted, but must be subject to a hearing to extend this 
beyond 6 hours. (Wis Admin Code DOC §346.47). 
 
Wyoming Permitted 
 
Juvenile SHU is permitted for offenders over 12 years old. 
 
(Code Wyo R, Department of Family Services, Certification of Providers of 
Substitute Care Services ch 3, §2(a)(iv)). 
 
Federal Govt Prohibited 
 
(DC Mun Regs tit 29, §6273.12). 
 
 
Military 
 
No juveniles: N/A 
 
 
  
Appendices 
385 
 
FIGURE 7.2D 
Example diagram of a federal super maximum-security prison “USP-ADX”, 
demonstrative of a typical 7ft x 12ft cell used in federal and state solitary 
confinement.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Adapted from source: Amnesty International, (4 October, 2014) ‘Entombed: Life in the USA’s cruel 
isolation chambers’ <https://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/entombed-life-in-the-usa-s-cruel-
isolation-chambers-0> accessed 27th April 2015. 
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FIGURE 7.2E: Additional data for Figure 7.2, this time arranged by value. Columns i and ii 
are both arranged according to ascending value of Column ii (maximum duration in SHU, in 
months, rounded and averaged where appropriate). Columns iii, iv, and v are arranged 
according to the ascending value of Column iii (maximum juvenile SHU without due process 
or some form of review, in hours). 
i ii iii iv v 
Jurisdiction 
Max 
duration in 
SHU 
(months) 
Juvenile SHU 
without review 
(hours) 
After review Jurisdiction 
Hawaii 0.17 1 Indefinite Washington 
Michigan 1 2 5days Florida 
Oklahoma 1 3 Indefinite Utah 
Oregon 1 6 6days Wisconsin 
Vermont 1 8 Indefinite Alabama 
West Virginia 1 8 Indefinite Arkansas 
Alaska 2 8 72hrs Louisiana 
Delaware 3 8 48hrs Ohio 
Idaho 3 12 24hrs Iowa 
Illinois 3 23 4days Montana 
Rhode Island 3 24 5days Alaska 
Alabama 6 24 Indefinite Arizona 
New Hampshire 6 24 90days California 
New Jersey 6 24 Indefinite Georgia 
North Dakota 6 24 5days Indiana 
Missouri 12 24 5days Kentucky 
Connecticut 16 24 Indefinite Massachusetts 
Georgia 18 24 Indefinite Missouri 
Maine 18 24 Indefinite Nebraska 
Utah 20 24 72hrs Nevada 
New Mexico 22 24 10days New Jersey 
Nevada 24 24 72hrs New Mexico 
Ohio 31 24 Indefinite North Carolina 
Kentucky 42 24 5days South Dakota 
Minnesota 42 24 5days Virginia 
South Dakota 42 24 Indefinite Wyoming 
Wyoming 42 72 Indefinite Michigan 
Arizona 72 72 Indefinite Tennessee 
Indiana 90 72 Indefinite Texas 
Iowa 90 720 Indefinite Kansas 
Kansas 90 720 Indefinite Minnesota 
Maryland 90 - - Illinois 
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i 
 
ii 
 
iii 
 
iv 
 
v 
Jurisdiction 
Max 
duration in 
SHU 
(months) 
Juvenile SHU 
without review 
(hours) 
After review Jurisdiction 
Mississippi 90 - 60days Colorado 
Pennsylvania 96 - - Connecticut 
Military 108 - - Delaware 
Colorado 120 - N/A Hawaii 
Massachusetts 120 - - Idaho 
Montana 120 - - Maine 
Nebraska 120 - - Maryland 
North Carolina 120 - - Mississippi 
South Carolina 120 - - New Hampshire 
Tennessee 120 - - New York 
Washington 120 - Indefinite North Dakota 
Wisconsin 120 - - Oklahoma 
Arkansas 144 - - Oregon 
Virginia 168 - - Pennsylvania 
Federal Govt 264 - 3days Rhode Island 
New York 312 - Indefinite South Carolina 
Florida 324 - - Vermont 
Texas 360 - - West Virginia 
Louisiana 480
4
 - - Federal Govt 
California 504 - N/A Military 
 
In Column ii, values which provided ranges (1-2years; 2-5years; and 5-10years, for example, 
see Figure 7.2A) have been averaged to the mid-point in months (18months; 42months; and 
90months, respectively). 10years+ is represented by a minimum point of 120months. As such, 
these averages represent a minimum and not a maximum or even a representative average. 
  
                                                          
4
 Note that this estimate could in fact be as high as 516, though early records are unclear as to when the 
inmate in question entered SHU. Woodfox v Cain 3:06-cv-00789-JJB-RLB (MD Louisiana 2015). 
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10.2 APPENDIX 2 
FIGURE 7.3: US Resident Population Estimates (2010 and 2014).5 
 
2010 Census 2014 Estimates 
Alabama 4,779,736 4,849,377 
Alaska 710,231 736,732 
Arizona 6,392,017 6,731,484 
Arkansas 2,915,918 2,966,369 
California 37,253,956 38,802,500 
Colorado 5,029,196 5,355,866 
Connecticut 3,574,097 3,596,677 
Delaware 897,934 935,614 
District of Columbia 601,723 658,893 
Florida 18,801,310 19,893,297 
Georgia 9,687,653 10,097,343 
Hawaii 1,360,301 1,419,561 
Idaho 1,567,582 1,634,464 
Illinois 12,830,632 12,880,580 
Indiana 6,483,802 6,596,855 
Iowa 3,046,355 3,107,126 
Kansas 2,853,118 2,904,021 
Kentucky 4,339,367 4,413,457 
Louisiana 4,533,372 4,649,676 
Maine 1,328,361 1,330,089 
Maryland 5,773,552 5,976,407 
Massachusetts 6,547,629 6,745,408 
Michigan 9,883,640 9,909,877 
Minnesota 5,303,925 5,457,173 
Mississippi 2,967,297 2,994,079 
Missouri 5,988,927 6,063,589 
Montana 989,415 1,023,579 
Nebraska 1,826,341 1,881,503 
Nevada 2,700,551 2,839,099 
New Hampshire 1,316,470 1,326,813 
New Jersey 8,791,894 8,938,175 
New Mexico 2,059,179 2,085,572 
New York 19,378,102 19,746,227 
North Carolina 9,535,483 9,943,964 
North Dakota 672,591 739,482 
Ohio 11,536,504 11,594,163 
                                                          
5
 Data compiled by United States Census Bureau, ‘Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 
1, 2010 to July 1, 2014’ <https://tinyurl.com/nz7dpmq> accessed 1st May 2015. 
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2010 Census 
 
2014 Estimates 
Ohio 11,536,504 11,594,163 
Oklahoma 3,751,351 3,878,051 
Oregon 3,831,074 3,970,239 
Pennsylvania 12,702,379 12,787,209 
Rhode Island 1,052,567 1,055,173 
South Carolina 4,625,364 4,832,482 
South Dakota 814,180 853,175 
Tennessee 6,346,105 6,549,352 
Texas 25,145,561 26,956,958 
Utah 2,763,885 2,942,902 
Vermont 625,741 626,562 
Virginia 8,001,024 8,326,289 
Washington 6,724,540 7,061,530 
West Virginia 1,852,994 1,850,326 
Wisconsin 5,686,986 5,757,564 
Wyoming 563,626 584,153 
 
TOTALS 308,745,538 318,857,056 
   
Rounded totals 309m (2010) 319m (2014) 
 
 
